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This thesis investigates the role and vocabulary of ‘political counsel’ in 
Anglophone discourse from the end of the Wars of the Roses (1485) to the end of 
the English Civil War (1651), demonstrating its importance as a parallel concept to 
sovereignty. Whereas theories of monarchical power and sovereign command have 
been thoroughly explored in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, counsel 
has received comparatively little attention. The principal aim of this thesis is to 
correct this imbalance by presenting a broad exploration of the concept and related 
themes. Part I treats the Henrician period from the accession of Henry VII in 1485 
to the death of Henry VIII in 1547, exploring the English humanist discourse of 
political counsel in this period. In Part II, covering the remaining decades of the 
Tudor era (1547-1603), the combined challenge to this tradition presented by 
Machiavellian discourse and the perceptions of an English monarchy ‘weakened’ 
by the accession of young and female rulers is explored.  Particular attention is paid 
to the resultant suspicion of the figure of the counsellor and the increasing 
institutionalisation of counsel. Finally, in Part III the thesis turns to the discourse of 
political counsel in the first half of the seventeenth century, with emphasis on the 
‘reason of state’ tradition, and the vocabulary of counsel in civil war propaganda. 
The thesis ends with a consideration of the work of Henry Parker and Thomas 
Hobbes, noting that whereas the humanist tradition had emphasised the separation 
of counsel and command, both the parliamentarianism espoused by Parker and 
Hobbes’s state theory – arguably the precursors of modern political thought – 
subsume counsel under sovereign authority, focusing on the latter as the relevant 
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The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes:  
 
ODNB: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online version)  
Sl. MS: Sloane Manuscript 
 
Bibliographies  
The bibliographies list all of the primary sources I have quoted and the secondary 
scholarship on which I have relied. Where the attribution of an anonymous work is 
subject to conjecture, I have put the name of the suggested author in square 
brackets and added a question mark.  
 
Biographical Details  
All biographical information has been taken from the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography online edition, unless otherwise indicated. I have attempted to 
use biographical details to identify lesser-known figures, but have not done so in 
the case of major historical figures.  
 
Dates 
I have given dates in Common Era (BCE and CE) and taken the year to begin on 
the 1 January.  
 
Definitions 
All definitions are provided by the Oxford English Dictionary, online edition, 
unless otherwise indicated.  
 
Line-breaks 
As a number of medieval and Renaissance works of literature use a slash (/) mid-
line, I have used a vertical bar (|) to indicate line-breaks.  
 
Names 
Authors’ names have been given as they appear in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, online edition, and Early English Books Online. Names and 
noble titles have been employed interchangeably, except in cases where this may 
cause confusion. For instance, William Cecil, Lord Burghley is referred to as 
‘Burghley’ throughout in order to avoid confusion with his son, Robert Cecil. Titles 
such as ‘Sir’ or ‘Saint’ have been dropped from authors’ names.  
 
Transcriptions  
I have preserved original spelling, capitalisation, and punctuation as far as possible, 
but have normalised the long ‘s’. Abbreviations and contractions have been 
extended in square brackets where the meaning would otherwise be unclear.   
 
Translations  
All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I make extensive use of the 
Loeb Classical Library and have indicated these editions in my references. Original 
terms and phrases have been included in square brackets where these are of note.  
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Introduction 
Assessing recent accounts of the emergence of the modern ‘discourse of counsel’, J. 
G. A. Pocock suggests that one of the principal casualties of the English Civil War 
was a particular variant of the English monarchy: the ‘monarchy of counsel’.
1
 From 
the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War, he tells us, Latin republican 
rhetoric was put to work within the mechanisms of the English monarchical system 
and, specifically, within the council chamber.
2
 He notes, however, that this 
development fell apart during the course of the civil war, and what emerged in its 
place was a distinctive and modern discourse of sovereignty.
3
 
 In the two decades since Pocock introduced the idea of the English 
‘monarchy of counsel’ there has been increasing interest in fleshing out the theories 
which underpin it.
4
 This development has been led by the work of John Guy, whose 
treatment of the ‘rhetoric of counsel’ from the Wars of the Roses to the English 
Civil War notes the articulation of two ‘vocabularies’ of counsel – feudal-baronial 
and humanist-classical.
5
 In agreement with Pocock, he suggests that by the end of 
the civil war era these vocabularies had become ‘redundant’ in the changed political 
                                                 
1
 Pocock 1993, p. 395.  
2
 Pocock is consciously drawing on preliminary work on this topic, especially that of 
Skinner 1978a and Skinner 1978b. For the purposes of this introduction I am primarily 
concerned with detailing those works which have dealt explicitly with the discourse of 
counsel in the last twenty years, as these provide the most pertinent background, 
consciously re-evaluating what went before. For details of earlier works in Tudor 
political history, see Fideler and Mayer 1992, pp. 1-11; Guy 1997, pp. 1-11; Alford 1999, 
pp. 535-48; for previous works in the history of political thought see Goldie 2006, pp. 3-
19. Note that both these fields have come together in a rejection of the work of G. R. 
Elton as being too focused on the study of institutions over ideas; see Guy 1997, pp. 3-9; 
Skinner 2002a, pp. 9-25.  
3
 Pocock 1993, pp. 377-421.  
4
 As Walker 2005, p. 143 notes ‘The relationship between prince and counsellor 
was, then, the lynchpin of the humanist conception of the state’ and as such is 
essential to historians of sixteenth-century political thought.  
5




 Recently, Guy’s work has been expanded by David Colclough and 
Jacqueline Rose, who introduce a third vocabulary, an ‘exclusively religious’ 
language of counsel.
7
 Although these studies have made great strides in assessing 
the role of counsel within this period, they all remain consciously preliminary. 
Political historians and historians of political thought still lack a detailed survey of 
the early modern discourse of counsel in England.  
This dissertation builds on this scholarship in order to provide such an 
account. My analysis is similarly framed by the Wars of the Roses and the English 
Civil War, exploring the development, negotiation and fall of theories of counsel in 
the Tudor and early Stuart periods.
8
 Importantly, rather than focusing on the 
monarchy of counsel – approaching counsel from the perspective of the ‘personal 
monarchy’
9
 or questions of imperium
10
 – this study is concerned first and foremost 
with the figure of the counsellor himself, and seeks from this perspective to 
understand the relationship of counsel to issues of sovereignty and command. What 
emerges is not only a more thorough understanding of a complex political discourse 
with a distinct and important relationship to that of sovereignty, but also new 
perspectives on a number of related concepts, contributing to our grasp of the 
politics and political theory of the age.  
 
The discoveries described in this dissertation have been made possible only by 
leaving questions of modern sovereignty aside and engaging with the writings of 
                                                 
6
 Guy 1995b, p. 310.  
7
 Colclough 1999, pp. 177-212; Colcough 2005; Rose 2011, pp. 47-71; see also 
Mears 2003, pp. 703-22. 
8
 Unlike Rose, I do not see an active discourse of counsel being developed in the 
period after the civil war, but it must be acknowledged that her focus is on 
ecclesiastical counsel, whereas mine is on humanist-classical counsel.  
9
 Rose 2011, p. 47.  
10
 Guy 1995b, p. 292.  
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the period, as much as possible, ‘on their own terms’.
11
 Recently, an approach 
combining Quentin Skinner’s observations regarding vocabulary and context with 
an acknowledgement of advances in the political history of the Tudor and early 
Stuart periods has been outlined by Guy, with the intention of building a ‘New 
Political History’.
12
 This new approach seeks to emphasise the ‘mutually-
informing’ relations between institutions and ideas by bringing together the history 
of political thought and political history.
13
 In overt contrast to the work of G. R. 
Elton, Guy notes that Tudor historians have organised their work ‘the wrong way 
round’; they have ‘first reconstructed the politics of the period, and only then 
attempted to relate their accounts, if at all, to the contemporary literature and other 
sources’.
14
 There are, as Stephen Alford has similarly suggested, ‘important 
conceptual problems associated with writing an institutional account of Tudor 
government’, not the least of which is the uncertainty regarding the language of 
‘counsel’ and ‘council’ in this period.
15
  
 As we shall see, the ambiguity between these two terms in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries reflects a larger tension between ‘personal’ or ‘informal’ 
counsel and its more formal public variants. To attempt to impose a modern 
understanding on these ideas would be to obfuscate crucial debates. Thus I have 
turned to Thomas Elyot’s distinction between ‘Consultation’ – the ‘acte wherin 
                                                 
11
 See Skinner 2002a; Brett and Tully, eds. 2006.  
12
 Guy 1997, p. 3.  
13
 Guy 1997, p. 7:  
1. Tudor ‘political’ historians should seek to undertake genuinely political 
investigations, i.e. they should adopt holistic and socially derived approaches 
which attend to the cultural as well as the institutional structures of politics. 
2. The focus of a New Political History should be the interrelationships of, 
and interactions between, people, institutions and ideas... 
3. The history of politics and the history of ideas are interrelated and mutually 
informing... 
14
 Guy 1997, p. 3.  
15
 Alford 1999, pp. 538-9. 
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men do deuise to gether’ – and ‘Counsayle’ – which is the ‘sentence or aduise 
particulerly gyuen by euery man for that purpose assembled’ – to shape my own 
vocabulary, associating ‘council’ with the former and ‘counsel’ with the latter, 
although there remain ambiguities.
16
 The lingering uncertainty between the use of 
these terms demonstrates the importance of Guy’s suggestion that we must begin 
with an understanding of ideas and concepts, only afterward examining their uses 
and applications in institutional contexts, a sequence which not only dictates the 
direction of my research, but also its presentation, as I shall detail below.  
 Of particular importance to this endeavour is Guy’s further suggestion that 
the sources with which Renaissance and early modern historians engage should go 
beyond written texts.
17
 This undertaking is supported by the growth of scholarship 
concerned with the expression of political thought in a variety of Renaissance 
media, especially drama
18
 and visual sources.
19
 These latter works highlight the 
importance of illustrative modes, exemplified in the genre of the Renaissance 
emblem. This dissertation explores theories of counsel through the use of a 
particular emblem by Andrea Alciato, noting its similarities to the portrayals of the 
relationship between kings and counsellors in English print woodcuts. This analysis 
is combined with the work of Greg Walker on the expression of political ideas – 
particularly political counsel – through court performance, a theme I pick up in 
relation to the imagery of paradiastole in Tudor morality plays. Perhaps the most 
                                                 
16




 Guy 1997, p. 7: 
4. A New Political History will continue to be primarily archival in its 
methodology, but should not be narrowly positivist or empirical. It must 
respond to contemporary fictive and imaginative literature and to 
iconographical evidence as well as to traditional manuscript and printed 
sources. 
See Skinner 2002b, pp. 39-117.  
18
 See Walker 1996; Walker 1998. 
19
 See King 1989; Bath 1994; Sharpe 2009; Sharpe 2010. 
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exciting recent development in the examination of drama as political text is the 
inclusion of Shakespeare’s oeuvre, and I have expanded upon work in this area in 
order to present an analysis of Hamlet in the context of contemporary theories of 
counsel.
20
 Such an approach not only yields insights into the tensions in the 
Elizabethan discourse of counsel, but also presents a new way of looking at the play 
itself. 
 These new perspectives are provided by adhering to Guy’s suggestion that 
historians of this period pay close attention to the classical vocabularies 
characteristic of the English Renaissance, especially the rhetorical tradition detailed 
by Skinner.
21
 Although Guy initially isolated both a humanist-classical and a 
feudal-baronial language of counsel, in later work he acknowledges that ‘Tudor 
culture became distinctively Renaissance... and therefore (by definition) humanist-
classical.’
22
 I have therefore given primary attention to this vocabulary, and my 
study begins with a survey of the classical underpinnings of Renaissance theories of 
counsel.  
                                                 
20
 For Shakespeare and the history of political thought see Armitage, Condren and 
Fitzmaurice, eds. 2009. 
21
 Guy 1997, pp. 7-8:  
5. Historians must pay the closest attention to the classical and Renaissance 
traditions which underpinned Tudor political culture...  
8. Tudor historians should be sensitive to the use of language in sources... 
language must be set firmly in the context of the rhetorical and classical 
traditions that underpinned Tudor educational and political practice. 
 9. Between 1500 and 1600 politics, for Renaissance councillors and ‘men of 
business’, became the state of their art and the art of the state. Historians need 
to investigate this process and to illuminate not only the convolutions of 
policy-making, but the expansion of the horizons of politics and statecraft 
which occurred in the sixteenth century. To conceptualize what was 
specifically Renaissance about Tudor politics and government lies at the heart 
of this challenge. 
See Skinner 1996; Skinner 2002b; Skinner 2002c.  
22
 Guy 1997, p. 3.  
 15 
Perhaps the most striking discovery that emerges from following this 
approach concerns the importance of the vocabulary of kairos in the political 
thought of the period.
23
 Having established Elyot’s Pasquil the Playne as an 
important text within the humanist-classical – or what I more often refer to as the 
‘orthodox humanist’
24
 – tradition of counsel, I investigate the Greek play from 
which Elyot quotes in a crucial passage of the dialogue. This allows me to compare 
the original line in the Greek with Elyot’s translation, taking into account Elyot’s 
experience with the classical tradition. Given previous scholarship on rhetoric 
which stresses importance of decorum, I had expected that the central term in the 
quotation would be prepon.
25
 Instead, I discovered that the word in question was 
kairos, and from this I have been able to uncover a series of insights into the re-
emergence of this crucial concept in the Renaissance and early modern periods. 
 Further, I would contend that Guy’s suggestion that we pay close attention 
to classical texts is somewhat narrow, which is why I have also drawn upon the 
growing scholarship on the medieval discourse of counsel that points to a continuity 
rather than a break between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
26
 Although my 
work does suggest that there are important developments in theories of counsel in 
the sixteenth century, this does not negate the legacy of the previous centuries, 
especially in the establishment of prudence as the essential quality of the 
counsellor, upon which the entire discourse becomes based.
27
 In attempting to 
                                                 
23
 See Paul 2014b [forthcoming].  
24
 This is to differentiate it from the Machiavellian challenge, which is also has 
strong roots in classical and humanist theory, but presents a different model of 
political counsel; see Kahn 1994a; Skinner 1996, pp. 170-2; Skinner 2000.  
25
 See Kapust 2011, pp. 92-112.  
26
 See Ferster 1996; Deist 2003; Gillespie 2006; Coleman 2012, pp. 19-31. 
27
 See Green 2007. 
 16 
understand what was ‘specifically Renaissance’ about the Tudor (and early Stuart) 
periods, I have sought to ensure that I do not ignore important medieval legacies.
28
  
I also want to suggest an extension of Guy’s argument that Tudor history 
‘should not be narrowly or unthinkingly “English” (or lowland English)’.
29
 It is true 
that, in my attempt to provide a survey of the print culture of the period, Irish, 
Scottish and borderland experiences have necessarily received less attention.
30
 
However, I have expanded Guy’s suggestion in a different direction by considering 
the influence of continental sources. Focusing on an ‘Anglophone’ rather than 
‘English’ discourse allows us to uncover nuances in the translation and adaptation 
of ancient and continental texts, paying particular attention to the use and meaning 
of particular allusions or concepts.  
Finally, Guy declares that the focus of this approach should be the analysis 
of counsel: ‘Considerable attention will need to be paid to issues of “counsel” and 
policy-making, Court and conciliar politics, and the processes of political advice 
and persuasion.’
31
 This subject follows naturally from the agenda formed at the 
convergence of political history and the history of political thought between the 
Wars of the Roses and the English Civil War. It is an expansive topic, and one to 
which this study contributes only an element, albeit a crucial one.  
 
There are three avenues which I have chosen not to pursue in this research, but 
which remain closely related to the themes I discuss. These choices have been 
                                                 
28
 Guy 1997, p. 8. 
29
 Guy 1997, p. 7.  
30
 My work is supplemented in this way by that of other members of the Politics of 
Counsel research project, based at the University of St. Andrews and convened by 
Jacqueline Rose, which includes a number of projects that exclusively detail the 
Scottish discourse of counsel in this period.  
31
 Guy 1997, p. 7.  
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governed, in large part, by a distinction that Guy draws in reviewing the advances 
facilitated by his approach. He notes that results will fall broadly into two 
categories: ‘the history of ideas, stimulated by the work of quintessentially 
Renaissance historians such as Quentin Skinner’ and ‘at the points where ‘“public” 
and “private”’ overlap and intersect.
32
 Counsel unquestionably sits at precisely the 
type of connective point between public and private to which Guy refers, and my 
work notes the negotiation of these lines as the delineation of a sphere of ‘the 
political’ grows. My efforts, however, have been concentrated primarily on the 
history of political ideas rather than more specific local and private concerns.  
I have therefore chosen to focus on what I have termed political counsel, 
rather than the prevalent advice literature on private matters.
33
 This division is not 
arbitrary, but is clearly marked in the early modern literature. For example, William 
Cornwallis writes at the turn of the seventeenth century that ‘Aduice fitteth friend 
to friend: counsaile counsailours to states, the first priuate, the other publike’.
34
 It is 
when the one bleeds into the other that many writers see a particular issue with 
political counsel, so the distinction is an important one, and I have chosen to 
approach my research from the perspective of ‘counsel’ rather than ‘advice’.  
 Second, much of this concern with the transformation of private into 
political counsel revolves around questions of gender. Women were not only 
external to the sphere of the political, but also were not seen to have the requisite 
skills to give political counsel, and thus their counsel was largely feared and 
                                                 
32
 Guy 1997, p. 6. 
33
 For instance Whitford 1533; Colet 1534; Breton 1605.  
34
 Cornwallis 1610, sig. Bb, 5
v
. Although I sometimes use ‘advice’ and ‘counsel’ 
interchangeably (along with ‘counsellor’ and ‘adviser’), it is important to note at 
the outset that these could represent distinct categories, which is why I more often 




 Work has been done to detail the important interplay between gender 
and counsel in the relationship between a female monarch and her male 
counsellors, as well as the rare instances of women proffering their political advice 
in print (for instance in the cases of Christine de Pisan and Anne Dowriche, both 
whom I include in my survey).
36
 But this remains a vast subject requiring further 
research.  
Of particular interest is the relationship between the condemnation of 
female counsel and the prevalent personification of counsel as a feminine 
counterpart to male sovereignty. As Cornwallis states in the essay quoted from 
above, ‘Counsailes part, is Cassandraes parte’, referring not just to the difficulty of 
being believed, but the understanding of counsel as essentially female.
37
 His 
contemporary and fellow essayist Francis Bacon articulates this idea even more 
strongly, using the myth of Jupiter and Metis to illustrate the proper relationship 
between male sovereignty and female counsel:  
...they say Iupiter did marrie Metis (which signifieth Counsell.)... shee 
conceiu’d by him, and was with childe, but Iupiter suffered her not to 
stay till shee brought fourth, but eate her vp; whereby hee became 
with child and was deliuered of Pallas, armed out of his head. Which 
montrous fable containeth a secret of Empire: How Kings are to make 




                                                 
35
 It is for these reasons that I use the masculine pronoun when referring to the 
counsellor. There was a general agreement that this figure should be male, even 
though this may not have always been true in practice. Personal counsel, on the 
other hand, could be seen as being the purview of women; see Deist 2003, pp. 171, 
229, 231. 
36
 For female counsel in medieval literature see Deist 2003; Schieberle 2008. For 
the counsel of Pisan and Dowriche see Nederman 2008, pp. 28-9; Suzuki 2009, pp. 
174-93, respectively. For the influence of gender in the relationship between 
Elizabeth and her counsellors see Crane 1988; Guy 1995a; Alford 1998; Mears 
2001, pp. 629-50; McLaren 2004. 
37
 See also Alford 2004, p. 49.  
38
 Bacon 1612, pp. 59-60.  
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Counsel is an inherently feminine – and potentially threatening – counterpart to 
masculine sovereign power, which needs to be conquered and absorbed.
39
 
Understanding the importance of this characterisation, especially given the ‘death’ 
of counsel in the face of modern state sovereignty, would provide a fascinating 
theoretical background to studies of counsel and counsellors within this period, but 
it cannot be attempted here.  
 Finally, I have also left aside issues of religion and ‘ecclesiastical counsel’. 
There is no question that religion and politics were intimately intertwined in this 
period; however, my attention to the humanist-classical discourse of counsel has led 
me to consult different sources than a focus on religion would require. The 
forthcoming work by Rose promises to supplement any omissions caused by such a 




The structure of this thesis is governed by two divisions – chronological and 
thematic, which I have interwoven in order to avoid the pitfalls of an exclusive 
focus on either. The three parts of the work are organised chronologically, each 
covering an approximate fifty-year period, according to considerations of both 
political and intellectual context. Part I surveys the Henrician period (1485-1547), 
as well as noting pertinent classical and medieval precedents. This first era saw the 
emergence of the humanist discourse in England and its expression in the humanist-
classical vocabulary of counsel. These developments took place in the context of 
widespread political and religious upheaval, as well as within the reigns of two 
                                                 
39
 See King 2001, p. 589; Leeming 2005, p. 262.  
40
 Rose 2011, p. 49. See also Chavura 2011 for the ecclesiastical political thought 
of the period, although note that his assertion that the ‘synthetic tensions within the 
English polity’ of ‘the absolutist claims of the prince and the conciliar claims of 
parliament’ leaves aside precisely the discourse of political counsel that this thesis 
attempts to uncover.   
 20 
adult male monarchs. The importance of the age and gender of the monarch 
becomes clear in Part II of the thesis, which considers the later Tudor period (1547-
1603), characterised by the reign of a minor – Edward VI – and two women – Mary 
I and Elizabeth I. This section is also marked by the rise of the Machiavellian 
challenge to the orthodox humanist discourse of counsel; a challenge not explored 
in the previous literature on counsel surveyed above nor in relation to the situation 
of ‘weakened’ monarchical rule in England.
41
 Finally, Part III is framed not only 
according to the rise and fall of the early Stuarts (1603-1651), but also the 
emergence of a third intellectual development – reason of state – ending with the 
debates of the English Civil War.  
 A second tripartite division works across these chronological boundaries, 
organising the chapters according to thematic concerns. The first chapter in each 
part introduces the broad theoretical shifts in question – humanism, 
Machiavellianism and reason of state respectively – and notes their expression in 
writings on counsel. These chapters, in other words, seek to determine the ‘why’ of 
counsel – the ends towards which it ought to aim. Chapters 2, 5 and 8 provide the 
‘how’ of counsel – the means by which a counsellor ought to deliver his counsel, 
and from what sources he should draw his political knowledge. The final chapter in 
each section details the ‘what’ and ‘who’, connecting counsel more intimately with 




                                                 
41
 For the limited acknowledgement of Machiavelli in this context see Guy 1995a, 
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 With this dual approach outlined, it is worth adding a few words about the 
content of each chapter. Chapter 1 opens with the emergence of the figure of the 
counsellor. Rather than beginning in the sixteenth century, I trace its source to the 
Aristotelian division of the Platonic philosopher-king into two distinct roles: the 
philosopher who counsels and the king who commands. This model of a 
philosopher-counsellor, the personification of prudence, is retained in the political 
writings of the middle ages, but consistently occupies an absentee or abstract role 
outside court politics. It is only with the introduction of Ciceronian humanism that 
this figure acquires a place within the court of kings, necessitated by Cicero’s 
insistence that the vir civilis fulfil his role on the political stage. Although these 
ideas are reflected in the works of continental humanists, I note here an important 
distinction between their view of such a figure as a teacher of the virtues and a 
particularly English perspective, drawn from Seneca, which instead envisages a 
figure who counsels on particular political actions.  
 Following this discussion of Ciceronian humanism, Chapter 2 considers the 
revival of classical rhetoric in the period. This chapter expands on the work done on 
rhetoric and counsel by considering the neglected yet essential concept of kairos. 
Due to its rhetorical meaning as the opportune time for frank speech, the concept 
becomes strongly associated with the role of the counsellor in the English tradition, 
especially within the works of Thomas Elyot. This association between rhetoric and 
kairos is also connected with the rise of the suspicion of the counsellor, a topic 
introduced in Chapter 3. As Elyot makes clear, kairos has the power both to make 
counsel more efficacious and more pernicious, as it can be employed to turn virtue 
into vice, a rhetorical technique associated with the figure of paradiastole.
43
 
                                                 
43
 See Skinner 2007, pp. 148-63.  
 22 
Through an engagement with literary sources, this chapter shows how the 
revolutionary actions of Henry VIII in the course of the English Reformation were 
interpreted as the result of rhetorically adept counsellors employing paradiastolic 
techniques. Conciliar proposals thus become figured within attempts to minimalise 
their influence, a tendency illustrated through the changing imagery of counsel.  
 With this, we move into Part II of the thesis, which begins in Chapter 4 with 
an exploration of counsel in Machiavellian thought and the articulation of a 
‘Machiavellian challenge’ to the orthodox-humanist model. Here, the focus on 
counsel enables me to make two important additions to existing scholarship on 
Machiavelli’s political theory and its reception in England.
44
 First, we are able to 
observe that Machiavellian thought in England was almost entirely focused on the 
figure of the counsellor, not the prince, resulting in what might be described as an 
‘advice to counsellors’ literature. Second, we see that this reception was not one of 
assimilation/rejection, but rather of negotiation, as even opponents of 
Machiavellian thought appropriated his vocabulary – and thus his framing – in the 
articulation of their attacks.  
Developing a more thorough understanding of Machiavelli’s own view of 
counsel is thus essential to an understanding of this complex reception. It is in the 
course of such a reevaluation that kairos once again appears, in a guise that will 
continue to be of significance in the political thought of the next century. 
Machiavelli draws on the meaning of kairos not just as an opportune time for 
speech, but for action, and relates this understanding to his themes of necessity and 
adaptation. With the reception and application of such ideas, prudence – still the 
essential skill of the counsellor – becomes reconceived and a dual meaning 
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emerges. The first retains the Aristotelian and orthodox humanist concern for 
determining virtuous action. The second, however, opposes this view by prioritising 
utile over honestum and focusing on the navigation of kairotic temporal 
considerations. 
 In Chapter 5 we see how these shifts lead many writers to reconsider the use 
of rhetorical techniques as tools of political counsel, suggesting instead that counsel 
should be based upon, and communicated through, histories. For those who adopt a 
Machiavellian view of prudence, focused on timeliness and the variability of 
fortune, it is history, not moral philosophy, which will impart these lessons. For 
those who fear counsellors’ rhetorical skill and Machiavellian scheming, histories 
offer a more trustworthy source of counsel. This for some results in an outright 
rejection of the figure of the counsellor, expressed in the oft-repeated maxim optimi 
consiliarii mortui – the best counsellors are [the] dead. 
 This maxim is realised both in English politics and on the English stage, as 
Chapter 6 illustrates. Expanding further on the themes of institutionalisation as a 
response to evil counsel, this chapter begins with a consideration of the unique 
nature of the late Tudor polity, especially the perceptions of a monarchy 
‘weakened’ by the rule of the children of Henry VIII, and a focus on the various 
attempts to solve this problem through the development of conciliar institutions. 
This emphasis on counsel/council as the solution to monarchical instability adds 
weight to the suspicion of counsellors, especially those close to the monarch, such 
as Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who are 
accused of hiding their Machiavellian scheming behind humanist rhetorical 
practices. The dire consequences brought about by such counsellors are played out 
before audiences in a number of late Tudor plays, epitomised by Shakespeare’s 
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Hamlet. Here I offer a novel reading, noting echoes of Plutarch’s ‘How to Tell a 
Flatterer from a Friend’ in the treatment of the courtiers who surround Hamlet. An 
understanding of the discourse of counsel especially highlights the role of Polonius 
as an adviser who combines humanist rhetoric with Machiavellian plotting, 
demonstrating that the best counsellor is indeed a dead one. 
My consideration of reason of state in Part III follows from this treatment of 
the Machiavellian challenge. Chapter 7 explores the vocabularies of this tradition – 
policy, reason of state and interest – and their association with counsel. This 
discussion demonstrates once again that, whereas continental discourse focuses on 
sovereign and state, the English are more concerned with the role of the counsellor. 
The introduction of the vocabulary of interests gives the increasing suspicion of 
counsellors a language with which to express itself; counsellors are to be feared for 
their prioritisation of private interests over interests of state.  
Concern regarding dangerous self-interests leads, in Chapter 8, to another 
shift in the sources of counsel. History, which had been presented as a more 
trustworthy and relevant alternative to humanist rhetorical figures in Chapter 5, 
becomes problematised by the language of interests in the early Stuart period. It is 
now argued that those who write and use history politically distort such sources for 
their own ends. A number of writers accordingly suggest that counsel ought to be 
derived instead from direct observation of other states and turn to the reports of 
travellers and spies to glean the knowledge essential to politics. 
Chapter 9 brings these themes together in a consideration of the political 
thought of the English Civil War, focusing in particular on Henry Parker and 
Thomas Hobbes as examplars of the two sides of the civil war debates. Despite 
writing from opposing ends of the ideological divide, Parker and Hobbes both base 
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their theories of sovereignty – popular and state – upon an engagement with 
political counsel. These writers see a ‘crisis of counsel’ in the English political 
system, caused by the powerful influence of counsellors who prioritise private 
interests over public. For Parker, this crisis necessitates a deviation from the 
‘ordinary’ course of affairs in which counsel and command must remain distinct, 
and the assumption of sovereign power by the realm’s ‘proper’ conciliar body, 
parliament. Hobbes, on the other hand, seeks to mitigate (or rather eliminate) the 
influence of evil counsel by wholly rejecting the foundations upon which the 
discourse of counsel had been built, especially the quality of prudence, which he 
holds to be insufficient for political knowledge. In both Parker’s and Hobbes’s view 
of politics, the figure of the counsellor all but disappears.   
 
Appended to the third part of the thesis are two original manuscript transcriptions. 
The first is an early seventeenth-century abridgement of Botero’s Ragione di Stato, 
prepared by Richard Etherington, a disgraced landowner attempting to win favour 
with the chancellor to Prince Charles. It is the only contemporary English 
translation of Botero’s work, and is included to supplement the use of the 1956 
Waley and Waley translation, which at times obscures the text’s connections with 
Machiavellian ideas, especially virtù and occasione. Furthermore, Etherington’s 
abridgement gives us a clearer idea of how Botero’s ideas were received in the 
English context. For instance, we might note Etherington’s treatment of interesse. 
In the first instance of the term, relating to the interests of princes and states, 
Etherington chooses to translate interesse as ‘reputation’ rather than ‘interest’, and 
in the second, concerning the interests of counsellors, he eliminates the passage 
altogether. As Etherington explicitly sets out to extract ‘the marrow of [Botero’s] 
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Bookes his seuerall politiqe positions’, his choices regarding what to include and 
exclude tell us a great deal about what contemporary English readers saw as the 
important elements of Botero’s work.
45
 
 I have also incorporated a transcription of Sloane MS 3938, an English 
translation of the Secretissima instructio, probably produced in the early 1620s. 
Noel Malcolm has recently uncovered the importance of secretissima instructio 
texts and reproduced the English translation of the Altera secretissima instructio 
prepared by Hobbes; however, he has little to say about this earlier text and almost 
nothing regarding its translation.
46
 Although the translator and purpose of the 
manuscript remain unclear, a full reading enables us to appreciate the ways in 
which the counsellor who is purported to have written the text is portrayed as a 
scheming, devious figure, as well as the importance placed upon on the observation 
of other states. By examining such texts, we are able to understanding the ways in 
which the ever-complex relationship between counsellor and sovereign was 
perceived, mistrusted and manipulated. 
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Part I: The Henrician Humanists, 1485-1547 
Chapter 1: The Figure of the Counsellor 
Plato’s philosopher-king combines the elements of sovereign command and wise 
counsel in a single figure.
47
 The Aristotelian rejection – or rather alteration – of this 
ideal lies at the heart of the development of the humanist figure of the counsellor. 
Power comes from the king, but this power is guided – even ruled – by the 
prudence of counsel. By separating the roles of command and counsel into two 
distinct figures, Aristotle generates a very different theory of governance, one that 
requires a position not just for the sovereign but also for the counsellor. Although 
the discourse of counsel that emerges from this tradition is reflected in classical and 
medieval political traditions, it is in the writing of the Henrician humanists of the 
early sixteenth century that the figure of the counsellor first becomes fully realised, 
taking his place within the political structures of the time.  
 
I. Medieval Aristotelianism and Prudent Counsel 
The Aristotelian tradition accepts Plato’s basic premise that reason must govern the 
ruler’s passions and the appetites in order for good governance to rule over all. This 
is possible through the inculcation of the virtues, the most important being 
phronesis (φρόνησις - prudentia) – prudence or practical wisdom – understood as 
the ability to determine which action one ought to take in a given situation. Without 
prudence, Aristotle writes, ‘real virtue does not develop’ for ‘we cannot be really 
good without practical wisdom, or practically wise without virtue of character’.
48
 
Prudence is distinct from wisdom (Σοφíα – sapientia) as, unlike wisdom, it is 
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‘concerned with worldly affairs, namely, with what we can deliberate about’.
49
 It is 
this dedication to phronesis which leads Aristotle to reject the view that a 
philosophic nature – obeying at all times the rule of reason – is likely to exist in the 
prince.
50
 As the prince is a single and corruptible figure, there is no guarantee that 
he will have the knowledge that supports prudence, nor the self-control to follow it 
in choosing virtuous actions. Instead, this prudence must exist externally in a 
philosopher who rules and guides him.
51
 Reason will rule, if a philosopher rules a 
king through his prudent counsel.  
 The diffusion of this idea in the middle ages primarily came not through a 
text of Aristotle’s own hand, but one ascribed to him: the Secretum Secretorum. 
Perhaps the most popular secular book of the medieval period, the Secretum was 
thought to be a translation of an original from Aristotle.
52
 Although in fact a later 
fabrication, the arguments presented do find their foundation in Aristotelian 
sources, as does the role played by the character of Aristotle himself in the text.
53
 
From this work, there emerges a tradition of the counsellor as a wise but absent 
and/or otherworldly figure, who teaches the prince about the virtues requisite to his 
reign.
54
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The bulk of the Secretum contains letters purported to have passed between 
Aristotle and his royal student, Alexander, alongside narration from the 
author/translator, illustrating and describing the proper relationship between a 
prince and his philosopher-counsellor.
55
 Alexander is wholly obedient to Aristotle’s 
advice, requesting it at every turn. Aristotle, however, refuses the call to accompany 
the prince in person, instead using his letters to further impress upon the young king 
the importance of counsel, advising him that it is ‘by the counsaylle of 
Phylosophers wyse’ that he shall bring his people ‘easyly to good gouernaunce’.
56
 
Underscoring the limitations of a singular ruler, Aristotle reminds Alexander that he 
ought ‘prudent counsayll [to] make thy chefe pryncesse’ for he ‘arte but one 
man’.
57
 Alexander, like all princes, ought to be ruled by prudent counsel from 
outside sources, beginning with Aristotle himself. 
This lesson is echoed in the multiple translations of the text. Forming a 
crucial part of the prevalent medieval speculum principis literature, the Secretum 
was utilised as a means to offer counsel on good governance, including the 
importance of prudent advice.
58
 The ‘original’ translator dedicates the work to his 
caliph, reminding him to ‘in vertue... set his gouernaunce’ and to acquire virtue ‘by 
grete aduysenesse’.
59
 Subsequent translations were prepared for other princes – 
John Lydgate’s fifteenth-century English text was prepared for the reading of 
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Henry VI, and it is likely that the 1511 print edition of this text was intended for the 
eyes of the recently-crowned Henry VIII.
60
 
 Other specula serve a similar purpose.
61
 For instance, the fourteenth-century 
French text, the III Consideracions Right Necessarye to the Good Gouernaunce of 
a Prince, originally intended for the future John II of France, was translated into 
English and compiled in a manuscript with the Secretum in the 1450s, most likely 
at the request of the soldier and counsellor Sir John Fastolf for Richard, Duke of 
York, claimant to the English throne.
62
 This text draws on Aristotelian thought to 
establish the two parts to the prince’s knowledge, both to be provided by ‘good 
counseyllours, true and wyse’.
63
 First, such counsel would make up for the limits in 
the prince’s knowledge of self, rents and revenues, and duties – the three 
considerations of the title. Second, wise advice would also support the attainment of 
the ‘IIII vertues necessarye for the good governaunce of a Prince’ – science, 
providence, justice and mercy – without which the first ‘consideracions’ cannot be 
achieved.
64
 For these reasons ‘it is full good and necessarye to a Prince to have 
aboute him good and auncient, sage, true counseillours, and to theyme yive 
credence’.
65
 This is especially true in regards to the ‘the vertue of providence’ or 
prudence: a ‘vertue comyng and growing of science, by the whiche men knowe 
what they shall doo, whanne and how they shall doo’, upon which the performance 
of the other virtues rests.
66
 Although the text was most likely written by a 
counsellor in the French court, and offers advice about counsel, it is anonymous, 
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and there is no counsellor figured within it.
67
 This is often the case with speculum 
texts; although they give important information about the purpose of counsel in 
guiding the king, their place as mirror held before the prince leaves little room for 
the figure of the counsellor himself.  
When a counsellor-figure does appear, he or she is often presented as a 
divine or imagined figure, difficult to imagine in the court of a contemporary 
monarch. This is the case in Christine de Pisan’s L'Épistre de Othéa a Hector, 
written at the turn of the fourteenth century and printed in English in 1549, which 
uses the goddess of prudence, Othea, to communicate advice.
68
 Othea counsels 
Hector throughout the text, demonstrating ‘howe the vertue of Prudence is moche 
to be reco[m]mended’ for ‘Prudence is the most noble of all other thynges’.
69
 Pisan 
also gives the example of the relationship between Joseph – another divine figure – 
and the pharaoh from Genesis, noting that it was only by ‘the counsayle of his 
prudence’ that Joseph saved Egypt from famine, concluding that ‘As longe as thou 
shalt beleue the counsayle of them whiche vseth sapyence, and that loueth the 
loyally, thou shalt reygne victoryously’.
70
 
 By the fifteenth century, this tradition of the rule of the wise, or more 
specifically prudent, philosopher-counsellor was a strong and established tradition 
in England as well, based in large part on the widespread circulation of texts such 
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as the Secretum and the specula of Christine de Pisan. Much of the interest in such 
texts was spurred by the political turmoil surrounding the overthrow of Richard II 
in 1399.
71
 Writers used the Aristotelian tradition of the philosopher-counsellor to 
criticise Richard’s failure to obey advice, a mistake they made clear ought not to be 
repeated by the new king, Henry IV. This is the lesson communicated by the poet 
John Gower’s Confessio Amantis, originally written in the 1380s and dedicated to 
Richard II, but revised and re-dedicated to Henry of Lancaster upon Richard’s 
overthrow.
72
 It once again figures a wise and otherworldly adviser – Genius
73
 – 
who must guide and rule the passionate Amans, imparting to him Aristotelian 
philosophy as a way to temper his affections. In place of prudence, Genius speaks 
of ‘practique’ by which ‘the vertu tryeth fro the vice’ structuring the principles ‘hou 
that a worthi king schal rule’.
74
 Throughout the text he provides examples of kings 
who because of their ‘wisdom and hih prudence’ kept wise advisers near them, 
listening to their advice, and the downfall of those – like Richard II – who did not.
75
 
It is in this tumultuous context at the turn of the fifteenth century that an 
image of the counsellor himself begins to emerge. Rather than presenting an absent 
or a reified persona, two texts written in this period begin to bring the figure 
himself into more light.
76
 The first is the anonymous Mum and the Sothsegger, 
presented as a paired text with Richard the Redeless, a reflection on the downfall of 
Richard II, which attributes Richard’s demise to his lack of proper ‘rede’ – 
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 Mum suggests the remedy to such ‘redeless’ rule through a reflection on 
the figure who offers frank counsel within the court. In the text, the character of 
Sothsegger sets out to find a courtly truth-teller, but he finds such a figure elusive 
and undefined; he searches the works of past authors and the sciences of the 
universities, but none tell him where to look for such a frank speaker, for the topic 
is new and unexplored. Finally, in a dream, Sothsegger receives the advice of a 
wise bee-keeper (much like Gower’s Genius) who tells him that the truth-teller he 
seeks has the potential to exist within all men, including Sothsegger himself, and 
thus he ought to write a series of advice-books to his prince which will prevent the 
situation portrayed in Richard the Redeless. Sothsegger’s duty to give counsel is 
figured in the text as a natural extension of the feudal duties to any liege-lord; if 
Sothsegger is meant to defend his king against harm, he should also offer advice 
which will protect him: ‘And as my body and my beste/ oute to be my liegis,| So 
rithffully be reson/ my rede should also’.
78
 Although Sothsegger’s own adviser 
comes to him in a vision like a divine being, the counsellor of the court is not an 
absent or abstract figure but rather an educated lord such as Sothsegger, whose 




 The contemporary Regement of Princes, written by the poet and clerk of the 
privy seal Thomas Hoccleve in 1410-11 and also dedicated to Henry IV, paints a 
similar picture of the counsellor-figure.
80
 The Regement begins with a lengthy 
account of the motives of the author, who too becomes the recipient of advice from 
a wise older teacher in a dream before he himself takes that role with his prince. 
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Hoccleve, as he tells his readers, is out of favour and out of money, and unsure how 
to regain both. Like Sothsegger’s beekeeper, Hoccleve’s old man advises him to 
‘Wryte to’ his prince ‘a goodly tale or two’ following which ‘his free grace shal 
upon thee lyght’.
81
 Although not an extension of feudal duties as in Mum, in the 
Regement advice-giving is still seen as a part of the reciprocal relationship between 
lord and servant; Hoccleve will give his advice, and expects a reward for it.  
The rest of the text is the result of this encounter: a speculum in the 
medieval style, once again emphasising the connection between prudence and 
counsel. Only by the light of prudence, Hoccleve writes, can the other cardinal 
virtues be known, for prudence ‘counseil[s] what tho othir thre do’ and what works 
are proper to them.
82
 It is the faculty of understanding that ‘makith man by reson 
him governe’ and works through ‘avysament’, which is why Hoccleve goes on in 
the section on prudence to tell his prince to set his estate ‘by wys counseil’, before 
moving on in the subsequent chapter to address counsel specifically.
83
 For 
Hoccleve too it is the problem of the singular and limited nature of the king which 
necessitates this counsel. As ‘a kyng is but a man soul’ and ‘his wit nevere so good’ 
he still may make mistakes, whereas ‘good counseil may exclude a wrong’.
84
 
Furthering the idea that counsel not only guides but governs the prince, Hoccleve 
likens it ‘to a brydil| Which that a hors up keepeth fro fallyng’.
85
 Without the rule 
of prudent counsel, the affections of the prince may run wild over the whole of the 
commonwealth.  
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II. Ciceronian Humanism and the Duty to Counsel 
From the medieval Aristotelian tradition we have the generation of a philosopher-
counsellor who guides and even governs the prince, making up for insufficiencies 
in both his knowledge and his reason, captured in the key virtue of prudence. 
Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, we encounter the construction of 
worldly counsellors within the court, driven by their feudal duty or desire for favour 
to offer advice regarding the virtues to their prince. With the spread of Ciceronian 
(or civic) humanism this figure becomes reconceptualised as the vir civilis, who has 
a moral duty to offer counsel to the prince, guaranteeing the achievement of the 
common good.
86
 The attention to prudence also leads this figure to be placed in the 
context of the royal court; no longer the unyielding philosopher envisaged within 
the Aristotelian tradition, he must adapt to the ‘theatre’ of politics in order to play 
his role effectively.  
This is laid out in the work of one of the leading humanists of the Northern 
Renaissance – Desiderius Erasmus. Although he himself remained distanced from 
active political engagement, he addresses the figure of the counsellor in two key 
texts, his Moriae encomium, written in 1509, published in 1511 and translated into 
English in 1549, and his Institutio principis Christiani, written in 1516 and 
published in 1532.
87
 This latter text is written in the speculum tradition; Erasmus 
outlines the qualities necessary in a prince to the future Emperor Charles V. As the 
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translator of the Secretum had told his caliph, Erasmus writes to Charles that he will 
‘not be able to be a king unless reason is king over you’, and he must use ‘reason 
and judgment’ in all things. He agrees with Plato that a commonwealth can only be 
happy when ‘philosophers are put at the helm, or those to whose lot the rule 
happens to have fallen embrace philosophy’.
88
 However, he suggests that the 
system of hereditary monarchy makes this improbable and so ‘When there is no 
power to select the prince, the man who is to educate the future prince must be 
selected with comparable care’; thus ‘a country owes everything to a good prince; 
but it owes the prince himself to the one whose right counsel [recta ratio] has made 
him what he is’.
89
 Like Aristotle, he sees the Platonic philosopher-king as 
unattainable within his political context and so a second figure must provide the 
philosophical element essential to rule.  
The prince, in Erasmus’s text, becomes no more than an instrument through 
which the wisdom of the philosopher is transmitted to the rest of the 
commonwealth. For this, he borrows from Plutarch, who had set out in his Moralia 
that philosophers who address themselves only to one man benefit only that single 
individual; if, on the other hand, they speak to kings, ‘the benefit will be imparted 
unto many’.
90
 In Plutarch and Erasmus’s works, the prince is simply a 
fountainhead, through which the influence of the philosopher – good or bad – 
flows.
91
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The view of the role of the philosopher set out by Erasmus is very different 
from the one presented in medieval works. It is not a feudal duty to protect the 
prince nor hope of reward which motivates him to share his wisdom, but rather a 
sense of moral duty to the commonwealth, a view drawn from Cicero’s De Officiis. 
For Cicero, those who adopt the Platonic view that the philosopher ought to absent 
himself from politics abandon their primary duty to social life, for those who have 
‘their selfe fully gyuen to the doctryne [doctrina], study, and wisdom [sapientia], 
dyd specially bestowe their prudence [prudentia] and intelligence [intellegentia] to 
the profyte and behofe of all men’.
92
 In the ranking of moral duties, ‘all offyces that 
is of any power to kepe and contynue the company of man is to be preferred before 
the offyce that is comprysed in knowlege and scynce’.
93
   
The counter-argument is laid out in Erasmus’s satire, Moriae, in which the 
character of Folly rejects the idea of the political philosopher, marvelling at the 
suggestion that ‘commen weales most happily shoulde flourish, that were gouerned 
by philosophers, or whose gouernours applied them selfes to philosophie’, for if 
one examines history, it becomes clear that ‘no rulers were euermore pestilent to a 
commen weale, than if the same at any tyme fell into the hand[es] of suche one, as 
was geuen to any sect of philosophie’.
94
 Those who, like Cicero, choose to ‘meddle 
with matters of the commen weale’ are as ‘vnapte for all publike offices and 
affaires’ as ‘an asse is to fynger an harpe’ and so will, like Socrates, be ‘laught to 
scorn’.
95
 Contrary to what one might think, prudence comes of folly, not of reason. 
Since prudence is developed by way of experience, and a philosopher only learns 
from books, it is fools who possess ‘perfect true prudence’, based on their 
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willingness to take an active role in worldly affairs.
96
  Furthermore, prudence 
consists in the knowledge and judgement of things, which, according to Folly, 
requires knowing that all things ‘haue two faces muche vnlyke and dissemblable’.
97
  




Folly’s critique misunderstands Cicero’s point and rejects the figure of the 
active philosopher too readily, as Erasmus makes clear in the Institutio. In this text 
he creates for himself a critic not unlike Folly, ‘some idiot courtier, who is both 
more stupid and more misguided than any woman ever was’, who protests that 
Erasmus is ‘“making a philosopher for us, not a prince”’ in his insistence that the 
prince be guided by a philosopher.
99
 He defends his position on the grounds that 
‘“philosopher” does not mean someone who is clever at dialectics or science but 
someone who rejects illusory appearance and undauntedly seeks out and follows 
what is good’.
100
 A philosopher is not someone divorced from reality, but heavily 
embedded within it. Folly is right that prudence comes from experience, and from 
participating in the stage-play of life, but she has not realised that it is the skill of 
the philosopher to sift through such information, distinguishing reality from 
falsehood, and thus identifying true virtuous action; such a philosopher fulfils 
precisely the role that Folly had set out for prudence.  
This is clearest in Erasmus’s treatment of the princely virtues in both texts. 
In the Moriae, Folly suggests that a king is nothing but a simple man who carries 
all the symbols of kingship which signify virtue, but does not actually demonstrate 
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them: ‘geue hym a chayne about his necke, for token that all vertues woulde 
agreablie be euchayned in hym: geue hym also a crowne frette with perle and stone, 
in signe he ought to excelle others in all princely vertues: than a sceptre in his hand 
betokennyng iustice with an vpright mynde on all sydes: lastly a Robe of purpre, 
whiche signifieth zeale and feruent affection towarde his subiectes’.
101
 Such a 
prince ought to be ‘ashamed to weare’ such trappings, for he hath ‘no maner part of 
a prince in hym, sauyng onely the clothing’.
102
 In the Institutio these symbols and 
their corresponding virtues are repeated, with the same admonishment that they are 
not simply accessories but should ‘serve to remind [the prince] of [his] duty’.
103
 In 
a prince who does not wield the accompanying virtues, ‘these symbols are not 
decorations but reproaches of his defects’ and thus become ‘stigmata of vice’.
104
 
Erasmus asks: ‘If all that makes a king is a chain, a scepter, robes of purple, and a 
train of attendants, what after all is to prevent the actors in a drama who come on 
the state decked with all the pomp of state from being regarded as real kings?’, to 
distinguish real-life from the  ‘stage play of Folie”?
105
 The answer, as we have seen, 
is the philosopher.  
A similar Ciceronian amendment to the Aristotelian philosopher-counsellor 
is presented by Baldassare Castiglione in his Libro del Cortegiano, written between 
1513-1528 and translated into English by Thomas Hoby in 1561. Instead of 
changing the definition of ‘philosopher’ to place him in the context of the court, as 
Erasmus does, Castiglione reassigns the role to the courtier himself. He begins his 
dialogue with a lengthy discussion of the education, pastimes and characteristics of 
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the good courtier, declaring that ‘the ende therfore of a perfect Courtier [is]... that 
he may breake his minde to [the prince], and alwaies enfourme hym franklye of the 
trueth of euerie matter... and to set him in y
e
 waye of vertue’.
106
 Castiglione echoes 
Folly’s view of the philosopher, rejecting the suggestion that he will fulfill this role, 
for if such a one should endeavour to show a prince ‘plainlie & without enie 
circomstance the horrible face of true vertue and teache them good maners and 
what the lief [sic] of a good Prince ought to be, I ame assured they wolde abhorr 
him at the first sight, as a most venimous serpent, or elles they wolde make him a 
laughinge stocke’.
107
 Thus it must be the well-trained and virtuous courtier 
described in the text who will ‘leade [the prince] throughe the roughe way of 
vertue’.
108
 Castiglione ends by summarizing the qualities of the courtier whom he 
had described, concluding that:  
THE FINAL END OF A COVRTIER, VVHERTO AL HIS good 
condicions and honest qualities tende, is to beecome An Instructer 
and Teacher of his Prince or Lorde, inclininge him to vertuous 
practises: And to be francke and free with him, after he is once in 
fauour in matters touching his honour and estimation, alwayes 




Whether invested in the active philosopher or a virtuous and knowing 
courtier, the Ciceronian amendment to Aristotle’s philosopher-counsellor sees such 
a figure as fulfilling a moral duty within the theatre of politics. But is this truly the 
counsellor? Erasmus tells us in the Institutio that the figure he addresses is not a 
counsellor in the truest sense, but rather a princely tutor, and the same can be said 
of Castiglione’s courtly ‘Instructer and Teacher’. As the title might suggest, 
Erasmus’s subject in the Institutio is ‘the man who is to educate the future prince’, 
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whose role he makes distinct from that of the counsellor.
110
 It is ‘fruitless’, he 
suggests, ‘to give advice on the principles of government’ – as a counsellor would – 
‘without previously setting a prince’s mind free’ through philosophic instruction in 
‘established principles and ideas’ which emerge ‘from theory and not from 
practice’.
111
 It is only after this instruction that the ‘practical experience which [the 
prince’s] youth denies him’ should be supplemented by the advice of counsellors.
112
 
As prudence is a ‘wretched sort of wisdom’, only acquired by the sort of experience 
that could ruin a state, the prince ought to come to it ‘by sitting in on consultations’ 
and acting ‘by the advice of wise counsellors’, but this is only ‘after instruction in 
the principles involved’.
113
 Erasmus draws a clear distinction between the tutor who 
plants the seeds of virtue in a prince and counsellors who provide the prudence 





III. Henrician Humanists and the Political Counsellor 
It is the Henrician humanists who take the final step in the development of the 
political counsellor by shifting focus from the role of instruction in the principles of 
virtue to that of guiding daily political action. The argument made by Erasmus, that 
practical counsel is ‘fruitless’ without previous instruction in higher principles is 
rejected, creating the need for a permanent conciliar presence at court. It is a subtle 
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extension of the arguments of Aristotle and Cicero, but an important one in the 
development of the figure of the counsellor in the sixteenth-century.  
The key lies in the work of the originator of the speculum genre: Seneca.
115
 
Erasmus’s argument for the futility of counsel in the case of an uneducated prince is 
precisely that which Seneca had opposed in Epistle XCIV of his Epistolae morales 
ad Lucilium. Arguing against the position set out by Aristo and the Stoics, he 
makes a distinction between ‘decrees [decreta] and precepts [praecepta] of 
Philosophie’ in that ‘the one are generall, the other particular’.
116
 The former 
provide universal principles, the latter pragmatic advice. From this Seneca divides 
virtue into two parts – contemplation and action – concluding that ‘institution 
teacheth contemplation, admonition action [contemplationem instituio tradit, 
actionem admonitio]’.
117
 As virtue is incomplete without virtuous action, and it is 
counsel which acts as a guide to virtuous action, so ‘it followeth that admonition is 
necessary’.
118
 Nature provides the ‘seeds of vertue’, but they only ‘fructify by 
meanes of admonition’, like a ‘sparke being assisted with a light blast, becometh a 
great flame: vertue is awakened, when she is either touched or shaken’.
119
 Thus, it 
does not follow that in the absence of a virtuous education admonitions are to be 
rejected.  
 The fully realised political counsellor – combining the Platonic rule of 
reason, the Aristotelian separation of counsel and command, the Ciceronian vita 
activa and the Senecan distinction between instruction and counsel – is first set out 
in Book I of Thomas More’s Utopia, published in Latin in 1516 and translated into 
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English in 1551. In what has become known as the ‘dialogue of counsel’, the 
character of More attempts to convince Hythloday that it is his duty to ‘apply your 
wytte and delygence to the proffyt of the weale publyque’, which he can ‘[n]euer so 
well doo, nor with so greate proffitte perfourme’ but if he chooses to be ‘of sum 
great prynces councell’ where he shall guide him ‘to honeste opynyons, and 
vertuous persuasyons’.
120
 His suggestion is framed according to Aristotle’s 
pragmatic adjustment of the Platonic philosopher-king, for he notes that ‘Plato 
Iudgethe that weale publyques shall by this mea[n]es attayne perfecte felicitie, other 
if phylosophers be kynges, or els if kynges giue them se[l]fes to the study of 
Philosophie’ and asks ‘how farre I praye yowe, shall commen wealthes then be 






Hythloday, however, does not give up the Platonic ideal; echoing the view 
that Seneca had countered, he maintaines that ‘oneles kynges themselfes would 
applye their myndes to the studye of philosophie, that elles they would neuer 
thoroughlye allowe the counsell of phylosophers, beyng themselfes before euen 
from their te[n]der age infecteyd, and corrupt with peruerse, and euyll 
opinio[n]s’.
122
 Hythloday even employs the same vocabulary that Seneca had 
rejected, arguing that ‘If I should propose to any kynge holsome decrees [decreta], 
doinge my endeuour to pluck out of his mynde the pernitious originall causes of 
vice and noughtenes, thynke you not that I shoulde furth[er] with other be dryuen 
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awaye, or elles made a laughy[n]ge stocke?’
123
 Hythloday has misunderstood 
Cicero’s and Seneca’s construction of the ideal counsellor, repeating the same 
arguments of Erasmus’s Folly and Seneca’s Aristo.  
The character of More recognises Hythloday’s mistake. He tells him that 
‘this schole philosophie [philosophia scholastica]’ which teaches of universal truths 
and ‘thinketh all thinges mete for euery place’, truly does not have a place amongst 
kings.
124
 That being said, ‘ther is an other philosophie more cyuyle’ which is more 
practical and ‘knoweth... her owne stage’.
125
 Echoing the words of Folly and 
Cicero, More agrees with Hythloday that a philosopher embracing the academic 
philosophy would be akin to, during a comedy, ‘sodenlye com[ing] vpon the state 
in a philosophers apparell’ and playing out the scene from Octavia ‘wherin Seneca 
disputeth with Nero’, but this is not what he is suggesting.
126
 The counsellor must 
not only compromise in order to participate in the stage-play of politics, as Cicero 
had set out, but also accept his role as guiding action, not implanting virtue and 
uprooting vice, as Seneca had made clear.  
In a sense, however, the character of More loses the debate, for the rest of 
the text is taken up by precisely the sort of abstract Platonic theorising that the 
counsellor is meant to avoid. This lesson becomes even more apparent when 
compared to another sixteenth-century work which considers the role of the 
counsellor and, unlike Utopia, fully embeds him in his political context. Thomas 
Starkey’s Dialogue Between Pole and Lupset, written between 1529 and 1532, 
stands as an utter rejection of Hythloday’s position, as well as his discussion of 
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Utopia in Book II, further establishing a specific position for counsel in the context 
of early sixteenth-century England.
127
  
Like Utopia, the Dialogue begins with an exhortation to counsel; the 
character of Lupset comments to the character of Reginald Pole: ‘I have much and 
many times marvelled... Master Pole, after so many years spent in quiet studies and 
learning [why you] have not settled yourself and applied your mind to the handling 
of matters of the common weal’, and asks him to present his views on the state of 
England.
128
 When Pole objects that the contemplative life is superior to the active, 
Lupset agrees that ‘the perfection of man resteth in the mind’ and thus ‘prudence 
and policy were not to be compared with high philosophy’, however, he suggests 
that neither can be reached without the other.
129
 A man must ‘first to make himself 
perfit, with all virtues garnishing his mind’ through contemplation and then 
‘commune the same perfection to other’, requiring active engagement in politics.
130
 
He too makes allusion to Seneca’s ‘seeds’ of virtue, noting that the cardinal virtues 
‘are rooted and planted’ in the hearts of man, but they require ‘the diligence of 
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man... for their springing up and good culture’.
131
 Without the guidance of ‘great, 
wise and politic men’, such as Pole, men’s own vanity will get in the way of the 
cultivation of virtue, and so Pole ought not to withhold his advice.
132
  
Pole accepts this argument, but wonders whether it is true that it is always a 
good idea to live an active life, or whether it is contingent upon ‘time and place’.
133
 
Directly echoing Hythloday (as well as Erasmus’s Folly), he tells Lupset that in 
time of tyranny his counsel ‘should be laughed at’ and fall upon the ears of ‘deaf 
men’.
134
 Like Hythloday, he also highlights a concern for corruption, concluding 
that ‘to attempt the handling of the matters of the common weal without regard 
either of time or place, nothing obtaining but only to be corrupt’.
135
  
Lupset counters Pole’s objection in two parts. First, he suggests that even if 
one were to consider time and place in a decision to offer counsel, it would not 
stand as an objection in this case, as England is free from tyranny, and so Pole 
should take the opportunity of Henry’s goodness to offer his counsel to him. Lupset 
emphasises that Henry has a ‘fervant love to the wealth of his subjects’ and a zeal 
for justice and equity.
136
 Notably, this is ‘after he is thereof informed and surely 
instruct by his wise counsellors and politic men’ and ‘when he knoweth the best’ 
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  Henry’s goodness itself is contingent upon receiving the right 
sort of counsel, further reason for Pole to provide it.  
Second, he denounces those who ‘so narrowly and so curiously... ponder the 
time and the place, that in all their lives they nother find time nor place’ and thus, 
like Hythloday, spend their lives looking ‘for Plato’s common weal’.
138
 There is no 
place for Utopias in counselling kings. Once Pole acquiesces to the request for 
counsel, Lupset further emphasises this point, encouraging Pole to reject the 
example of Plato in addressing a non-existent ideal republic and to speak instead of 
the commonwealth of England in which they live. Pole agrees, and so instead of a 
discussion of a republic out of time and place as in Utopia, they move on to a 
discussion of the specific ‘fauts and misorders’ of England.
139
  
In doing so, it quickly becomes apparent that the most pressing problem is a 
familiar one. The system of hereditary monarchy does nothing to ensure against a 
prince driven by his affections instead of reason. Because of this the people are 
ignorant of virtue and therefore miserable, which by ‘diligent instruction and wise 
counsel’ should be rectified, if only there was someone to provide it.
140
 Adopting 
Lupset’s Senecan metaphor of the seeds of virtue, Pole remarks that if man would 
‘hear counsel of wise and prudent men’ the ‘seeds of nature planted in his mind’ 
would not be choked, which causes him him to be ‘led by ignorance and folly’.
141
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As ‘the end of all politic rule is to induce the multitude to virtuous living’, and this 




This requires, first, that wise men offer their counsel and, second, that it is 
then spread to the rest of the commonwealth. Recalling the Plutarchan metaphor of 
the fountain, good governance requires both nourishing water – provided by 
prudent counsellors – and the proper functioning of the fountain to distribute it – 
the prince. Even if the first problem is rectified, the second would persist, for, Pole 
argues, ‘this is sure, and a Gospel word: that country cannot be long well governed 
nor maintained with good policy where all is ruled by the will of one not chosen by 
election, but cometh to it by natural succession’, as he is unlikely to have the ‘virtue 
and wisdom’ required for such a post.
143
 Resolving this problem would provide a 
‘common remedy... for all the rest of misorders’ of England.
144
 
Although the ideal option, in Pole’s mind, would be to elect the monarch, he 
and Lupset agree that this is unrealistic in their current political context, and so 
instead Pole sets out a second solution – the prince ought to be joined to a council, 
‘tempering his power’ and substituting his lack of reason.
145
 Pole’s remedy to this 
recurrent problem is stated in much stronger terms than that of previous theorists, as 
he creates an elaborate institutional structure whereby ‘the prince would... be 
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restrained and brought to order’.
146
 By such ‘good prudence and policy’, Pole and 
Lupset agree, the commonwealth will come to its proper end and perfection.
147
  
The text does not end with this accord, however, for Lupset continues to 
push Pole to give his counsel publicly, rather than in the ‘leisure’ in which they find 
themselves.
148
 Pole suggests that they ought to have a further discussion on the 
matters of ‘true nobility’ and whether a counsellor ought to wait until he is called 
before giving his advice.
149
 They resolve to discuss these concerns another time, 
indicating Starkey’s intention to compose a second volume, but there is no evidence 
that it was ever completed. Starkey takes More’s introduction of the political 
counsellor a step further, embedding him in the Henrician political structure, but 
stops short of a description of the figure himself.  
It is Thomas Elyot who fully articulates the figure of the counsellor in the 
English humanist tradition.
150
 He addresses the counsellor in a number of his texts, 
most notably the Boke Named the Gouernour (1531).
151
 Whereas the medieval 
specula had addressed the figure of the counsellor by way of the discussion of the 
prince, Erasmus and Castiglione had focused on a figure distinct from the 
counsellor, and More and Starkey had discussed an adviser in treating the best state 
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 Elyot couches his discussion in the same acknowledgement of the inevitable 
insufficiencies of a single monarch first introduced in the Secretum. Since ‘one 
mortall man can not haue knowlege of all thynges done in a realme or large 
dominion’ in order to support both parts of this governance ‘it is expedient and also 
nedefull/ that vnder the capitall gouernour be sondry meane authorities’.
153
 A prince 
must have a ‘double gouernaunce’, for not only must he maintain an ‘exterior or 
outwarde gouernaunce’, consisting of governance over ‘his chyldren/ his 
seruauntes/ and other subiectes’, but he must also possess an internal governance 




Guidance, once again, is provided by means of prudence.
155
 Whereas 
wisdom contemplates the divine, prudence ‘teacheth: warneth/ exhorteth/ ordereth/ 
& profiteth/ like a wise capitaine’ in regards to ‘execution or actuall operation’.
156
 
With reference to Seneca, Elyot notes that instruction in wisdom and science are 
important to the achievement of virtue, but they do not guarantee virtuous action: 
‘we instructe our children in the llberall [sic] sciences/ nat bycause those sciences 
may gyue any vertue: but bicause they prepare the mynde, and make it apt to 
receyue vertue’.
157
 True virtue is gained through prudence, which comes either 
from actual experience, study of history or, most importantly to a prince, counsel.  
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 For a courtier, such as the one Elyot addresses, ‘the ende of al doctrine and 
studie is good counsayle’, for it is ‘in good counsaile/ wherin vertue may be 
founden’.
158
 Counsel is the ‘propre mantion or palice’ of virtue, where her power 
‘concernynge gouernaunce’ may be found, whether it is the governance of one – 
internal governance – ‘called morall’, or of many – external governance – ‘called 
polityke’.
159
 It is counsel which forms the connection between these two forms of 
governance; it is ‘the last part of morall Sapience, and the begynnynge of sapience 
politike’.
160
 By providing this counsel to his prince, the figure that Elyot addresses 
will ensure that he rules within the strictures of reason and virtue. This is the 
humanist counsellor, fully realised.  
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Chapter 2: Classical Rhetoric 
By the early Tudor period, theorists had developed an understanding of the figure 
of the counsellor adapted from the Aristotelian philosopher-counsellor, whose role 
was to supplement the limitations of the prince, especially in terms of the prudence 
required to guide virtuous action. The key element added in the sixteenth century 
was to situate this figure within his political context, participating in, rather than 
disrupting, the theatre of politics. Crucial to this role was an understanding of the 
classical art of rhetoric, particularly deliberative rhetoric. The figure of the 
Henrician humanist counsellor combined the philosopher with the orator to recreate 
the active citizens of old, whose wise rhetoric guided the res publica towards the 
twin aims of utile and honestum. Deliberative rhetoric was the talent requisite in a 
counsellor to fulfil the ends of counsel established above. 
 
I. The Orator and the Philosopher 
The rearticulation of the classical art of rhetoric is most clearly represented in 
Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique.
161
 First published in 1553, it went through a 
further eight editions during the sixteenth century.
162
 Drawing in particular on 
Cicero and Quintilian, as well as his contemporaries, Wilson presents the most 
comprehensive account of the neo-Roman theory of rhetoric for a practising 
readership – whether lawyers, teachers, politicians or, indeed, counsellors.  
 Wilson opens his handbook with the story of Cineas, a Greek orator, scholar 
and counsellor, who is able to persuade the people and captains of the Roman cities 
besieged by his king to surrender. From this tale Wilson remarks ‘Good was that 
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Oratour whiche coulde do so muche: & wise was that king which woulde vse suche 
a meane.’
163
 The construction of the humanist counsellor is an attempt to reproduce 
precisely such a figure, who combines the wisdom of the philosopher with 
impressive oratorical ability. 
 It was such a man, Wilson tells his readers, who first drew men from their 
beastly living into civility. Drawing on Cicero’s De inventione, Wilson writes that 
after the Fall, people lived ‘man againste manne, one agaynste another, and all 
agaynste order’.
164
 To repair this vicious and ungodly manner of living, God 
‘stirred vp his faythfull and elect, to perswade with reason, all men to societye. And 
gaue his appoynted ministers knowledge bothe to se the natures of men, and also 
graunted them the gift of vtteraunce, that they myghte wyth ease wynne folke at 
their will, and frame theim by reason to all good order’.
165
 Such figures continue to 
be needed in a commonwealth to stand between men and their beastly natures, as 
Thomas Starkey had written in his Dialogue. Just as ‘by the persuasion of wise men 
in the beginning men were brought from their rudeness and bestial life to this 
civility so natural to man’, Starkey writes that by the wisdom of ‘wise and politic 
men... the multitude might be contained and kept in good order and civility’.
166
 
 The wise orator, however, is generally accepted by such writers to be a rare 
commodity. Just as Starkey and his contemporaries wrote in order to convince 
philosophers to become more active in political life, so too must orators be 
convinced to become more like wise and prudent philosophers. As Cicero writes, 
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‘wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence 
without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful’.
167
 For 
Cicero, rhetoric had been divorced from philosophy, and thus orators imitate rather 
than cultivate the virtues: ‘But when a certain agreeableness of manner – a 
depraved imitation of virtue – acquired the power of eloquence unaccompanied by 
any consideration of moral duty, then low cunning supported by talent grew 
accustomed to corrupt cities and undermine the lives of men’.
168
 The talented but 
immoral orators were deemed ‘fit to govern the state’, which ‘brought eloquence 
into such odium and unpopularity that men of the greatest talent left a life of strife 
and tumult for some quiet pursuit’, the resultant exodus of philosophers from the 
public sphere further intensifying the effect of these virtueless rhetoricians.
169
 Both 
orators more interested in popularity than philosophy and philosophers more 
interested in contemplation than the good of society are to blame for ‘the rupture, 
so to speak, between the tongue and the brain’, resulting in the split of the 
disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric.
170
  
Quintilian adopts this story as well, agreeing with Cicero that ‘philosophers 
and orators’ were ‘once so closely joined by nature and united in function’ that they 
‘were taken to be the same’.
171
 Quintilian seeks to bring them together again by 
emphasising that the ‘ideal’ orator is a good man. Whereas Cicero’s ideal orator 
had been ‘admirable’ by virtue of his possessing the skill of oratory – for ‘who can 
exhort people to virtue more passionately than the orator, and who can call them 
back from vice more vigorously?’ – Quintilian is deliberate in his assertion that 
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only a good man can possess these skills in the first place.
172
 His purpose is ‘to 
educate the perfect orator, who cannot exist except in the person of a good man’.
173
 
In order to avoid the corruption described above, the orator must have ‘not only 
exceptional powers of speech, but all the virtues of character as well’.
174
 Quintilian 
makes clear that ‘no one can be an orator unless he is a good man’, for ‘one could 
surely not concede intelligence to people who are offered the paths of virtue and 
vice and then choose the worse’.
175
 It is not oratorical skill which makes one a good 
man; it is only the good man who can learn and practice the art of rhetoric. 
Thus the orator must not just learn the mechanics, techniques and figures of 
rhetoric, but he must ‘above all else develop his moral character by study, and 
undergo thorough training in the honourable and the just’.
176
 The ‘principles of 
upright and honourable [honestas] living’ should not belong just to the 
philosophers, for this is the source of all the trouble surrounding rhetoric previously 
recounted.
177
 Instead, philosophical ideas ‘truly and rightly belong to [the orator’s] 
work, and are strictly relevant to the art of oratory’.
178
 Rather than the orator 
infringing on the discipline of philosophy, ‘the truth is rather that they are busy with 
our material’, and so discussion of the ‘good, the expedient and the just’ falls just 
as much under the heading of rhetoric as it does philosophy.
179
 That being said, 
Quintilian does not ‘want the orator to be a philosopher, for no other way of life is 
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more remote from the duties of the citizen and the task of an orator generally’.
180
 
Instead, he wants him to be a ‘Roman wise man’ who is ‘able to play the part of the 
statesman not in private seminars but in the experience and activity of real life’.
181
 
Whether it is encouraging the philosopher to a more active life, or pushing the 
active orator to embrace philosophy, the synthesis between the two is what results 
in the generation of the figure of the counsellor – he who will, in the words of 




II. Deliberative Rhetoric and Decorum 
This connection between oratory and the counsellor becomes especially clear when 
one turns to the forms of rhetoric set out by the classical authors. These were 
demonstrative (also referred to as epideictic or laudatory) – which is ‘in praise, or 
dispraise of a thynge’, judicial (also called forensic) – which disputes ‘whether the 
matter be right, or wrong’, and deliberative – which is ‘in consultyng’.
183
 This last 
form treats decision-making, attempting to convince the hearer to or from a path of 
action. It is thus ‘for those who give advice in private and those who speak in the 
assembly’, in other words, those who give counsel.
184
 The topic of this form of 
rhetoric, as Aristotle had first laid out, is utilitas – will the outcome of the decision 
be useful or harmful to the hearer? This is not to say it is an amoral form of 
argument, however, for in seeking to ascertain ‘what kind of good or bad things the 
deliberative orator advises’, Aristotle concludes that men will always seek their 
own happiness, thus ‘all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things 
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which conduce or are detrimental to it’.
185
 As true happiness, for Aristotle, can only 
come from virtue, the deliberative orator – like the humanist counsellor – must lead 
his listener to virtuous action in order to lead him to utilitas.  
Cicero is even clearer regarding the need for virtue to be considered in the 
speech of the deliberative orator. In treating ‘speeches before deliberative bodies 
[deliberations]’, he goes against ‘some writers’ who ‘have thought that advantage 
[utilitas] alone should be proposed as an object in urging or proposing a political 
measure’ and instead suggests that they should concern themselves with both ‘what 
is honourable [honestum] and what is advantageous [utile]’.
186
 As he sets out in De 
officiis, ‘nothynge is profytable that is not ioyned with honesty’.
187
 In choosing a 
path of action, or counselling towards it, one will never have to choose between an 
action which is advantageous but dishonest, or honest but unprofitable, for the two 
will always be united. In considering ‘com[m]en cou[n]sayles’, Cicero sets out that 
‘there is nothynge profytable that is cruell’ and declares ‘therfore let this be a 
conclusyon that that thynge whiche is honest is neuer profytable.... For it is yuell to 
iudge that to be profytable that may not be honest’.
188
 
Wilson repeats a similar formula. Deliberative rhetoric considers ‘whether 
the cause is profitable or unprofitable’, under which comes a variety of 
considerations, including that it is ‘honest, Saufe, Profitable, Easie, Pleasant, 
Harde’ and so on.
189
 Like his classical predecessors, Wilson gives a lengthy 
description of the four cardinal virtues and suggests that these should be the first 
consideration in attempting to persuade someone. Thus, in all cases, despite a 
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division that ascribes utility to the domain of deliberative rhetoric, these authors 
include the consideration of honestas alongside, or often above, that which is utile 
in discussions of the rhetoric of counsel.  
The key element in the connection between these two ends of advice is 
decorum. We have already seen this idea in the metaphor of the ‘stage-play’ in the 
works of More and Erasmus – More had advised that the philosopher-counsellor 
ought to play his part in the theatre of politics ‘cum decoro’ – translated by Ralph 
Robinson in 1551 as ‘with comlynesse’.
190
 Decorum is the ability, as Cicero makes 
clear, to adapt one’s speech and action to the circumstances of time and place. As 
he explains in his Orator, ‘the same style and the same thoughts must not be used 
in portraying every condition in life, or every rank, position or age, and in fact a 
similar distinction must be made in respect of place, time and audience’ and so 
decorum is the ‘universal rule’ both of oratory and life.
191
 
 For the sixteenth-century English rhetoricians, the far more influential 
discussion of decorum is in De Officiis. Here Cicero uses his definition of decorum 
to make the important connection between utile and honestum. He makes clear 
from the outset that this conception of decorum, translated from the Greek prepon 
[], is related to honestum; decorum ‘can not be separat from honesty, for 
bothe that whiche is comly is honest, and that whiche is honest is comly’.
192
 It is 
‘hole medled with vertue’, so any action that is comely, will also be honest, and any 
action that is in accordance with virtue, will also accord with decorum.
193
 As 
decorum rests in the opinion of those around us – ‘this comlynesse that apereth in 
the lyfe of man moueth prayse of the[m] with whome we lyue’ – speaking and 
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living in accordance with decorum will produce a good reputation.
194
 This is the 
basis for the connection between honestum and utile; for Cicero, honest actions will 
be useful, because they will always incur good repute.  
Deliberately echoing Cicero, Quintilian too writes that ‘different styles of 
eloquence... are appropriate to different people’.
195
 By this he not only means the 
hearer or judge, but the speaker himself. He who is engaged in a life of active 
citizenship, ‘the good citizen and true Wise Man’, unlike the reclusive philosopher, 
is ‘happy to use anything which is effective in achieving the objects of his 
speech’.
196
 Nevertheless, Quintilian reiterates that such speech must remain in line 
with the virtuous ends of rhetoric, for this active citizen is willing to use these 
means only ‘once he has established his own mind what is honourable to 
achieve’.
197
 Quintilian states outright that when expediency (utilitas) and propriety 
(decorum) conflict, ‘expediency must give way to propriety’.
198
 On the other hand, 
propriety is always in line with the honourable; it is ‘always becoming to act in an 
honourable [honestum] way’.
199
 For Quintilian, too, acting and speaking with 
decorum always lead to the dual ends of the useful and the honourable. 
In the sixteenth century, the first conscious attempt to translate a Ciceronian 
notion of decorum comes with the 1518 edition of the work of the Italian humanist 
Dominico Mancini – rendered as The Myrrour of Good Maners by Alexander 
Barclay, a poet and monk best known for his Ship of Fools of 1509. Barclay 
translates decorum as a ‘comly order/ in euery worde and dede’ as well as ‘dewe 
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conuenience| And semely proporcion’.
200
 Mancini’s text begins with a treatment of 
‘outwarde comelyness in behauour’, noting that it is ‘so sure annexed/ to lyfe of 
honeste| That without it/ honest/ can be nothyng at all’.
201
 Honesty, he says, cannot 
exist without comeliness, because it is ‘opyn to beholders/ both for to heare and se’, 
and so ‘without this behauour (after my iugement)| No lyfe can seme honest/ ryght 
nor conuenient’.
202
 As Cicero had suggested, without the outward performance of 
honesty through decorous behaviour, honesty loses the all-important aspect of 
esteem and the connection to utilitas collapses. 
The ‘second comelyness’ refers to the inner decorum which ‘belongeth in 
mankynde: in proper gouernaunce’, which, as we learned from the Aristotelian 
tradition, occurs ‘whan clere reason ruleth/ as regent souerayne’.
203
 Here too, 
however, there is an outward component, for Mancinus notes that these emotions 
must also ‘wele agre| In habyte: voyce/ iesture/ in loke and countenaunce| In 
shamefastnesse/ measure/ tyme/ place/ & cyrcu[m]staunce’.
204
 This is done, ‘so that 
in all thy maners/ in worde/ loke and iesture| Is the tyme requyreth/ be ordered by 
measure’.
205
 Even internal decorum, rule of reason over the passions, has an 
important outward component, earning the respect of observers.  
The rhetorician George Puttenham, in his Arte of English Poesie of 1589, 
applies the notion of decorum specifically to the task of counselling the monarch. 
When it comes to ‘matter[s] of aduise’, Puttenham suggests a middle ground 
between flattery and frankness, for ‘it is neither decent to flatter him for that is 
seruile, neither to be rough or plaine with him, for that is dangerous, but truly to 
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Counsell & to admonish, grauely not greuously, sincerely not sourly’.
206
 Like 
Wilson, he uses the example of the counsellor Cineas who was able to keep ‘that 
decencie in all his perswasions’ and thus ‘he euer preuailed in aduise, and carried 
the king which way he would’.
207
 ‘Decencie’, he explains, is the translation of the 
Latin decorum and the Greek prepon: ‘The Greeks call this good grace of euery 
thing in his kind [prepon], the Latins “decorum” we in our vulgar call it by 




III. Kairos and the Counsellor 
Puttenham’s direct translation of prepon into decorum veils another important 
concept for the proper timing of speech, especially as pertains to the political 
counsellor.
209
 In Cicero’s treatment of decorum, he not only makes reference to 
prepon, but to a second Greek concept, kairos – καιρός – which denotes the 
‘efficacy both of place and tyme’.
210
 It is not appropriate, for example ‘in a mater of 
grauyte to bringe comunicacyon mete for a bankettynge’.
211
 A man ‘maye seme 
inhonest, bycause he knoweth not tyme’, i.e. the ‘right time’ to speak in a certain 
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 Cicero is deliberate in his use of kairos, for directly preceding his chapter 
which the 1534 translator Robert Whittington names ‘The ordre of dedes with 
comlynesse [Ordo actionum cum decoro]’, Cicero treats ‘the order of thynges and 
oportunyte of tyme’, in which he tells the reader that the ‘tyme of dede mete is 
called in greke tonge Enkeria’.
213
 He translates this as occasio in the Latin 
(rendered ‘occasyon’ by Whittington) and blends it into his definition of decorum 
as an element of temperance: ‘this temperaunce that we interpretate so as I haue 
sayd’, in addition to being ‘a scyence of those thynges whiche shall be done or 
sayde, to be set in their due place’, becomes also ‘a scyence of oportynyte of tyme 
to do any thynge’.
214
 Thus, although Cicero’s decorum is understood to be a direct 
translation of the Greek prepon, it in fact combines the propriety associated with 
prepon and the sense of right timing associated with kairos.
215
 It is essential to also 
appreciate the history and meaning of this latter term in order to understanding the 
Henrician figure of the counsellor. 
 The word kairos has its roots in archery, where it denoted a ‘penetrable 
opening, an aperture’ through which Greek archers aimed, simulating the forest of 
shields and armour through which an arrow must pass to reach its target.
216
 The 
development of kairos from this source explains its dual meaning as an opening or 
opportunity and as due measure, for the shot requires not only accuracy but also the 
right amount of power – neither too much nor too little – in order to pass 
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successfully through the opening.
217
 In most cases, kairos carried a temporal 
connotation – a rare singularity standing in opposition to the linear chronos.
218
  
Many Greek writers focused on kairos as a fleeting moment in which to 
present efficacious speech. This was especially true in relation to the timing of 
parrhesia (παρρησία) – frank speech – an especially pertinent question to the 
political counsellor.
219
 This issue is most clearly taken up by Plutarch.
220
 He 
emphasises the importance of the orator’s knowledge of kairos: ‘occasions [kairoi] 
arise quickly and often bring with them in public affairs sudden developments,’ 
thus ‘the man who is so moved by the events which take place and the opportunities 
which offer themselves that he springs to his feet is the one who most thrills the 
crowd, attracts it, and carries it with him’.
221
 
Plutarch’s most extensive treatment of parrhesia and kairos can be found in 
his Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur, a text which became an important 
source for discussions of the role of the counsellor in the Renaissance. Plutarch 
employs kairos repeatedly throughout this text, marking its importance to those 
wishing to give truthful and virtuous advice for the honour and profit of the hearer. 
This is in contrast to the flatterer, whose speech is directed at the pleasure of the 
hearer and who has no notion of kairos at all. A true friend is willing to give 




                                                 
217
 Onians 1988, p. 345. See the definitions of kairos given by Kinneavy 1986, 80; 
Baumlin 2002, p. 177; Miller 2002, pp. xi-xiii. See also Haskins 2004, p. 67.  
218
 See Kinneavy 1986, 79. 
219
 See Colclough 1999, pp. 177-212.  
220
 See Spencer and Theodorakopoulos 2006, pp. 1-30 for the advisory role of 
Greeks under the Roman empire in the period in which Plutarch was writing.  
221
 Plutarch 1874, vol. 10, p. 187.  
222
 Plutarch 1603, p. 85. 
 64 
Discussing parrhesia, Plutarch notes that ‘this libertie of speech [parrhesia] 
where of I speake, is the nature of a medicine, which if it be not given in time 
convenient and as it ought to be, besides, that it doth no good at all, it troubleth the 
body, worketh greevance, and in stead of a remedie prooveth to be a mischiefe’.
223
 
Without kairos, frank counsel is no better than flattery, and in fact may even be 
worse, for ‘fit opportunity overslipt and neglected doth much hurt’.
224
 Recalling 
Cicero’s discussion of speaking appropriately at a banquet, Plutarch writes that ‘we 
must take heed how we speake broad at a table where friends be met together to 
drinke wine liberally and to make good cheere: for he that amid pleasant discourses 
and mery talke mooveth a speech that causeth bending and knitting of browes’ 
causes great disruption and even risk, for ‘this neglect of opportunitie bringeth with 
it great danger.’
225
 On the other hand, ‘a faithfull and carefull friend’ will not ‘reject 
such occasions’, but will ‘take hold thereof quickly, and make good use of them’.
226
 
In short, ‘opportunitie a wise and skilfull friend will not omit, but make especial 
good use of’.
227
 Such moments ‘open the doore and make way for us to enter, and 
give us leave to speak frankly’.
228
  
Given the power of parrhesia for good or ill, Plutarch addresses the 
questions: ‘In what cases and occurrences then, ought a friend to be earnest and 
vehement? and when is he to use his libertie of speech, and extend it to the full?’
229
 
In other words, what is it exactly that makes counsel kairotic and (thus) justifies 
free speech? The answer combines the virtuous ends of counsel with a 
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consideration of kairos. One should give frank counsel ‘when occasion is offered, 
and the time serveth best to represse excessive pleasure, to restraine unbridled 
choler, to refraine intollerable pride and insolencie, to stay insatiable avarice, or to 
stand against any foolish habitude and inconsiderate motion’.
230
 Kairos exists in the 
opportunity to encourage virtuous action and bridle vice. For Plutarch this 
‘define[s]... the opportunity of free speech’.
231
 
Although most Renaissance writers focused far more on the tradition of 
decorum rather than kairos, there are a few notable exceptions.
232
 For instance, 
Thomas Starkey places a great deal of emphasis on time and place in his Dialogue, 
articulated as a tension between decorous abstention from politics and kairotic 
timeliness. As Lupset tells Pole ‘like as there is some respect to be had of time for 
the abstaining from the entreaty of matters of the common weal, so there is much 
more of taking the time when it is, and taking occasion when it offereth itself’.
233
 
He exhorts Pole to ‘let not occasion slip; suffer not your time vainly to pass, which 
without recovery fleeth away; for, as they say, occasion and time will never be 
restored again’.
234
 These themes are recalled at the conclusion of the dialogue, 
when Lupset encourages Pole to speak his mind not only in the context of their 
private discussion, but before the king. To Pole’s objection that he ought to wait for 
Henry VIII’s solicitation, and thus ‘tarry my time’, Lupset tells him once again not 
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 Plutarch 1603, p. 110. 
231
 Plutarch 1603, p. 110. 
232
 Kinneavy 1986, pp. 59, 86 argues that, although the Ciceronian concept of 
decorum continued well into the medieval and Renaissance periods, the influence 
of karios was completely lost. This argument is countered in Baumlin 2002, p. 138.  
233
 Starkey 1948, p. 38; ‘kyke as ther ys some respecte to be had of tyme for the 
abstenyng from the intrety of materys of the commyn wele, so ther ys much more of 
takyng the tyme when hyt ys, & takyng occasyon when hyt offryth hyt selfe’ 
(Starkey 1989, p. 17).  
234
 Starkey 1948, pp. 38-9; ‘let not occasyon slyppe, suffur not your tyme vaynly to 
pas, wych wythout recovery fleth a way, <fer as they say> occasyon & tyme wyl 
never be restoryd <agayne>’ (Starkey 1989, p. 17). 
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to ‘let this occasion slip’ for such ‘tarrying of time... is the destruction of all’.
235
 
Pole suggests that they will discuss ‘whether a wise man ought to desire to handle 
matters of the common weal, or tarry till he be called’ at another time, but assures 




Starkey’s second dialogue on the temporal dimension of political counsel 
has not survived and was probably never written. There is, however, a 
contemporary text which discusses precisely these themes, deliberately placed in 
the tradition of kairos set out by Plutarch in the Second Sophistic. This is Thomas 
Elyot’s Pasquil the Playne of 1533, which like his other works of the early 1530s 
directly addresses the office of a good counsellor.
237
 Whereas Starkey makes no 
direct mention of the tradition of kairos, Elyot is explicit in making an 
understanding of this term the central theme of his text.
238
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 Starkey 1948, p. 191; ‘tary my tyme’... ‘let thys occasyon slype’... ‘thys tarying 
of tyme... ys the destructyon of al’ (Starkey 1989, p. 142).   
236
 Starkey 1948, p. 191; ‘wether a wyse man aught to desyre to handle materys of 
the commyn wele, or tary tyl he be callyd’... ‘schal ever as occasyon movyth me be 
redy to dow servyce to my prynce & cuntrey’ (Starkey 1989, p. 143).  
237
 Walker 2005, p. 183 describes Pasquil as ‘the high water mark of Elyot’s direct 
assault upon individuals in his attempt to counsel the King towards moderation’. As 
Conrad 1992, p. 95 points out, Elyot’s Pasquil is the earliest English example of a 
pasquinade, a genre which had developed in Rome in the first decades of the 
sixteenth century. Walzer 2012a, pp. 25-6; Walzer 2012b, pp. 2-3 suggest that 
Pasquil was written as a reflection on Elyot’s failed attempts to counsel Henry VIII 
against his marriage to Anne Boleyn and his subsequent removal from his 
diplomatic posting. For Elyot’s interventions in Henry VIII’s divorce case see 
Walker 2005, pp. 124-40.  
238
 Although Conrad 1992, pp. 95-9 gives a careful reading of the dialogue of 
Pasquil, including the passage from Aeschylus, the important vocabulary of kairos 
is not mentioned. Likewise Walzer 2012a, p. 38; Walzer 2012b, pp. 1-21 provide a 
close reading of Pasquil in the context of classical rhetoric, considering both 
prepon and kairos, but does not note the connection between the quotation from 
Aeschylus and kairos, nor the use of ‘season’ for kairos in the dialogue between 
Pasquil and Harpocrates. 
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He certainly would have been aware of the tradition that he was drawing on. 
Elyot translated Plutarch’s De liberis educandis in 1530 and it has been suggested 
that he also produced a translation of Plutarch’s Quomodo adulator ab amico 
internoscatur for Henry VIII.
239
 In the same year that Elyot published Pasquil, he 
also published a translation of Isocrates’ Ad Nicoclem – a work of political advice 
to the Cyprian king Nicocles – in which Isocrates notes that the crucial virtue of a 
counsellor is the ability to speak in accordance with kairos.
240
 In Elyot’s words: 
‘specyally they that be counsailors ought to haue consideration of the occasyon, 
tyme, and opportunyte [kairos]’.
241
  
This idea is played out in Pasquil. Pasquil is a dialogue between three 
counsellors on the best method of giving advice to their prince. The title character 
must defend his frank speech against two other figures: Gnatho, who argues that 
flattery is the best way to counsel a king, and Harpocrates, who favours silent 
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 Jardine 1997, xxiii. Elyot was not ignorant of the tradition of decorum either, as 
he translates the term in his Dictionary of 1538 as ‘a semelynesse, or that which 
becommeth the person, hauynge respecte to his nature, degree, study, offyce, or 
professyon, be it in doinge or speakynge, a grace. sometyme it sygnifyeth honestie’ 
(1538, sig. XXX
v
). It is interesting that all sense of the temporal element of 
decorum is missing here. Elyot thus represents one of the few English humanist 
writers who noted and adopted an understanding of kairos distinct from that of 
decorum, probably based largely on his reading of Isocrates and Plutarch. 
240
 See Walzer 2012a, pp. 36-7; Walzer 2012b, pp. 20-1. As Walker 2005, p. 181 
points out, Pasquil was the first of Elyot’s texts to be published in 1533, followed 
closely by Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man, also a dialogue on the 
subject of counsel, and then his translation of Isocrates. He was, however, already 
very familiar with the text, having recommended it in the Gouernour two years 
earlier (Walker 2005, p. 218).  
241
 Isocrates 1533, 11. Elyot’s translation emphasizes the themes of kairos and the 
counsellor far more strongly than the modern: ‘You should, therefore, avoid what is 
in controversy and test men's value in the light of what is generally agreed upon, if 
possible taking careful note of them when they present their views on particular 
situations’; Isocrates 1980, vol. 1, p. 107. Sipiora 2002, pp. 1-11 notes that Isocrates 




 Gnatho chides Pasquil for ‘raylyng’ on without considering ‘what, 
and to whome, and where thou spekest.’
243
 He suggests that Pasquil’s ‘libertie in 
speche’ is ‘vnprofitable’.
244
 This argument is based upon his interpretation of 
‘Aeschylus counsaylle’, given in Pasquil as ‘holding thy thonge wher it behoueth 
the. And spekyng in tyme that which is conuenient’.
245
 
The line quoted is from the second play of Aeschylus’s Oresteia, The 
Libation Bearers. The character of Orestes addresses the chorus, instructing them: 
‘σιγᾶν θ’ ὅπου δεῖ καὶ λέγειν τὰ καίρια’ – keep silent in places where there is need 
and speak that which is in the right place.
246
 Like Plutarch, Elyot seeks to identify 
exactly what constitutes kairotic counsel, and so the rest of the dialogue concerns 
the proper interpretation of this line from Aeschylus – in other words, the proper 
interpretation of kairos for a counsellor. 
Gnatho gives his reading first. He interprets the statement as meaning that 
‘it behoueth a man to holde his tunge, whan he aforeseeth by any experience, that 
the thinge, whiche he wolde purpose or speke of to his superior, shall neyther be 
pleasantly herde nor thankefully taken’.
247
 He suggests that, when it comes to 
words, ‘oportunitie & tyme alwaye do depende on the affection and appetite of hym 
that hereth them’.
248
 Of course, anyone well read in their Plutarch, as Elyot was, 
would know that this was an interpretation of kairos completely at odds with the 
one that a good counsellor was meant to adopt. 
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 Walker 2005, p. 185 makes the argument that Harpocrates is intended as a 
criticism of Thomas Cramner.  
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 Aeschylus 1926, vol. 2, p. 216. Note that the form here is kairios, a variant of 
kairos. Note as well that the added temporal reference ‘spekyng in time’ given by 
Elyot has no precedent in the original.  
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In response, Elyot has Pasquil reiterate much of Plutarch’s doctrine of 
kairos explored above. He begins with examples drawn from the discussion of table 
talk: ‘When men be set at a good soupper, and be busily occupyed in eatynge and 
drinkinge, though thou be depely sene in philosophie, holde thy tonge and dispute 
not of temperaunce’.
249
 This is juxtaposed with a more formal council setting: 
‘Whan thou arte sittynge in counsaile aboute maters of weighty importaunce: talke 
not than of passe tyme or daliaunce, but omittinge affection or dreede, speke than to 
the pourpose’.
250
 If one takes account of the proper occasion, Pasquil tells Gnatho, 
then the counsel will be even more effective. For example, ‘Whan thy frendes be 
set downe to souper, before the cuppes betwise fylled: reherce the peryll and also 
dishonesti that hapneth by glotony’.
251
 When it comes to councils, the right time 
comes ‘after thou haste either herde one raisonne bifore the, or at the leest weye, in 
the balaunce of thynge owne raison ponderid the questio[n]’.
252
 It is then that one 
should ‘spare not to shew thine aduise, & to speke truely’.
253
  
Pasquil then proceeds to give Gnatho a full definition of the classical 
concept of kairos:   
Oportunite consisteth in place or tyme, where and whan the sayd 
affections or passion of wrath be mitigate and out of extremitie. And 
wordes be called conueniente, whiche haue respecte to the nature and 
state of the person, vnto whom they be spoken, and also to the 
detrimente, whiche mought ensue by the vice or lacke that thou hast 
espied, & it ought not to be as thou hast supposed. For oportunite & 
tyme for a counsayllour to speke, do not depend of the affection and 
appetite of hym that is counsayled: mary than counsaylle were but a 
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As Plutarch had established, the affections should not be entered into a 
consideration of opportunity, in fact the opportune time is when they are ‘out of 
extremitie’. Rather one should only consider those things that will ensure that 
truthful and virtuous counsel will be most efficacious. 
Pasquil and the third member of the dialogue, Harpocrates, also enter into a 
consideration of kairos and timeliness. Hearing that his master will ‘syt in counsail 
about waightie causes’ after dining, Harpocrates declares that only after he too has 
dined will he give attendance.
255
 This prompts in Pasquil a diatribe against the 
reversals of the world, which cause men to counsel after the day is done, instead of 
attending to such matters first thing in the morning.
256
 He reflects that ‘after noone 
is tourned to fore noone, vertue into vice.’
257
 This discussion of the importance of 
the timing of pleasurable pursuits (namely dinner) and counsel, following closely 
on the heels of Pasquil’s previous examples which juxtaposed the same, recalls the 
reader to a consideration of the importance of the opportune time to counsel, 
especially as regards the definition of virtue and vice. 
Challenging Harpocrates’s dedication to silence, Pasquil asks him ‘If I 
perceyued one at thy backe with a swerde drawne, redy to strike the, woldest thou 
that I shulde holde my peace, or else tell the?’
258
 Harpocrates responds that ‘Naye, 
sylence were than oute of season’ – ‘season’ being another common translation for 
kairos.
259
 Pasquil responds that Harpocrates ‘wyll season silence’ and jokes that 
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 See Dillon 2002, p. 37 for the importance of dining and philosophic counsel.  
257
 Elyot 1533, fo. 13
v
. This ‘turning virtue into vice’ speaks to the tradition of 
paradiastole which will be addressed in the next chapter. Notably, Elyot may have 
been the first English writer to attempt to define paradiastole in his Dictionary of 
1538 (sig. Q, iv
r
): ‘Paradiastole, a dilatinge of a mater by an interpretation’. 
258




 Elyot 1533, fo. 13
v
. For the translation of kairos as ‘season’, see Baumlin 2002, 
pp. 141-4. ‘To season’ in English has its root in the temporal meaning of ‘season’, 
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‘Marye I wene my lorde shulde haue a better cooke of you thanne a 
counsayllour.’
260
 He asks Harpocrates ‘howe thou doest season thy sylence[?]’
261
 
Harpocrates responds that he does so ‘with sugar, for I vse lyttell salte,’ and Pasquil 
retorts that this ‘maketh your counsayl more swete than sauery.’
262
 
Harpocrates’s seasoning of his silence with sugar, Pasquil suggests, makes it 
more appealing to the pleasurable appetites of his master, but less wholesome. The 
timing or season of his counsel alone changes its direction from virtuous ends to 
serving only the passions. Harpocrates concedes this point and so Pasquil asks him 
again, ‘whan is your silence in season?’
263
 Harpocrates admits that he ‘can not 
shortly tel’ for he is ‘so abashed’ by the ‘froward reson’ of Pasquil.
264
 Pasquil 
comes to an end by encouraging his listeners to ‘Beare away the sayde sentence [of 
Aesychlus] with myne exposition, and vse it’ – to take away his interpretation of 
kairos and apply it to their counsel.
265
 Elyot’s lesson is clear: without understanding 
all the important elements of oratory, including the considerations of decorum and 
kairos, the positive effects of the humanist counsellor’s advice can be completed 
reversed, leading his prince to vice rather than virtue. 
                                                                                                                                        
originally referring to allowing fruits, etc to ‘season’ – i.e. ‘to render (fruit) 
palatable by the influence of the seasons’ – before picking them. Thus ‘right time’ 
is etymologically linked to this sense of seasoning, and Elyot’s pun has even greater 
meaning.  
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 Elyot 1533, fo. 29
r
. Although it is true as Walzer 2012b, pp. 13-14 points out 
that Pasquil as the parrhesiastes is unlikely to have been the model of counsel that 
Elyot was propounding (this instead being the negotiation of a via media between 
the three characterised models based on the cultivation of prudence), his arguments 
regarding the kairotic timing of counsel go unchallenged and accepted by the end of 
the dialogue, strongly suggesting that they are Elyot’s own.   
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Chapter 3: Illustrations of Counsel and Councils 
The construction of a discourse of the ideal counsellor was paralleled by 
developments in a tradition of evil counsel. In the medieval period this involved a 
preoccupation with figures perceived as irrational, primarily women and youths. In 
the humanist discourse this grows to include a concern about rhetoricians who are 
able and willing to dress the vices as virtues – embracing the rhetorical figure of 
paradiastole [παραδιαστολή] – thereby leading their prince down a path of 
pleasure-seeking rather than virtue. This becomes a particular concern in the 
context of the Henrician regime, in which the dramatic actions of Henry VIII were 
cast as resulting from the dominance of evil counsel over good. Such pernicious 
counsellors, in addition to leading their prince to worldly, self-serving pursuits, 
stifle rather than mediate the voices of the people who are seen as having a 
legitimate right to provide their monarch with counsel. The increasing 
institutionalisation of counsel in the period is thus both a way to strengthen the 
power of good counsel as a bridle on the prince’s arbitrary power, and as a way to 
ensure that the interests of the people are served through the mediating role of the 
good counsellor.  
 
I. Counsel and the Fall of Princes  
Whereas the good counsellor in the medieval Aristotelian tradition helps to govern 
the prince’s passions and appetites, the evil counsellor has the opposite effect, 
spurring the prince’s pleasurable or self-interested pursuits. Such evil counsellors 
are unable to provide the governing counsel so necessary to the prince, as they 
themselves are ruled by their passions. It is therefore unsurprising that women and 
youths were typically castigated as being improper counsellors, as they were not 
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credited as having the rationality and experience necessary to provide the prince 
with the prudence requisite of good counsel.
266
  
 This lesson is clearly demonstrated in Giovanni Boccaccio’s De casibus 
virorum illustrium, written in the late fourteenth century. This text details the lives 
of powerful men and women throughout history, demonstrating the influence of 
fortune to both bestow and withdraw worldly gain. It was the early fifteenth-
century version expanded by the French humanist Laurent de Premierfait that John 
Lydgate (also responsible for the English translation of the Secretum) translated 
into English in the first half of the fifteenth century as the Fall of Princes.
267
 
Lydgate not only translated many of the commentaries added by Premierfait to 
Boccaccio’s original, but inserted many of his own as ‘envoys’ before each tale.  
These additions came at the suggestion of his patron, Humphrey, Duke of 
Gloucester, who was an opponent of conciliar government in the period that the 
Fall was being composed, which may have been the cause of the recurring theme of 
evil counsel in Lydgate’s envoys.
268
 Certainly, the vast majority of the additions to 
the text address the importance of the lessons for a royal readership, emphasising 
the use of the Fall as a speculum principis.
269
 Such changes add a greater moral 
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 Bradshaw 1991, pp. 557-73 notes that for Aristotle, whereas both women and 
men have the ability to deliberate rationally, women will be subject to the dictates 
of their passions and therefore will not be capable of acting according to rational 
deliberation.   
267
 Budra 2000, pp. 5-6. As Budra 2000, p. 7 points out, the original Latin version 
was never circulated widely in England, so this was the only edition of the De 
casibus for the vast majority of English readers.  
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 Mortimer 2005, p. 58. Budra 2000, p. 19 notes that while the de casibus tradition 
is distinct from the speculum principis genre, they can coincide, as they do in the 
case of Lydgate’s Fall.  
269
 See Mortimer 2005, pp. 58-61.  
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 For instance, in the chapter addressing the fates of kings ‘that yeueth hasty 
credence to liers and flaterers’, Lydgate begins by giving general precepts about the 
danger of flatterers, and the importance of critically engaging with the advice that 
one is given.
271
 Lydgate then turns to women in particular, arguing that they can 
never be good counsellors, for ‘Of their nature wymen can flater and fage| And be 
sumtyme to copious of their language’.
272
 These lessons are repeated in the chapter 
describing ‘Howe Saul kinge of Ierusalem borne of lowe degre, as longe as he dred 
god was obedient to him, and rulyd by good counseile had many great 
disconfitures’ and how when he did not he ‘lost his crowne, and was slayne by 
Philistees’.
273
 Lydgate highlights three elements that made the early part of Saul’s 
reign successful: humility, obedience to God and good counsel:  
while that he was meke and humble in dede 
Voide of pride and fals presumpcion 
And prudent counseyle with him did lede 
Him to gouerne by good discrecion 
He fonde quiete through all his region 
No foreyn enmy durst him to werreye 




Saul’s downfall comes when his pride ‘outraied reason to haue the gouernaunce’.
275
 
After this transformation Saul refuses proper counsel, for he ‘stode disconsolate| 
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 Boccaccio 1494, sig. I, iii
v
. Although this sort of moralising did not actually 
apply to many of Boccaccio’s tales – which featured the downfall of virtuous as 
well as vicious rulers – Lydgate was persistent in these lessons in his envoys; see 
Budra 2000, pp. 49-51.  
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 Boccaccio 1494, sig. D, iv
v
. Lydgate had tempered much of Boccaccio’s 
misogyny, but it is still present even in the amended English version; Budra 2000, 
pp. 61-2.   
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Counseyl of god nor prophete knewe he none’ making him a ‘man moost 
infortunate’.
276
 Instead, Saul takes the counsel of a woman, a ‘phetonesse’ whose 
counsel was ‘nat accodynge... to reson| Nor like a thinge which that is credible’.
277
 
Thus, when he does finally seek counsel, it is clear that Saul seeks it from the 
wrong source – a woman – and thus is failed by it.
278
  
Young advisers are also to be avoided, as Lydgate makes clear in the 
chapter ‘Howe king Roboam for gyunge feith to yonge counseyle lost the 
beneuolence of his people and dyed a fool’.
279
 The prince, ‘whan he entryd into his 
region... Rulyd him silf by will and no reason’ and ‘despised the doctryne and 
counsayle’ of the ‘olde [and] wise to his greate disauaile’.
280
 Like women, the 
young are all will and no reason, and therefore equated with flatterers.  
 Such examples are commonplace within medieval texts. We have already 
seen how the anonymous poem Richard the Redeless had blamed a lack of adequate 
counsel for the downfall of Richard II, particularly criticising his choice of young 
men as counsellors: ‘For it fallith as well to fodis/ of xxiiij yeris,| Or yonge men of 
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 Ferster 2006, p. 110. The suspicion of women’s counsel was a long-standing 
tradition. In the Secretum the character of Aristotle details a list of people who 
cannot be trusted – women among them – and then recounts a tale of how he 
warned Alexander against a woman bent on poisoning him (poison being an oft-
employed metaphor for evil counsel); see Ferster 2006, p. 42. John Gower’s Mirour 
de l’Omme also criticises male monarchs ruled by women as a commentary on 
Edward III and his mistress Alice Perrers. Such examples are in some sense 
contradictory to the widespread use of female figures who communicate advice 
within the speculum literature; see Schieberle 2008.  However, these divine and 
otherworldly figures – such as personified prudence – were presented in a much 
different light than the female influences surrounding the prince, who were 
dangerous sources of advice. Where a female counsellor was acceptable, even 
commonplace, in the private sphere, it was male prudence that dominated the 
political; see Deist 2003, p. 231. 
279








yisterday/ to yeue good redis,| As becometh a kow/ to hoppe/ in a cage!’.
281
 
Particularly the story of Rehoboam (or Roboam as Lydgate calls him) was a tried 
and true exemplar of the ruler who takes the advice of the young and passionate, 
rather than the old and prudent.
282
  
 Like the specula texts, the proliferation and translation of the De casibus 
literature also functioned as performance – rather than just example – of political 
counsel. The 1527 edition of the Lydgate text produced by crown printer Richard 
Pynson stands as a prime example. Like most editions of the work, the front matter 
contains a traditional ‘presentation portrait’ of the author gifting his work to his 
patron, with the rest of the court attentively making note of the act, both through 
word and gesture.
283
 In the 1527 edition, the figure of authority pictured is a clerical 
one, most likely a cardinal or high-ranking bishop, who receives the book before 
the rest of his court (Figure 2). 
An illustration later in the text also features a similar high-ranking cleric, 
but this time in a much more compromised position, atop Fortune’s wheel. It was 
common in the de casibus texts to include an illustration of Fortune and her wheel 
(Figure 3), but this one is rather different (Figure 4). At the centre of the image, 
atop the wheel, is a figure not included in other representations of this scene: a 
cardinal, identifiable by his dress (in particular his hat), who seems to reflect the 
image of the recipient in the presentation portrait.
284
 The text is intended as a 
message to a high-ranking cleric, holding court and perched at the height of 
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 Richard the Redeless 2000, ln. 260-2. 
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 Ferster 2006, pp. 125-6.  
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 See Perkins 2003, p. 174. 
284
 As both Perkins 2003 and Gillespie 2006 suggest, the image of Fortune’s wheel 
was often paired with the presentation portrait in manuscript editions of Lydgate’s 
work.  
 77 
fortune’s wheel. The implication appears to be clear: the cardinal is Wolsey.
285
 In 
February of 1527, when the Fall was published, Wolsey was still at the high point, 
perhaps the highest point, of his career. But he was not above criticism, and an 
image of Wolsey poised high on Fortune’s wheel about to take a disastrous tumble 
is not so much prophetic (given the catastrophic year that he was about to have) as 
advisory.  
Fortune's wheel, like the specula, functions as a mirror for those in 
authority; as such, it shows the cardinal the dangers of his current path and the 
ramifications if he does not treat the textual counsel portrayed in the presentation 
portrait and contained within the text with the gravity it deserves.
286
 Not only will 
he suffer a fall in life, the picture suggests, but his downfall will live in infamy as 
well, for – like his acceptance of the textual advice in the presentation portrait – this 
latter scene is also carefully watched, as the figure of Boccaccio, poised to write, 
replaces the watchful group of spectators on the frontispiece. The Janus-faced 
Fortuna, also a unique feature of the 1527 Fall, serves to remind the reader that 
Fortune ‘sees, the yeares bothe oulde, and newe’ and watchful authors are ever 
ready to take the examples of the present and immortalise them.
287
 Lydgate’s 
examples of evil counsellors are brought into the context of the Henrician court by 
the illustrations in the 1527 edition of the Fall.  
 
II. Painting Vice as Virtue  
The warning to Cardinal Wolsey brings us to a type of evil counsel particular to the 
humanist discourse. This is not to say that the concern for the passionate influences 
                                                 
285
 Gillespie 2006, p. 173. 
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 See Gillespie 2006, p. 175. 
287
 Whitney 1586, p. 108. 
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of seductive women and wilful youths disappears – Henry VIII in particular was 
often criticised for his willingness to favour both.
288
 But there emerges with the 
Henrician humanist tradition a new and predominant concern for the influence of 
persuasive orators in the courts of princes, who are able to use their skills to deceive 
princes into mistaking vices for virtues, contrary to the true ends of the political 
counsellor.  
 For the classical rhetoricians, there were cases where techniques of 
rhetorical ornamentation and amplification extended into something else, a figure 
of speech identified by Quintilian as paradiastole, or ‘rhetorical redescription’, for 
instance ‘when you call yourself wise instead of astute, brave instead of rash, 
economical instead of mean’.
289
 This sort of euphemistic language poses a problem 
for Renaissance theorists, who were aware of the proximity between virtues and 
vices; the ability to describe one as the other meant that one could easily lead the 
hearer down the wrong path.
290
  
 Perhaps the clearest illustration of this paradiastolic transformation exists in 
the popular morality plays of the period, which also served as examples and 
presentations of counsel. Their performance replaces the text in the presentation 
portrait with a live play, but the role as mirror and exemplar does not change, nor 
does the importance of the watchful spectators, who are not just observing the play 
but also its intended recipient.
291
 The requirement that the lord or prince in question 
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 For instance in 1519, Henry’s young courtier-companions were ‘expelled’ from 
court ‘under pretence of their being youths of evil counsel, and intent upon their 
own benefit, to the detriment, hurt and discredit of his Majesty’ as the Venetian 
ambassador reports; quoted in Walker 1989, p. 3, and the concern over the 
influence of Anne Boleyn cannot be overstated; see Ives 2005.  
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 Quintilian 1922, p. 484; see Skinner 2002b, p. 273 and Skinner 2007, pp. 148-
63. 
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 Skinner 2002b, pp. 274-85.  
291
 Walker 1998, p. 64.  
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be seen as fulfilling the role of a patron seeking advice from such sources left a 
space – albeit a small one – for the airing of criticism and the opening of public 
debate.
292
 The plays themselves, more often than not, also portray models of 
counsel in which the monarch must beware of evil, dissembling or flattering 
counsellors. In particular, they highlight the thin line between vice and virtue, 
between good and bad counsel, that is defined by language alone. A recurring trope 
sees the counsellor-characters represented as vices which transform themselves into 
associated virtues, a real-life depiction of the flatterer’s ‘dressing virtue for vice’.
293
  
For example, in Magnyfycence, a play written as early as 1504 by the 
former royal tutor and clergyman John Skelton, the king of the title becomes 
convinced by Fancy, masquerading as Largesse, that Measure is only suited for ‘a 
marchauntes hall| But largesse becometh a state ryall’ and thus has Measure 
banished from the court.
294
 Fancy brings in a host of other vices, all who take on the 
appearance and title of a virtue – Crafty Conveyance poses as ‘Surveyaunce’, 
Counterfeit Countenance becomes Good ‘Demeynaunce’ and Cloaked Collusion 
hides as Sober Sadness. By their counsel, Magnificence lets Liberty free of the rule 
of Measure, declaring: ‘nowe syrs I am lyke as a prynce sholde be| I haue welth at 
wyll largesse and lyberte| Fortune to her lawys can not abandune me| But I shall of 
fortune rule the reyne’.
295
 Of course, such pride cannot end well for our prince, and 
his statement allows another counsellor in, ‘Courtly Abusyon’, who counsels the 
king always to regard his pleasure: ‘By waywarde wylfulnes let eche thynge be 
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conuayed| what so euer ye do folowe your owne wyll| Be it reason or none it shall 
not gretely skyll| Be it ryght or wronge by the aduyse of me| Take your pleasure 




Very quickly, the king learns of the consequences of his choices, as Felicity 
and Liberty depart, and other characters such as Poverty and Adversity enter. The 
character of Circumspection declares the moral of the piece: ‘A myrour incleryd is 
this interlude| This lyfe inconstant for to beholde and se’.
297
 He draws attention to 
the public character of the counsel, as well as to the speculum principis nature of 
the exemplarity it contains. A prince must beware of those counsellors who 
disguise vice as virtue, tempting the prince to follow his pleasure rather than 
prudent measure. 
The same lesson is communicated by the Scottish poet and humanist George 
Buchanan’s Baptistes sive Calumnia, written in the 1540s, although not published 
until the late sixteenth century. Unlike Magnyfycence and other contemporary 
morality plays, Baptistes does not feature vices who dress as virtues to counsel their 
prince, but rather human counsellors who use their language to accomplish the 
same ends, a theme emphasised in the prologue, in which the author speaks of those 
‘who assume new faces and change themselves into any form they please’.
298
 
Although the play tells the tale of John the Baptist, the majority of action is given 
over to the machinations of the counsellors within Herod’s court who contribute to 
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 It begins with a dialogue between two counsellors: Malchus 
and Gamaliel, the latter the voice of reason and moderation who attempts – 
unsuccessfully – to calm the rage of Malchus against John the Baptist. Like his 
classical predecessors, Buchanan writes a ‘Chorus’ into his play, who comment on 
the action on the stage, noting the worth – but futility – of the counsel of Gamaliel, 
for  ‘wrath, the enemy of Gods advice, darkens his minds cleer light, who stops his 
ears to wholsome admonitions’.
300
  
Gamaliel complains that Malchus will counsel the king according to ‘what 
ere he holds commodious to himself, masking his wickedness with honest 
names’.
301
 It is a ‘common fault’ among Princes, he complains, that they are 
susceptible to such counsellors, who ‘change the name of quondam vertue’ and 
‘with glorious titles proudly preferre the Vulgar we beguile’.
302
 The Chorus picks 
up this theme as well, decrying a world in which ‘False modesty doth skreen the 
brazen face, pieties vale the impious doth conceale’.
303
 Herod himself is presented 
in a favourable light; it is the evil counsel that surrounds him – personified not only 
through the deceptive Malchus but also the ‘enraged’ Queen
304
 – which prompts 
him to persecute the only truthful and god-serving counsellor in the piece: John the 
Baptist. 
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John protests to Herod that his truth telling is actually in the king’s interest; 
warning him of the divine law to which he will be held to account. To Herod’s 
suggestion that he ought to separate the divine and the political – ‘When thou shalt 
come to Heaven speak heavenly things, but while thou livest on earth, earths Laws 
abide’ – John responds that he has a higher duty than his allegiance to his country – 
‘To earthly Kingdoms reverence I bear, and Kings obey, but those eternall 
Kingdoms I hold my Country and their King adore’.
305
  
It has been suggested that Baptistes was written as a commentary on the 
death of Thomas More, whose own historical drama – the History of King Richard 
III – also demonstrates the pernicious power of persuasion to shape political 
realities.
306
 Written between 1514 and 1518, Richard III was composed in both 
Latin and English, with subtle divergences between the two, the former intended for 
the educated humanist audience, the latter for a vernacular readership.
307
 Neither 
version was finished, and in both cases the portrayal of English history is a dark 
one; the powerful use their rhetorical skills to shape the theatre of politics into one 
defined by deception and dissimulation.
308
  
This ability to shape politics through language is first emphasised by the 
dying Edward IV in the opening scene of the text. Concerned for the well-being of 
his young sons, Edward calls together his lords to impress on them the importance 
of their good counsel to his children, for ‘whyle the youth of hys children shoulde 
lacke discrecion of themself and good counsayle of their frendes’, they are 
vulnerable to many dangers, especially from those who ‘should counsayle for their 
own commodity and rather by pleasaunte aduyse too wynne themselfe fauour, then 
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by profitable aduertisemente to do the children good’.
309
 In the competitive vying 
for power, Edward tells them, ‘flattery shall haue more place then plaine and 
faithfull aduyse’, which will ‘infect’ the young minds of the princes.
310
 Despite 
emphasising the power of persuasion to corrupt the princes, Edward’s own oration 
goes completely ignored by the nobles present.
311
 His words draw the reader’s 
attention to the real issues of the history – rhetoric and counsel – but beyond this, it 
has no effect on the plot, and the entire episode is quickly forgotten. 
The scheming Richard III is not only a master actor within the theatre of 
politics – he is introduced in the Latin version as ‘Personam quamlibet induere, 
gerereque, et tueri naviter; hilarem, severam, gravem, remissam, prout sumere aut 
ponere suasit commodum’ – but also a master director, knowing who to select for 
which role, and when to deploy them.
312
 Two of Richard’s key actors are the Dukes 
of Hastings and Buckingham.
313
 As ‘no manne doubted or neded to doubte’ 
Hasting’s ‘trouth towarde the king’, he uses him to persuade ‘the Lordes to belieue, 
that [Richard] the Duke of Gloucester, was sure and fastlye faithfull to his 
prince’.
314
 More notes that Hastings himself only ‘parte hym selfe beliued’ his 
words to the lords and ‘parte he wist the contraye’.
315
 Nevertheless he is willing to 
use his skills and credibility to move the lords towards support of Gloucester, to the 
loss not only of his life, but his reputation, as after Hastings’s death, Richard puts 
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Like Hastings, the Duke of Buckingham is described as ‘marueilouslye well 
spoken’, employing his powers of persuasion on three critical occasions: the 
breaking of the queen’s sanctuary, the manufacturing of the consent of the people to 
the accession of Richard and the petition to Richard to accept the crown.
317
 Each 
event reflects the ability of words to shape the political environment: immoral and 
unlawful actions become just, the consent of the people is fabricated and evil kings 
are appointed.
318
 This lesson is epitomised in the final example – the lords’ petition 
to Richard to take the crown of England. Despite having orchestrated the event 
himself, Richard resists the pleadings of Buckingham to take the crown in order to 
create the appearance of yielding to the will of the people. It is at this moment that 
the most lasting and resilient metaphor of the work is put forward. The people in 
attendance recognise that ‘to shewe out of seasonne’ the truth behind the pageantry, 
and ‘calle him by his owne name whyle he standeth in his magestie’ not only would 
cause ‘one of his tormentors... to breake his head’ but lead to ‘marring of the 
play’.
319
 Thus it is that ‘these matters bee Kynges games, as it were stage playes, 
and for the more part plaied vpon scafoldes’.
320
 Politics is an illusion, generated by 
words, and those who have not the skill to participate ‘disorder the play & do 
themself no good’ and so ‘they that wise be, wil medle no farther’.
321
 Of course, 
this is the same theme communicated by Hythloday in Utopia – participation in the 
theatre of politics without skill is destructive to the play itself; but the skills 
                                                 
316
 More 1963, p. 52.  
317
 More 1963, p. 15.  
318
 Logan 2007, pp. 28-32 notes how these are exemplars of paradiastolic speech.  
319
 More 1963, p. 81.  
320
 More 1963, p. 81. 
321
 More 1963, p. 81. 
 85 
required are more often than not turned to evil purposes. The Latin play ends here, 
on this dark and pessimistic note regarding to the possibility of positive civic 
engagement. 
But the English account contains a glimmer of hope. In this version, More 
goes on to describe to the reader how Richard’s reign is plagued from the start with 
division, and Richard himself is tormented by his conscience, as all tyrants are.
322
  
More focuses on the break between Richard and Buckingham, who, unlike 
Hastings, survives the usurpation. It is at this point, in the final pages of the English 
text, that we have Richard’s antithesis presented in the person of Morton, Bishop of 
Ely. Like Richard, Morton has the ability to shape his surroundings and direct those 
around him with his words, but is uses such skills in the service of the realm. This 
is the same Morton who appears in Utopia, marked by his ‘polished and pointed’ 
speech, ability to test the ‘mettle’ and ‘presence of mind [of] a person’ through 
‘rough address’ and in whose advice the king had the ‘greatest confidence’.
323
 In 
Richard III More describes him as ‘a man of great natural wit, very wel learned & 
honourable’ who is also of ‘greate experience... [with] a depe insight in politike 
worldly driftes’.
324
 He is thus able to navigate the changing political scene without 
sacrificing his loyalty and integrity. Although he appears to be ‘taken by y
e
 tirant’, 
and is mentioned in the text as being present in Richard’s councils, he secretly 
aligns himself with the future Henry VII, who ultimately overthrows the usurper.
325
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While Richard was constructing his drama, Morton was working all the while 
within and underneath it to subvert it. More even credits him with the arrangement 
of the marriage between Henry VII and Elizabeth of York, which ends the Wars of 
the Roses and establishes the Tudor line, bringing ‘infinite benefite to the realm’.
326
 
Morton uses his rhetorical abilities to manipulate Buckingham; playing 
upon the Duke’s pride, ‘he craftely sought waies to pricke him forwarde taking 
always the thoccasion of his comming & so keeping him close w
t
in his bondes, that 
he rather semed to folow hym then to lead him’.
327
 Morton even manages to lead 
Buckingham into a position of supplication, exhorting the cardinal for his advice: 
‘Then longed the duke sore to here what he would haue sayd... & exhorted him so 
familiarly betwene them twain, to be bold so say what soeuer he thought’.
328
 
Morton at first denies these requests, drawing a striking parallel to Richard’s refusal 
to accept the crown from Buckingham. Both Richard and Morton create scenes 
whereby they are convinced into doing what they had always intended, in order to 
stay within the bounds of law and propriety. The power of words – the exchange 
between duke and future king or between duke and bishop – are the real power 
behind political action, even if the spectators know them to be false.  
Morton brings this lesson to the fore through a tale nominally from 
Aesop.
329
 In the tale, the lion declares that ‘on pain of deth there should be none 
horned beast in that wood’ and so a creature with a ‘bonch of flesh’ on his forehead 
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escapes the realm. When a fox asks the creature why he flees – after all he has not 
the dangerous horn the lion fears, the creature responds, ‘But what & he cal it an 
horn, wher am I then?’.
330
 The words of the lion are enough to construct a political 
reality powerful enough to turn innocence into guilt, even when the evidence to the 
contrary is staring everyone right in the face. Of course, Morton’s tale is itself 
deceptive; what he has in his head is not so harmless, but rather the treason that 
Richard fears. However, his words are powerful enough to receive Buckingham’s 
assurances of the secrecy of his counsel, and so Morton lays his (ultimately 
successful) trap.  
Morton, like the ideal counsellor described by More in Utopia, combines 
the Erasmian philosopher’s prudential ability to discern truth from falsehood with 
the willingness and ability to play his part in the theatre of politics, doing the best 
he can within it.
331
 Morton bides his time through the usurpation, when he cannot 
hope to draw Richard from his plan, until the passions of Buckingham present the 
perfect opportunity to act. Thus, in the closing passages of the extant Richard III, 
More gives us an example of an ideal counsellor, who has the power to bring 
infinite good to the realm through his manipulation of language.
332
 
Two further portrayals comment even more directly on the political context 
of early Tudor England by profiling counsellors of the early Henrician period 
whose use of language plays a crucial role in the character of their counsel. Both 
pieces – William Roper’s biography of Thomas More and George Cavendish’s 
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account of the rise and fall of Cardinal Wolsey – were written in the same period, 
from 1554 to 1558, recounting events of the Henrician revolution.
333
 The work of 
Roper, son-in-law of Thomas More, proclaims the value, nature and action of the 
ideal counsellor; Cavendish, Wolsey’s former gentleman usher, on the other hand, 
acknowledges that his title character makes all the wrong choices, serving as an 
example for other counsellor-figures.
334
 
Cavendish tells his readers that Wolsey is able to climb so high on Fortune’s 
wheel, not because of the pursuit of virtue in his own life, nor the inculcation of 
virtue in the actions of his prince, but rather in the application of his talents in 
bringing into reality whatever the prince’s will or pleasure might demand. In 
particular, Cavendish highlights the cardinal’s ‘especiall gift of Natural Eloquence’ 
by which he could ‘perswade and allure all men to his purposes’.
335
 He applied this 
ability to ‘advanc[ing] the Kings owne will and pleasure, having no respect to the 
Case’, which won him the favour of the king.
336
 Cavendish juxtaposes Wolsey’s 
indulgence of the king’s pleasure with the counsel of Henry’s other advisers, who 
act in line with the ideals of counsel advanced by humanist writers. Wolsey even 
stands in the way of the king receiving their advice, convincing him instead to 
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pursue only his will and pleasure: ‘Now the King being young, and much given to 
his pleasure, his old Councellors advised him to have recourse sometimes to the 




When he finally decides to use his rhetorical powers to give advice contrary 
to the king’s will and pleasure, in the matter of his divorce, Cavendish makes it 
clear that it is too late: ‘It is a wonderfull thing to consider the strength of Princes 
Wils when they are bent to have their pleasure fulfilled, wherin no reasonable 
perswasions wil serve the turne’.
338
 His biggest mistake, Wolsey says, in a reversal 
of John the Baptist’s claim in Baptistes, is serving the king’s pleasure over the will 
of God: ‘had I but served God as diligently as I have served the King, he would not 
have given me over in my grey haires. But this is the just reward that I must receive 
for my diligent pains and study, not regarding my service to God, but onely to my 
Prince’.
339
 He admonishes William Kingston, who is present to take him to the 
tower, that ‘if you be[come] one of the Privie Counsell’, which he does only years 
later, ‘take heede what you put in the Kings head, for you can never put it out 
againe’.
340
 These references harken back to Wolsey’s earlier advice to William 
Shelley on counselling the king:  
I counsel you and all other fathers of the law and learned men of [the 
king’s] counsel to put no more into [his] head than the law may stand 
with good conscience; for when ye tell him that ‘this is the law’ it were 
well done yet should tell him also that ‘although this be the law, yet this 
is conscience.’ For law without conscience is not good to be given unto 
a King in counsel... for ‘laus est facere quod decet, non quod licet’.
341
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This Latin quotation, ‘It is praiseworthy to do what is fitting [decus], not what is 
permitted’ comes from the pseudo-Senecan Octavia (ln. 454), in which Seneca 
attempts to counsel the tyrannous Nero, the same passage referenced by More in 
Utopia when he describes the importance of decorum in counsel. 
This quotation also reflects a moral written into Roper’s biography of More: 
The mirrour of vertue in worldly greatnes. Unlike the ambitious Wolsey, who 
worked his way into the king’s counsel by ‘attend[ing] those men whom hee 
thought to beare most rule in the councell’ and seizing every opportunity for 
advancement that he could, Roper tells his reader that More, like the reluctant 
Morton in Richard III, had to be convinced to take on roles in the king’s court.
342
 In 
fact, it is Wolsey himself, Roper suggests, who exhorts More to take a more 
prominent place at court: ‘the Cardinall accordin[g] to the Kinges pleasure, 
earnestly laboured with [More], & amongst his many other persuasio[n]s, he 
alleadged vnto him, how deere his seruice must needs be to the King’.
343
 In contrast 
to Wolsey and the rest of the counsellors, More’s humility and attention to his 
conscience is stronger than his desire to serve the king’s pleasures. This is the 
cause, Roper suggests, for both the downfall of More and the troubles in England 
surrounding Henry’s divorce. As the character of More tells his daughter: ‘it is a 
great pity, that any Christia[n] Prince should, by so flexible a Counsell ready to 
follow his affections, & by so weake a Clergy wanting grace to stand constantly to 
their Religion, with flattery be so grossely abused’.
344
 It is the evil counsel 
surrounding the king which is responsible for the fate of England. 
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Wolsey, as we saw, ends his life regretting his choice to serve the king’s 
will over and above that of God, whereas More makes it clear from the outset of his 
relationship with Henry that he will ‘first looke vnto God, after God, [then] vnto his 
King’ and, although Roper does not report it, More’s famous last words repeat the 
same dedication to God’s will over that of the king: beseeching those in attendance 
‘earnestly to pray to God to give the King good counsel, protesting that he died his 
faithful servant, and God's first’.
345
 The counsellor is meant to put regard for right 
action over that of the king’s pleasure or will. This is reflected in More’s instruction 
to another rising counsellor, Thomas Cromwell, which repeats the message that 
Wolsey had passed on to Shelley and Kingston. More tells Cromwell that ‘if you 
follow my poore aduise, you shall in your Counsell-giuing, euer tell [the king] what 
he ought to do, but neuer what he is able to do. So shall you shew your selfe a true 
and faythfull seruant, & a right worthy Cou[n]sellour’.
346
   
 
III. Counsel and Councils 
Roper also recounts an event in the life of More which brings us to another 
important theme in the Henrician conciliar tradition. In 1523, shortly after coming 
to court, More is appointed Speaker in Parliament, a role he is disinclined to take, 
but accepts from the king on two conditions: ‘the one priuately concerning my self, 
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the other concerning your whole asembly of Commons in Parlament’.
347
 First, he 
asks the king to forgive him if he should fail in his role of intermediary between the 
parliament and the king. He worries that he will ‘preuert or impayre their prudent 
instructions’ and so asks the king to allow him, if this should happen, to ‘repayre 
agayne to the Co[m]mon House, there to conferre anew with them, and take the 
more substantiall aduice’.
348
 More suggests that the counsel given by parliament 
might in fact be better than his own, and that he runs this risk of ‘perverting’ it in 
his attempts to mediate between the king and the commons.  
The value of parliament as a source of counsel is further emphasised in 
More’s second petition to the king, in which he requests that the Commons be 
given ‘your most gracious licence, and pardon’ to freely ‘declare [their] aduice’.
349
 
The members of the commons do not have the eloquence required within the 
theatre of politics and so run the risk of angering the king with their counsel. 
Amongst so many, ‘euery man is not alike witted, or so well spoken, as other’; just 
as ‘it often happeneth, that much folly is vttered, in a paynted speach; As likewise, 
many that are boystrous & rude in language, do yet giue right good substa[n]tiall 
Cou[n]sell’.
350
 For the ‘aduise of the commons’ is to be highly valued, as it is there 
that ‘matter[s] of weight & importance’ are treated of... which doth chiefly, & 




 More’s defence of the counsel provided by parliament is presented in stark 
contrast to Wolsey’s relationship with the Commons. More opposes Wolsey’s 
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complaints ‘that nothing was either spoken, or done in the Parliament house, but 
was immediately blowne abroad in euery Alehouse and Tauerne’.
352
 At More’s 
encouragement, the House rejects Wolsey’s requests for subsidies, mocking the 
‘Pompe’ with which he approaches them.
353
 In answering Wolsey’s demands, More 
further defends parliament’s ability to represent the diversity of the king’s subjects, 
for ‘although they had with all their voyces chosen and trusted him to speake, yet 
except euery one of the[m] could put into his owne head all their seuerall wittes, he 
along in so weighty a matter, was far vnmeete to make his Grace [an] answere’.
354
 
The value of the ‘many wits’ of Parliament makes it a valuable source for counsel, 




 We have already seen how many of the portrayals of counsel and politics 
from the period emphasised the neglected wisdom of the people. The Chorus of 
Buchanan’s Baptistes remain on the sideline of the action, for the majority of the 
play their cries and warnings go unheard. So too with the people of London in 
More’s Richard III, they are aware of the stage-play before them, but their parts 
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growth in the power and influence of parliament in this period has been well 
documented. Henry VIII’s execution of his father’s personal counsellors – Richard 
Empson and Edmond Dudley – was seen as a rejection of the personal rule of such 
men for the more enlightened counsel of the humanists who filled the young king’s 
court, as well as a return to parliament as a source of counsel, and parliament 
played a critical role throughout the reign, especially in regards to the legislation 
behind the Henrician Reformation. See Holmes 1990, p. 17; also Starkey 1987, pp. 
71-118 and Walker 1997, p. 13. 
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within it are fabricated by those more powerful than them, and they are not able to 
participate fully, even when their participation might dramatically change the tragic 
outcome.
356
 It is worth recalling that it is in the vernacular version of the text – for a 




Even in models emphasising the counsel of the people, however, the 
humanist counsellor still has a vital role to play in communicating the advice of 
parliament, as Roper’s description of More shows. If, as Richard III seems to 
suggest, the people are able to recognise the stage-play of politics, but do not have a 
voice to be more than spectators of it, this voice can be provided by a counsellor 
who, like More, speaks for them to the king. These figures are poised between ruler 
and ruled; Elyot refers to counsellors in his Book Named the Gouernour as the 
‘sondry meane authorities’ who stand below the king but above all others.
358
  
An illustration of this role is given by John Heywood, playwright and friend 
of Thomas More, in his Play of the Wether, published in England in 1533.
359
 Unlike 
Magnyfycence, which portrays a prince easily swayed by the deceptions of 
counsellors, Heywood’s play presents a strong and capable monarch – Jupiter – 
whose ‘hye parlyament’ has presented him with the problem of the varied weather 
across the kingdom.
360
 He will base his decision, he says, on advice from ‘all our 
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 See Paul 2012, pp. 36-54.  
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 Wegemer 2007, p. 48 suggests that the lessons of Richard III are aimed at 
cultivating a prudent citizenship. We might suggest instead that Richard III 
demonstrates that the citizens already possess the prudence necessary to see 
through the falsities and performances of politics – as Hythloday had – but lack the 
ability or will to put such knowledge into action.  
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 For the connection between Heywood and More see Walker 1998, pp. 108-16. 
For the Play of the Wether as an ‘audacious example of the literature of counsel’ 
see Walker 2005, pp. 100-19.  
360




people’ and invites ‘eche man [to] auaunce’ and state his case.
361
 Jupiter himself 
will not be privy to these meetings, for he knows his absence will ‘enbolde all 
suche more playnely to disclose’ their counsel, so he appoints an intermediary to 
hear the petitions from the people, Merry Report, who claims to speak ‘all waye 
truely’ and be ‘so indyfferent’ to the matter that ‘all is one to me’.
362
 
It is important to note that both the king and Merry are presented as truthful, 
honest and virtuous, which is what makes this model successful. The king, for 
example, is only interested in what ‘beste may stande to our honour infynyte| For 
welth in co[m]mune and eche mannes singular profyte’ and will not make a 
decision based on anyone’s counsel until he has ‘harde eche man indifferently’.
363
 
Merry performs his role as promised – being truthful and unbiased throughout, and 
Jupiter declares that he has no reason to regret his appointment. 
Merry’s role is portrayed as necessary, as the counsel presented before him 
is not only varied but irreconcilable and often presented in inappropriate and 
indecorous ways. This is brought to the fore in the long dialogue between the Water 
Miller and the Wind Miller. In addressing the first, Merry tells him that he ‘doute[s] 
nothynge in your audacite| But I fere me ye lacke capacite’ and remarks ‘Howe 
rudely ye erre frome rules of curtesye’, coming in ‘reuelynge and reheytynge| Euen 
as a knaue myght go to a beare beytynge’.
364
 When they have both made their 
requests – the one for rain but no wind, the other for wind but no rain – the Water 
Miller remarks that their requests cannot both be filled for ‘ye must lacke wynde or 
I must lacke rayne’ and so he who ‘is though
t
 weyken when we haue fynysht’ 
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should ‘Leue of his sute and content to be banysht’.
365
 The greed of each petitioner 
to have his way absolutely is recognised by Merry, who comments that ‘bothe 
mylles may serue in place... eche myll may haue tyme to vse his set’; the weather 




Jupiter, having heard the report, rejects the offer of Merry’s advice on the 
issue, declaring ‘we nede no whyt thy counsel| For in our selfe we haue forseen 
remedy’.
367
 Interestingly, however, his decision is the same as that which Merry 
had suggested in his absence, to vary the weather so everyone gets what they 
need.
368
 Merry’s role is not to give counsel on action in this case, but simply to 
communicate the complaints of parliament. It is clear, however, that if Jupiter had 
needed it, Merry would have been ready at hand to provide the ideal solution.
369
  
Merry’s intermediary role is transformed into an institutionalised body by 
the humanist writer Christopher St. German in a draft bill composed in 1531. 
Although the bill was never presented to the House, it was retained in Thomas 
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 Heywood 1544, sig. F, i
v
. Walker 1998, p. 89 suggests Heywood is here arguing 
that a prince does not need counsel; however, this undermines the important role 
that Merry plays, as well as Jupiter’s insistence that he consult with his parliament, 
even if he makes a decision independently of it.  
368




 On the frontispiece, the character is described as ‘Mery Reporte the vyce’ and 
there has been much debate about the meaning of this designation (the first of its 
kind): whether Merry Report represents vice in the same way as other morality play 
characters, such as in Magnyfycence, or instead if he is meant to play the fool, as 
later characters designated by ‘the vice’; see ‘Is Merry Report a Clown or a 
Courtier?’ Staging the Henrician Court (accessed 18 Feb 2013). Instead, given 
Merry’s role within the play, which is neither vicious nor particularly foolish, we 
might examine other meanings of the term ‘vice’ in the sixteenth century, including 
as ‘counsel, advice’ and ‘one who acts in the place of another; a substitute or 
deputy’. In this way I depart from those such as Walker 2005, p. 106 who see 
Merry as ‘the unruly court “hanger-on”... a source of both social and sexual 
misrule’.  
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Cromwell’s papers pertaining to theological and political theory.
370
 The draft 
establishes that the pressing issues outlined (ranging from the translation of the 
New Testament to public welfare policy) will be addressed by a ‘great standynge 
counsayll’, which will ‘here the reasons and opynyons’ of those involved and then 
‘make reporte unto the kynges highnes’ who will decide in each case.
371
 It does not 
serve simply an intermediary function, however, as it is also given authority to 
assign Justices of the Peace, as well as to punish vagabonds, publish ordinances and 
appoint its own members. That being said, like the role of Merry Report, this 
council is purely institutional and mediary; it has no function in guiding the actions 
of the prince towards virtue, nor is there talk of restraining his passions.  
Thomas Starkey, on the other hand, does combine this humanist purpose of 
the counsellor with an institutional structure in order to rectify and control the 
prince’s actions. We have already seen how Starkey’s character of Reginald Pole in 
his Dialogue sets out a neo-classical theory of counsel, concluding that the remedy 
for England’s many problems lies in the improvement of counsel: ‘the general fauts 
and misorders and universal decays of this common weal... by common counsel and 
good policy may be redressed, reformed and brought to good civility’.
372
 Arguing 
that a ‘country cannot be long governed nor maintained with good policy where all 
is ruled by the will of one not chosen by election but cometh to it by natural 
succession’, he suggests that ‘better is the state of the common weal to restrain 
from the prince such high authority, committing that only to the common counsel of 
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 Guy 1985, p. 33; Guy 1985, p. 26 speaks to the importance of this document.  
371
 St. German 1985, pp. 127, 128.  
372
 Starkey 1948, p. 75; ‘the general fautys & misordurys & unyversal dekeys of 
thys commyn wele... by commyn counseyle & gud pollycy may be redressyd 
reformyd <& brought to gud cyvylyte>’ (Starkey 1989, p. 48).  
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the ream and parliament assembled here in our country’.
373
 Pole backs up his 
suggestion with the familiar argument that ‘the wit of one commonly cannot 
compass so much as the wit of many, in matters of policy’.
374
 In order to avoid 
‘great destruction’ the prince must ‘submit himself to the order of his counsel’.
375
 
Pole establishes four bodies – three already existing in the English system: 
prince, privy council and parliament, and a fourth of his own construction: a 
council of fourteen appointed by parliament. This parliamentary council is the main 
authority over the other three, for it carries the weight of parliament, ‘to this end 
and purpose: to see that the king and his proper counsel should do nothing again[st] 
the ordinance of his laws and good policy’, and also has the power to call 
parliament ‘for the reformation’ of any faults.
376
 This council has many of the 
powers traditionally assigned to the king, such as ‘pass[ing] all acts of leagues, 
confederation, peace and war’.
377
 ‘All the rest’, which is not much, ‘should be 
ministered by the king and his [privy] counsel’.
378
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 Starkey 1948, pp. 99, 100; ‘cuntrey can not be long wel governyd nor 
maynteyned with gud pollycy, where al ys rulyd by the wyl of one not chosen by 
electyon but commyth to hyt by natural syccessyon’... ‘bettur hyt ys to the state of 
the commyn wele, to restrayne <from the prynce> such hye authoryte, commyttyng 
that only to the commyn counseyl of the reame & parlyamente assemblyd here in 
our cuntrey’ (Starkey 1989, pp. 68-9).  
374
 Starkey 1948, p. 101; ‘the wyt of one <commynly> can <not> compass so much 
as the wyt of many <in materys of pollycy>’ (Starkey 1989, p. 69).  
375
 Starkey 1948, p. 102; ‘grete destructyon’... ‘submyt hymselfe to the ordur of hys 
conseyl’ (Starkey 1989, p. 70).   
376
 Starkey 1948, p. 155. The fourteen members of this council are: ‘four of the 
greatest and ancient lords of the temporality; two bishops, as of London and 
Canterbury; four of the chief judges; and four of the most wise citizens of London’ 
(p. 155; ‘iiij of the gretyst & ancyent lordys <of the temperalty>, ij byschoppys as 
of london & canterbury, iiij of the chefe jugys & iiij of the most wyse cytyzyns of 
london’, 1989, p. 112). 
377
 Starkey 1948, p. 156; ‘passe al actys of <leegys> confederatyon peace & warre’ 
(Starkey 1989, p. 113).   
378
 Starkey 1948, p. 156; ‘al the rest schold be mynystryd by the kyng & hys 
conseyl’ (Starkey 1989, p. 113).   
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The privy council is also subject to the power of parliament, but does sit 
above the king: ‘the king should do nothing pertaining to the state of his ream 
without the authority of his proper counsel’.
379
 Importantly, the privy council must 
not be chosen by the prince himself, as it was in England at the time; it ‘may in no 
case be committed to the arbitrament of the prince – to choose his own counsel – 
for that were all one and to commit all to his affects, liberty and rule’.
380
 Instead, 
Pole writes, councillors should be appointed ‘as the most part of the parliament 
shall be judged to be wise and meet thereunto’.
381
 Parliament has the power to 
select councillors, who in turn control the arbitrary passions of the king.  
This, he repeats, is the solution to all problems of the commonwealth, for 
‘this counsel, though we took our prince by succession, for the avoiding of sedition, 
should deliver us from all tyranny, setting us in true liberty’, and he proceeds to 
demonstrate specifically how counsel will solve each of the commonwealth’s 
diseases that he had detailed in the body of the dialogue.
382
 By a complex system of 
councils and parliament Starkey suggests that the king will receive the counsel 
requisite to his good governance and be restrained by it.
383
  
The increasing institutionalisation of counsel into councils in order to 
restrain the passions of the king is most vividly illustrated in visual terms, 
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 Starkey 1948, p. 156; ‘the kyng schold dow no thing perteynyng to the state of 
hys reame without the authoryte of hys <propur> counseyl’ (Starkey 1989, p. 113). 
This ‘proper counsel’ should consist of ‘two bishops, four lords, and four of the 
best learned and politic men’ (p. 156; ‘ij byschoppys, iiij lordys, & iiij or the best 
lernyd & polytyke men’, 1989, p. 113).  
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 Starkey 1948, p. 156; ‘thys conseyl though we toke our prynce by successyon 
for <the> avoydyng <of> sedycyon schold delyvur us from al tyranny <setting us in 
true lyberty>’ (Starkey 1989, p. 113). See Sălăvăstru 2012, pp. 18-47.   
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 For the connection that Starkey’s theories have to the legacy of medieval 
conciliarism see Mayer 1988, pp. 201-27.  
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particularly by the popular emblematic literature of the time. The emblem, which 
simultaneously functioned as a symbol, a literary genre and a poetic mode, was the 
invention of the Milanese humanist Andrea Alciato, whose emblem book was first 
published in 1531.
384
 Like many of the texts we have seen thus far, such books held 
counsel for kings and princes, as well as reflecting consciously on the nature and 
form of political counsel.
385
 One emblem in particular – the in senatum boni 
principis – sets out the proper model for a king receiving counsel. The changes to 
this image over time reflect the formalisation of counsel, taking place in a wide 
European context, with echoes in contemporary English images.  
The in senatum is present in the first edition of Alciato’s Emblematum liber 
in 1531, and its title and description vary little from this first presentation. The text 
reads:  
Effigies manibus trunce ante altaria Divum, 
Hic resident, quarum lumine capta prior. 
Signa potestatis summae sanctique senatus, 
Thebanis fuerant ista reperta viris. 
Cur resident? quia mente graves decet esse quieta, 
Iuridicos animo ne [sic] variare levi. 
Cur sine sunt manibus? capiant ne xaenia, nec se 
Pollicitis flecti muneribusve sinant. 
Caecus at est princeps, quod solis auribus, absque 
Affectu constans iussa senatus agit. 
 
[Figures without hands sit here before the altars of the gods. The 
chief of them is deprived of sight. These symbols of the supreme 
power and of the reverend senate were discovered by men of 
Thebes. – Why do they sit? – Because lawgivers should be serious, 
of a calm mind, and not change with inconstant thoughts. – Why 
have they no hands? – So that they may not take gifts, nor let 
themselves be influenced by promises or bribes. But the president is 
blind, because the Senate, by hearing alone, uninfluenced by feeling, 
impartially discharges what it is bidden to do.]
386
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 Leisher 1987 [1952], p. 13; see Diehl 1986, p. 3; Bath 1994, p. 7; Drysall, 2008, 
pp. 79-97. 
385
 Clements 1955, p. 117.  
386
 Alciato 1531, sig. D1
v
. Translation provided by ‘In Senatum Boni Principis’ 
Alciato at Glasglow Emblem Project (accessed 16 Aug 2011). 
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There is no designation of king or counsellors in the written passage. There is a 
capta prior, later a princeps, – a ‘chief’ or ‘prince’ – among them, who is 
‘deprived’ of sight, representing the proper functioning of the senate, which ought 
to operate through discussion and dialogue, not the passions, and the members of 
which have no hands to take bribes.  
 The emblem itself tells a slightly different tale. In the 1531 edition (Figure 
5), as in all editions, the princeps is undoubtedly a king. Holding a sceptre and 
wearing a crown, his eyes appear to be closed, rather than obstructed, and he is 
relaxed, contemplative in his unadorned chair. Seated on the same level and very 
close to the king, on either side, are two counsellor-figures. Lacking hands, as the 
passage indicates, they still gesture to the king, working to make themselves heard 
in the wordless medium of the emblem. Other than the centrality and dress of the 
princeps, there is little difference between him and the other two figures. It is an 




 Three years later the same emblem appears again in a new edition of 
Alciato’s collection (Figure 6).
388
 Although the text remains the same (aside from a 
small correction), the picture is vastly different. The king continues to be the central 
figure, marked by his sceptre, crown and closed eyes. His position, however, is 
more prominent in this illustration than it had been in 1531. He is given a throne, 
and the counsellor-figures are ranged around and behind him, not sitting on a level 
with him. There are also significantly more of them. Once again gesturing with 
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 This image is also used in the editions of Alciato produced in Ausburg in 1531 
and 1534. 
388
 This is the Paris edition from 1534. The same image is used in the Paris editions 
of 1539 and 1542. 
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By 1549, the image has transformed once again (Figure 7); the counsellors 
find themselves seated in an ornate and organized privy chamber. The king is 
seated in the middle on a raised throne under a cloth of state. The counsellors, 
sitting on benches, three on either side of the king, debate with each other, not 
addressing or even looking at their monarch who faces forward. Instead of closed 
eyes, the king has been blindfolded. His vision is obstructed by an outside force, 
not his own will. His presence in the image, while still imposing and central, is 
separated from the discursive action that goes on around him. It is this image, 
portraying a much more formal scene with an uninvolved monarch, which is also 
used in the editions of 1551 and 1558. An institutionalised council quite different 
from the personal and informal model of a few decades before becomes the 
dominant image. 
Comparing these images to those produced in England in the first half of the 
sixteenth century, a similar pattern emerges. In the late fifteenth century, a stock 
woodcut (Figure 8) begins to be used by the printer Richard Pynson for a wide 
variety of texts, most of them having to do with statutes from the reigns of Richard 
III and Henry VII.
390
 This image, strongly reminiscent of the first two Alciato 
emblems, shows a crowned monarch, seated on his throne, holding the sceptre and 
orb of his office. On either side are two figures who appear to be instructing the 
king. Four other figures range behind the king, partially obstructed by the arms of 
his large throne. Although the king is the central figure, and abnormally larger than 
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 This image is also used in the French versions of Alciato in 1536.  
390
 This figure continues to be used following Pynson’s appointment as the king’s 
printer in 1506 and into the reign of Henry VIII; see Hodnett 1973, p. 348.  
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the others pictured, the two counsellors are standing very close to the monarch, 
occupying the space in front of the throne. Their strong role in relation to the king 
is suggested by their pointed forefingers, which indicate power and dominion.
391
 
Although the king holds the symbols of regal authority, the two figures have an 
authority of their own.  
Later representations of counsel are not so informal, and reflect the distance 
created between king and counsellors also illustrated by the later Alciato image. An 
excellent example is provided by the 1548 publication of Edward Hall’s Vnion of 
the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre [and] Yorke. The frontispiece 
(Figure 12) shows a picture of the newly crowned Edward VI, with seated 
counsellors on either side, who converse among themselves.
392
 A parallel image 
comes at the end of the text (Figure 13), of his father also in council.
393
 Henry VIII 
is notably more active and engaged with his counsellors, and the scene is less 
formal, although certainly more so than the Pyson images above. Both reflect the 
same sort of changes applied to the 1549 edition of the Alciato image – a formal 
council chamber, active conversant councillors and a detached king. It is perhaps no 
surprise that it is Edward who is figured in the more institutionalised setting, and 
who appears only as a symbolic presence, rather than an active one. With the 
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 Ripa 1707, p. 25 (original 1607): ‘Dominio: DOMINION. A Man, in a noble and 
sumptuous Habit... pointing with his Fore-finger, as is usual with those who have 
Dominion’. We might compare this image with a pair of images used as the 
frontispieces to the tale of Salomon and Marcolphus – the first published in 
Antwerp in 1492 (Figure 9), the second by Pynson in 1529 (Figure 10). Both tell 
the tale of the fool who was able to outdo the wise king in a battle of wits, walking 
away with the promised reward. In the earlier image, the king, sat on his throne 
under his cloth of estate points a figure at the poorly clad Marcolphus. In Pynson’s 
version, the roles are reversed. Marcolphus, not looking quite so drab, points his 
finger in instruction to the pictured king. Compare, too, the woodcuts common to 
the period which show a scholar teaching students, almost always with his 
forefinger extended (Figure 11); see Hodnett 1973, figs. 77-81.  
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 For the emblematic significance of frontispieces see Höltgen 2008, pp. 393-410.  
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 Metal-cut image, see Luborsky and Ingram 1998, vol. 1, p. 422.  
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accession of Edward in 1547, there is a dramatic shift in the humanist discourse of 
counsel, contending not only with the challenge of a monarch in his minority, 
followed rapidly by two female monarchs, but that presented by a single individual: 
Niccolò Machiavelli.  
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Part II: The Machiavellian Challenge, 1547-1603 
Chapter 4: The Redefinition of Prudence 
The introduction of Machiavellian political thought into the context of an England 
weakened by perceived monarchical instabilities opens a new chapter in the history 
of the English discourse of counsel. Machiavelli’s works offer a challenge to what 
we may now think of as the traditional or orthodox humanist theory of counsel by 
questioning its fundamental assumptions, most notably the understanding of the 
role of counsel as serving to bridle the vices and passions by guiding the prince to 
virtuous action. Rather than functioning to combat the internal motives of the 
prince, in this new tradition prudence – still the special skill of the political 
counsellor – acts to mitigate and navigate the outside forces of fortune and 
circumstance.  
The introduction of contingent temporality generates a theory of moral 
flexibility amongst many writers, even those who are self-described anti-
Machiavellians, especially in considering ‘policy’ and political deliberation. In 
order to reconcile this change with traditional views, late sixteenth century writers 
experimented with the idea of a two-tiered system – traditional universal morality 
for the private sphere and an ethics of contingency for the political realm. 
Counsellors must weigh both these considerations; offering advice that takes into 
account necessity and advantage politically, but with an awareness of traditional 
views, embracing the skill of paradiastolic redescription when occasion calls for the 





I. Machiavelli and Advice-to-Counsellors Literature 
Especially in England, Machiavelli becomes understood as presenting advice not 
only to princes, but also to counsellors, and so the history of Machiavellianism 
becomes inseparable from a history of the understanding of the role of counsel in 
the political arena. Although the first publication of an entire Machiavellian text in 
English does not occur until the 1562 translation of the Arte of Warre, and The 
Prince and the Discourses are not printed in English until much later, there is no 
question that there was an active English readership of Machiavelli’s works even 
within the first decade of their publication in Italian.
394
 In fact, of the small number 
of examples of articulated responses to Machiavelli in the first half of the sixteenth 
century, most address an English context, and the first attempts to apply his theories 
to political analysis were by English writers.
395
 These responses were intimately 
connected to the discourse of counsel and the figure of the counsellor; The Prince 
in particular was seen as especially pertinent to this role. For example, in 1539 
Henry Parker, Lord Morley wrote to Thomas Cromwell recommending both the 
Istorie Florentine and Il Principe to the high-profile counsellor, suggesting that the 
latter ‘ys surely a very speciall good thing for youre Lordschip, whiche are ny 
aboughte oure Soueraigne Lorde in Counsell’.
396
 It would seem that other 
prominent counsellors thought the same, as there are records of the purchase or 
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 Raab 1964; Anglo 2005; Petrina 2009; Petrina 2013, p. 14. See particularly 
Petrina 2009, p. 15: ‘There is ample evidence for the circulation of Machiavelli’s 
books in England, and for an articulate readership that dates back as far as the 
1530s’. In what follows I am less concerned with evaluating writers on their 
(mis)use of Machiavelli, and more concerned with what they did draw from his 
texts and what purpose such references have in their overall argument and as 
applies to counsel. 
395
 Anglo 2005, p. 102.  
396
 Ellis 1824, p. 66. The dating of the letter as 1539 is given by Petrina 2009, p.15, 
although Ellis 1824, p. 63 and Anglo 2005, p. 97 date the letter to 1537. 
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ownership of Il Principe by a number of noted counsellors, including Thomas 
Smith, William Thomas and William Cecil.
397
 
 With the exception of the 1562 translation of the Arte of Warre, when 
Machiavelli’s works are translated and published in English, translators consistently 
dedicate such works to counsellor-figures. Thomas Bedingfield’s translation of The 
Florentine Historie was dedicated to Sir Christopher Hatton, Lord Chancellor of 
England, as it contained matters for ‘such as be called to consultation of publike 
affaires & gouernment’.
398
 In the same way, Edward Dacres’ later translations of 
the Discourses and The Prince are both addressed to James, Duke of Lennox, 
prominent councillor and cousin to the king. Dacres notes that Machiavelli’s work 
will be especially of use to him whose ‘neereness of bloud, as affection and favour, 




Of course, large selections of Machiavelli’s texts had already been 
published through other works, and these too were specifically dedicated to 
counsellors. Perhaps the greatest example of such selective use of Machiavelli is 
presented in the 1590 translation of Francisco Sansovino’s The Quintensence of Wit 
by soldier and writer Robert Hitchcock. Taken from Sansovino’s Concette Politici 
published in 1578, and including the added concetti of the 1583 amended 
Propositioni... di cose di Stato, Hitchcock faithfully translates all 805 of 
Sansovino’s listed maxims, including the 186 directly derived from Machiavelli’s 
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 Anglo 2005, p. 20; Petrina 2009, p.20.   
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 The letter is dated 1588, seven years before the translation is published, and 
three years before the death of Hatton. It is unclear why Bedingfield waited until 
after Hatton’s death to publish the work, although we may speculate that was 
related to the reputation of Machiavelli at the time.   
399






 Notably, although this represented the largest contribution to the 
Quintensence from any single author, Machiavelli is not listed among the ‘names of 
those Authors and writers’ from whom ‘the conceites of this present booke be 
gathered’.
401
 Nevertheless, educated English readers would have known where 
most of these precepts were coming from, perhaps even more intimately and with 
more immediacy than modern-day readers. For example, John Donne, poet and 
secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, correctly identified the passages 
drawn from Machiavelli in his 1588 copy of the Propositioni, and there is no reason 
to think that Hitchcock’s talented and educated patron, the counsellor Robert Cecil, 
would lack the ability to do the same.
402
 Although Sansovino had originally 
dedicated his precepts to the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolph II, Hitchcock dedicates 
his to Cecil, who in the same year had been created Secretary of State, emerging as 
one of the leading counsellors in Elizabeth’s court. Hitchcock writes to Cecil that 
‘the value and varietie of the worke is so excellent’ that it would be a great ‘fault 
committed against the common societie of men’ to keep it hidden.
403
 
The English connection between Machiavelli’s works and the role of the 
counsellor had been established by one of the earliest English responses to 
Machiavelli, Reginald Pole’s Apologia ad Carolum Quintum of 1539. The use of 
Machiavelli by Pole is only incidental to his purpose, which is an attack on the 
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 In particular, and in the passages where he makes 
reference to Machiavelli’s work, Pole argues that the entire event can be blamed on 
a lack of good counsel in the court of Henry VIII.
405
 Pole suggests that it is the 
timidity of the majority of Henry’s council, combined with the vicious forwardness 
of one – namely Cromwell – which is to blame for Henry’s actions in the break 
with Rome. He then suggests that Cromwell got his ideas from another satanic 
counsellor, Machiavelli in his Prince, and proceeds to offer up his own impassioned 




Although the reading of Machiavelli as offering advice to counsellors such as 
Cromwell is unjustified, there is no question that Machiavelli was acting as a 
counsellor himself by offering advice to a prince in his work. Machiavelli’s first 
engagement with the classical discourse of counsel comes in the opening lines of 
the dedicatory epistle of The Prince, in which he borrows directly from one of the 
foundational texts in the classical advice-to-princes literature: Isocrates’s To 
Nicocles.
407
 Just as Isocrates had begun his address by acknowledging that the gifts 
of most courtiers ‘be wonte Nicocles, to bringe to you, that be kynges, garmentes, 
vesseil, or plate, or other lyke iewelles’, Machiavelli tells his addressee, Lorenzo 
de’ Medici, that ‘They, that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince, 
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commonly use to offer... Horses and Armes, cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such 
like ornaments.’
408
 Isocrates had argued that his gift was the ‘beste gefte and moste 
profitable, also most conuenient as well for me to geue, as for the to receiue’ and 
Machiavelli likewise had ‘found nothing in my whole Inventory, that I thinke better 
of, or more esteem’ than his gift – The Prince.
409
 Machiavelli’s reference to a text 
that stresses so strongly the need for political counsel to princes sets the tone of The 
Prince, locating it within the advice-to-princes genre and figuring Machiavelli as 
the reimagined political counsellor.
410
 So to what end was his counsellor to direct 
his liege? According to what guiding rules and principles? And how does 
Machiavelli describe other counsellor-figures? 
Machiavelli’s answer to the first question is contained largely within the 
crucial opening passages of Chapter XV. It is here that Machiavelli states most 
clearly his critique of the classical and humanist advice-to-princes genre.
411
 
Machiavelli’s reference to, and refutation of, these other political writers is direct; 
he declares that many have written on ‘what the conditions of a Prince ought to be’ 
but he will be presenting ‘an opinion different from others’.
412
 This is based on his 
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 This paper stands in contrast to those, such as Garver 1987, who claim that 
Machiavelli ‘endows the prince with powers that will make his own position as 
advisor superfluous’ (p. 60) and that he ‘reject[s] the value of such a role [as 
advisor] in the discussion of counsel and advice that appears in chapters 22-23’ (p. 
63).  
411
 Skinner 1988, pp. xv-xvii gives this refutation in detail, and Stacey 2007 focuses 
on how this attack is concentrated specifically on the work of Seneca in De 
clementia. These chapters are, as Skinner 1988, p. xv put it, ‘the most sensational 
and “Machiavellian” sections of the book’.  
412
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‘intent... to write for the advantage of him
413
 that understands mee’, for which he 
has thought it ‘fitter to follow the effectual truth of the matter, than the imagination 
thereof’.
414
 The connection between Machiavelli’s intent to write for advantage, or 
utile, and his determination that the proper method is thus to study ‘effectual truth’ 
is a close one, as ‘there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men 
ought to live; that hee who leaves that which is done,
415
 learnes sooner his ruine, 
than his preservation’
416
 and ‘that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, 
must needs goe to ruine, among so many that are dishonest.’
417
 Thus, it is 
necessary, Machiavelli tells his reader, for the prince to be able to treat honesty as a 






Although intertwined, two critiques of the princely virtues are presented by 
Machiavelli at the outset of Chapter XV.
420
 The first is quite familiar – one cannot 
expect a single, fallible man to be well-learned and adhere strictly to all of the 
virtues; although ‘every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praiseworthy for a 
Prince to be adorned with all the above nam’d qualities that are good’, such as 
liberality, piety and so on, ‘this is not possible, nor doe humane conditions admit 
such perfection in vertues’.
421
 As we have already seen, writers from Aristotle 
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onward had accepted this premise, providing it as the foundation for the necessity 
of political counsel; Machiavelli, however, takes it in a different direction.  
His second critique is more revolutionary, although perhaps not as radical as 
many have thought. Even if the prince could adopt all the virtues, Machiavelli 
writes, there is a further skill needed for ‘some things we shall find which have the 
colour and face of Vertue [virtù], and following them, will lead thee to thy 
destruction; whereas some others, that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the 
course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being’.
422
 
This idea too, that those actions which have the ‘colour’ of virtue may in fact be 
vice, we have seen before, in the language and expression of paradiastole of the 
rhetoricians and morality plays. However, Machiavelli goes a step further. In none 
of the morality plays, for example, does the prince succeed by following virtue 
disguised as a vice, but Machiavelli here suggests that on occasion a prince must 
embrace an action which appears as vice in order to pursue his advantage. Thus, the 
virtues are meaningless beyond their appearance to those upon whose esteem the 
prince’s power is based. The prince must be willing to employ the virtues as 
necessity dictates, and in that way, rethink how he conceptualises the virtues as 
virtues. 
As such, Machiavelli has two pieces of advice for the Prince. First, he must 
have prudence: ‘it is necessary for him to be so discreet [prudente],
423
 that he know 
how to avoid the infamie of those vices, which would thrust him out of his State; 
and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence, 
but where it cannot bee, let them passe with lesse regard’.
424
 Machiavelli’s 
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definition of prudence comes in Chapter XXI, shortly on the heels of his discussion 
of the other cardinal and princely virtues, and pertains directly to this skill of seeing 
through the appearance of vice and virtue to what will be most advantageous.
425
 
Prudence, or ‘the principall point of judgement’ as Dacres renders it, ‘is in 




Second, the prince must embrace paradiastolic redescription himself: ‘it is 
necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to bee 
able to faine and dissemble thoroughly’.
427
 Even the adoption of these more 
pernicious vices may be less disadvantageous than following their associated 
virtues, as long as the prince is able to manage the people’s perception of his 
actions. The adoption of a vice is only disadvantageous if the people recognise it 
and are motivated to hatred or contempt by its performance.
428
 
Machiavelli’s view of prudence and paradiastole, then, is subtly different 
from those of the orthodox humanists. Whereas they, likewise, had recognised the 
need for prudence in distinguishing between true and false virtue, in seeing through 
redescription, Machiavelli builds on this to suggest that the prince himself must 
become the master of paradiastole in order to hold the esteem of the people. 
Whereas for Cicero the people’s ability to see through such deception was the 
important link between honestum and utile formed by decorum, Machiavelli holds 
no such expectation, for ‘men are so simple and yeeld so much to the present 
necessities, that hee who hath a mind to deceive, shall always find another that will 
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 Thus as long as he manages well how he is perceived, ‘there is no 
necessity for a Prince to bee endued with all these above written qualities, but it 
behooves well that he seeme to be so, or rather’, Machiavelli continues, ‘I will 
boldly say this, that having these qualities, and always regulating himselfe by them, 




Following Machiavelli, these skills become not only the content of political counsel 
to the prince, as they are for Machiavelli, but also advice to counsellors regarding 
how they ought to frame their own speech and actions.
431
 This is especially true in 
the English context where, as we saw, Machiavelli’s precepts were seen as 
particularly pertinent to advisers. The clearest example is provided by the 
translation of the Spanish writer Fadrique Furió Ceriol’s Machiavellian work on the 
counsellor by the prominent English humanist Thomas Blundeville in 1570.
432
 
Blundeville’s translation, A very brief and profitable treatise declaring howe many 
counsells and what maner of counselers a prince that will gouerne well ought to 
haue, is intended to be read and adopted by counsellors, not princes. In contrast to 
Ceriol’s original dedication of the text to Philip II, Blundeville’s is dedicated to the 
Earl of Leicester and is meant to be ‘a glasse’ of the ‘vertues and qualities that... 
ought to raigne in euery other good counseler’.
433
 He removes much of the 
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explicitly Machiavellian content; Ceriol’s original text contained near word-for-
word quotations from The Prince, which Blundeville does not translate, claiming to 
have cut ‘all superfluous talke’ in his abridged translation.
434
 That being said, the 
Machiavellian themes still persist, even where the verbatim passages have been 
removed.  
It is especially worth noting the emphasis given to prudence in this text, and 
how it is understood. Blundeville lists prudence as one of the five ‘qualities of the 
mind’ – reduced from Ceriol’s fifteen – needed by the counsellor. Whereas Ceriol’s 
original inventory had been a straightforward list, Blundeville describes them under 
the headings of the four cardinal virtues, plus science. However, prudence, even in 
Blundeville’s translation, has little to do with virtue, and more to do with evaluating 
the utility of actions in a given political circumstance. Under this heading he 
includes the expectation that the counsellor be wise, ‘politique’, well-travelled, and 
expert in contemporary affairs (‘to knowe the force as well of hys Prince, as of his 
enymies and neyghbours’).
435
 Being a ‘pollitike counseler’, for Ceriol and 
Blundeville, means being able to answer questions from his prince such as:  
whyther it be better to builde a Citie in a fertyll or barren soyle? which 
winds are to be barred from an habitation or dwelling place? how 
manye wayes a state or kingdome is woont to bee lost? by what 
meanes the good gouernement of anye common wealth is decayed? of 
what causes seditions and rebellions doe spring? how they may be 
oppressed? wherin the power of a Prince doth consist? whyther in 




We may recognise most of these questions (and the others in his list) as being dealt 
with in the Discorsi, most even being rough translation of chapter titles.
437
 If the 
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 They are also reminiscent of William Thomas’s list to Edward VI; see Ellis 
1827, pp. 189-95. 
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counsellor can ‘rightly and readily answere’ these and like questions, the section 
concludes, ‘he is worthy to bee called a pollitike counseler’.
438
 To be politic, 
therefore, is to have knowledge of the important circumstances and realist 
considerations of the Machiavellian tradition. 
 
For Machiavelli, prudence is essential in order to navigate the changing winds of 
Fortune.
439
 This means that, despite the definition he gives in Chapter XXI, it is 
almost impossible to define what exactly constitutes prudence, what activities or 
behaviours define prudent action or the prudential person, for it varies with the 
times.
440
 The path that Machiavelli endorses involves using both virtues and vices 
as tools, according to the variation in circumstances: ‘it behooves [the prince] to 
have a mind so disposd as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; 
and as formerly I said, not forsake the good; while he can, but to know how to 
make use of the evill upon necessity.’
441
 
This discussion of necessity cannot be separated from Machiavelli’s 
engagement with the tradition of kairos.
442
 We have already seen how kairos 
functioned in the rhetorical tradition, as expressed by Thomas Elyot in his Pasquil 
the Playne of 1533. There was, however, another understanding of kairos in the 
classical (largely Greek) tradition, which articulated a theory of political action, 
rather than speech. This understanding was built upon the same temporal view of 
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kairos, denoting both the character of a time – as in a season – as well as a rare 
opportunity or occasion to be taken advantage of.
443
   
For many ancient thinkers, the understanding of kairos as related to political 
action necessitated a flexible view of morality. If one accepts kairos as a deviation 
from linear and universal time, any expectation that one must match actions to the 
character of the times presents a problem for universal or absolute moral systems. It 
is no surprise, then, that from the early centuries of Greek philosophy, the concept 
of kairos was linked to moral relativism, especially that of the sophists of the fifth 
century BCE.
444
 For such thinkers, morality was determined by the nature of the 
times, by kairos: ‘“there is nothing that is in every respect seemly or shameful, but 
kairos takes the same things and makes them shameful and then changes them 
round and makes them seemly.”’
445
  
We have already seen how Plutarch, writing in the Second Sophistic, 
embraced the importance of kairos in giving advice and counsel. It is also one of 
the most important factors in determining the success of political actions in his 
Lives. Those who succeed or fail do so according to their ability to match their 
actions to kairos. He gives the example of Cato, whose qualities, admirable though 
they were, did not accord with his times. He ‘fared just as fruits do which make 
their appearance out of season [kairos]’, as his qualities were ‘look[ed] upon... with 
delight and admiration’ but did not lead to success.
446
 He ‘enjoyed great repute and 
fame, but was not suited to the needs of men because of the weight and grandeur of 
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[his] virtue, which were out of all proportion to the immediate times’.
447
 He ‘acted 
as if he lived in Plato’s commonwealth, and not among the dregs of Romulus’ and 
so he was defeated in his bid for the consulship.
448
 Likewise, political leaders must 
make use of the opportunities presented to them, as Caesar, who ‘took advantage of 
the favourable instant... and thereby... in a brief portion of one day he made himself 
master of three camps’.
449
 By contrast, Philopoemen ‘threw away his life... by 
hastening to attack Messene before occasion offered’.
450
 The lesson of Plutarch’s 




This urge to act, whereby an actor can assert his agency against the press of 
chronos, often slips into a reverse relationship, whereby kairos forces action, and 
thus becomes strongly connected to a consideration of necessity, leading to the 
same sort of moral relativism presented by the sophists. For example, Plutarch 
writes that Titus’s ‘natural gift of leadership’ led him to realise that he should not 
only rule ‘in accordance with the laws’ but must also ‘when kairos required it’ 
know ‘how to dominate the laws for the common good.’
452
 Echoing the sophists, 
Plutarch writes that ‘honourable action has its fitting time and season: nay, rather, it 
is the observance of due bounds that constitutes an utter difference between 
honourable and base actions’, a sentiment echoed in his Moralia:
 
‘every natural 
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virtue produceth the effect to which it is ordained better or worse, according as its 
season is more or less proper.’
453
 
Machiavelli’s use of this tradition is expressed through his emphasis on 
occasione, most notably in the sixth chapter of The Prince.
454
 Like Plutarch, 
Machiavelli sets out examples of the ‘worthiest persons’ to be imitated. In these 
exemplary cases, the leaders were dependent on Fortune only for the opportunity or 
occasion to demonstrate their virtù: ‘it will not appeare, that they had other help of 
fortune, than the occasion [occasione], which presented them with the matter 
wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas’d’.
455
 Machiavelli sets out 
a mutually supportive relationship between occasione and virtù; neither can be 
realised without the other: ‘without that occasion, the vertue [virtù] of their mind 
[animo] had been extinguish’d; and without that vertue, the occasion had been 
offer’d in vaine.’
456
 Occasione for Machiavelli, as for Plutarch, functions as a rare 
opportunity in chronological time, which only the truly prudent can recognise and 
take hold of: ‘their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of’ which 




These lessons are applied in the final chapter of The Prince, added at the 
same time as the dedicatory epistle. Like the epistle, this chapter is addressed to 
Lorenzo de’ Medici and draws directly on a work of Isocrates – in this case his 
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Panegyricus, which urges the people of Athens to take up arms against the 
barbarian invaders.
458
 Echoing Chapter VI, Machiavelli suggests that ‘the times 
might serve to honour a new Prince’, as ‘there were matter, that might minister 
occasion [occasione] to a wise [prudente] and valorous [virtuoso] prince, to 
introduce such a forme, that might doe honour to him’.
459
 The moral rectitude of the 
act is based on the consideration of its necessity, for ‘that warre is just, that is 
necessary’, and the Medici are forced into action, for ‘Circumstances are now very 
favourable indeed, and the difficulties cannot be very great when the circumstances 
are propitious, if only your family will imitate the men I have proposed as 
exemplars’.
460
 Just as Isocrates had concluded his exhortation by emphasising that 
one ‘must not throw [kairos] away; for it is disgraceful to neglect a chance when it 
is present and regret it when it is past,’ Machiavelli ends his chapter, and his book, 




Here, too, when this idea is articulated in subsequent work it is applied not the 
prince but to the counsellor. For instance, John Thorius’s 1589 translation of The 
Counseller by the Spanish Bartolome Felippe, dedicated to the privy councillor 
John Fortescue, suggests that the prudence required of the counsellor consists in 
being aware of such occasions and opportunities, as the ‘singular wit and rare 
iudgment, and the putting of matters in execution’ required by counsel, ‘demaunded 
fit opportunitie, with occasion proportionable, and much fidelitie’.
462
 Due to the 
nature of their subject matter – that which is particular and unpredictable – 
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‘Counsellers for the most part, depend vpon the occasions and circumstances’.
463
 
This is the skill which ‘in matters touching counsel... is to be considered’.
464
 
Felippe explicitly connects Machiavelli’s discussion of occasione with the 
ancient tradition of kairos, writing that ‘in ancient times past, the Image of 
opportunitie was set vp in many places, that men might remember to let no 
occasion slip, which might be to their commoditie when opportunitie was 
offered’.
465
 Felippe goes on to describe the ancient personification of occasio in 
detail:  
they painted her on a wheele, because she neuer standeth still, nor 
remaineth in one place, with wings on her feete, because she passeth 
away swiftly, her face couered with the haire of her forehead, because 
she lets none know her, but such as be verie attentiue to looke on her: 
with a raser in her hande, because shee cuts of their hope that take no 
heede of her but let her passe: with the hinder part of her head balde, 
because if she once be gone, no man can catch hold of her, and with a 
Maid that waits vpon her which is called Poenitentia, for repentance 
doth accompanie them that cannot tell how to reape profit by 
occasion.
466
   
 
Thus it is that the important consideration of the prudent counsellor is not whether 
an action should or should not be done – whether it is utile or honestum – but rather 
when it should be done. Echoing the sophists, Plutarch and Machiavelli, Felippe 
writes that ‘many things in mans life are mard, not for that they ought not to be 
doone, but because they be not doone in time and place.’
467
 The pertinent question 
to the counsellor is not one of morality, but of timing.  
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II. Dissimulation and Two Types of Prudence 
Reginald Pole’s Apologia, one of the first written commentaries on The Prince, had 
criticised Machiavellianism for working through the counsel of Thomas Cromwell 
to the detriment of the English commonwealth. His objection to such ideas was not 
just that they ran counter to traditional moral or religious concerns, but that they 
disadvantaged the well-being of the kingdom, as well as Henry VIII himself. The 
quality of Machiavellianism as counsel is judged on utilitarian, not moral, grounds 
as part of Pole’s attempt to undermine Henry’s regime.
468
 Similar concessions are 
reflected in the work of many of the anti-Machiavellians of the late sixteenth 
century, serving to generate a theory of permissible transgression of traditional 
morality based, once again, on ideas of variable temporality and, further, a 
distinction between the private and public realms.  
The French writer and ambassador Mathieu Coignet’s Politique discourses 
upon trueth and lying, originally published in 1584 and translated by Edward Hoby 
in 1586, refutes Machiavelli’s counsel, on the grounds that princes who follow 
them ‘haue had most miserable endes, after hauing beene made a laughing stocke 
vnto their enemyes.’
469
 To ensure that his own advice does not lead to such a 
miserable end, Coignet is forced to soften what is otherwise a complete rejection of 
deception. He concedes in his chapter on ‘faining and dissembling’ that he does not 
mean ‘that euerie one, nor at al times, nor of euerie matter, should speake what he 
thinketh’, allowing not only for selective silence, but outright deception.
470
 For 
although ‘euerie counterfaiting done to the ende to deceiue an other is reprooued... 
if it bee to conceale a good counsell, fearing lest it might be preuented, then is it not 
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 In particular this applies to those in politics, for ‘hee who cannot 
dissemble, shall neuer raigne prosperously’.
472
  
He provides a similar defence of promise-breaking in select circumstances. 
Although it is to be rejected and reproved, ‘neuerthlesse he ought not to bee 
accused for a lyar, who maye not lawfully keepe [his promise] for some iust 
occasion’.
473
 So it is that ‘Necessitie is the mother of dispensation’ and he suggests 
that failure to keep promises is ‘likewise excusable, if any preiudice, or interest 
happen not thorough [sic] the not accomplishing of a promise’.
474
 Coignet, in 
discussion of these issues, notes that ‘Here I could alledge the opinion of an 
Athenian embassador recited by Thucidides, that a Prince ought somtime to be a 
friend, somtime an enimie, & to ply himselfe according to occurents’.
475
  
The French soldier and statesman Jacques Hurault’s Politicke, Moral, and 
Martial Discourses, translated by Arthur Golding in 1595, is also written in 
refutation of Machiavelli, but he too makes concessions in certain circumstances.
476
 
Despite objecting at length to the idea that princes should be held to different 
standards of morality, Harault admits that the prince should ‘be skilfull both in 
playing the lion to encounter such as will assaile him, and in playing the fox to saue 
himselfe from the trains and snares that are layd for him’.
477
 Dissimulation can be 
used as a defensive strategy, and he supports this with the same maxim that Coignet 
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had, that ‘he which can no skill to dissemble can no skill to reign’.
478
 In order to 
defend this position, he makes a distinction between deceit and dissimulation. 
Deceit is ‘to pretend to be a man of honestie, and to promise that which he 
intendeth not to performe’, which Hurault rejects completely.
479
 Dissimulation, on 
the other hand, ‘commeth of Wisedome’, for ‘to dissemble in time and place, is 
great wisedome’.
480
 As others had done, he equates the role of such wisdom to the 
skill of a navigator: ‘it is as much to say, as that a man must strike saile, apply 
himselfe to the wind like a good pilot, & take good heed to the seasons’.
481
 In other 
words, it is the skill which allows a prince to change with the times and fortunes as 




The best-known anti-Machiavelli work of this period is that of Innocent 
Gentillet, which was widely read in England, even before its translation in 1602 by 
Simon Patrick.
483
 Gentillet’s main purpose, as he states in the preface, is to show 
‘that Nicholas Machiavell... understood nothing or little in this Politicke science... 
and that he hath taken Maximes and rules altogether wicked, and hath builded upon 
them, not a Politicke, but a Tyrannical science’.
484
 He divides his attack into three 
sections which treat counsel, religion and policy respectively. He begins in the first 
pages by attacking the Machiavellian model of counsel in favour of the traditional 
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model we saw in Part I, refuting Machiavelli on traditional grounds – concern for 
virtue and honestum, before moving on to his (ir)religious advice. 
It is in the section on ‘such Pollicie, as a Prince ought to hold in his 
Commonweale’, that Gentillet’s arguments lean towards those of his intended 
target, for it is here that Gentillet takes on Machiavelli’s concern for advantage. The 
term ‘policy’ had acquired, by the time Gentillet was translated, a strong 
association with precisely the sort of Machiavellian moral flexibility we have been 
exploring. Although on the most basic level it retained a meaning as the particular 
skill or knowledge of the political, as Hurault writes, the ‘the skil to gouerne and 
rule a whole multitude of men’, it had also taken on a more pejorative meaning.
485
  
Here Gentillet discusses the much-used maxim ‘A Prince ought to follow 
the Nature of the Lyon, and of the Foxe: not of the one without the other’; however, 
he presents a novel counter to Machiavelli’s precept by providing a redefinition of 
the concept of prudence.
486
 Rather than suggesting that resorting to beastly 
behaviour is unbecoming of a prince, or that the deceptive nature of the fox is 
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provided by William Thomas to the young Edward VI on the question of ‘Wheather 
it be expedient to varie with tym’ in the early 1550s. Opening with a reference to 
the biblical discussion of kairos in Ecclesiastes 3:1, Thomas tells Edward that ‘he 
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Coignet’s discussion of the variability of the prince described in Thucydides had 
been marked by Hoby in the margin as describing ‘Policie in a Prince’ (1586, p. 
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always to be eschewed, Gentillet’s argument is over the definition of the terms. He 
wants to ensure that lawful deception, when ‘in warre a man may lawfully use 
subtilties against his enemies’, is disassociated with such beastly vocabulary. These 
actions are ‘not called foxlike subtiltie, or unlawful deceiving, but ought to be 
called militarie prudence’.
487
 This prudence, ‘to use subtiltie, fraud and militarie 
sharpenesse of wit (for all those names may be well used)’, Gentillet emphasises, 
‘is not to counterfeit the beast, nor to play the Fox’.
488
 For Gentillet, there is a type 
of prudence, associated with policy, which involves the use of a type of legitimate 
deception and fraud.  
The idea that there are two types of prudence is taken furthest by Justus 
Lipsius in his Sixe Bookes of Politickes, translated by William Jones in 1594.
489
 The 
six books can be separated into two halves: the first three presenting a traditional 
notion of the political, the second three taking a ‘realist’ approach.
490
 The overall 
aim is to generate a theory that encapsulates both these dimensions of the political. 
This may be why scholars have such difficulty categorising Lipsius into 
Machiavellian or anti-Machiavellian camps.
491
 His intent was not to associate with 
either exclusively, but rather to fuse them together.
492
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There is no question, given this preoccupation, that the Sixe Bookes is a 
work with a lot to say about the nature and aims of counsel. Lipsius draws the 
reader’s attention to this theme from the outset, noting in his opening letter to 
‘Emperovr. Kings. Princes’ the role and importance of counsel to such rulers. 
Despite these royal addressees, Lipsius is speaking to fellow counsellors in the 
epistle, writing that ‘to deserue well of the Common-wealth, we ought to deserue 
well of our Prince: that is, we ought to guide and direct him, to this marke of the 
common profit’.
493
 Jones further emphasises these themes in his translation, for 
where Lipsius had exhorted his royal addressees not to ‘despise our counsels, 
because you are above iussa’ – above the laws, Jones here adds an absent 
possessive pronoun to render the passage: ‘because you are above our 
commandements’ – i.e. the commandments of his counsellors.
494
 Jones too, like 
many of those we have examined in this tradition, chooses to dedicate his 
translation to an English counsellor – Sir John Puckering, who was sworn into the 
privy council two years before.  
Jones makes a further important change in his translation of this opening 
passage. It is here that Lipsius first sets out his theme of an equal distribution of 
Ciceronian moral and Tacitean/Machiavellian pragmatic concerns in political 
affairs. He writes that a prince is ‘iust, & lawfull’ who ‘had not rather heare men 
say, that he is mightie, then that he is good: and who knoweth, how to conioyne two 
most diuerse things’.
495
 In the original Latin, those things that must be conjoined 
are potentia and modestia, to mirror the dichotomy between ‘mightie’ and ‘good’ in 
                                                                                                                                        
counter the ‘perceived threats’ to the Ciceronian dedication to the vita activa. See 
also Brooke 2012, pp. 59-75.  
493












the first part of the sentence.
496
 Jones, however, chooses to translate these terms as 
‘Modestie, and Prudence’, not power.
497
 It is very unlikely that this is a misreading 
or misinterpretation, given Jones’s skills as a translator throughout the rest of the 
text. Instead, we must conclude that Jones chose to employ the term ‘prudence’ 
either because he felt that the concept carried such strong Machiavellian and 
Tacitean overtones that it would strike the right balance with modesty or, more 
likely, he was foreshadowing the later dichotomy Lipsius makes between virtue and 
prudence. 
This pairing is presented at the outset of the first book, in which Lipsius sets 
out how all men should guide their lives. In general, he states, there are two 
directors that every man should be attentive to: prudence and virtue. Immediately 
we must take note that Lipsius presents these two distinctly: prudence is not to be 
counted among the virtues, but instead holds equal weight with all other virtues in 
the determinations of daily life. Prudence is the guide of these virtues, it ‘not onlely 
ruleth your self, but vertue likewise, yea it directeth it’.
498
 It also stands as a counter 
to fortune, for ‘All things yeeld obedience vnto Prudence, euen Fortune her selfe’; 
the wise man, like Machiavelli’s man of virtù, ‘frameth his own fortune’.
499
 Virtue 
and prudence each have their own jurisdictions as well: virtue is what is required to 
be a good man, prudence to be a good citizen; virtue is the director of the private 
sphere, prudence of the political. 
It is in the third book that Lipsius explicitly addresses prudence in the 
prince, emphasising that although ‘the vse of Prudence is necessarie in all worldly 
                                                 
496
 Original Latin from the 2004 edition of the text by Jan Waszink.  
497
 Lipsius 1594, sig. A, v
r
; emphasis added. 
498
 Lipsius 1594, p. 11.  
499
 Lipsius 1594, p. 12. He proceeds in the rest of this first book to describe the 
ways to acquire prudence, which I shall treat in the subsequent chapter. 
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affaires’ it is especially required in government and is the ‘onely proper vertue 
belonging to a Gouernour’.
500
 He immediately equates prudence with counsel, 
suggesting that ‘the euent of all ages hath, and will euer instruct vs, that in the 
managing of waightie affaires, more things are brought to passe by good aduise 
and counsell, then by force of armes’.
501
 He notes that it is most commendable for a 
man to be able to ‘foresee all things to come’, but that ‘he in like manner doth 
derserue great praise, that can follow the wise aduise of others’.
502
 In line with 
traditional views of counsel, Lipsius suggests that counsellors are necessary to 
supplement the prudence of the prince, but his definition of prudence is more in line 
with that of Machiavelli and those who follow him. Prudence must take into 
account the ability to vary with circumstance, for ‘he is truly prouident [prudens] 
and wise, that keepeth not alwayes the same pase, but the same way. And he is not 
therefore to be esteemed variable, but rather applyable, and fitting things to the 
purpose’.
503
 Lipsius concludes that the prudent man is he ‘who holdeth not one, and 
the same course, though he tend, to one and the same hauen’; prudence consists in a 




In the second half of the book Lipsius carries this acceptance of adaptability 
into a discussion of dissimulation and deception. He begins the ‘new preface’ to the 
work by making clearer his views on ‘proper prudence’ or ‘that which is requesite 
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to be in a Prince’.
505
 Such prudence, he suggests, has three main characteristics. 
First, it is ‘diffused’ and ‘concerneth particular matters’, for which reasons 
precepts are not enough to teach such a skill.
506
 Second, it is ‘confused’, for it is 
‘imploied about things vncertaine’.
507
 Because of these characteristics, prudence 
itself has no static form:  
if the things themselues are vncertaine, Prudence it selfe likewise 
must of necessitie be so, and so much the rather, because it is not 
onely tied to the things themselues, but to their dependents, hauing 
regard vnto the times, the places, and to men and for their least 
change, she changeth her selfe, which is the reason why she is not in 




 Having presented ‘the best and purest wine’ of prudence in the first three 
books, Lipsius wonders if, based on this new understanding of prudence, ‘it be 
lawfull for me to mingle lightly, and ioyne with it some dregs of deceipt?’
509
 He 
decides that it would indeed be allowable, based on the conditions of ‘this age, and 
the men that liue therein’, suggesting that those who oppose this position ‘giue their 
opinion, as if they liued in the common wealth of Plato, and not in the dregs of the 
state of Romulus’.
510
 We may recognise this line from Plutarch’s discussion of 
kairos in his life of Cato; Lipsius applies it to the question of stretching the 
definition of prudence to allow for deception, concluding with Thomas that since 
‘we conuerse... with craftie and malicious persons, who seeme to be made of 
fraude, deceipt and lying’, especially princes, who ‘although they shewe 
themselues to be like Lyons, yet are they in their corrupt hearts dissembling 
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Foxes’, we ought to adopt the same practices, in order to match our actions to the 
conditions of the times.
511
 
A prince ‘hauing to deal with a foxe’ must sometimes ‘play the foxe’, 
especially in cases where ‘the good and publike profit’, synonymous with ‘the 
benefit and profit of the Prince’, is concerned.
512
 Such a cause changes the very 
moral value and appellation of an action: ‘that which is commonly reputed 
dishonest for this cause, will not be so’.
513
 Thus a prince will ‘intermingle that 
which is profitable, with that which is honest’.
514
 Prudence does not change ‘albeit 
a few drops of deceipt bee mingled therewith’.
515
 He makes the connection that this 
argument has to Machiavelli explicit by defending him at the close of this chapter. 
Lipsius refers to him as the ‘Italian faulte-writer’, identified by name in the margin, 
whose ‘poore soule is layde at of all hands’ and whom an experienced man will not 
condemn for the recognition that ‘there is a certain honest and laudable deceipt.’
516
 
 In the following chapter Lipsius informs the reader of what this honest 
deceit consists. It is, he writes, ‘a subtile counsell, which swarveth from vertue or 
the lawes for the good of the Prince and the estate’.
517
 He sets out three levels of 
such honest deceit – light, middling and great – claiming that ‘the first sort of 
deceipt I persuade, the second I tollerate, and the third I condemne’, although he 
does not denounce any form absolutely, even the gravest, for there is always an 
occasion where it may be necessary.
518
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The first, ‘light’ type of deceit ‘paceth not farre from vertue’ and is only 
‘slightly watered with the dewe of euill’, involving practices such as distrust and 
dissimulation.
519
 He repeats the oft-quoted idea that ‘he knew not wel how to beare 
rule, that knew not how to dissemble’.
520
 In fact, for Lipsius dissembling is only 
allowable when it comes to rulers, for ‘it ought not to bee amongst priuat persons’ 
but when it comes to governors ‘they shall neuer gouerne well, who know not how 
to couer well’.
521
 This dissembling is not just in relation to ‘strangers, or their 




He defines middling deceit as ‘when for thy profit thou intisest another by 
an error or false tale’ and, although it is not allowed to those who use such means 
against princes, he argues that it ‘be lawfull in a Prince... for the commoditie of 
their subiects... to vse lying and deceipt’, for ‘to deceiue in time and place is 
wisedome’.
523
 He suggests that such strategies are often stronger and more effective 
than force, and notes that ‘oftentimes by pollicie of counsel [princes] atchieue that, 
which the necessitie of affaires, and want of time doth denie them’, deceiving in 
speech, letters and through their ambassadors.
524
 This ‘pollicie of counsel’, he 
suggests, ‘albeit is not to be praised, is certainly necessary and justifiable ‘if you 
enter into a consideration of humane prudence’.
525
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He classifies great deceit under the headings of ‘Trecherie and Iniustice’.
526
 
Even in this discussion, however, Lipsius redefines many otherwise dubious actions 
in order to make them allowable for princes, for ‘it is necessarie to be a little 
withdrawn from iustice, in matters of small importance, to the end they may keepe 
it in waightie matters’.
527
 Thus, if a prince commits ‘some small iniustice’ and it is 
‘kept secret’ then it might be allowable, particularly if it is ‘for the commoditie of 
the common wealth’.
528
 In such cases, Lipsius suggests that the prince employ his 
skills of paradiastolic redescription, for ‘A happie and prosperous mischeife is 
called vertue’.
529
 For Lipsius, virtue is only one part of the consideration of 
political success, the other consists of a view of prudence quite removed from its 
place as one of the cardinal virtues, which allows, based on temporal 




III. The Morality of Princes and Counsellors 
The creation of a flexible morality based on prudential evaluation of diverse 
circumstances which is proper to politics, as opposed to private affairs, is even 
more clearly outlined in the works of the essay writers of the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, whose subjective medium causes them to consider not 
just the theatre of politics, but the nature of the actors involved.  
                                                                                                                                        
which passe by the secret path of fraud and deceipt’ (p. 167). Direct counsels 
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This tendency, and the essay-writing genre, is originated by Michel de 
Montaigne, whose Essais were translated into English in 1603 by John Florio, a 
noted translator and writer in London. Montaigne’s work is intimately connected to 
that of Lipsius; Lipsius himself wrote of Montaigne that ‘I have found no one in 
Europe whose way of thinking about things is closer to my own’ and Montaigne 
described Lipsius as ‘the most sufficient and learned man now living’.
531
 
Montaigne, like Lipsius, has been variously declared both a Machiavellian and anti-
Machiavellian by turns, most likely because his intention too was to form a 
synthesis of the two, rather than place himself in one or the other camp.
532
 
Although he originally had set out to collect sources on many of the 
questions Machiavelli, Lipsius and others had tackled – such as ‘the role of chance 
in military and political undertakings [and] the stability of regimes’ – he had found 
the results to be contradictory, and hence gave up the task of producing a cohesive 
political treatise in the style of his predecessors.
533
 Instead, he published a series of 
‘essais’, attempts to grapple with these questions, with no claim to success, 
objectivity or conclusion. In fact, the entire collection presents a rejection of such 
notions. It is the intention, Montaigne’s essai, that counts.
534
  
This emphasis on intention is present in the essays themselves, for Montaigne 
claims that it is intention that ‘iudgeth our actions’.
535
 In fact, ‘nothing is truely in 
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our power’, he suggests, ‘except our will’.
536
 Thus it is the will which should be the 
subject of all discussions of morality: ‘It is no parte of a well-grounded iudgement, 
simplie to iudge our selves by our exterior actions’.
537
 As such, deception becomes 
the worst sort of immoral act; it is ‘an ill and detestable vice’ and Montaigne 
‘hate[s] it to the death’.
538
 He declares it ‘a vaine and servile humour, for a man to 
disguise and hide himselfe vnder a maske, and not dare to shew himselfe as he 
is’.
539
 Thus in truth-telling, as in all things, Montaigne chooses the course whereby 
he can defend his intentions, and leave the rest to fortune: ‘I apply my selfe to 
ingenuitie, and ever to speake truth and what I thinke, both by [my] complexion and 
by [my] intention; leaving the successe thereof vnto fortune’.
540
  
The same applies to counsels – it is the intention that matters: ‘our counsels 
go astray, becayse they are not rightly addressed, and have no fixed end’.
541
 Such 
considerations come before any other thoughts of means: ‘a skilfull archer ought 
first to know the marke he aimeth at, and then apply his hand, his bow, his string, 
his arrow and his motion accordingly’.
542
 Whether or not he hits his mark is 
inconsequential: ‘counsels ought not to be iudged by the events’ for ‘events are but 
weake testimonies of our worth and capacity’.
543
 Just as it is ‘folly to thinke, that 
humane wisedome may acte the full part of fortune’, ‘vaine is his enterprise, that 
presumeth to embrace both causes and consequences’.
544
 Thus there are two parts 
that make up correct action and counsel for Montaigne: that the intention has the 
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right aim and that it is in accordance with one’s own nature. The power of Fortune 
will determine the rest.  
Unlike Lipsius, for Montaigne prudence does not have the power to combat 
Fortune, and so it is that one will see ‘Divers events from one selfe same 
counsell’.
545
 ‘So vaine and frivolous a thing is humane wisedome [prudence]’ he 
declares, ‘and contrary to all projects, devises, counsels, & precautions: fortune 
doth ever keep a full sway and possessions of all events’.
546
 Fortune’s abilities far 
outstrip man’s; she ‘sometimes addresse[s] and correct[s] our counsells’ for she 
‘hath better advise than wee’ and ‘in hir directions exceedeth all the rules of 
humane wisedome’.
547
 This is even more the case in the political realm: ‘publike 
innouations, depend more on the conduct of fortune’ than private ones.
548
 As 
Fortune ‘seldome wil yeeld, or never subject her-selfe vnto our discourse or 
wisedome’, the great power of prudence is humbled by her incomprehensibility.
549
 
Although, for Montaigne, prudence does not give us the power to counter 
Fortune, we do have the power to change how we view and describe the outcomes. 
‘Fortune doth vs neither good nor ill’, it is only in our own estimation of events that 
they are either good or bad: ‘fortune simply affoord-vs the matter, it lieth in vs to 
give-it the forme... that which wee terme evill, is not so of it selfe’.
550
 It is in this 
ability, Montaigne suggests, that we have a greater power than Fortune, for Fortune 
can do us no harm unless we declare it so: ‘she offereth-vs the seede and matter of 
it, which our minde more powerfull than she, turneth and applieth as best it 
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All of these themes are brought together in the essay, ‘Of profit and 
honestie’.
552
 Whereas others had rejected the concerns of honestum/utile based on 
particular temporal concerns, Montaigne’s objections are based on another 
particularity. He makes clear in this chapter that both the traditional and 
Machiavellian arguments about honestum and utile have one weakness in common: 




He begins the chapter with an acknowledgement of the logical consistency of 
the Machiavellian argument that vices must, at least on occasion, be profitable. This 
is presented in the form of a simple syllogism. As (P1) ‘there is nothing in nature 
vnseruiceable, no not invtilie itselfe’ and (P2) ‘our essence is symented with crased 
qualities; ambition, jealousie, enuie...’ therefore (C) even these baser and seemingly 
unnatural qualities must have a purpose and utility: ‘the seede of which qualities, 
who should roote out of man; should ruine the fundamentall conditions of our 
life’.
554
 He notes that this is especially true in regards to ‘policy’: ‘in a mater of 
policie-likewise, some necessary functions are not onely base but faultie: vices find 
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 Thus this argument finds itself between those, such as Skinner 1978a, p. 253 and 
Tuck 1993, who suggest that Montaigne was advancing arguments for reason of 
state and those, such as Collins 1992 and Fontana 2008, p. 18, who suggest that he 
was critiquing this view. Montaigne’s point, I suggest, was not to take either side, 
but rather to suggest that both had a fundamental flaw in that they prescribed 
universalities; either moral system could be viable, depending on the particulars. In 
this way it is aligned with the argument in Fontana 2008, p. 138: ‘on Montaigne’s 
terms, acting prudently, in the private as in the public domain, meant something 
quite different in each individual case’, as ‘prudent conduct’ consisted of 
‘“following nature”’.  
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therein a seat, and employ themselues in the stitching vp of our frame: as poisons in 
the preseruation of our health’.
555
 
The use of such vices is particular to the political sphere, or rather, to those 
within it. Even if some deplorable actions ‘become excusable, because we have 
need of them’, that does not mean, Montaigne makes clear, that such actions are to 
be performed by all men.
556
 Albeit an action might be excusable because it is 
necessary, that still does not make it good, and one’s conscience may still suffer for 
it. It therefore should be performed only by those individuals who are suited to it. 
As he had remarked in his tenth essay, actions ought to be matched to the nature of 
the individual performing them. When he suggests that ‘The way to trueth is but 
one and simple’, Montaigne is not suggesting a universal moral system, but quite 




Taking this into consideration, Montaigne can make allowance for what he 
terms ‘lawfull vices’.
558
 It is true, he says, that true justice would never allow such 
things, but we must refer to an ‘especiall, and nationall iustice’ which is ‘restrained 
and suted to the neede of our pollicies’.
559
 We, as fallen beings, do not have the 
ability to know the exact nature of true justice. As a result, all we have is imitation, 
as ‘we haue no liuely nor life-like purtrature of vpright law and naturall iustice: we 
vse but the shaddowes and colours of them.’
560
 Montaigne thus suggests that we 
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‘follow the common phrase, which makes a difference betweene profitable and 
honest things; terming some naturall actions, which are not onely profitable but 
necessarie, dishonesty and filthie’.
561
  
 In fact, especially when it comes to princes, the performance of vicious 
actions may be divinely mandated punishment. Princes may have to conduct 
themselves immorally, suffering the damage this does to their conscience, for some 
previous sin:  
When an vrgent circumstance, or any violent and vnexpected 
accident, induceth a Prince for the necessity of his estate, or as they 
say for state matters, to breake his worde and faith, or otherwise 
forceth him out of his ordinarie dutie, he is to ascribe that necessitie 
vnto a lash of God’s rod: It is no vice, for he hath quit his reason, 





For a prince, Montaigne suggests, there is no remedy to this ill fortune: ‘were he 
trulie rackt between these two extreames... he must haue done it’.
563
 However, if he 
is a different sort of person, ‘one of so tender or cheverall a conscience, to whome 
no cure might seeme worthie of so extreame a remedie’ then his choice not to take 




                                                                                                                                        
(p. 593). Instead, ‘the vertue assigned to the worlds affaires, is a vertue with sundry 
byases, turnings, bendings and elbowes, to apply and joyne it selfe to humane 
imbecilitie; mixed and artificially: neither right, pure or constant, nor meerly 
innocent’ (p. 593).  
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 This is because, for private men, dedication to the well-being of their 
country does not have to come above private concerns, such as conscience or 
family. It is part of our nature as humans to have such bonds, and overriding them 
fragments that fundamental unity: ‘Let vs bereave wicked, bloodie and trayterous 
dispositions, of this pretext of reason [more publike]; leave we that impious and 
exorbitant [nationall] justice, and adhere vnto more humane imitations’.
565
 It is 
these individual and particular relationships which define us, both as individuals 
and a human community, and trump all concerns of either honesty or utility. Thus, 
he concludes:  
Falselie doe we argue honour, and the beautie of an action, by it’s 
[sic] profit: and conclude as ill, to thinke every one is bound vnto it, 
and that is is honest, if it be commodious.  
Omnia non pariter rerum su[n]t omnibus opta. 
All things a-like to all,  




Even before its translation into English, Montaigne’s Essais were widely read 
in English intellectual circles, as evidenced by the spread of the essay in the 
decades following its publication. One of the earliest writers within the English 
genre was William Cornwallis, whose Essayes were first published in 1600, with a 
second half added the following year. Intimately acquainted not only with the 
works of Lipsius and Montaigne, but also with the real-world politics of 
counselling, Cornwallis’s essays reflect a fusion of these influences.
567
  
His first essay sets this tone. ‘Of Resolution’ begins with a reflection of his 
own thoughts and views, before turning his evaluating gaze outward – first to 
society, and then to the political. Touching on the themes of adaptation to 
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circumstance and paradiastole, he uses an example from Plutarch’s Lives – 
Alexander’s decision to wear the clothes of the ‘barbarians’ he had conquered – 
declaring that he is ‘not of their mindes that tax Alexanders putting on the habit of 
the Persians’, for this was a ‘a politicke inte[n]t, he ioyned the[m] to him, by that 
yeelding’.
568
 In this case, ‘Fantasticknesse lent wisdome to Pollicy’.
569
 He thus 
allows that ‘some actions, if they be not wholely vicious, humanitie and good 
nature shall make [them] sociable’.
570
 
This is particularly true of political actions. In the essay ‘Of Suspicion’, 
Cornwallis addresses the issue of necessary vicious actions done by princes and 
makes the argument for the separation of private and political moralities. Princes, 
he writes, are fundamentally different from private men, as ‘vppon this state 
dependes the common good’, and so ‘among these States, Suspicion and 
Dissimulation are to be allowed’ as they are the ‘Handmaydes of Pollicie’.
571
 He 
agrees with Hurault that princes ‘ought to be conuersant’ in such practices ‘not to 
offend, but to defend’.
572
 
Taking Montaigne’s suggestion that morality should be based on the 
individual involved, Cornwallis founds his separation of private and public morality 
on the state of the person acting, not just the situation or timing. Princes in 
Cornwallis’s estimation are fundamentally different from private men; they are 
allowed actions usually considered dishonest ‘not in respect they are men, but in 
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regard they are princes’.
573




Cornwallis goes further than Montaigne in making the suggestion that the 
moral valuation of these actions is fundamentally changed based on the 
consideration of who is performing the deed, for ‘things [are] different in name and 
nature, according to the possessor’.
575
 Thus ‘to a lowe fortune belongs simply the 
vse of Vertue’, but to princes ‘[virtue] must be often chaunged, not into vice, but 
not to looke alwayes like Vertue’.
576
 Combining this doctrine with that of Lipsius, 
he tells his reader that the private man need only walk a straight and simple path, 
but the navigations of princes are more diverse and complex: ‘couersant with 
multitude, [he] must sometime goe about & seek by wayes, which in him may bee 
vertuous, though in the other it would be termed dishonest’.
577
 Virtue and vice are 
necessarily redescribed when speaking of princes. 
Turning to the controversial topic of dissimulation, Cornwallis connects it 
directly to the discussions of variable circumstance, calling dissimulation ‘a 
skillfull manager of time’.
578
 It is thus ‘tollerable; in some courses necessarie’ to 
dissimulate, as Alexander did with his barbaric Persian attire.
579
 These cases are 
defined, as they were for Plutarch and Machiavelli, by an understanding of kairos: 
‘Time in it selfe is alwayes one, but Occasion runs Diuision vpon Time, her note is 
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Recalling the important connection between kairos and counsel, Cornwallis 
suggests that this attention to occasion must be especially embraced by counsellors, 
for ‘it is the duty of a faithfull seruant to tell his maister of his faultes... but he must 
watch fit oportunity’.
581
 Counsel is essential to every man, Cornwallis suggests in 
his second essay ‘Of Advice’, for ‘if the end of life be to be good’, and ‘if the safest 
purchase of goodnesse bee counsayle’, then ‘why eschew wee the blessing of 
Aduise?’
582
 In line with the Aristotelian tradition, Cornwallis suggests that it is 
advice which is ‘the medium transporting’ the rays of reason, the means by which 
we can control the affections and passions.
583
 This is especially pertinent in 
political considerations, for he ‘see[s] nothing more decay the fairest branches of 
our Commonwealth, then this neglect; either wee will not endure Aduise, or not 
beleeue it’.
584
 He ends this essay with an exhortation to political counsel: ‘let vs 
then infranchize Aduise, and perswade our eares to become good common-wealth 
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In the 1610 edition he adds a further consideration of advice in the political 
realm in the essay ‘Of Counsaile’. Here he distinguishes between ‘counsel’ – 
proper to politics – and private advice, for ‘aduice fitteth friend to friend: counsaile 
counsailours to states’.
586
 Whereas in the Aristotelian tradition counsel was 
proposed as a counter to the tyranny of a passionate ruler – which Cornwallis 
applies to personal advice – political tyranny comes in another form, to which 
counsel, once again, is the answer: ‘cha[n]ce chalengeth vnpremeditated actions; 
what more tyrannous?’ and so ‘must we admit counsaile’.
587
 Counsel, specifically 
political counsel as opposed to personal advice, is thus transformed from a remedy 
to the passions of a prince to the counter to the whims of capricious fortune. He 
concludes that ‘counsell then vpholds states, and to Counsaile, and to bee 
counsailed, fittes a states man’.
588
 
These themes are also considered by the best-known of the English essayists 
– Francis Bacon – who sets out two kinds of prudence: a traditional variant suited 
to the common man and another for those who must adapt to political circumstance. 
In his Twoo Bookes... Of the proficiency and aduancement of Learning, diuine and 
humane, published in 1605, Bacon presents two forms of wisdom: a ‘wisedome of 
counsell’ and a ‘wisedome of pressiing [sic] a mans own fortune’.
589
 Like Lipsius, 
Bacon imposes a division between the wisdom required for political counsel and 
that which brings success in day-to-day affairs: ‘many are wise in their owne ways, 
that are weak for gouernmente or Counsell’.
590
 The wisdom of fortune, he writes, 
must be acknowledged by those with public roles for ‘great Pollitiques indeede euer 
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ascribed their successes to their felicitie; and not to their skill or vertue’.
591
 Bacon 
feels the need to set out a doctrine for fortune’s disciples, ‘for fortune layeth as 
heauy impositions as vertue, and it is as harde and severe a thinge to be a 
Pollipolitique as to be truely moral’.
592
 It is his task to ascribe a curriculum for this 
‘Architecture of fortune’, for although many will not esteem him for doing it, 
‘neuerthelesse fortune as an organ of vertue and merit deserueth the 
consideration’.
593
 Bacon intends instruction in this kind of wisdom to those in 
‘gouernment or Counsell’ – politicians and, importantly, counsellors.
594
 
He sets out eleven precepts for their education, most of which will now be 
familiar to us. For instance, such a man must know the nature and ends of those 
around him, and learn to mistrust them as unfaithful dissimulators. He must be able 
to embrace the tools of rhetoric, and specifically paradiastole, in order to provide 
‘flourishes and inhansements of vertue’, and for ‘the couering of defects... by 
Caution, by Colour, and by Confidence’.
595
 From this, Bacon makes clear that the 
disciple of fortune must also know how to recognise and take hold of kairos, to 
‘frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion’, for ‘nothing hindereth mens 
fortunes so much’ as to lack the ability to change with the times.
596
 Politicians 
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especially must have this skill, for ‘nothing is more pollitique then to make the 
wheels of our mind concentrique with the wheels of fortune’.
597
  
Bacon attempts to make a clear distinction between his brand of temporally-
based counsel and that associated with Machiavellianism, which he makes a point 
to deride.
598
 Bacon assures his readers that his instructions are ‘Bonae Artes’ and to 
be distinguished from ‘euill arts’, which consist in ‘that principle of Machiauel: 
That a man seeke not to attain vertue it selfe: But the apparance only thereof’.
599
 
This flexibility and willingness to embrace redescription on occasion should not, 
Bacon makes clear, replace the desire to attain true virtue, a lesson he reads into 
Machiavelli’s works. Nevertheless, the surest way to this, and all other skills of 
government, Bacon suggests, is to follow precisely Machiavelli’s own method, for 
‘the fourme of writing which of al others is fittest for this variable argumente of 
Negotiation and occasions is which Machiauel chose wisely and aptly for 
Gouernmente: namely discourse vpon Histories and Examples.’
600
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Chapter 5: History and Counsel 
This chapter explores the intersection of the discourses of counsel we have been 
examining with the rise of historical literature in the latter half of the sixteenth 
century. Following the attacks on the rhetorical strategies of counsellors, written 
histories come to be seen by many late sixteenth century writers as the only 
legitimate means of presenting political counsel. In addition, when it comes to 
presenting material for political counsel, histories are seen as providing insight into 
the ‘occasions’ and variability of time which had become essential to the role of the 
counsellor. Historical knowledge thus takes the place of moral philosophy as the 
source of political knowledge, and histories the place of rhetorical techniques in the 
communication of this knowledge.  
There are three models of history-as-counsel presented in this period. The 
first figures history in the position of the counsellor, directly addressing the 
monarch as the beneficiary of the advice it contains. The second model retains the 
figure of the counsellor and positions him as the recipient of the benefits of 
history’s wisdom. He acts as mediator, communicating the lessons of history to the 
monarch according to his own discretion. Finally, towards the end of the century, 
we encounter a model of history which sees its lessons as belonging to the people 
as a whole; it is they who will best use it to navigate the vicissitudes of time and 
circumstance.  
 
I. The Rejection of Rhetoric and the Turn to History 
Both the problems which the turn to history is meant to solve – distrust of the 
counsellor and the changed definition of prudence – are laid out in Chapters XXII 
and XXIII of Machiavelli’s Prince. First, in a world where human nature leads us to 
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consider only our own self-interest, and where prudential counsellors will 
constantly and actively be changing their allegiances, Machiavelli has to deal with 
the problem of trust. Princes must be wary of a servant who ‘stud[ies] more for his 
owne advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, hee searches most after his 
owne profit [utile]’ for such a man ‘shall never prove a good servant [ministro], nor 
canst thou ever relie upon him’.
601
  
In the figure of the counsellor Machiavelli finds a conflict between the 
humanist theories that he is willing to jettison and those which he desires to retain. 
He clings to the view that the counsellor must be selfless in classically humanist 
terms: ‘he that holds the sterne of the State in hand, ought never call home his cares 
to his owne particular, but give himselfe wholly to his Princes service’.
602
 He, 
however, has placed this figure in a world which makes selflessness impossible, or 
at least unprofitable, and thus to be rejected by a prudent counsellor. 
As a remedy, Machiavelli proposes that the prince ought to keep the loyalty 
of such a counsellor by taking ‘care for his servant, honouring him, enriching, and 
obliging him to him’, so that the prince’s and counsellor’s interests are united.
603
 In 
other words, to make him more servile by making him dependent on the prince’s 
will. Of course Machiavelli was distrustful of such tactics as applied to 
mercenaries, so it is unclear whether he actually thought such a strategy would 
work when applied to counsellors.  
We might be inclined to think not, because he goes on to suggest an 
inversion of the model of counsel proposed by orthodox humanists in an effort to 
bind royal counsellors. Whereas for previous writers the prudence of the counsellor 
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determines the prudence of the prince, Machiavelli’s distrust of counsellors leads 
him to suggest that the influence should work in the other direction: ‘some men 
have thought, that a Prince, that gaines the opinion to bee wise [prudente], may be 
held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells hee hath 
about him; without question they are deceivd.’
604
 In a rare generalisation, 
Machiavelli suggests instead that it ‘is a generall rule and never failes, that a Prince 
who of himselfe is not wise [savio], can never bee well advisd’.
605
 Based on this 
suspicion of the counsellor’s motives, that ‘each one of the counsellers, probably 
will follow that which is most properly his owne’, Machiavelli concludes ‘that 
counsells from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from 




This Machiavellian distrust of the counsellor becomes coupled with a 
general distaste for the long and stylised orations of the neo-classical rhetoricians 
and the fear that they only serve to hide the dangerous techniques of 
redescription.
607
 Montaigne, for example, famously expressed his aversion to and 
distrust of ‘that eloquence, that leaves-vs with a dessigne of-it, and not of things’, 
arguing that such attention to ornamentation serves more to obscure the truth than 
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 In his Essais, he compares rhetoricians to ‘those that mask and 
paint women’, though the latter ‘commit not so foule a fault’ as orators, for such 
makeup only obscures what is better left hidden from man’s eyes.
609
 On the other 
hand, orators ‘professe and deceive and beguile, not our eyes, but our judgement’ 
and ‘bastardize and corrupt the essence of things’.
610
 The best commonwealths, he 
suggests, will remove rhetoric entirely, for it is ‘an instrument devised, to busie, to 
manage, and to agitate a vulgar and disordered multitude’.
611
  
This problem of the persuasive power of rhetoric comes to be articulated by 
many as a distinction between counsel and command, with the use of rhetoric 
coming under the purview of the latter.
612
 Bartolome Felippe, for example, treats 
such misuse of rhetoric in his eighth chapter: ‘what punishment they deserue, that 
doe not couusell [sic] their Princes sincerely and faithfully without deceite’.
613
 True 
counsel is employed by those who ‘counsell a man to doo any thing, and dooe 
onely shew him a reason why they counsell him to doo so’.
614
 These men simply 
‘make him acquainted with the reasons which mooue them to give such 
counsell’.
615
 This is exhortatio, or simple encouragement, and does not ‘bind, or by 
any necessitie force him to whom the counsell is giuen, to follow their counsell’.
616
 
Such counsel is given simply and straightforwardly, without use of rhetorical 
persuasive techniques. 
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This is distinct, he suggests, from those who ‘commaund and perswade a 
man to doo a thing’.
617
 To command and to persuade are both indications of a bad 
counsellor, for ‘they that command will haue that doone which they commaund: 
and they that perswade, vrge the execution of that which they perswade’.
618
 
Persuasion, in fact, is even worse than command in the hands of a counsellor. 
Quoting the Roman jurist Ulpian, Felippe writes that ‘it is more to perswade one to 
commit some offence, then to compell or constraine him to dooe it: for mens 
mindes are more mooued by perswasion, then by compulsion or 
commandement’.
619
 Felippe ends this argument by turning the rhetoricians’ own 
arguments for the efficacy and potency of oratory against themselves: ‘therefore 
Cornelius Tacitus and Plato saie, that the Arte which teacheth men to perswade, is 
the most excellent and noble Arte of al Artes’ and he quotes De inventione directly: 
‘for that which by mans force could not be atchieued, hath oftentimes beene 
obtained by eloquence’.
620
 This is precisely the power of rhetoric – extolled by 
classical writers – that Felippe draws attention to and questions; if to sway a 





In addition to this suspicion of counsellors, there is a second problem relating to 
counsel that Machiavelli is left with at the end of The Prince. Having established in 
Chapter XXV, as we saw, that ‘he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of 
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proceeding meets with the quality of the times: and so likewise he is unfortunate, 
from whose course of proceeding the times differ’, Machiavelli is faced with his 
own dedication to reality, and is forced to doubt that ‘there is any man so wise 
[prudente], that can frame himselfe’ to change so completely with the times, both 
‘because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto Nature inclines him’ 
and ‘also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such a way, cannot be 
perswaded to leave it’.
622
 All that Machiavelli can suggest is to be more forceful to 
subdue Fortune, but there is no guarantee that this will ensure success.  
Of course, Machiavelli’s own use of history as the foundation for counsel is 
clear throughout The Prince, and his preference for historical lessons over those of 
moral philosophy explicit. So it is no surprise that history becomes the tool by 
which the newly defined skill of prudence can be developed, both in his writing and 
in the works of those who follow him.  
History – the artes historicae – was categorised by Renaissance humanists, 
in line with their classical predecessors, as a branch of rhetoric.
623
 By the second 
half of sixteenth century, however, the genre of history was in the process of 
undergoing a substantial shift.
624
 Whereas focus had been on how histories were to 
be written (the rhetorical techniques at play), discussions began to move into a 
consideration of how histories ought to be read (the lessons that could be drawn 
from them).
625
 Furthermore, many writers sought to free history from the confines 
and requirements of rhetorical practice, focusing on the sources and lessons of 
history more than the ornamental way in which it was presented.
626
 Despite being a 
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branch of the rhetorical tradition, from the middle of the sixteenth century these 
changes stripped the genre of history of much of its rhetorical ornamentation, 
making the rhetorical arts look over-dressed and over-painted in comparison.   
Despite, or perhaps because of, this shift, historical writing was in its 
‘heyday’ in the closing decades of the sixteenth century.
627
 In England this was due 
in large part to the propagandistic strategies of the Tudor regime, which encouraged 
historical studies as a means to root the dynasty to the past.
628
 Coupled with this 
was the growing belief among sixteenth-century Englishmen that their place in 
history was a monumental one, requiring knowledge of the past to navigate the 
tempestuous times they found themselves in. For example, Francis Bacon in his 
1605 Aduancement of Learning notes that especially the ‘storie of England’ from 
the ‘Vniting of the Roses, to the Vniting of the Kingdomes’ has seen ‘the rarest 
varieties, that in like number of successio[n]s of any hereditary Monarchie hath bin 
known’, and he proceeds to note the turbulent events of the previous decades, using 
this evidence as justification for the importance of writing histories.
629
 The attempts 
to seize time and utilise it for the needs of the present and the demands of an 
uncertain future were grounded in a fear of the complex and unstable temporal 
vacillations of the sixteenth century.
630
 Englishmen wanted to take hold of their 
time, to control and influence it rather than feel at its mercy. The application of 
historical lessons to political events – the use of history in political counsel – was 
one way of accomplishing such a desire. 
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II. Histories and Princes 
The model of historical counsel as presented directly to the prince is expressed 
through the belief that ‘there is nothing more necessary for a Prince in this world 
the[n] Histories’ and in the oft-cited maxim optimi conciliarii mortui – the best 
counsellors are [the] dead.
631
 Matthew Coignet, for example, employs both these 
adages in Chapter 17 of his 1586 Discourses upon trueth and lying, which stresses 
‘that it is needfull to read histories, there to see the truth which one is afraid to 
speake’.
632
 Coignet questions the reliability of counsellors to present the king with 
frank and truthful advice, either due to the decorous demands of rhetoric, or their 
own self-interest. He supports his argument – that princes should thus turn instead 
to literary counsel – with the advice of Demetrius to King Ptolomy: to ‘diligently 
reade such bookes, as intreated of the gouernmentes of kingdomes and segnuries, to 
the end he might be instructed in those thinges, which men dare not so freelie, 
deliuer them selues to princes’.
633
 Coignet concludes that ‘the penne is of a more 




Lipsius, too, employs this phrase in his treatment of history and counsel in 
the Sixe Bookes. Although experience, ‘The knowledge of worldly matters which we 
haue either seene or had the handling of’, is far more valuable than memory, ‘the 
like knowledge of those things, we haue eyther heard or read’, experience is more 
problematic as it is ‘not learned by precepts, but taught by time’.
635
 It is only old 
men who can possess such knowledge, and the lessons will die with them. 
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Experience is conquered by time, rather than standing triumphant above it. Thus, 
‘the memorie of things, or of a historie’ is the easier approach ‘not onely to attain 
vnto prudence, but to goodnesse likewise’.
636
 It ‘bringeth more things that are 
profitable both to prudence, and beside to more persons then vse doth’.
637
 Here we 
see the Machiavellian shift in the meaning of prudence linked to a preference for 
knowledge gleaned from histories, based in large part on its applicability to 
particular circumstances. In its contingency, such knowledge is universally valid; it 
‘agreeth with all men, and fitteth all times, and seasons’.
638
 History is what provides 
us with the knowledge to recognise and seize kairos. Quoting Cicero, he notes that 
history is the ‘preseruer of the vertue of worthy personages’, a ‘benefactresse to all 
mankind’, the ‘light of truth, the mistresse of life’ and a ‘glasse’ in which one may 
‘behold, all maner of instruction and examples’.
639
  
Just as he had argued that experience ‘principally... conduceth vnto Ciuill 
policy’, Lipsius suggests that this ‘more safe, and assured’ way to prudence ‘is 
most necessarie in this part of Ciuill life’ and ‘Directeth those that haue publike 
authoritie’.
640
 Furthermore, histories in particular ‘are in matter of publike 
counsell... most profitable’ and ‘in consultation... holdeth the chiefest place’.
641
 
This is not to say that they should be wielded by counsellors, but rather that they 
should replace such a figure altogether, for he ends by declaring that ‘the best 
counsellors are the dead, that is... authors, which are without dissimulatio[n]’, 
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meaning ‘the bookes, and treaties of histories’.
642
 A living counsellor, armed with 
dissimulation and burdened by self-interest, cannot be trusted as much as a dead 
one. 
These ideas are first expressed in the English context by Edward Forsett, a 
government official and member of parliament, in his treatise A comparatiue 
discource of the bodies natural and politique of 1606, which sets forward a strongly 
monarchical view of natural law. In addition to espousing the necessity of subjects’ 
obedience to and love of their sovereign, Forsett emphasises the role of ‘State-
Phisicions’ or magistrates in ensuring the health of the commonwealth.
643
 In doing 
so, he makes a number of Machiavellian realist concessions, recognising, for 
example, that ‘Magistrats may make vse of the wicked’, that is to say ‘vppon 
occasion make vse of wicked men’.
644
 Such an allowance is ruled according to the 
magistrates’ use of their ‘discretion’ (Forsett is here translating decorum) which 
takes into account ‘particuler persons... sundrie circumstances, signes, and 
accidents’.
645
 They are also to be attentive to kairotic themes, for the physician-
magistrate must be aware that there ‘is a certaine point of opportunitie to be 
watched, and taken hold on’.
646
 In doing so, he can employ a sort of ‘beguiling 
loue, by sweetning and giuing a more pleasing reliefe to his remedies’.
647
 
 In employing such strategies, the public has no right to accuse them of 
‘vngodly policie’, but rather should ‘for such property & power liken them vnto 
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God, who himselfe infinitly good, extracteth good out of euill’.
648
 This is not to say, 
however, that such magistrates must be ‘infinitly good’. Quite to the contrary, 
Forsett makes it clear that ‘Magistrats may haue priuat faults, yet [be] good 
magistrats’.
649
 A ‘good Commonwealths man’ may excel in his craft ‘though 
otherwise for his priuat faults reproueable’.
650
 
 Having constructed such a dubious character, Forsett, in a separate 
concluding section, limits the effect that such a figure would have by employing the 
same topos that Coignet and Lipsius had. Like Coignet he makes reference to 
Demetrius and King Ptolomy, the former advising his prince that in books ‘you find 
that which none dare or will tell you’.
651
 In ‘such workes aduisedly & faithfully 
compiled, be vnpartial infomers, and vncorrupted Councellours’ who are able to 
apply ‘the generallitie of right and reason’ for ‘vse in particuler considerations’.
652
 
What a governor will draw from such a book will always be ‘simple and sincere, 
without admixture of either deceiptfull drifts, or affectional inclinations’.
653
 It is 
from historical examples that governors are best instructed and counselled. 
 Francis Bacon also repeats these sentiments in his essay ‘On Counsaile’, 
first published in 1612. Describing counsel as the ‘greatest trust’ that can exist 
between men, Bacon emphasises what is at stake in taking the counsel of another; 
whereas ‘in other confidences men commit the partes of their life’, in counsel ‘they 
commit the whole’.
654
 This is not to say, however, that for princes it presents ‘any 
diminution to their greatness... to rely vpon counsell’, quite the contrary. Counsel is 
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Bacon uses the mythic union of Jupiter and Metis, and the birth of Pallas, as 
a metaphor for the marriage that should exist between ‘Soueraignty or authority’ 
and counsel – suggesting that counsel serves to support the sovereignty of the king, 
as long as it occurs within the proper limits.
656
 That is, first kings ‘ought to referre 
matters to [the Counsell of state]’ and then, when ‘their counsel... grow ripe’ kings 
ought to ‘take the matter back into their own hand, & make it appeare to the world, 
that the decrees and final directions... proceede from themselues’.
657
 In other words, 
counsel supports sovereignty as long as it too is subject to it. 
This is the first of three ‘inconueniences’ of counsel which Bacon sets out 
and provides remedies for.
658
 The fable of Jupiter, Metis and Pallas demonstrates 
that princes ought not to fear the ‘weakning of authority’ from counsel.
659
 Second, 
he notes that although soliciting counsel has the potential for ‘the reuealing of 
affaires’, princes are not compelled to disclose secrets of state nor ‘it is necessarie, 
that hee that consulteth what hee should doe; should declare what he will doe’.
660
 
Bacon’s third inconvenience ‘that men will counsel with an eie to themselues’ he 
treats as having the most significance.
661
 He gives a number of suggestions as to 
how princes can remedy this problem, but concludes with Coignet, Lipsius and 
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Forsett that the best solution is to avoid living counsellors altogether. He ends his 





These ideas are also expressed through the prefatory material of the histories 
published in the middle and late sixteenth centuries. For example, this model of 
counsel can be seen in the earliest work to be treated here, Edward Hall’s The vnion 
of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancaster [and] Yorke, published 
posthumously in 1548 by the historian and printer Richard Grafton.
663
 In the 
dedicatory epistle, Hall marks the importance of history in overcoming ‘Obliuion 
the cancard enemie to Fame and renoune the suckyng serpe[n]t of auncient 
memory, the dedly darte to the glory of princes of time’ and in preserving the 
knowledge needed by princes.
664
 Examples give ‘young Princes and fraile 
gouernours... the keye to enduce vertue, and represse vice’ and ‘Thus Fame 
triumpheth vpon death, and renoune vpon Obliuion, and all by reason of writyng 
and history’.
665
 It is perhaps then no surprise that the work is dedicated to a 
‘young... and fraile’ prince – Edward VI – who is to take the lessons that Hall’s 
history contains, and apply them.
666
 
A history published only a year after Hall’s stresses more clearly the role 
that history should play in replacing the counsellor, as Coignet, Lipsius, Forsett and 
Bacon had. This is the 1549 Epitome of Chronicles, written by Thomas Lanquet 
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and finished by Thomas Cooper, a theologian and later bishop of Winchester.
667
 
Cooper’s dedicatory address is written to ‘the ryghte hyghe and myghtye Prynce, 
Edward’, by whom he means not Edward VI, but rather his protector, the Duke of 
Somerset, the ‘gouernour of the kynges maiestees most royall person, and 
protectour of all his hyghnesse realmes dominions, and subiectes’.
668
 His address to 
Somerset stands as a striking example of the way in which history could serve as a 
replacement to living counsellors. He begins by praising the Duke for his openness 
to receiving counsel. As all people of all degree ‘maye at all conueniente times 
haue free access’ to Somerset, Cooper thinks it likely that ‘the true knowledge of 
the state and condicion of the weale publike, is at all tymes to your grace reueled & 
opened’.
669
 He goes on, however, to question this assumption, for in all 
commonwealths of the past there have been those who have ‘hindered true 
report’.
670
 He thus worries about those who through ‘flatterye and dissimulacion’ 
may ‘abuse your godly gentlenesse’, leading Somerset and England to ruin.
671
  
Cooper does away with this traditional model of counsel, replacing it with 
one built on history. Since ‘of all other it is a thinge mooste difficile and harde to 
rule well, and for a chiefe magistrate and gouernour to be truly and without 
dissimulacion informed in euerye case,’ he suggests that ‘the best and most sure 
way for a noble gouernour... is to reade such bookes as most wittily and pithilye 
treat of the states of common weales, and namely histories’.
672
 Not only will true 
counsel be guaranteed through such means, but ‘in bookes shall [the prince] lerne to 
know the wilie flattering foxes, from his sure and trustye friends: good and faythfull 
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ministers, from false feigning dissemblers’.
673
 Furnished with such knowledge, the 
duke will have no need of any external counsel, for ‘he shall learne out of bookes to 
bee him selfe to him selfe, the best the truest and the surest counsaylour’.
674
  
A similar model is presented by William Thomas in his 1549 Historie of 
Italie, subtitled a boke exceedyng profitable to be redde: Because it intreateth of the 
astate of many and diuerse common weales. Thomas was a counsellor – and 
‘informal royal tutor’ – of Edward VI who in the 1550s set out ‘lessons’ for his 
prince based on chapter headings from the Discourses.
675
 In the letter from 1550 
recommending these Machiavellian lessons, Thomas identifies history as essential 
to the education of a young king: ‘there is no earthlie thing more necessarie than the 




He repeats these ideas in his opening letter to the Historie of Italie, noting 
the varieties of lessons that histories, and in particular his history, contain for 
princes – ‘All these thynges, with infinite moe, histories dooe so set foorth to the 
eies of princes (if thei reade theim well)’.
677
 Because ‘many wise and lerned men 
haue so substancially set foorth the infinite co[m]modities that grow of the readyng 
of histories’ he can afford to be brief, drawing attention to the fact that even as 
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Given Thomas’s emphasis on the role that histories can play in guiding a 
king, it may seem at first curious that he chooses to address his history not to 
Edward but to a counsellor, John Dudley, the Earl of Warwick. However, in 1549 
Somerset’s power was waning and Warwick’s on the rise. Just as Cooper chooses 
to address Lanquet’s history to Somerset, Thomas throws his support behind 
Warwick by making him the recipient of histories – the proper science for a prince. 
That being said, there is a sense that this sequence – Hall, Cooper, Thomas – 
indicates a movement away from the throne itself, and to the power that surrounds 
it. 
Elizabeth, too, was the dedicatee of historical works during the course of her 
reign, the authors of which justify their choice of addressee based on the same 
model of counsel-through-history.
679
 One such example is the 1571 translation of 
Pierre Boaistuau’s A most excellent Hystorie, Of the Institution and first beginning 
of Christian Princes by James Chillester. Not only does Chillester translate 
faithfully Boaistuau’s use of the model which replaces an active counsellor with 
historical texts, but his translation also suggests an attempt to present specific 
relevant counsel to the queen, an influential strategy we shall see employed often in 
Elizabeth’s reign. 
The original French text purports to have been a translation from the work 
of Chelidonius Tigurinus, but there is no other record of such a person, and it has 
been suggested instead that Boaistuau obtained his material from the 1519 De regis 
officio opusculum by Josse van Clichtove, the ascription to a fictional Chelidonius 
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being a deliberate fabrication.
680
 Boaistuau tells his readers that the original work 
fell short of his expectations; ‘Chelidonius’ neglected to write on several topics 
typical of the classical advice-to-princes genre. To make up for this, Boaistuau adds 
a number of treatises of his own construction, two of which are especially relevant 
here – the first outlining the theory of counsel-through-history, the second 
demonstrating it. 
Boaistuau composes an elaborate treatise on flattery, which serves as his 
prologue. Like Coignet, Lipsius, Forsett and Bacon, he emphasises the truth-telling 
potential of history over and above living persons, based on the temporal 
constraints faced by the latter: ‘Bookes do always franckly & with all libertie 
admonish vs of those things which our Friends (commonly giuing place to time) do 
suppresse and keepe in silence’.
681
 It is worth quoting Boaistuau’s articulation of 
this idea at length, as it is one of the fullest examples from the period:  
Bookes are as Iudges without feare, which neuer are ashamed to 
shewe the truth, nor neuer stay themselues for the dyspleasure or 
indignation of any King, Prince, or Magistrate, but folowing their free 
nature and condition, with sharp and nypping wordes to disclose mens 
corrupt manners, rebuking them sharply, that there is no sworde more 




The living counsellors of the court, on the other hand, Boaistuau describes 
as ‘flattering and mealy mouthed friends’, who ‘oftentymes did stoppe their eares, 
become mute and dumbe, and passe vnder consent the enormities and abuses they 
see... nothwithsta[n]ding they know and see very well, their Princes and Lordes 
want greatly admonition and councell’.
683
 Thus, princes ‘want nothing but frank 
and discrete mouthes that should tel them the truth’, a role which Boaistuau would 
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give to philosophers, who would act as ‘a dog, that shal bee capable of reason, and 
shall bark agaynst all men, yea euen against your owne selfe if ye shal do any thing 
worthy of reprehensio[n], and shal vse with al wisdom & discretio[n], and haue 
regard to the time & season when and how he ought to do his office’, and he gives 
several classical examples of such persons and their positive effects on princes.
684
 
However, in the context of the sixteenth-century court, respect to ‘time & season’ 
results in nothing but flattery and acquiescence. Thus, ‘there is no medicine more 
meete’ for the diseases of princes ‘than the continuall reading of Bookes, which do 
the office of Iudges and refourmers, and giue them knowledge of their offences’.
685
 
And what sort of books should replace these ‘gouerners of Princes’? Boaistuau 
makes it clear that it is the reading of histories which serves such a purpose: ‘this is 
the ende, that reading the Heroical vertues and excellent commendations of an 
infinit number of Kings, Princes and Lordes which haue bene before them, they 
shal be pricked and stirred vp by the brightnesse of their glorie’.
686
 The counsellor-
figure is wholly replaced by history. 
 
We might at this point inquire: if histories were meant to be the source of princely 
counsel, what advice were they communicating? In the case of Chillester’s 
translation of Boaistuau, the answer is contained in the second added treatise, which 
addresses the importance of marriage. In this work, included towards the end of the 
piece, Boaistuau seeks to declare ‘how that Princes and all other that feele them 
selues ouer prone of Nature, ought to marrie as well for the continuance of their 
race, as also for the comfort of the imperfection of mannes nature, and to auoide the 
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displeasure and indignation of God’.
687
 This is of course an apt and controversial 
topic for the 1570s, and one which Chillester would have only been able to present 
through such a medium. The unique ability of history to present naked truth without 




 In regard to the earlier, larger chronicles, the work of Hall most clearly 
answers this question of what lessons such histories contain, as it deals with 
Edward’s own realm, ancestors and context, as well as providing the most useful 
commentary on political events. Edward is immediately placed within the context 
of Hall’s history, as he is pictured in the frontispiece of the 1548 edition, 
surrounded by his council (Figure 12). This image is balanced by a woodcut 
featured at the end of the volume of Edward’s illustrious father, Henry VIII, also in 
discussion with his counsellors, who range around him in a similar fashion (Figure 
13). 
 Within the history itself Hall’s emphasis is on the importance of the strict 
line dividing counsel and command. Those who counsel properly are praised, and 
the king must always consider their advice carefully. On the other hand, those who 
cross the line and attempt to command the king must be punished and dispensed 
with. Hall draws attention to the examples of counsellors such as Empson and 
Dudley in the reign of Henry VII and Cardinal Wolsey in the reign of Edward’s 
father, who feed rather than limit the appetites of the king in their attempts to 
command him. In particular, Hall focuses on the character of Wolsey, who he 
describes as ‘very eloquente and fulle of witte’.
689
 Because of these abilities, 
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Wolsey is able to control and influence Henry for the first two decades of his reign. 
Hall tells his reader that Wolsey ‘bare all the rule aboute y
e
 kynge’ to the great 
dismay of council and commons.
690
 When at last Henry discovers the ambition and 
dissimulation of Wolsey, he vows to ‘be no more of so light credence hereafter’ and 
Hall marks that this is a second beginning to his reign: ‘The kyng whiche all the 
twentie yere paste, had been ruled by other and in especial by the Cardinal of 
Yorke, began now to be a ruler & a King, yea, a Kyng of suche wyte, wisedome 
and pollicie, that that like hath not reigned ouer this Realme’.
691
 It is only after 
escaping Wolsey’s commanding counsel that Henry VIII is able to rule as a true 
king. 
 Henry does continue to take counsel, but only from institutionalised bodies 
over which he has plain command. Hall makes numerous references to Henry as a 
counselled king; he acts ‘with great deliberation like a wise prince, consult[ing] 
muche with his counsail’.
692
 This is only so long, however, as the distinction 
between counsel and command is upheld. Just as Wolsey served as an example of 
the transgression over this dividing line, Hall also provides an important example of 
how the parliament should not try to command their king. Upon an adamant 
petition from parliament to show mercy to the clergy accused of Praemunire, Henry 
addresses the representatives of the parliament directly, telling them that ‘he was 
their prince and soueraigne lorde & that they ought not to restraine him of his 
libertie, nor co[m]pel him to shewe his mercy’, for he could use the laws to their 
extremity if he so pleased.
693
 Henry tells the parliament that he would be ‘well 
aduised’ to pardon the clergy, but ‘he would not be noted to be compelled to do it’, 
                                                 
690


















and thus refuses their request.
694
 He later, ‘like a good prince’ signs the pardon of 
his own accord, and the commons ‘louyngly tha[n]ked the kyng and muche praised 
his witte that he had denyed it to them when they vnworthely demaunded it’ but 
granted it when he ‘perceiued that they sorowed and lamented’.
695
 Thus, the final 
image, given at the end of the book, which shows Henry VIII in council, serves to 
remind Edward VI that he must maintain the relationships with both his counsellors 
and parliament as his father had, if he would like to fulfil the majestic picture of 
himself featured on the frontispiece. 
 
III. Histories and Counsellors 
Although Chillester and a few others choose to address their histories to their 
queen, the Elizabethan period sees a far greater number of historical works 
addressed to her influential counsellors. Elizabeth’s accession reopens the question 
of the proper site for counsel, as it calls into question the relationship between a 
female sovereign and her male counsellors.
696
 For many, her counsellors ought to 
take a stronger role with such a weak monarch at the helm, and so it is they who 
receive the advice of history. Blundeville’s translation of Ceriol, for example, shifts 
emphasis on the necessity of histories for princes by writing that ‘nothing is more 
necessary for a counseler, than to bee a diligent reader of Hystories’, and Felippe 
repeats a similar lesson: ‘The Counsellers of Princes, ought to haue attentively read, 
both ancient and newe Histories’.
697
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 This model is expressed in most detail by Thomas Blundeville in his 1574 
The true order and methode of wryting and reading hystories, dedicated to the Earl 
of Leicester. In his opening epistle Blundeville tells Leicester that his purpose in 
writing such a work is ‘to gather thereof such iudgement and knowledge as you 
may therby be the more able, as well to direct your priuate actions, as to giue 
Counsell lyke a most prudent Counseller in publyke causes’.
698
 Within the work, he 
stresses the role of the historian to present the truth in its entirety, so that those who 
read it can apply lessons to their present context. He also highlights history as the 
means to acquire the ability to navigate kairotic occasion; it is the ‘skill’ of the 
individual in history which ‘causeth him to take occasion when it is offered, and to 
vse the meetest meanes to bring it to passe’.
699
 This role is echoed by the reader of 
history, who by its knowledge gains ‘better knowledge of the opportunitie of 




 In addressing ‘What Profite hystories doe yeelde’, Blundeville makes clear 
that the application of history is political, replacing moral philosophy as the proper 
raw material for the counsellor: ‘the way to come to that peace [of the 
commonwealth] wherof I speake, is partly taught by the Philosophers in generall 
precepts and rules’.
701
 However, it is ‘the Historiographers’ that ‘doe teache it much 
more playnlye by perticular examples and experiences’, especially if they write in 
the way he prescribes.
702
 Such ‘perticular examples’ allow the reader to see the 
chain of causes and effects which bring political situations into being: ‘the three 
                                                 
698






















generall actions of any Citie, Prince, or common weale’ – peace, sedition and war – 
‘we ought diligently to obserue in histories with such considerations, as we may 
learne thereby, how one selfe effect springeth of one selfe cause’.
703
 By grasping 
such rules of causality, we can hope to influence the present, and thus the direction 
of time itself. The counsellor is resurrected as an agent in politics and in history. 
 This shift from prince to counsellor is notable in the republication of the 
Cooper-Lanquet history in 1560. Whereas the 1549 edition, as we saw, had been 
dedicated to Edward VI, the 1560 reprint replaces him not with his reigning sister, 
but with Lord Russell, the Earl of Bedford. In this opening letter, Cooper reiterates 
the purpose of history, based on Cicero, and its place above all other forms of 
knowledge and learning for bringing both ‘delectacion’ and ‘profyte’.
704
 Cooper 
makes the argument that history is even more reliable and useful than knowledge of 
contemporary affairs, for one may not come to know the truth of present politics 
either through the repression of truth by the prince or the ‘ill reporte of enuious 
men’.
705
 On the other hand, ‘the faithfull historiographer’, who never ‘diminishe for 
feare, nor adde for flatterie’, always ‘playnly report[s] vnto posteritee the truth’.
706
 
He repeats the idea that such examples lead us to ‘vertue and honestee’, adding, like 
Blundeville, that they do so ‘muche better then by thenstruction of any 
phylosopher’.
707
 Thus history, once again, becomes the best way to ensure truth and 
virtue in counsel, but this time its lessons are directed at the counsellor himself, not 
at a monarch. 
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 Richard Grafton, who had published the 1548 chronicle by Hall with a 
dedication to Edward VI, also changes his strategy in the Elizabethan period and 
addresses his two histories – the 1562 Abridgement of the chronicles of England 
and A Chronicle at large of 1569 – to counsellors: Leicester and Burghley 
respectively. Drawing on the already popularised notions of the utility of history, 
Grafton writes to Dudley that ‘beside many profitable causes... for which histories 
have bene written, the chiefest in polecie is this, that the examples in tymes passed 
are good lessons for tyme to come’, especially in politics.
708
 It is because Leicester 
has ‘some great parte of gouernau[n]ce’ in the council of Queen Elizabeth that he 
has addressed his history to him.
709
 Similar sentiments are expressed in the opening 
letters of the 1569 Chronicle by Grafton to Burghley and the letter to the reader by 
Thomas Norton. 
 The advice given in Grafton’s Chronicle reiterates the importance of 
counsel while, like Boaistuau, also broaching the controversial topic of marriage. 
The history he relates establishes a three-part ‘pattern’ for rule: the declaration of 
sovereignty, the submission to counsellors and finally, on their advice, a prudent 
marriage. This pattern is set in its ideal form by the founder of the Tudor regime, 
Henry VII. Grafton tells the reader that after his coronation, ‘When the solempnities 
and geuing of thanks were done and passed: according as other kings had bene 
accustomed, he congregated together the sage Counsaylors of his realme: in which 
counsayle lyke of Prince of iust fayth and true of promis... appointed a daye to 
ioyne in matrimonye the Ladye Elizabeth [of York]’.
710
 Grafton ties together the 
three elements of rule in this passage, noting that Henry VII’s two immediate 
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 Grafton 1569, p. 854.  
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concerns following his coronation as divinely appointed monarch are, and should 
be, wise counsel and a good marriage. Grafton repeats this lesson a few pages later, 
noting that while Henry VII ‘stablished in his house a graue counsayle of wyse and 
pollitique men, by whose iudgement, order, and determination, the people might be 
gouerned’, there is something missing: ‘Although by this election of wise and graue 
councellers al things semed to be brought to good and perfect conclusion, yet there 
lacked a wrest to the harpe, to set all the stringes in a monacorde and tune’.
711
 This 
is the ‘matrymoney to be finished betwene the king, and the Lady Elizabeth’, which 
‘like a good Prince’ he orchestrates not long after.
712
 
 The same pattern is repeated in the case of Henry VIII. Upon coming to the 
throne, the king, ‘first of all... did therefore [based on his youth and learning] 
prudently for the good gouernement of the realme, elect and choose of the most 
wisest and grauest personages to be of his priuie counsayle... vnto whom he 
committed the charge and gouernaunce of the affayres of the whole realme’.
713
 He 
writes that these counsellors, fearing the youth and great wealth of Henry, ‘very 
prudently and diligently’ encouraged the king to be always ‘present with them and 
to be pryuie of their counsailes and deuises, and so dayly acquainted him with the 
politique affayres of the realme, that by litle and litle he of his owne accord applyed 
hym selfe to rule and gouerne’.
714
 Thus Grafton portrays the proper way in which a 
young and inexperienced monarch should come into his (or her) own as a ruler – 
with the aid and support of a council that slowly transfers control of the helm. It is 
also by their advice that Henry VIII marries. After having established the solid base 
of counsel (and having removed the remnants of evil counsel in the form of 
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Empson and Dudley), Henry is ready to complete the final element required to 
reign: he is ‘moued by some of his Counsayle’ to marry.
715
 
 In the case of Edward VI, Grafton can only speak to the king’s coronation 
and counsel, noting that ‘The coronation beyng finished, the kinges Maiestie by the 
aduise of his Vncle the Protector, and other of his priuie Counsaile’ begins a 
reformation of religion, the major contribution of his reign, which is only 
accomplishable after first being declared anointed sovereign and assembling a wise 
council.
716
 Marriage is not a pertinent question in the case of the young king, but 
counsel certainly cannot be ignored. 
It is with this tradition in mind that Mary’s choice to marry Philip of Spain 
becomes an even clearer break with her royal duty. Her declaration, in the face of 
the Wyatt rebellion, that she is marrying Philip at the advice of her council – a 
blatant untruth in Grafton’s narration – flaunts the pattern of rule established by her 
grandfather. Mary, for Grafton, was ‘more stoute then it [was] credible’ and had 
ignored her council’s advice, plunging the country into turmoil and bloodshed.
717
 
Grafton chooses not to speak of the reign of Elizabeth, leaving what appears 
to be an intentionally blank section to be filled in by the actions of the monarch, 
whose completion of the tri-partite requirements remained unfinished. This silence 
regarding Elizabeth’s reign is made even clearer in Grafton’s closing prayer, in 
which he marks the reverence owed to Elizabeth as anointed sovereign, praying 
equally for her council, but on the third aspect of his three-part pattern for rule is 
necessarily silent: ‘here most hartily besseching Almightie God to preserue her 
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Maiestie in most prosperous and honorable estate... and also to keepe and preserue 
all her highnesse most honorable Counsellours’.
718
 The hope is that these 
‘honorable Counsellours’, Burghley especially, will fulfil their role and encourage 
the queen to and marry and thus secure her place in history. 
 
IV. Histories and the People 
We began by considering the two pervasive problems that Machiavelli encounters 
in his description of human nature and counsel – the distrust of the counsellor and 
man’s inability to vary with time – both which can be solved through the study of 
histories. It is worth noting that Machiavelli himself presents a solution to both 
these problems, but not in The Prince. In the Discourses, Machiavelli constructs a 
counsellor who gives his advice not to a prince, but to the entire body of the people, 
and in this way overcomes the problems laid out in The Prince. 
 In Chapter 9, Book III of the Discourses, Machiavelli reiterates the 
importance of adaptation: ‘a man must of necessitie change with the times, if hee 
will alwayes have good success in his undertakings’.
719
 He once again 
acknowledges that ‘a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner, never 
alters, as it is sayd, and must of necessitie, when the times disagree with his way, 
goe to wracke’, based on the same two-fold problem: ‘one because wee cannot 
resist that, which our nature is inclin’d to, the other is, beause when one man in 
such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily, it is impossible to perswade him, 
that things will proove well, where hee proceeds otherwise’.
720
 However, this time 
Machiavelli has a solution to these issues, for he is no longer talking about, or to, an 
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individual man, as he was in The Prince. Where it might be impossible to persuade 
an individual to change, Machiavelli is more optimistic about the ability of the 
multitude in a republic to vary with circumstance; a republic ‘can better fit her selfe 
for severall accidents [diversità de’ temporali], by reason of the variety of her 
Subjects [diversità de’ cittadini], that are in her, then can a Prince’.
721
 
The republic, based on its multitudinous populace, will have the ability to 
change with the times, over and above that of a singular individual, but can the 
people always be trusted to have the prudence to know what is required for their 
advantage in each case? And if not, how can they trust a counsellor to lead them, 
given the reasons to be suspicious of such a figure?  
In the case that the ‘opinions [of the people] were false’ Machiavelli assures 
his readers that there is ‘a meanes to rectify them’.
722
 The people can be corrected, 
‘if some discreet Oratour in the assemblies’ will ‘perswade them of theire errour’, 
for the people have the ‘capacity to conceive the truth being told them by any man 
worthy of credit [da uomo degno di fede è detto loro vero], and doe easily 
submit’.
723
 A ‘great and worthy personage [uomo grave]’ can ‘appease and quiet 
the rage of the multitude’, for ‘nothing restraines the fury of a multitude inraged, as 
the reverence of some grave man [uomo grave e di autorità] comming among 
them’ who brings them back to an understanding of where their actual good lies.
724
  
This is in contrast to a prince, who is not as good a judge of character and 
can be ‘drawne aside by his owne passions, which are greater in them, then in the 
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people’ without the remedy of counsel.
725
 In Chapter 58 of Book I, Machiavelli 
argues that, whereas the prince will prove obstinate to good counsel, the people will 
submit: ‘a good man [un uomo buono] may easily have the meanes to perswade 
with a licentious and tumultuous people, and so reduce them to reason But to a 
mischeivous Prince no man can speake, nor is there any other remedy but the 
sword.’
726
 Counsel has far more likelihood of success given to a people than to a 
prince. Just as a prince ‘should be advertised thereof by some of his councellours 
[chi lo consigliasse]’, so to the people ought to have the same failsafe, in the case 
that they too might err.
727
 He concludes that ‘when [the people] can be advised 
[consigliati], as Princes are, they runne into fewer errours, then Princes’.
728
 
What about the suspicions Machiavelli had about self-interested 
counsellors? Machiavelli suggests that even this problem is resolved in the republic, 
and he gives a number of reasons as to why. First, just as with every member of the 
republic, the counsellor’s interests are likely to be in line with those of the whole, 
without the need for bribery. He is, after all, a cittadino, and thus will be just as 
likely as any other citizen to want to bring about the maintenance of liberty within 
the republic. It is true, Machiavelli suggests in his chapter on conspiracies, that the 
familiars of a prince should not be trusted, for ‘a Prince should be more jealous of 
those, to whom he hath afforded more favours’, but no equivalent warning is given 
regarding the counsellors of the people.
729
  
This may be related to a second point: this counsellor is an orator, whose 
words and character will be judged by the people more perceptively than the prince, 
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as Machiavelli had established in Chapter 34 of Book III. We must as well consider 
Machiavelli’s dedication to the rhetorical writings of Quintilian. As we may recall, 
for Quintilian, the good orator is by definition a good man, and hence would not be 
likely to lead the people astray.
730
 Machiavelli seems to assume the same in the 
Discourses – the figure in question is an uomo buono, an uomo grave, an uomo 
degno di fede. The orator will not convince the people unless his words and 
character are reflective of truth and worth. The people will only be persuaded by 
someone who has their own interests at heart. Both ‘those who advise a Republique 
and they that Councell a Prince [che quegli che consigliano una republica, e quegli 
che consigliano uno principe]’ hold similar positions, but it is only the former who 




This turn to the people as the proper recipient of counsel, avoiding self-interested 
counsellors and obstinate princes, is reflected in the historical literature of the 
period. The first such example comes with the 1563 publication of John Foxe’s 
Actes and Monuments.
732
 Foxe intended his work to be read by as wide an audience 
as possible, simultaneously offering its lessons to the monarch and to the people. In 
regards to the first, Foxe, like Chillester, dedicates his work to Elizabeth and writes 
– in his address to the Christian reader – that he ‘thinks I have good cause to wish, 
that like as other subiectes, even also Kings and Princes, which commonly delite in 
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heroicall stories, would diligently peruse such monumentes of Martyrs, and lay 
them alwayes in sight, not alonely to read, but to follow’.
733
 
Foxe’s intention that his history be read and followed by his prince is made 
even clearer by the marker cuts throughout.
734
 The first is a presentation scene 
which is drawn into the initial capital C of his dedication to Elizabeth (Figure 15). 
Beyond the anti-papal sentiment it expresses – Elizabeth’s throne rests atop the 
prostrate pope – it makes a very clear statement about Foxe’s beliefs that his work 
should be read and followed by monarchs. In this image, Foxe, with two other men 
– probably John Day and Thomas Norton – presents the queen with his work, a 
reflection of the three wise men of the Bible.
735
 
This image is echoed in the opening woodcut of the second volume of the 
1583 edition, which figures Henry at the centre of a flutter of activity (Figure 
16).
736
 Like Elizabeth, his throne is atop the fallen pope, who in this scene is 
assisted by his struggling ministers. Also like his daughter, Henry figures in a 
presentation scene. To Henry’s right stand Cramner and Cromwell, along with two 
unnamed Protestant figures (Henry ignores the sneering Catholics on his left). A 
book is being passed between Cramner and the king, although in which direction it 
is difficult to determine.
737
 Given its relationship with the image of Elizabeth and 
Foxe, one would certainly be persuaded to think that it is Cramner who is passing 
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the text to Henry, placing it in the tradition of presentation scenes, and highlighting 
the role of Henry’s counsellors in the suppression of the pope. 
This role is emphasised in the text itself – a call to action for counsellors of 
the Elizabethan reign, a message for Elizabeth to ensure that she follows only the 
counsel of the godly and a reminder to the people to remain wary of those about the 
prince. Counsel for Foxe has great influence and sway over a monarch, both for 
good and bad. He writes of Henry VIII that while the godly counsel of Cramner and 
Cromwell ‘was about him, and could be heard, he did much good’ but ‘when 
sinister and wicked councillors under subtle and crafty pretences had gotten ever 
the foot in, thrusting truth and verity out of the prince’s ears, how much religion 
and all good things went prosperously forward before, so much on the contrary side 
all revolted backwards again’.
738
 Counsellors are also the determining force behind 
Mary’s evil acts. Whereas Hall and Grafton suggest that Mary’s actions came about 
because of her failure to listen to counsel, Foxe’s presentation of Mary stresses 
exactly the opposite. It is Stephen Gardiner and Edmund Bonner who are 
responsible for the atrocities of Mary’s reign; her major flaw is her credulity, not 
her cruelty.
739
 Elizabeth must take the positive lessons from her father, not the 
negative lessons of her sister and figure herself, as Foxe has her figured, as the 
recipient of godly advice.
740
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Despite this attention on Elizabeth, Foxe’s attempts to cater to a wider 
audience through the Actes and Monuments cannot be ignored.
741
 These are also 
primarily expressed through the woodcuts throughout the work. Although the use of 
woodcuts in print texts of the age was widespread, in few other works are they so 
vividly presented, indicating their purpose in communicating the lessons of the text 
to an illiterate audience.
742
 The inclusion of woodcuts increases in the 1570 edition, 
suggesting that Foxe and his printer – John Day – were increasingly interested in 
expanding the ‘readership’ of Actes.
743
 These woodcuts use easily-recognisable 




This 1570 edition also received the full support of Elizabeth’s privy council, 
who were very pleased with what it said about how the government of England 
should be run.
745
 The privy council, headed by Day’s former patron William Cecil, 
wrote to the archbishops of York and Canterbury as well as the bishop of London in 
order to ensure the wide exposure of the Actes and Monuments.
746
 Such a history, 
they write, is ‘very profitable to bring hir majesties subiectes to good opinion, 
understanding, and dere liking of the present government of thes realme by trewe 
rehersall and conference of tymes past’.
747
 They make the unprecedented request 
that the Actes ‘be had in all churches, halles or... otherwise as to your wisdoms shall 
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seme metest, so as yt may be made publicque and come to the hands and 
knowledge of all hir majesties good subiectes generally’.
748
 There was no question 
in the mind of Elizabethan councillors that Foxe’s history was intended for and 
ought to be read by the masses, and they fully supported the lessons that it 
contained.  
The suggestion that Foxe was attempting to present his history to a wider 
audience than just the monarch or her counsellors is further substantiated by the 
examination of other historical texts of the period which take the same approach. 
For example, although the translation of Spanish humanist Pedro Mexia’s The 
Foreste or Collection of Histories by Thomas Fortescue is dedicated to a member 
of the queen’s council, Fortescue writes in his letter to the reader that his intention 
was ‘to profite...  chiefly the lesse learned’.
749
 The lessons The Foreste contains are 
largely private matters, but when Mexia does address political questions, such as 
‘What daunger it is to murmer againste Princes’, his focus is on the perspective and 
role of the people, not the monarch.
750
 However, as this chapter heading suggests, 
despite their place as the recipients of his history, Mexia does not suggest that the 
people ought to actively participate in counselling their monarch, quite the contrary. 
From history the people are to learn that their role is to remain silent and patient, as 




A different model of the people’s relationship with history, and politics, is 
presented by Raphael Holinshed in his 1577 Chronicles of England, Scotlande, and 
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 Although dedicated, once again, to a counsellor – Burghley – Holinshed 
does not connect the content or purpose of his history with Burghley’s role as 
counsellor but appeals to him only in a bid to avoid censorship. In this, Holinshed 
failed, for both the 1577 and 1587 editions of the Chronicle underwent censorship 
by the privy council, as it contained ‘sondry thinges which [the council] wish had 
bene better considered... that concern the State, and are not therfore meete to be 
published in such sorte as they are delivered’.
753
 It would seem then that the privy 
council was not the intended audience of whatever counsel might be contained in 
the Chronicle, for it certainly did not cater to its interests. 
Instead, it has been suggested that in his Chronicles, as in the Actes and 
Monuments and Fortescue’s translation of Mexia, Holinshed had a wider audience 
in mind.
754
 Unlike these other two texts, however, the emphasis in the Chronicles is 
not only on its lessons for the reading public, but its readerships’ role in delivering 
the gathered counsel to their prince.
755
 This is especially true for Elizabeth, as 
opposed to her (male) predecessors. In speaking of Henry VII, for example, 
Holinshed praises counsellors such as Reginald Bray and Cardinal Morton over the 
people for their role in admonishing and counselling the king. Of Bray he writes: ‘If 
any thing had beene done amysse, contrarie to lawe and equitie, hee woulde after an 
humble sorte plainely blame the King, and giue him good aduertisement, that he 
should not onelye refourme the same, but also bee more circumspect in any other 
the lyke case’.
756
 Morton was ‘of the same vertue and faythfull plainnesse’ with his 
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 Thus ‘these two perso[n]s were refrainers of y
e
 kings vnbrydeled libertie’, 
as proper counsellors of the humanist tradition should be.
758
 The people, in this 
section, are actually greatly misguided, as they ‘iudged and reported, that the 
counsayle of those two worthie personages, corupted y
e




In treating Elizabeth, however, Holinshed places great store and importance 
in the counsel of the people. He gives an elaborate description of Elizabeth’s 
coronation and the various pageants presented to her, emphasising particularly the 
counsel that each display had for the young queen. The last – Elizabeth as Deborah 
– encouraged Elizabeth to always take counsel from her people and Holinshed 
notes that as ‘the ground of this last pageant before had set before hir graces eyes 
the flourishing and desolute states of a common weale, shee by this be put in 
remembrace to consult for the worthie gouernment of hir people, considering God 
oftentymes sent women nobly to rule among men... and that it behoueth both men 
and women so ruling to vse aduise of good counsaile’.
760
 It is the counsel of the 
people represented in these displays, and it is the counsel of the people – educated 
by histories such as Holinshed’s – to which she must listen.  
Holinshed makes clear, however, that such counsel has to occur within the 
strictures of the counsel/command distinction articulated by Hall and Felippe. He 
details a scene very similar to that of Hall’s – in this case a petition from parliament 
regarding Elizabeth’s marriage. Elizabeth tells the representatives that she ‘doe 
lyke’ the ‘maner’ of their counsel and she ‘take[s] it in good part’, as ‘it is simple, 
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and contayneth no lymitation of place or person’ – they have counselled within 
their bounds – but she also takes this opportunity to issue a warning regarding the 
division between counsel and command.
761
 Like Hall’s description of Henry’s 
encounter with the representatives of his people, Elizabeth tells them that if they 
overstepped themselves by attempting to command or force her, she ‘must haue 
mislyked it verie much, and thought in you a verie great presumption, being vnfitte 
and altogither vnmeete, to require them that may commaunde, or those appoynt, 
whose partes are to desire or such to binde and limitte, whose duties are to obey: or 
take vpon you to draw my loue to your lykings, or to frame my wil to your 
fancies’.
762
 Elizabeth includes any attempts to ‘draw [her] loue to [their] likings, or 
to frame [her] will to [their] fancies’ as equally inappropriate as attempts to bind 
her, echoing Felippe’s equation of persuasion with force, on the grounds that they 
are just as bad as (if not worse than) attempts to command the prince. Importantly, 
Elizabeth ends with a promise to provide them with an heir, a promise that 
Holinshed may have wanted to remind the people of in the context of the waning 
decades of the sixteenth century. 
The people are once again awarded a role in counsel by the publication, and 
repeated republication, of the Mirror for Magistrates. In this case, their role is to 
watch and provide advice not just to the monarch but to counsellors themselves. 
Originally published in 1559, the Mirror was continually added to by various 
authors over the following two decades, reaching a height in the 1570s following 
the reprinting of the original volume in 1571.
763
 The ‘chiefest ende’ of the book, in 
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all its various forms, is to instruct the monarch and other nobles in wisdom and 
virtue, by way of a revival of the de casibus form we encountered in Part I.
764
 
However, despite the dedication to ‘All the nobilitie, and all other in office’ by 
most of the authors publishing under the name of the Mirror, the emphasis, in 
comparison to Lydgate’s publication of the Fall of Princes, is not on the counsel 
presented to princes or nobles, but rather on the ‘commentaries’ and discussions 
between the authors that frame the tragedies.
765
 This, it has been suggested, 
transforms the purpose of the Mirror from a didactic address aimed at those in 
power to a dialogue amongst the people about the nature of power itself.
766
 The 
counsel offered in the book, due to its multivocal authorship, could be, and often is, 
contradictory, emphasising not the counsel itself, but the very act of counselling.
767
 
This opening of counsel to the larger reading public was based partly on a 
belief about the contingent nature of political truth. Just as Machiavelli had 
emphasised in the Discourses that the people would be better able to adapt to 
changing times, the Mirror demonstrates that different contexts call for different 
counsel, and that such an open forum is the best way to accommodate such 
variability.
768
 As there are no universal rules for political action, the nobility must 
be constantly changing their behaviour, based in large part on counsel provided by 
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the people. This is understood to take place on a public stage, in front of a spectator 
public, actively conversant and ready to comment on any failure on the part of the 
nobles to reform. 
These themes, and their implications for the expansion of the 
historical/political role of the people, are also present in Anne Dowriche’s The 
French Historie of 1589. Wife of a Church of England clergyman, Dowriche uses 
her text to place the onus of a political role of spectatorship and counsel on the 
Protestant multitude, due to the untrustworthiness of traditional counsellor-figures 
who have adopted Machiavellian tactics and are, in the most crucial event of the 
history, represented by a weak queen (in this case the Queen Mother Catherine de’ 
Medici).
769
 Given the failure of both counsellors and their female ruler, the (godly) 
people are left as the only legitimate source of good counsel.
770
 Dowriche 
establishes these themes in her address to the reader, writing that her ‘onelie 
purpose in collecting & framing this worke was to edifie, comfort and stirre vp the 
godlie mindes vnto care, watchfulnesse, zeale & feruertnesse’.
771
 It is the people 
who must intervene against evil policies, and specifically evil counsellors. 
The devil is an active character in her history, working primarily through 
orators and counsellors. He gives roles to a number of political actors, including the 
queen mother, instructing them that ‘if force will not preuaile’ then ‘by flatterie’ 
they must accomplish their goals, echoing the relationship between force and 
counsel criticised by Felippe.
772
 The devil’s flattering policies ‘strike the Princes 
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It is clear that Dowriche had Machiavellianism in mind when she wrote of 
the devil’s strategies. Aside from the popular association his name had with the 
devil, Dowriche explicitly refers to Gentillet’s re-articulation of Machiavelli in her 
third section.
774
 In this segment the themes of counsel are emphasised even further, 
as the queen mother, servant to the devil, admits that force has indeed failed, and so 
they must, as the devil had originally set out, have recourse to flattery to ‘take in 
hand these Princes to subuart’.
775
 The strategy? Pure Machiavellianism. Dowriche 
notes in the margin that ‘The queen mother was a good scholer of that diuel of 
Florence, Machiauel, of whom she learned manie bad lessons’.
776
 She makes an 
oration to the king and ‘other trustie mates’ setting out the plan, based on the 
summary of Machiavelli by Gentillet. Her words are ‘demure and sage’, yet she 
plants ‘a bloodie plot’, further emphasising the growing gap between rhetoric and 
virtuous speech in the post-Machiavellian period.
777
 
Dowriche’s marginal notes throughout her oration are drawn from 
Gentillet’s treatise against Machiavelli, noting the ‘lessons’ they contain, such as ‘A 
Prince must imitate the natures of a Foxe and a Lion... when occasion is offered’.
778
 
Occasion plays a large part in the Queen Mother’s oration, as it does for 
Machiavelli; her speech is framed by an urging to seize the moment, to ‘take the 
profered time’, for ‘This is the onelie time this matter to dispatch; But being fled, 
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these birds are not so easie for to catch’.
779
 Her oration is successful in swaying 
those assembled, resulting in the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of thousands of 
Dowriche’s Protestant protagonists. Dowriche’s history is a warning to the people 
to take the opportunity to intervene if such events occur again.   
These themes, emphasising the value of history for the people, continue into 
the seventeenth century, becoming coupled with the idea that the people have a 
right of ownership over their history and the lessons that it contains. John Clapham, 
former clerk to Lord Burghley, expresses a wish in his preface to the 1602 Historie 
of England, that ‘wee [Englishmen] might haue one continued History’.
780
 He 
dispenses with the usual praise of historical writings; such commendation would be 
redundant, as ‘the Proems of Historical Bookes are already filled with discourses of 
the profitable vse that may be made of them’, but notes especially, as Blundeville 
and others had done, that the examples found in histories are ‘much more auaileable 
to the reforming of manners, then bare rules and precepts’.
781
 The lessons of history 
are more easily learned by the majority of Englishmen than philosophical 
principles. He emphasises as well that if Englishmen should learn of history, it 
ought to be their own history, for ‘there is no Historie so fitte for Englishmen, as 
the very Historie of England’.
782
 
A similar sentiment is expressed by the French Calvinist and historian Jean 
Serres, whose history is translated by Edward Grimston as A general iuentorie of 
the history of France in 1607, and who, like Clapham, directly addresses his 
countrymen. He introduces his subject and its audience by way of a treatise 
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‘tovching the vse of this his Inuentorie’.
783
 In the first few lines he repeatedly 
emphasises that history and its lessons are for all men, not a select few. He tells his 
readers that ‘Historie is the Theatre of mans life’ in which ‘all may learne one 
common lesson’ through its examples.
784
 History thus ‘inuites all men to view, 
heare, and conceiue’ these examples, ‘offring her selfe to all’.
785
 He quotes the 
Ciceronian praise of the purpose and use of history, noting especially its application 
to statecraft. However, even here, Serres wants to make clear that this particular 
purpose for history is not restricted to those who have a role in the governance of 
the state, but rather all men who live within it: ‘in the generall Historie of all 
Nations, euery man is bound to be more perticularly informed of that which 
toucheth himselfe, and instructed in the managing of the State, vnder which he is 
borne’.
786
 He justifies his history of France on these grounds, seeking to instruct his 
countrymen on the political lessons applicable to their context, based on a history of 
their own country. 
In particular, Serres goes on to say, this instruction is necessary to curb the 
influence of detrimental forces in their state, especially those around the throne, 
recalling Dowriche’s lessons in her history of France. ‘Too often’ Serres writes, 
‘the negligence of our Kings hath... brought our Royall Diadem into danger’ 
because they ‘suffered their Seruants to command absolutely’.
787
 Again, the 
distinction between counsel and command is highlighted; the conflation of which 
has endangered the great nation of France repeatedly: ‘Wee haue seene the Crowne 
of Kings in their minorities, set to sale by their Tutors, who became murtherers, and 
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of Regents, Theeues, making themselues Kings: We haue seene a King in his non-
age become madde, gouerned by the passions of Men and Women, holding the 
chiefe degrees in state’.
788
 It is to the united spectators of such events, his 
‘Countrymen... whome your History is directed’.
789
 History is the property of the 
French people, because it is they who have been, and are, invested in it. They have 
‘the chiefe interest in the estate’ of their country, and Serres makes clear that their 
own turbulent recent history gives them an even greater right to the lessons that 
history as a whole contains.
790
 Thus the ‘Example rightly represented in the Historie 
of our Ancestors, serues vs now as a good guide’ in the context of ‘our inciuill 
warres, which... hath suckt (euen to the marrowe) all the vigour of this Estate’.
791
 
The culmination of such thought is presented both visually and in written 
form in Walter Raleigh’s History of the World, first published in 1614 and reprinted 
repeatedly throughout the seventeenth century. Raleigh’s frontispiece (Figure 17) 
illustrates for the reader the Ciceronian importance of history shared with all men. 
History brings the knowledge of the world forward, conquering the effects of death 
and oblivion. By standing between veritas and experientia, history outshines them 
both in her presentation of the globe, which is supported both by fama bona and 
fama mala, who between them proclaim providentia, depicted as an all-seeing eye. 
There is no dedicatory epistle to Raleigh’s work, for he claims that he 
originally composed his history with the intention of presenting it to Prince Henry, 
who had died only two years before. It is now ‘left to the world without a Maister’, 
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and so to the world it is given.
792
 He repeats the lesson from his frontispiece that 
history ‘hath triumphed ouer time’ by taking hold of it and that ‘In a word, wee may 
gather out of History a policy no lesse wise than eternall’.
793
 Note here that Raleigh, 
like Serres, sees the venture of learning from history as a public one; it is the ‘wee’ 
who receives the lessons of history. The author does not present his work to a single 
sovereign or counsellor, as in the presentation scenes of earlier works. Instead, 
history stands triumphant, offering the prudence gleaned from history to all. 
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was never meant to be given to the late prince, but that he uses this purported 
original dedication to legitimate the publication of his intentionally ‘public text’.  
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Chapter 6: Counsel and the Theatre of Politics 
Following from the presentation of history as the ‘theatre’ of life, this chapter 
explores how the competing discourses of counsel – orthodox humanist and 
Machiavellian – played out in the context of the reigns of the late Tudor monarchs: 
Edward VI, Mary I and Elizabeth I, particularly regarding the institutionalisation of 
counsel, portrayals of contemporary counsellors and the representation of counsel 
in theatre. From this exploration, a number of themes emerge. First, 
institutionalised council, whether through a ‘council of state’ or parliament, is 
presented throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century as an answer to 
weaknesses of reason rooted in the age and/or gender of the ruler. This, second, 
puts pressure on the already dubious reputation of the counsellor, a critique often 
expressed in a rejection of ‘Machiavellian’ counsel, wherein ‘policy’ is preferred 
over honest and godly advice. Finally, these concerns for the role of the counsellor 
are expressed in three plays in the latter half of the sixteenth century – Republica, 
Gorboduc and, especially, Hamlet – the last of which poignantly expresses the 
subtle lessons of the treatises, histories and other sixteenth-century portrayals of 
counsel: optimi consiliarii mortui – the best counsellor is a dead one. 
 
I. Interregnum and the Council of State 
Although the increasing roles of the privy council and parliament have been noted 
in scholarship on each of the three reigns which make up the later Tudor period, 
little work has been done in order to unravel the ‘literature of English conciliarism’ 
that runs through them.
794
 In order to understand this trend, and its associated 
                                                 
794
 Alford 1998, p. 210. See Collinson 1994; Guy 1995a; Alford 2004; McLaren 
2004; Colclough 2005; Hunt 2009, pp. 557-72. Alford 1998, p. 210 suggests that 
 192 
themes, it is important to understand that all three regimes can be, and were, 




 The recourse to a council as a way to solve dynastic instability in the reigns 
of Henry VIII’s children is set out as early as Henry’s will, in which he also makes 
the important connection between counsel and marriage as essential to legitimate 
rule.
796
 Henry’s will establishes an effective ‘council of regency’, giving ‘full 
Powre and Authorite unto our said Counsaillours that they... may make, devise and 
ordeyn what thing soever they... shall, during the Minoritie aforsayd of our sayd 
Sonne think meet, necessary or convenient’.
797
 Edward is to be ‘ordred and ruled 
both in his marriage and also in ordering of thaffaires of the Realme as well 
outward as inward and also in all his own priuate affayres and in giving of offices 
of charge by thadvise and counsail of our right entierly beloved Counsaillours’.
798
 It 
is they who have the ‘the gouvernement of... all our Realmes, Dominions and 
Subgects and of all the affayres public and private’.
799
 They are awarded full and 
unchallengeable sovereignty, for the ‘thing’s [sic] devised made or odeyned by 
them... shall and may laufully’ be executed ‘by their discretions... In as large and 
ample maner as if we had or did expresse unto them by a more sp’iall Commission 
under our great Seale of Englande every particuler cause’.
800
 In short, they alone 
rule with the authority of the king of England. 
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 Although Henry first sets out that this is to be the case until Edward ‘shall 
have fully accompleted the eightenth yeir of his age’, he later gives a second 
condition for the termination of this conciliar rule: ‘until our sayde sonne and heyre 
shalbe bestowed and maryed by their advise’.
801
 Of course this ambiguity never 
mattered, the rule of this council lasted only eight weeks, and Edward never 
reached the age of eighteen, but it remains a rather interesting question whether this 
second limit on his sovereignty would have stood if he had come to the age of 
majority without marrying. Such a counter-factual question serves to demonstrate 
the important link between counsel and marriage; if Edward was to be released 
from the rule of the privy council only upon his marriage, then it is clear that he 
would have to marry according to their advice, and that their choice of his bride 
would constitute an important aspect of his right to rule. 
 This condition is explicitly expressed in the case of Henry’s daughters, 
Mary and Elizabeth. Henry, in establishing the order of the succession to the crown, 
notes that Mary would inherit after Edward and his heirs ‘upon condition that... 
[she] shall not mary no take any personne to her husbande w’out the assent and 
consent of the pryvey consaillours and others appoincted by us to be of counsail’, 
and the same condition is placed upon Elizabeth.
802
 To act in opposition is to 
sacrifice the right to the throne: ‘if our sayd Doughter mary doo mary w’out the 
consent and agreement of the pryvey counsaillours and others appoincted by us to 
be of the counsail to our sayd sonne... the sayde imperial croun and other the 
premiss’s shall holly remain be and cum to our sayd Doughter Elizabeth... as 
though our sayd doughter Mary wer thenne dead’.
803
 Only by the advice and 
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consent of the privy council can the heirs of Henry VIII be married and still 
maintain their right to rule. 
 Of course, as mentioned, this institution only lasted eight weeks before the 
rise of Somerset as protector and effective ruler of Edward and England. That being 
said, more often than not the official propaganda legitimising the young king’s 
reign still played on the image of his being ‘ruled’ by the counsel of those older and 
wiser than he, as we have already seen in the histories and associated woodcuts.
804
 
The importance of the council and parliament in the reign of Edward VI set 
important precedents for the reigns of his sisters.
805
 After all, many of the same 
counsellors who bore ‘rule’ during the reign of Edward VI were also the 
counsellors to Mary and subsequently Elizabeth.
806
 
 It is thus no surprise that with the accession of Mary I, a lone female ruler of 
England, counsel was once again seen as the best way to ‘bridle’ the passions of a 
ruler who could not be trusted to bridle herself.
807
 The solution of conciliar rule was 
proposed at two specific points in Mary’s reign, both when she ruled without the 
alterative bridling element of a husband: first, upon her accession and second, after 
she had been married to Philip II of Spain, upon Philip’s departure. In August of 
1553, when Mary, having successfully put down the opposition posed by her 
competitor for the throne, sought to be proclaimed queen in her own right, the 
council, in the words of the imperial ambassador of the time, ‘were now of opinion 
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that Parliament should be held before the coronation to avoid the likelihood of 
trouble’.
808
 This flew in the face of every tradition regarding the coronation of a 
new monarch, in that it sought to demonstrate Mary’s subordination under the 
authority of parliament, not the other way around.
809
 As it was the privy council 
which called the parliament, this proposal placed Mary at the bottom of a chain of 
command topped by the council. This, like Henry’s will, was doomed to failure; 
Mary rejected the proposal outright, but it remained as a legacy, denoting not only 
the strength of the Edwardian conciliar political culture, but bequeathing a legacy 
of a ‘headless parliament’ at the command of the privy council.
810
 
Once Mary had chosen a husband, fears abated somewhat as to the 
unbridled nature of this female monarch.
811
 However, Philip’s physical proximity to 
the helm of the state was necessary for such assurances, for when this was absent, 
an institutionalised council once again was proposed to fill the power vacuum. 
Before departing from England in 1555, Philip established a ‘select council’ to 
represent and replace him in the governance of England. This institution was 
established to be a permanent presence at court, reporting its proceedings to Philip 
three times a week, communicating with other councillors weekly, and even taking 
the place of the privy council in Mary’s consultations.
812
  
These measures left a lasting legacy of the need to ‘conquer’ a queen 
through counsel. The queen’s legitimacy as a ruler came to be seen as founded on 
her incorporation through three interrelated marriages: to the crown, to a prince and 
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to the ‘body of the realm’ through ‘queen-in-parliament’.
813
 We see the same 
themes played out in the much longer reign of her sister, Elizabeth.
814
 Unlike Mary, 
who only acquiesced to conciliar rule in the form of her husband’s select council 
late in her reign, Elizabeth’s rule demonstrated an opposite tendency, beginning 
with a powerful privy council who saw their role as limiting and controlling the 
prerogative of the ruler and ending with a severe reduction of conciliar control and 
a markedly imperial rule by Elizabeth.
815
 
The move toward conciliar rule in the first part of her reign was led by 
William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who in 1563, drawing on the precedents of the 
previous fifteen years, drafted a ‘clause’ for a bill to be put before parliament in the 
event of Elizabeth’s death and the ‘vacation and interreigne’ that would follow.
816
 
Burghley establishes that it is ‘very necessary beside the ordynary government of 
the Realme’ there should remain after Elizabeth’s death ‘a Counsell of estate’ 
which is ‘usually named a privee Counsell’.
817
 This council is awarded the 
governance of all things domestic and international, spiritual and temporal until a 
new monarch is found. Notably, Burghley makes clear this council is instituted by 
parliament, which also has the power to dissolve it once the new monarch is 
‘declared’. Parliament is awarded the power to both transfer royal imperial power 
to the council as well as to ‘find’ and ‘declare’ a new successor.
818
 This clause 
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endured, revived in the ‘Elizabethan Exclusion Crisis’ of the 1580s, when further 
proposals were made for ‘headless conciliar government’.
819
 
Of course, such visions were never actualised; sovereignty remained 
invested in the queen, or rather the queen-in-parliament. However, these conciliar 
proposals serve to emphasise the importance placed on counsel in the context of 
‘weaker’ Tudor monarchs. Machiavellian counsellors, feared in the court of an 
adult male prince, become a paramount concern in the Edwardian, Marian and 
Elizabethan polities.  
 
II. Counsellors and Machiavels 
This concern for the counsellor’s ability to exert his influence over a weak prince is 
exacerbated by the employment of Machiavellian ideas and strategies by several 
leading counsellors. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the relationship 
between the ends of utile and honestum is reconceptualised as a tension between 
‘policy’ and ‘religion’, between the concerns of state and God’s word.  
For instance, William Thomas, writing to Edward VI in the 1550s, suggests 
to the young prince that in cases of relations with other (devious) princes, ‘policie is 
no vice’ and ‘crafte’ and ‘subtiltie’ are ‘rather honourable than otherwise’.
820
 He 
expands this view in a discourse entitled ‘My private opinion tooching your 
Ma[ties] outward affaires at this present’, also written for the young prince. He 
notes here that an understanding of ‘outward affaires’ has been neglected in the 
counsel of the prince because it has only recently become important: ‘Tyme was in 
the daies of your father... this astate being dradde of all our neighbours needed not 
to esteeme any of them more than itself was esteemed’, but because England now 
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finds herself ‘hate and contempned of them all’, the relations between nations must 
be further examined and new counsels presented.
821
  
There are two remedies that Thomas suggests could aid their position 
internationally: ‘either friendship to helpe us, or tyme to make ourselfes stronge’, 
but as there are no allies in whom they can truly place their trust, Thomas suggests 
that the only remaining solution is to turn ‘unto tyme to see howe much we may 
wynne thereof’.
822
 Because Edward does not have the resources either to win nor to 
purchase time, his only choice is to ‘worke by policie’, in other words, to put the 
‘two puissante princes’ of France and Spain ‘in hope of thinges that we meane not, 
and thereby wynne tyme both to provide us of mooney and to order our men’.
823
 He 
contrasts this ‘policie’ with Godliness, writing that ‘albeit that our quarrel is in 
God, and God our quarrel... yet forasmuch as wickednesse raigneth in the midst of 
us, like as we shulde not mistrust the goodnesse of God, so ought we neither to 
neglect that policie that may helpe us’.
824
 As long as Edward can ‘looke for none 




Thomas uses Machiavelli overtly in his counsel, but we see such language 
creeping into the writings of other counsellors with less explicitly Machiavellian 
tendencies. For example, we may turn to the influential adviser and political writer, 
Thomas Smith, who also served as a clerk to the privy council under Edward VI 
and was appointed secretary of state in 1548. However, as he had associated 
himself with Somerset, his influence waned with that of the duke, and it was not 
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until 1571 that he was appointed to the privy council and in 1572 restored to the 
position of secretary of state. Even while lacking an official position within the 
council, however, Smith continued to give his political advice, shaping it according 
to the conventions of the age.
826
 For example, in his Orations for and against the 
Queen’s marriage of 1561, Smith examines three positions on the young queen’s 




Like Thomas, Smith establishes the division between utile and honestum in 
political counsel: ‘Two things [are] appointed to be had in election, if the one be 
honest, th’other dishonest’.
828
 However, what is honest varies according to the 
‘circumstances of time and place, person and occasion’.
829
 Thus the arguments for 
the honest life of chastity can be rejected, as ‘this is not so simply granted... that the 
sole life is the better, no, though it be the harder; but according as the circumstances 
be’.
830
 In the case of the queen, it is in fact marriage, not chastity, which is the more 
honourable course. His correspondence shows the same attention to the factors of 
circumstance in determining proper political action. For example, in 1572, Smith 
writes to Lord Burghley that he had ‘moved the Quene’s Majesty’ in regards to her 
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such extra-conciliar counsel: ‘albeit I am not of the King’s Council, to whom the 
reformation and consideration [of the Commonwealth] does chiefly belong’ he is ‘a 
member of the same Commonweal and called to be one of the Common House’ 
(1929, p. 10) and in his De republica Anglorum written in the 1560s, Smith defines 
tyranny as rule ‘without the aduise and consent of the people’ (1583, p. 6). 
827
 This view is the one which remains uncontested at the end of the dialogue, 
suggesting it is the argument of the work, for ‘For even as when in a heap of sand 
or mould there is espied a bright thing like metal, by sifting of it and washing it, 
will come to a nearer guess, and by farther travail, be tried whether it be gold or 
no’, ‘where wise persons dissent one from another, the truth appeareth, and the best 
way is chosen’ (Smith 1820, p. 208). For the Oration as an example of sixteenth-
century rhetorical practices see Peltonen 2012, pp. 116-17.  
828
 Smith 1820, p. 196.  
829
 Smith 1820, p. 197.  
830
 Smith 1820, p. 197.  
 200 
intervention in Scotland, rejecting her suggestion that she delay: ‘I shewed her 
Majestie that it was but a protracting of tyme’.
831
 The time to act was upon them, 
for ‘Now, the French being thoroughly occupied, is the best tyme to do that 
enterprise which is to be done’.
832
  
Burghley too demonstrates the same concerns in his own correspondence, 
most clearly expressed in the instructions to his son, Robert Cecil, on the art of 
counselling Elizabeth. In a letter of 1593, Burghley notes that ‘the rule of christian 
philosophie consisteth in difference betwixt utile and honestum’, which of the two 
honesty ‘were to be preferred with more constancy’.
833
 However, one must also 
take into account that ‘in private men’s causes cretisare cum cretensi’ – ‘to deceive 
among deceivers’ – ‘is allowable’ and so he ‘beginne[s] to wander before I dare 
affirm anything’.
834
 One cannot make a decision based on an evaluation of the 
honour of an action alone, as it cannot always be guaranteed to be the best course. 
Burghley, like Thomas, notes that this results in a tension between policy 
and the word of God. In his role of counsellor, he tells Robert Cecil in 1595, he has 
always held his course ‘in such matters as I differ in opinion from her Majesty’.
835
 
Burghley writes that in such cases he ‘will not change my opinion by affirming the 
contrary, for that were to offend God, to whome I am sworn first, but as a servant I 
will obey her Majestie’s commandment’.
836
 As the queen is God’s minister on 
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earth, ‘it shall be God’s will to have her commandments obeyed, after that I have 
performed my duty as counsellor’.
837
 He concludes that he is ‘in a mixture of 
divinitie and policy, preferring in policy her Majesty before all others on earth, and 




Counsellors’ attempts to balance the concerns of religion and policy, couched in the 
language of variable circumstance, were dangerous as they hovered on the edge of 
the oft-criticised view of Machiavellianism. Even these critics, however, found 
themselves making recourse to Machiavellian theories or ideas, demonstrating how 




The definition of Machiavellianism is most clearly given by the 1571 
Treatise of Treasons: ‘a Machiauellian State & Regime[n]t’ is ‘where Religion is 
put behind in the seco[n]d & last place: wher y
t
 ciuil Policie... is preferred before 
it’; this is ‘a Machiauellian defined’.
840
 The author does not seek to criticise 
Elizabeth, but like others we shall see, writes against the real power behind the 
throne – her counsellors, in particular two unnamed men (probably Leicester and 
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Burghley) to whom he attributes ‘what so euer of importance commeth foorth vnder 
[Elizabeth], or hath bene sene in her time’.
841
 Prioritising policy over religion and 
using the rhetorical arts of persuasion, these counsellors have transgressed the line 
between counsel and command: ‘of these two men, I say, and of none other, am I to 
be vnderstanden in this Treatise, when I vse any terme, that may seeme to touche 
Authoritie: bycause I meane none other Authority, then of them two only’.
842
 
 The power of these counsellors is drawn from the weakness of rule 
presented by the queen’s gender. Speaking of ‘the chief of these two 
Machiauellians’, the Treatise’s author suggests that even before Elizabeth came to 
the throne, he, ‘finding that he had a yong Ladie in hand, that was vnexpert in 
matters of State’, had worked his way into her trust and also introduced to her 
counsel his ‘confederate’, the second counsellor in question.
843
 Returning to the 
important relationship between counsel and marriage, these problems may have 
been averted if the queen had married, but as it was, this was ‘the state and 
condition, in which your Prince, a yong Ladie, and sole Virgin, without help of 
Husband, entered & was setled in her Crowne and Dominion, & toke to her seruice 
this couple of Counsailers’.
844
 
 The Treatise advises the queen that she ought to free herself from such 
influences, for ‘wisedome (I wene) yea and Machiauell him self’ would recommend 
that she ought to ‘cast both them and their Counselles, out of her credit and 
Courte’.
845
 Here, the author may be making reference to Chapter XXIII of The 
Prince, in which Machiavelli treats the case of a monarch whose own wisdom is 
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not enough to rule over his counsellors, in England’s case a woman without 
prudence to guide her. Such a prince, Machiavelli suggests, can rule well if he finds 
one ‘wholly to direct and governe him, who himselfe were a very wise man 
[prudentissimo]’.
846
 However, this counsellor ‘in a short time would deprive him of 
his State’ and overthrow him (or, in this case, her), so it is necessary for a prince to 
be on guard against him.
847
 Even the author of the Treatise is forced to suggest that 
Elizabeth take a Machiavellian approach to counsel, suspecting all those who 
surround her and trusting none. 
 Such issues, and their relationship to marriage and counsel, are also 
expressed in the controversial Discoverie of a Gaping Gvlf written in 1579 by John 
Stubbe, a Protestant writer and member of Lincoln’s Inn.
848
 This tract on the 
proposed French marriage, for which Stubbe would be condemned to lose his hand, 
begins by reproaching those who – like the Machiavellian counsellors of the 
Treatise of Treasons – place profit before honesty: ‘In all deliberations of most 
private actions, the very heathen are wont first to consider honesty and then profit’, 
but there is a ‘strange Christianity of some men in our age, who in their state 
consultations have not so much respect to honesty as they had to profit’.
849
 These 
counsellors are ‘not Satan in body of a serpent, but the old serpent in the shape of a 
man, whose sting is in his mouth, and who doth his endeavour to seduce our 
Eve’.
850
 Stubbe reminds his readers that these pernicious counsellors are even more 
worrying in England’s present state of female rule, ‘because [our Eve] is also our 
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 Although concerned with negotiations over the French marriage in 
particular, Stubbe makes clear from the outset that the tract is in fact about counsel 
in general.
852
 The ‘gaping gulf’ of the title, in which ‘England is Like to be 
Swallowed’ refers directly to the deficit of good counsel in the English court:  
some English mouths professing Christ are also persuaders of the 
[marriage]... alas, this ship of unhappy load hath among us and of 
ourselves (I would, not in prince’s court) those who with all their 
might and main help to hale it in, and... our own men walk on this 
shore and lay to their shoulders with fastened lines and cables to draw 
it in. This is our mischief, this is the swallowing gulf of our bottomless 




His main piece of advice to Elizabeth, therefore, is not just to refuse the proposed 
marriage, but also to patch up this ‘gulf’ in England’s defences. He addresses 
Elizabeth directly: ‘we instantly beseech you, to keep this sin far from you by 
admitting no counsel that may bring it near to you... [and to] stop your Majesty’s 
ears against those sorcerers and their enchanting counsels’.
854
 In particular, he 
warns her against the types of counsellors the Treatise of Treasons had identified, 
who ‘use the word of God with as little conscience as they do Machiavelli, picking 
out of both indifferently what may serve their turns’.
855
 Like the author of the 
Treatise and Machiavelli, he accepts that it is the prince who must be prudent 
enough to control his counsellors, not the other way around, and so he prays that 
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she be given a ‘principle spirit’ to ‘sift counsels that you may smell a flatterer from 
a loyal counsellor, prove all and approve the best’.
856
 
 The recourse to Machiavellianism as a way to counter Machiavels is most 
clearly seen in Leicester’s Commonwealth, which began circulating in 1584.
857
 
Written in reply to Burghley’s True Execution of Justice in England, which 
condemns the treasonous nature of the Catholic population of England, this 
anonymous dialogue puts forward the argument that the far greater threat to 
England comes from closer to the crown, namely the ambitious Earl of Leicester, 
whose influence ‘hath done more hurt to his commonwealth than if he had 
murdered many thousands of her subjects or betrayed whole armies to the professed 
enemy’.
858
 The dialogue’s participants agree with the premise of Burghley’s True 
Execution, that there is a ‘degree’ of treason which ‘want[s] but occasion or ability 
to break into the second [degree]’; in other words all it lacks is the right moment to 
be put into execution.
859
 However, there is a ‘cause or circumstance [which] may 
stay’ the Catholics from such treason ‘when they shall have ability and 
opportunity’: the fear of servitude to other countries.
860
 Leicester’s treason, on the 
other hand, lacks only opportunity – the queen’s death – an event which he himself 
could orchestrate and which is, in the end, inevitable. 
 In general, the author writes, there is a danger posed by any counsellor who 
crosses the line between counsel and command, for it ‘it cannot be but prejudicial 
and exceeding dangerous unto our noble prince and realm that any one man 
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whatsoever... should grow to so absolute authority and commandry in the Court’.
861
 
Playing on the idea that the prince ought to be ‘bridled’ by good counsel, he 
suggests that such a man ‘cast[s] nets and chains and invisible bands about that 
person whom most of all he pretendeth to serve, [and] he shutteth up his prince in a 
prison most sure, though sweet and senseless’, while other counsellors watch on 
silently.
862
 Echoing Boaistuau, the main speaker of the dialogue comments on how 
‘many even of the best and faithfullest subjects of the land do yield to the present 
time and do keep silence in some matters that otherwise they would take it for duty 
to utter’.
863
 Leicester, on the other hand, will use time to his advantage, for having 
learned from ‘Seignor Machiavel my Lord’s counsellor’, Leicester waits until the 
moment when ‘occasion serve[s]’ to move against the queen; ‘Such is the variable 




Notably, the solution proposed in Leicester’s Commonwealth is to adopt the 
same attitude to time and expediency as the traitorous Leicester. Traditional justice 
is too confining, for it waits until the treasonous act has been committed. Instead, 
one must accept the use of pre-emptive justice; it may not be honourable, but it is 
necessary to the safety and well being of the state: ‘Perhaps the consultation of this 
affair is not what were convenient but what is expedient: not what ought to be done 
in justice, but what may be done in safety’.
865
 The typical demands of justice must 
be dispensed with in the name of expediency. Thus, although the author remarks 
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against Leicester’s use of Machiavelli, he is forced to accept that the only way to 




III. Counsel and the Elizabethan Theatre 
The role of counsel in bringing about the destruction of the kingdom was vividly 
performed on the late Tudor stage – particularly in the plays Respublica, Gorboduc 
and Hamlet. Respublica is an anonymous work in the tradition of the morality plays 
explored in Chapter 3, which once again highlights the use of paradiastole amongst 
court counsellors. Performed in 1553, it features a lone queen – presumably 
representing Mary I – who is led astray by counsellors who have changed their 
names from vices to virtues – Insolence to Authority, Oppression to Reformation, 
Adulation to Honesty and, importantly, Avarice to Policy – in order to gain the 
queen’s trust and rule through her.
867
 Avarice/Policy takes the lead, using kairotic 
timeliness to introduce the others into the queen’s circle: ‘Wherever I fynde hir a 
tyme convenient,| I shall saie and dooe that maie bee expedient!’
868
 Respublica is 
wholly tricked by their schemes, and when the true nature of her counsellors is at 
last revealed, Respublica can only exclaim ‘what creature woulde suspicion have 
had| That my late administraters had been men so bad?| Or who woulde have 
thowght theim counterfaictes to have been| That had harde theeir woordes and their 
countenaunce seen?’
869
 Although the vices, with the notable exception of 
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Adulation/Honesty, are thrown out of the court, Respublica must lean on other 
virtuous counsellors to preserve her state. This play, ending with a prayer for the 
good governance of both queen and council, simultaneously offers a critique of 
counsel, while noting its important place within the court of a female monarch.
870
 
 The 1565 courtly play Gorboduc has also been recognised as presenting 
powerful counsel to the queen in regard to the crafty manipulations of counsellors, 
although emphasis is more often put on the messages that it has concerning the 
succession.
871
 Certainly, this element cannot be ignored; King Gorboduc lets 
Britain fall to ruin because of the division resulting from his inability to choose a 
single heir to his throne. However, this is in the context of a string of failures of 
counsel throughout the course of the play.
872
 
 The king, in his decision to divide the kingdom of Britain, is introduced in 
Act I Scene 1 by the queen, Videna, as being immoveable to counsel: he ‘Hath so 
firmely fired his vnmoued mynde| That plains & praiers can no whit auaile’.
873
 
Rather than being counselled by his advisers, Gorboduc will persuade them to 
accept his plan: ‘He wyll endeuour to procure assent| Of all his Counsell to his 
fonde deuise’.
874
 The failure of counsel bears the blame for the entire outcome of 
the play, for with the council ‘restest all, but if they fayle therof,| And if the ende 
bringe forthe an euyll successe| On them and theirs the mischeife shall befall’.
875
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Such a disasterous end will always come about, the queen suggests, ‘When Lordes 
and trusted Rulers vnder kynges| To please the present fancie of the Prince,| With 
wrong transpose the course of gouernance’.
876
 
 The queen proves to be correct, for in the next scene Gorboduc presents his 
plan to his counsellors: Arostus, who praises it, Philander, who presents a small 
amendment to it, and Eubulus, the truest counsellor (literally ‘good counsel’ in the 
Greek), who speaks frankly against it.
877
 Gorboduc too emphasises that in the 
counsellors’ hands rests the well being of the state, encouraging them to speak ‘Lest 
as the blame of succedynge thinges| Shall light on you’.
878
 Nevertheless, even after 
the warnings of Philander and Eubulus, Gorboduc declares that he will go along 
with his intended plan, adding only that he will ‘joyne to eyther of my sonnes| 
Some one of those whose longe approued faith| And wisedome tryed may well 
assure my harte: That mynyng fraude shall finde no way to crept| Into their fensed 
eares with graue aduise’.
879
  
After this failure of counsel in Act I, the attention shifts to the counsel given 
to the young princes, now rulers in their own right. This is reinforced by a dumb 
show which precedes the second act. A king, flanked by his nobles and sat in a 
chair of state is presented with a ‘Cuppe... of wyne in a glasse’ by a ‘graue and aged 
Gentilman’, which he refuses.
880
 Next, a ‘braue and lustie yong Gentelman’ 
presents the king with a ‘Cup of Golde filled w[t] poison’ which the king accepts 
and drinks, immediately falling down dead.
881
 The print edition of the play gives 
the meaning of the dumb show, equating the glass cup with ‘a faithfull Counsellour 
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[who] holdeth no treason, but is playne & open, ne yeldeth to any vndiscrete 
affection, but giueth holsome Counsell, whiche the yll aduised Prince refuseth’.
882
 
The golden cup, on the other hand, ‘betoketh flattery’.
883
 The dumb show is a 
precursor to the action in the second act, as the destruction of the king shown 
foreshadows the downfall of Gorboduc’s sons, Ferrex and Porrex, ‘who refusing 
the holesome aduise of graue Counsellours, credited these yong Paracites, & 
brought themselues death and destruction thereby’.
884
  
This is played out in the second act, in which Dordan, the good counsellor 
to Ferrex, realising that his prince will follow the advice of the ‘parasite’, Hermon, 
cries ‘O that the Secretaries wise aduise| Had erst ben harde’, for now it is too late 
for good counsel to intervene: ‘traiterous councell now will wherle about| The 
youthfull heads of these vnskilfull kinges’.
885
 Gorboduc’s refusal to accept the 
advice of Eubulus begins a chain reaction, resulting in the powerlessness of even 
the best counsel to stand in the way of the realm’s destruction: ‘Whan kinges... wyll 
neglect the rede,| Of best aduise, and yelde to pleasing tales... Succeeding heapes of 
plagues shall teache to late| To learne the mischiefes of misguyding state’.
886
 
Despite the importance of succession in this play, it is counsel that is at the source 
of the destruction of Gorboduc’s line, and the kingdom of Britain. 
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v
. A manuscript account of the performance 
of the play in the Inner Temple in early 1562 suggests that at this showing, the 
dumb show preceding the second act ‘declared... that men refused the certen and 
tooke the uncerten, whereby was ment that yt was better for the Quene to marye 
with the L[ord]. R[obert]. [Dudley] knowen then w[t] the K. of Sweden’, probably 
because of insertions to the text made by Dudley himself, which not only forwarded 
his marital suit, but also neutralised the potential critique of his own role as the 
‘lustie yong Gentelman’ in the dumb show; Pincombe 2003, p. 40. In such a case, 
the older counsellor, and perhaps Eubulus himself, may have been representations 
of Cecil; Pincombe 2003, p. 40.  
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The greatest statement of the suspicion of counsellors in the Elizabethan 
period comes with Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Poised at the turn of the century, Hamlet 
brings together many of the themes growing throughout the sixteenth century 
discourses of counsel in a resounding statement of the fallibility of counsel in the 
court of kings. By analysing four of the courtier figures presented in Hamlet – 
Osric, Rosencrantz, Guildenstern and Polonius
887
 – in this context, the critique of 
the Elizabethan counsellor becomes clear. Although Osric, Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern are clear representations of flatterers, it is Polonius who is presented 
as the most pernicious. He is also the only character in the play identified as a 
‘Counsaylor’, and therefore his role cannot be properly understood outside of the 
context of the discourses of counsel we have been exploring.
888
  
Polonius makes his first appearance to the audience in the role of the ‘good 
counsellor’ according to the orthodox humanist discourse, advising Laertes on his 
conduct in France in standard, albeit tedious, tropes. However, when the audience 
next sees Polonius shortly thereafter, he has all the skills of a master ‘Machiavel’ 
and applies them in spying on his son. Polonius is presented in such a dual role 
throughout the play, recalling the attempts on the part of Elizabethan counsellors to 
bring together the orthodox humanist and Machiavellian strategies of counsel in 
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the question of political counsel appear in a number of his texts. However, this 




 These attempts are shown to fail in Hamlet, for 
Polonius’s role as the orthodox humanist ideal of the counsellor is a comical failure, 
whereas his skill as a Machiavel is a notably destructive and disturbing facet of 
such a trusted counsellor. In other words, Polonius is a bad ‘good counsellor’ and a 
good ‘bad counsellor’, with no ability to successfully balance the roles, forcing both 
Hamlet and the audience to conclude that Polonius is better off dead.  
 The four courtiers in question are all presented as flatterers who are willing 
to change their opinions and dispositions according to those of the person in power. 
To understand Shakespeare’s deliberate portrayal of them as such, it is worth 
turning again to Plutarch’s ‘How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend’, published in 
English in 1603.
890
 Plutarch encourages his reader to ‘make triall of him’ he 
suspects to be a flatterer.
891
 The first such test seeks to discover ‘whether there be 
an uniforme equalitie in all his intentions and actions or no?’ for ‘a flatterer... hath 
no one permanent seat in his maners and be haviour’ and is ‘variable and changing 
alwaies from one form to another’.
892
 The translation of Plutarch’s work at the turn 
of the century collides with the Machiavellian discourse, which, as we saw, 
accepted as one of its primary tenets the need to vary with time and circumstance. 
The character of Hamlet, educated in the studia humanitatis in Wittenberg, 
would have been well versed in Plutarch’s text, so it comes as no surprise that 
                                                 
889
 Although Fisher 1990, p. 46 notes that ‘in the careers of at least Gabriel Harvey 
and Francis Bacon the two interests were found together’ this conclusion only leads 
him to ask ‘so what?’ We might respond by asserting that this intersection says 
something important about the discourse of counsel as presented in Hamlet. 
890
 Although not published in English until 1603, Plutarch’s essay was widely read 
and circulated and there is no question that Shakespeare and his audience would 
have been familiar with the text, even if through its quotation in other sources; see 
Evans 2001, pp. 1-41.  
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Hamlet applies Plutarch’s test to the courtiers in his midst. He makes trial of 
Polonius in Act III Scene 2:  
Ham. Do you see yonder clowd that's almost in shape of a Camel?  
Pol: By'th masse and tis, like a Camell indeed.  
Ham: Mee thinks it is like a Wezell.  
Pol: It is backt like a Wezell.  
Ham: Or like a Whale.  




Although comical, Hamlet’s test of Polonius reveals him instantly as a flatterer, 
‘applying his actions wholly to the humor of another... never simple, uniforme, nor 
like himselfe’.
894
 Polonius’s variability, although striking, is minimal compared that 
of Osric, to whom Hamlet applies his test in Act V. Osric’s oscillations are from 
one extreme to its complete opposite:  
Cour: I thanke your Lordship, it is very hot.  
Ham: No belieue me, tis very cold, the wind is Northerly.  
Cour: It is indefferent cold my Lord indeed.  
Ham: But yet me thinkes it is very sully and hot, or my complection.  




Both courtiers fail Hamlet’s test for flattery by drastically altering their opinions 
according to Hamlet’s changing opinions. Hamlet notes that ‘the drossy age dotes 
on’ such men, who have who have ‘the tune of the time’ and thus develop an 
outward ‘habit of incounter’ which allows them to carry through ‘the most 
prophane and trennowed opinions’.
896
 Like the ‘Machiavellian’ counsellors we 
have encountered, such men suit their actions, opinions and outward appearances to 
the times.  
 Although not given the same test by Hamlet, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
are also presented in such a light. It is in their very names, (‘Rossencraft’ and 
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 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2247-53, pp. 154, 156 (odd pages contain F1 
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894
 Plutarch 1603, p. 88.  
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 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 3599-605, p. 248.   
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 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 3652, 3653, 3656, p. 254.   
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‘Gilderstone’ in the 1603 ‘First Quarto’) and as such their very natures, to give a 
rosy colour to craftiness and to gild the stone.
897
 Their willingness to submit to the 
machinations of Claudius against their old school friend marks them as an even 
more dangerous form of flatterer than the sycophantic but harmless Osric. For 
while Osric might be a proficient flatterer, he is certainly no skilled manipulator; 
Hamlet has no trouble seeing through his attempts to play upon his pride. 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, on the other hand, are far more crafty; they, as 
Plutarch warned, have ‘by way of imitation’ worked their way into Hamlet’s trust: 
‘the flatterer, while he doth imitate and counterfeit others, doth entice and draw 
them, as it were, with a pipe or call, into his net, and so beguileth them’.
898
 Despite 
their skill, Hamlet eventually does recognise his ‘friends’ as precisely such 
flatterers: ‘Why looke you now how vnwoorthy a thing you make of me, you would 
play vpon mee, you would seeme to know my stops, you would plucke out the hart 
of my mistery... do you think I am easier to be plaid on then a pipe[?]’
899
 Hamlet 
has read his Plutarch well. 
 Even their bringing the Players to court, as much as Hamlet is able to turn it 
to his profit, betrays their pernicious role, for as Plutarch warns, the flatterer 
‘windeth himself into favour by meanes of pleasure, and wholy is imploied to 
procure mirth and delight’, for his only aim ‘is alwaies to devise, prepare and 
confect, as it were, some play or sport, some action and speech, with pleasure and 
to do pleasure’.
900
 Thus instead of trying to help Hamlet, Rosencrantz and 
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 Hamlet makes reference to Rosencrantz’s name when he tells the pair that their 
‘modesties haue not craft enough to cullour’ their looks; Shakespeare 1991 
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Guildenstern seek to distract him, in the hope that such distraction will afford them 
the opportunity to accomplish the king’s will. 
 Such men, despite being far more dangerous and troublesome than a ‘water-
fly’ such as Osric, are still not the type of flatterer most to be feared, for although 
they meddle in the affairs of kings and princes, they only serve as instruments to the 
fancies of those above them and have no machinations of their own.
901
 As Hamlet 
correctly identifies, these men are no more than a ‘spunge... that sokes vp the Kings 
countenaunce, his rewards, his| authorities, but such Officers doe the King best 
seruice in the end, he| keepes them like an [ape] in the corner of his iaw, first 
mouth'd to be| last swallowed, when hee needs what you haue gleand, it is but 
squeesing| you, and spunge you shall be dry againe’; they themselves have little 
substance and no grand design.
902
 
 The flatterer, however, who is in Plutarch’s estimation ‘so hard and yet 
needfull to beward of’, is he ‘who seemeth none such, and professeth nothing lesse 
than to flatter’, who ‘for the most part sober he is enough’ but loves to ‘bee a 
curious Polypragmon; he will have an oare in every boat, and thinks he is to 
intermedle in all matters; he hath a minde to be privie and partie in all deepe 
secrets; and in one word he carrieth himselfe like a grave Tragedian, and not as a 
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 Plutarch 1603, p. 86.  
904
 Although much work has been done on Polonius’s name, position and 
contemporary analogues, little attention has been paid to his role of as a counsellor 
in the context of the contemporary literature; see Bennett 1953, pp. 3-9; 
Churchward 1997, pp. 221-38; Oakes 1999, pp. 154-61; Kliman 2002, pp. 5-7. 
Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 2009, p. 183 acknowledges that Polonius’s character was most 
 216 
 Polonius is first introduced as a trusted counsellor and as a loving father, 
loath to see his son leave his side.
905
 When we next see Polonius, he continues to 
play such a role, imparting to Laertes well-meaning, if long-winded, precepts to 
guide his conduct. Here, Polonius is the quintessential orthodox humanist 
counsellor, although his lack of brevity and sense of timing in speech marks him as 
a very poor one indeed.
906
 
 As well as being familiar through a number of more contemporary sources, 
most of this advice to Laertes is drawn from Isocrates’s Ad Demonicum, used a 
handbook for Elizabethan school children.
907
 Regardless of whether such advice 
would thus be taken seriously or not, the timing of the advice is clearly poorly 
chosen, a lesson which is further emphasised by the source material itself. It is in 
this text that Isocrates gives his much-cited dictates for kairotic speech: ‘Choose 
two moments only for speaking, the one when you know the subject well, the other 
when it is necessary to speak about it. These are the only occasions on which 
speech is better than silence; on all others it is better to be silent than to speak’.
908
 
The irony of this when applied to Polonius’s own oration here and throughout the 
                                                                                                                                        
likely drawn from the class of books – what she calls the speculum aulici – which 
included Goślicki De optimo senatore.  
905
 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 228-9, p. 26. 
906
 See Fisher 1990, pp. 37-47 for Polonius as humanist, Cardullo 2011 for 
Polonius’s lack of brevity and delay of action. See also the debates in Shakespeare 
Quarterly in the 1950s on Polonius’s instructions to his son: Bennett 1953, pp. 3-9; 
McGlinchee 1955, pp. 362-4; Bennett 1956, pp. 275-6; Hunter 1957, pp. 501-6; 
Davis 1958, pp. 85-6. Perhaps it is worth concluding these debates with the 
observation in Hunter 1957, p. 506 that regardless of whether the precepts are 
initially farcical or serious, eventually their ‘disproportion becomes obvious’ and 
the audience realises their ‘inadequacy’.  
907
 Bennett 1953, pp. 3-9.  
908
 Isocrates 1980, 1:41.  
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 His advice to Reynaldo is equally lengthy, so much so that it causes him, 
comically, to lose his place. However, this speech, coming quickly on the heels of 
his instructions to Laertes, reveals a disturbing second side to Polonius. Having just 
finished instructing his son in the precepts which should guide his life, Polonius is 
willing to use whatever deceitful means necessary to ensure that Laertes is 
following his advice. Reynaldo is to use ‘What forgeries you please’ to discover 
Laertes’s actions, the examples of which shock his servant.
910
 But Polonius has 
thought his method through, and tells him that:  
Your bait of falshood take this carpe of truth,  
And thus doe we of wisedome, and of reach,  
With windlesses, and with assaies of bias,  




Thus Hamlet’s later identification of Polonius as a ‘fishmonger’ is indeed apt.
912
 
Polonius fishes out the ‘carpe of truth’ with the ‘bait of falsehood’, selling it on 
where it can fetch the highest price.
913
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 Knowing and seizing kairos is a persistent problem for many of the characters in 
the play, especially Hamlet himself; see Baumlin and Baumlin 2002, pp. 165-86.  
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 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 911, p. 68.  
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 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1211; see Shaaber 1971, pp. 179-81; Jofen 
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colloquies, which details the dialogue between a butcher and a fishmonger. The 
declared purpose of the dialogue is to ‘treat of human Constitutions’ which some 
‘prefer... before divine Laws’ while still others ‘abuse Institutions both human and 
divine, to Gain and Tyranny’. The two men agree that the religious peace and 
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Advantage of the Opportunity’. Notably, the butcher prompts the fishmonger to 
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1997, pp. 675-762. 
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 Of course, Polonius does not, as Hamlet would have him, ‘play foole no 
where but in’s owne house’ but rather in the courts of king as well, where we once 
again see the dual identities of Polonius as orthodox humanist and Machiavellian at 
work. Paralleling his instructions to Laertes, his speech to Claudius and Gertrude 
regarding the cause of Hamlet’s madness is a travesty of the rhetorical discipline, 
punctuated by Gertrude’s ‘more matter with lesse art’ and his own response that he 




 However, once again, this is not all there is to Polonius, for he ends by 
suggesting a plot whereby he and the king may spy on Hamlet. Such plans to 
observe Hamlet, first with Ophelia and later with Gertrude, recall the contemporary 
imagery of counsellors who hide their true intentions and motives behind ‘painted 
words’, just as women paint their faces to hide their ugliness.
915
 Shakespeare takes 
such imagery literally, twice placing the plotting Polonius behind not only veils, but 
behind the women in Hamlet’s life. This is made explicit in this first scheme to 
overhear Hamlet with Ophelia. Having decided that he will ‘loose [his] daughter’ 
upon him, Polonius advises her to appear reading a book, as this will ‘cullour’ her 
‘lowliness’, telling her ‘Tis too much proou’d, that with deuotions visage| And 
pious action, we doe sugar ore| The deuill himselfe’.
916
 Although Polonius is simply 
instructing Ophelia in the art of deception, as he had done Reynaldo, the listening 
Claudius takes the words to heart and echoes them: ‘O tis too true,| The harlots 
                                                 
914
 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1123, 1124, 1117, p. 82; see Cardullo 2011.  
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 Recall Montaigne 1603, p. 166: ‘Those that mask and paint women, commit not 
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beguile, not our eyes, but our judgement; and to bastardize and corrupt the essence 
of things.’  
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cheeke beautied with plastring art,| Is not more ougly to the thing that helps it,| 
Then is my deede to the most painted word’, equating the art of beautification of 
women with the art of rhetoric in the hiding of ill deeds.
917
 Hamlet too repeats the 
trope in his chiding of Ophelia in the same scene: ‘the power of beautie will sooner 
transforme honestie| from what it is to a bawde’ and again ‘I haue heard of your 
paintings well enough, God hath giuen you one face, and you make your selfes 
another’.
918
 Polonius, as Claudius had done, uses paradiastolic redescription to 
paint over his plotting, although it does not deceive Hamlet.  
Polonius’s dissembling nature not only brings about his own death, but also 
serves to justify it. Although Claudius would send Hamlet straight to England, 
Polonius insists that he first observe the conversation between Hamlet and 
Gertrude. He once again hides himself behind woman (queen) and veil (arras), 
which leads to his misidentification and his death at Hamlet’s hand. It also confirms 
his identity as the worst kind of flatterer according to Plutarch: ‘As for him, who 
(like as the Pourcuttle fish stretcheth out his clawes like branches) reacheth as farre 
as to the secret chambers and cabinets of women, with his busie intermedling, with 
his calumniations and malicious demeanors, such a one is savage, fell, intractable 
and dangerous to be approched.’
919
 Hamlet, upon killing Polonius, establishes that 
it is his plotting and dissimulating nature which lies at the heart of his destruction – 
‘Thou wretched, rash, intruding foole farwell|... Thou find’st to be too busie is some 
danger’.
920
 Driving home the idea that optimi conciliarii mortui, Hamlet notes how 
it is only in death that Polonius last achieves the skills most to be esteemed in a 
counsellor: ‘this Counsayler| Is now most still, most secret, and most graue| Who 
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was in life a most foolish prating knaue’.
921
 The counsellor suffers his demise at the 
hands of Hamlet.  
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 Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2580-2, 176.  
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Part III: Reason of State, 1603-1651 
Chapter 7: The Language of Reason of State 
As we have seen, by the latter half of the sixteenth century the Machiavellian 
challenge to the orthodox humanist discourse of counsel had developed into a fully 
articulated tradition. This does not mean that the orthodox discourse fades away, 
quite the contrary. In this chapter we shall be exploring one of the foremost answers 
to the Machiavellian challenge, articulated through an engagement with the 
vocabulary of reason of state. 
The phrase ‘reason of state’ cannot be said to have any definitive or 
uncontested meaning in the early modern period.
922
 We can, however, explore its 
use in two early seventeenth-century conciliar discourses.
923
 The first is the 
‘Machiavellian’ tradition that we have already explored. This is reason of state as 
associated with the tenets of Machiavellian counsel to princes, particularly the 
dissociation of utile and honestum, which becomes rearticulated – as we saw in 
Chapter 6 – as a tension between ‘policy’ and the law of God. However, little direct 
evidence of this Machiavellian reason of state exists; our knowledge of it proceeds 
almost entirely from the critiques which make up the second discourse of reason of 
state, the focus of this chapter.
924
 
This second tradition seeks to advance ‘true’ reason of state against the 
Machiavellian variant. Primarily articulated by Jesuit writers, this view suggests 
that true reason of state and policy are not in contradiction to divine law, for 
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 As Höpfl 2002, p. 211 points out, it was in fact those writing in opposition to 
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following God’s law is in fact what is beneficial to the state.
925
 In other words, 
these writers sought to undo the Machiavellian separation of utile and honestum, 
restoring the Ciceronian ends of counsel, by reconciling the state’s advantage with 
religious concerns. Their willingness, however, to engage with concepts and 
terminology borrowed from their opponents, and to make their arguments for 
honestum from a concern for utile, mark their work as fundamentally different from 
that of Cicero and the orthodox humanists and closer to the ‘false’ reason of state 
they were attempting to discredit. 
 
I. Policy 
We have already seen some of the ways in which the idea of ‘policy’ became 
opposed to religion and morality in the sixteenth century.
 
To counter this tendency, 
many authors used this vocabulary in an attempt to remoralise political deliberation, 
by defining two distinct types of policy.
926
 The first was the original, prescribed by 
God, which was lawful and honest, and by these means brought about profit. The 
other was a perversion of the term, associated with Machiavellians who redescribed 
it as a willingness to counsel a prince towards whatever means necessary to achieve 
profit. For example, Barnabe Rich, a soldier and social critic, writes in his 1606 
Faultes, faultes, and nothing else but faultes that there is policy ‘that is legittimate, 
first begotten by Wit, and then fostered by Honestie’ which is ‘not to be 
neglected’.
927
 However, there is also a type ‘which more respecteth profit than it 
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 See Höpfl 2002, pp. 211-37. 
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: ‘policie conducted by vertue, 
I thinke the life of Gouernment, without which a common-wealth can no more liue, 
then a bodie without a soule’ as opposed to ‘policie (as it is commonly taken and 
vsed) [which] is no more certaine nor profitable, then a Farmers drawing all his 
Councell from a Kalendar’. 
927
 Rich 1606, p. 45. 
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doth the souereign Pollicie prescribed by Gods law’.
928
 This ‘worldly Policie’ will 
‘do litle good, but to the end to doe a great deale of harme; for Pollicie and Profite 
haue euer marched arme in arme in one ranke’.
929
 He echoes Cicero in writing that 
‘Profite being diuorced from Honestie, begetteth but a bastardly progenie, and it is 
a very dangerous doctrine, to teach that Profite may be separated from honestie’.
930
 
However, it is not honesty but profit, for Rich, that has the first consideration, for 
‘All Policie... is to be reiected, that tendeth not to publique profite’.
931
 So he 
concludes that ‘there is not a more pestilent thing then this plague of policy, which 
diuides it selfe from the policie prescribed by the rule of Gods word’ and he 




 Perhaps the clearest expression of this tension is given by Christopher 
Lever, a religious writer educated at Cambridge, in his 1608 Heauen and Earth, 
Religion and Policy, which takes as its central tenet that ‘the best Policy is 
Religion’.
933
 He too identifies two types of policy, for ‘the generall name of Policie 
(like the double face of Ianus) respecteth two seueral obiects; the better hath 
regardful eie to honesty, and lawfull warrent onely, the other beholdeth all things 
with indifferent eie, not respecting lawfulnes, but conueniency in euery practise’.
934
 
It is this latter definition which is the ‘common vnderstanding of Policie’ whereby 
‘the name of lawfull Policie doth often times receiue much iniury’.
935
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 Lever repeats these ideas and applies them directly to the role of counsel in 
The historie of the defendors of the catholique faith, published in 1627: the ‘practise 
of euill men is in common construction Pollicie, whereby the name of Pollicie doth 
receiue much wrong by their grosse and senceless understanding it’.
936
 For Lever, it 
is the aims of political counsel which give a normative ascription to this neutral 
term: ‘Pollicie may be either good or bad according to the end’.
937
  He demonstrates 
this through a history of the English Reformation and the roles of each of the 
monarchs – from Henry VIII to James I – in bringing about religious change in 
England, provided for the instruction of King Charles. 
 Counsel plays a prominent role in this text, for Lever notes that Henry VIII 
was ‘ruled by perswasion and not by Iudgement’, especially of that ‘Matchiuellike’ 
and ‘great Polititian’ Stephen Gardiner.
938
 The same fate befalls Edward VI, who 
ought to have kept in mind that ‘It is a Pollitique wisedome in a Prince to suspect 
the sincerity of al such state aduise, that hath principall reference to the 
aduancement of such Counsellors’.
939
 A similar lesson applies in the case of Mary 
I, whose only fault was the ‘two [sic] much credit she gaue to euill counsel’, chiefly 
that of Bonner and Gardiner, whose ‘Counsell was wicked pollicie, but no 
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 He treats her marriage to Philip II according to these requirements, 
concluding that it was ‘neither Poilitique [sic] nor Holy’, the latter because it 
brought her closer to the pope, the former because it was ‘very hurtfull for our 
Nation, ayming directly at the vtter ouerthrow of the English Monarchie’.
941
 He 
concludes his discussion of Mary by declaring:  
The Queenes error in these proceedings, was to receiue her State 
instructions, from such Counsellors as did labour onely to frame her to 
their owne designes, not regarding the publike benefit of the State. For 
doubtlesse had the Queene bene ordered by her Pollitique State, or by 
any one Counsellor in the State of honourable quallity, she had not 
giuen so much of her title and Maiestie to Rome and Spaine as by the 




It is Elizabeth I who is able to resist the counsel of such men and establish 
England as a truly Christian state. Lever here makes the distinction between 
‘gouernment meerely pollitique’, where the two pulls of ‘Religion and Pollicie are 
two diuers (or rather in full opposition) and that (many times) in the practise of 
State is commendable which in the iudgement of Religion is most damnable’ and 
‘Christian States’ where policy is a ‘seruant to the worke of holinesse, and iudged 
by the sentence of true Religion’ and thus religion and policy are reconciled.
943
 
Elizabeth’s reign is a moment of transition between these two types, for Elizabeth 
was forced to make a choice between religion and policy, faced with ‘certaine 
considerations, which in respect of Pollicie might haue diswaded the Queene from 
reforming the State of Religion’.
944
 Her alteration of religion was ‘in the wisedome 
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of State’ very dangerous; however, her choice created a Christian state in England, 




II. Reason of State 
Lever uses the language of ‘wisedome of State’ in his history in order to describe 
those counsels which lead to the well-being of the state, and can either stand in 
unity with, or opposition to, divine law. It is very probable that by this he had in 
mind the vocabulary of ‘reason of state’.
946
 In order to understand this idea and its 
role in political counsel, one must begin with Giovanni Botero’s Ragione di Stato, 
originally published in Italian in 1589. In his dedication to Wolf Dietrich von 
Raitenau, the Prince-bishop of Salzburg (given as Wolfgang Theodoric in the text), 
Botero notes with astonishment that reason of state is ‘a constant subject of 
discussion’ in the ‘courts of kings and great princes’.
947
 His shock is caused by the 
fact that this concept severs the connection between honestum and utile, placing 
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 The Italian ragione di stato was not always translated as reason of state. For 
instance, Richard Etherington’s translation of ragione di stato is ‘Iudgement of 
State’ in the opening passages of his Abstract of Boterus della Ragione di Stato, 
produced between 1617 and 1625 (Sl. MS. 1065; see Appendix B). As no 
contemporary English print translation of the Ragione exists, I will be relying on 
Etherington’s Abstract to supplement my reading of the 1956 Waley and Waley 
edition. The Italian indicated in square brackets is drawn from the 1598 edition of 
the text (the last that Botero himself edited), except where it differs from the 
original 1589, which I have noted.  
947
 Botero 1956, p. xiii. Botero’s choice of dedicatee may have had to do with 
Raitenau’s political policies, which highlight the tension between divinity and state 
interests. Less than a year before Botero dates his dedicatory, Raitenau had expelled 
the Lutherans from Salzburg, but had chosen to grant exemptions to those whose 
industry supported the economic well-being of the state. Botero seems to support 
such a compromise, for he criticises the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 
Ragione (1956, p. 146) on the grounds that it weakened the state and praises 
Raitenau for being able to combine the ‘solicitude of the shepherd with the gravity 
of the prince’ so that one cannot judge whether he is better suited to the ‘rank of 
prince or prelate’ (1956, p. xiv). See Strauss 1959, pp. 35-7 for the policies of 
Raitenau; see Birely 1990, pp. 48, 67 for Botero’s treatment of the expulsion of the 
Jews.  
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emphasis on the latter.
948
 This division is founded on the reading of two writers: 
Machiavelli, who ‘bases his Reason of State on lack of conscience’, and Tacitus, 
whose exemplar, Tiberius, ‘justified his cruelty and tyranny by an inhuman lex 
maiestatis’.
949
 Both, for Botero, erred in assuming that reason of state could be 
achieved by practices that were in opposition to honesty and God’s law.
950
 
 Botero makes explicit that his goal is to rectify this mistake in the ‘policy 
[gouerni] and counsel [consigli] of princes’.
951
 Such rectification, however, does 
not mean that he disagrees with the Machiavellian idea that the preservation of the 
state should be the ultimate goal of such policy and counsel, but rather suggests that 
the means by which this preservation will come about will be in line with 
honestum. He writes in his dedicatory epistle that ‘The very beasts possess a natural 
instinct which turns them towards useful [vtili] things and away from harmful ones: 
shall then the light of reason and dictates of conscience, bestowed upon man to 
enable him to distinguish good [bene] from evil [male], be obscured in affairs of 
state [affair publici], mute in matters of importance?’
952
 The ‘light of reason’ and 
‘dictates of conscience’ – reason of state and God’s word – should and will be 
united in the achievement of utile.
953
 The end of the political for Botero, as for 
Machiavelli, therefore, remains profit, but this profit can only be achieved through 
means which are in line with honestum.
954
 
                                                 
948
 Botero 1956, p. xiv. 
949
 Botero 1956, p. xiii.  
950
 Botero’s intention in uniting honestum and utile was noted by some of his 
earliest commentators, such as Apollinare de’ Calderini who, writing in 1597, 
praised him for having ‘so accommodated morality [honestà], justice, and 
obligation with the advantage [profito] of the prince’; quoted in Bireley 1990, p. 46.  
951
 Botero 1956, p. xiv; note that these terms are plural in the Italian.  
952
 Botero 1956, p. xiv. 
953
 Botero 1956, p. xiv. 
954
 Etherington provides an abridgement of this epistle under the heading ‘Law of 
State and Conscience one’: ‘Some haue grounded their reason in litle conscience. 
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 Botero defines reason of state as ‘the knowledge [notitia]’ of such means by 
which a state, a ‘stable rule over a people’, may be ‘founded, preserved and 
extended’.
955
 Reason of state is not the end of the political – this remains the 
security of the state – but rather the knowledge of the means by which to reach this 
end. As for Machiavelli, this rests in the achievement of virtù and the maintenance 
of the prince’s reputation.
956
 For Botero, however, virtù remains connected with the 
classical virtues, reputation serving to connect this virtù to the good of the state. In 
Chapter 8, Botero notes that the most important element of a state’s preservation is 
the ‘tranquillity of the subjects’, best gained by establishing the prince’s riputatione 
among the people.
957
 As the people only give the right of governance to those who 
are ‘known for their valour and outstanding qualities [virtù]’, virtù is essential to 
maintaining stable governance over a people: ‘the foundation [fondamento 
principale] upon which every State is built is the obedience of the subjects to their 
prince, and this in turn is founded upon his outstanding excellence [l’eminenza 
della virtù del Principe]’.
958
 
                                                                                                                                        
Some haue mantled their tyranny with a cloke of barbarous lawe of Ma[jes]
tie
, and 
yet both accounted famous Statists or Idœaes of State, as though there were one law 
of State another of conscience: when as such as take away consciences Iurisdiction 





 Botero 1956, p. 1. It is unclear if notitia here carries the meaning of knowledge 
as a set of rules or principles, akin to a science, or rather a general awareness. Its 
relation to ‘intelligence’ and ‘news’ in the period suggests a connection to the 
knowledge of contemporary affairs, which Botero and others emphasise in relation 
to reason of state (see Chapter 8). Etherington renders this passage ‘Iudgement of 
state is a notive of meane actions to found, conserue and enlarge gouernment or 
dominyons’ (Sl. MS 1065, fo. 5
r
). Although no dictionary entry exists for ‘notive’, 
it is probably related to ‘notition’ meaning ‘knowledge, information, intelligence’.  
956
 Note that the translation of virtù by Waley and Waley 1956 obscures this 
important connection to Machiavelli. 
957
 Botero 1956, p. 12.  
958
 Botero 1956, pp. 12, 13-14. Etherington retains the essence of this passage: 
‘Reputation... [is] desireable in Prynces, for that the foundations of euery State, is 
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In Chapter 11 Botero provides his explanation of this crucial term.
959
 
Whereas Machiavelli had dissociated virtù from the classical taxonomy of virtues, 
Botero reiterates this connection, placing the classical virtues into three 
categories.
960
 In the first are those virtues which inspire love among the people and 
are associated with justice and liberality, such as humanità, cortesia and clemenza. 
Although Botero provides a lengthy treatment of both justice and liberality in the 
chapters that follow, he makes it clear that they are of lesser importance when it 
comes to political leadership, for they are more likely to inspire love than 
riputatione, and it is the latter which will ensure the security of the state. It is the 
second category of virtues which inspire the reputation of the prince, and thus are 
more important. These include fortezza, military and political skills, constanza, il 
vigour dell’animo and la prontezza dell’ingengo, summarised under the headings of 
prudence and valour.
961
 The final category contains temperance and religion, which 
support the achievement of the other virtues. 
 
Despite his declared attention to the consegli of princes, Botero says little about the 
role of the counsellor in relation to reason of state. As with the Machiavellian 
tradition, it is to the Anglophone discourse that we need to turn to see these 
continental ideas directly applied to the role and figure of the political counsellor. 
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 See Bireley 1990, p. 54.  
960
 Botero’s list of the key virtues is almost identical to the four cardinal virtues, 
with the substitution of liberality for temperance, which is removed from the list of 
principle virtues and placed alongside religion in the third category. This may have 
to do with Machiavelli’s specific treatment of liberality in Chapter XVI of The 
Prince.  
961
 Etherington: ‘Reputation by fortitude, Art military, policye, constancy, vigor of 
mynde, readines of witt, w
ch





The English priest and (after 1614) Jesuit Thomas Fitzherbert takes the anti-
Machiavellian discourses of policy and reason of state and translates them into 
‘general rules or aduises no lesse pious then politic, for the instructio[n] of such as 
desire to mannage affairs of state’, especially those ‘aduanced by his princes fauor 
to be of his Councel’.
962
 He addresses Machiavellians as political counsellors, who 
have failed in their duty to give advice in line with both God’s law and reason of 
state. 
Fitzherbert’s purpose is to undo the work of ‘Politikes’, such as 
Machiavelli, who remove from ‘policy’ all consideration of ‘conscience & religion’ 
and thus ‘preuert the order of nature it selfe’.
963
 As with Botero, it is an objection to 
the justification of unconscionable action based on the claim that ‘reason of state 
required it’ that moves Fitzherbert to compose ‘some discourse concerning the 
necessarie concurrance of the reason of state with conscience and religion’.
964
  
Although his argument is based, for the most part, on the direct intervention 
of God’s justice in the outcome of man’s affairs, Fitzherbert does acknowledge that 
even when this consideration is removed, Machiavellian counsel still fails to ensure 
the good of the prince, because it does not maintain the prince’s reputation. In 
addressing his young statist, Fitzherbert writes that there are three things ‘which a 
councellour ought to consider to his prince’: conscience, reputation and 
‘commodity’.
965
 First establishing that ‘any thing which is offensiue to God’ cannot 
possibly ‘be good for state’, Fitzherbert suggests that ‘beside that it is euident 
inough in true reason of state, that although there were no danger at al of Gods 
wrath, yet these and such other Macchiauillian policies, are not only insufficient to 
                                                 
962
 Fitzherbert 1606, pp. 304, 318.  
963




 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 36. 
965
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 331. 
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preuent or remedy the inconueniences which wicked princes incurre by the hatred 
of men, but also doe many times encrease their dangers’.
966
 Even if God is taken 
out of the equation, the damage done to a prince’s reputation by embracing 
Machiavellian policies ensures his downfall. Thus whether one is concerned for the 
prince’s conscience, reputation or commodity, the advice ought to be the same:  
Therfore I conclude that whereas commodity, conscience and 
reputation, are to be respected in al deliberations concerning princes 
affairs, conscience ought euer to predominate, and to serue for the 
touchstone and rule, as wel of reputation as of temporal commodities; 
and therein a councellour shal wel discharge his duty, if in al his 
consultations he hold the knowne axiome of Cicero for his ground, to 
wit, that Nihil est vtile quod non sit honestum. Nothing is profitable 




Fitzherbert revives the Ciceronian unification of utile and honestum based on a 
consideration of reason of state in the role of the counsellor.  
He drives this point home in a subsequent chapter by considering ‘for the 
furder instruction of a young statist... whether a princes state can be assured by 
wicked policy’.
968
 He addresses this question ‘by reason of state, without the 
consideration of Gods iustice’.
969
 Once again, it is reputation that does the work of 
connecting Machiavellian practices with the downfall of the prince, for ‘wickednes 
in a prince, maketh him hateful to his subiects and consequently endangereth his 
estate’.
970
 There is no such thing as being ‘securely wicked’.
971
 Machiavellians ‘doe 
most absurdly endanger their princes’ and thus the entire state ‘by their wicked 
counsel’ for one cannot ‘separate the peril of the commonwelth, from the peril of 
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 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 335. 
967
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 362. 
968
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.  
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 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.  
970
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.  
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 It is reason of state that, rather than justifying Machiavellian 
principles, serves to discredit them: ‘the absurdity of Macchiauel, is most manifest 
in true reason of state, seeing that in councelling princes to wickednes and tiranny, 
vpon confidence of humane force and policy, he exposeth them to an assured 
danger, and doth not geue them any assured or probable remedy but rather heapeth 
danger vpon danger’.
973
 Machiavellians fail as counsellors as they do not preserve 
the life of prince or state. 
It has been suggested that Fitzherbert modelled his argument on that of his 
‘friend and mentor’, the Jesuit Robert Persons, who had applied the language of 
reason of state to the question of religion in England in his 1593 Newes from 
Spayne and Holland.
974
 In the second half of this work, Persons turns to 
‘considerations of State’ in the question of ‘whether the present gouerment of 
Inglish affayres, setting a side al regard of partiality to religion: were in it selfe and 
according to reason, experience and law of pollicy to be account wise and 
prudent’.
975
 This is applied directly to the question of counsel, for the question 
comes down to ‘whether such as chiefly managed [English affairs], and namely the 
lord Burley, were in truth a wise ma[n] or no?’
976
 The discussants decide that he 
was not wise, because ‘his councelles... semed scarse defensable, not only for lack 
of iustice or co[n]science’ but also because ‘euen in nature of humane wisdome and 
pollycy set downe by Machauel him selfe, or by any other of lesse conscience then 
he, they seemed erronio[u]s’.
977
 Persons demonstrates that it is ‘a great ouersight in 
                                                 
972
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 382.  
973
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 402. 
974
 See Höpfl 2011, pp. 94, 96.  
975
 Persons 1593, pp. 21, 22.  
976
 Persons 1593, p. 22.  
977
 Persons 1593, p. 22.  
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reason of state’ for Elizabeth to have made ‘so vniuersal a change of religion’.
978
 
He suggests that it was Elizabeth’s counsellors, primarily Burghley and Nicholas 
Bacon, who swayed her to such a decision by using ‘reasons and arguments of 




The issue is taken up by another Catholic writer, Benjamin Carier, in A 
Treatise of 1614, who suggests that reason of state did in fact force Elizabeth to 
restore the Protestant religion. As it was ‘in policie necessarie for [Elizabeth], who 
was the daughter of King HENRY the eight by ANNE BOLEINE, borne with the 
contempt of Rome’ to restore the Protestant church, so it ‘were necessary in reason 
of State’ for her ‘to continue the Doctrine of Diuision’.
980
 Carier admits that if the 
‘same reason of State, which there was in the beginning, & continued all Queene 
ELIZABETHS daies’ still applied under James I, ‘there is as little hope now that 
your Maiesty should hearken vnto reconciliation’.
981
  However, there is no longer 
any disparity between reason of state and the Catholic religion, as James’s claim is 
not dependent on the marriage of Henry VIII to Anne Boleyn, and so Carier ‘doe 
finde as little cause of holding out in reason of State, as I doe in truth of 
Doctrine’.
982
 Reason of state, for Persons and Carier, can have the power to 
override concerns of right religion. For Carier, these reasons have disappeared with 
the accession of the Stuarts, and Catholicism can be restored, bringing policy back 
into alignment with religion.  
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 Persons 1593, p. 22.  
979
 Persons 1593, p. 22.  
980
 Carier 1614, p. 32.  
981
 Carier 1614, pp. 32, 30. 
982
 Carier 1614, p. 30. 
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III. Interests  
Both Persons and Fitzherbert ascribe the deviation from true reason of state to the 
personal motives of evil counsellors. Even Machiavelli himself, Fitzherbert 
suggests, was guilty of this; he argues that Machiavelli intentionally counselled 
against true reason of state in order to overthrow the Medici regime.
983
 Thus 
Fitzherbert underlines his requirement that counsellors should be free from 
‘passion, and particular affection’, or else they too will put forward advice that will 
bring about their own designs and not the good of the prince.
984
 
 Botero, too, writes against the conflict caused by counsellors’ individual 
ambitions; however, in doing so he employs a different and influential vocabulary, 
for he tells his addressee to ‘Admit to your counsels [consiglio di Stato] no one who 
owes allegiance to another ruler, for he whose interest [interesse] lies elsewhere 
cannot give you an unbiased opinion’, as ‘interest enters in many and subtle ways 
into the consultation of princes’.
985
 He makes reference to the idea of ‘interest’ in a 
different sense in the same chapter: ‘It should be taken for certain that in the 
decisions made by princes interest will always override every other argument’.
986
 
Thus, there are, for Botero, two kinds of interest: the prince’s interest, which ought 
                                                 
983
 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 412: ‘some Florentines of no meane iudgement 
[Machiavelli’s] owne cuntrymen, and frends, who in their ordinary discourses 
concerning his pollicies, doe not stick to confesse that he him selfe knew theym to 
be contrary to true reason of state, and pernicious to princes, & that neuerthelesse 
desiring to ouerthrow those of the house of the Medices which opprest the 
commonwelth of Florence in his tyme, he published his pestilent doctrin, hoping 
that they wold embrace it & ruine theymselues by the practise therof, wherby the 
state of Florence might returne to the ould Democracy or popular gouernment wher 
in it had continued many yeres before.’  
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 Fitzherbert 1606, p. 327. 
985
 Botero 1956, p. 46. This ‘maxim of prudence’ is missing from Etherington’s 
Abstract.  
986
 Botero 1956, p. 46.  
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Taking first these other ‘particular’ interests of the counsellor, during the 
course of the seventeenth century, a concern emerges for how such motives may 
cloud the judgment of the counsellor. For example, in Of Wisdome, translated in 
1608, the Catholic theologian Pierre Charron adds to the requirements of ‘honesty, 
and sufficiency’ in counsellors ‘a third, and that is, that neither they nor their 
neerest and inward friends haue any particular interest in the business’.
988
 Fray Juan 
de Santa Maria, another Jesuit writer, also expresses this sentiment in his Policie 
vnveiled, first published in English in 1632. He notes that a king must have about 
him ‘iust, prudent, & dis-interessed persons, to aduise them’.
989
 Such disinterest 
consists in an ‘vnderstanding... tearme[d] the Will’ which is ‘free and dis-
incumbranced of affection, or particular passions, as well in asking, as giuing 
Counsaile’.
990
 If this is the case, Santa Maria suggests, it will produce a unity of 
opinion in the council, ‘and if this vnitie be not amongst them, it is to be imagined, 
that they loue not so much the King and State, as their owne priuate interest’.
991
 
The prince must therefore consider his counsellors’ ‘affections, naturall 
inclinations, passions, ambitions, desires, and the like’, for all are inclined to ‘tread 
in one and the same steps... of their owne black and fowle Interest’.
992
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 Botero 1956, p. 41. Etherington here does not translate interesse as ‘interest’, 
but as ‘reputation’: ‘Hold as a thinge resolued for a Prynce not to deale in 
deliberation or trust w
th
 any that hath not y
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 Charron 1608, p. 324.  
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 Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 55.  
990
 Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 64.  
991
 Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 129.  
992
 Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 271. Santa Maria concludes based on this that 
‘Princes ought to peruse Histories’ for ‘Onely Histories, without feare or dread, 
speake plaine language to Kings’ (1650 [1632], p. 273).  
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This concern with interest is expressed in the continued publication of 
works in the advice-to-counsellors genre that we first encountered in Chapter 4. The 
counsellor of estate, written by the French administrator and diplomat Philippe de 
Béthune in 1633, and translated by Edward Grimston a year later, combines the 
work of several noted authors, including Bartolome Felippe, Justus Lipsius and 
Botero, in addressing the office of the counsellor. In his chapter on ‘the setling of a 
Councell of Estate, and of the quallities and number of Councellors’ Béthune adds 
Botero’s language of interest to Felippe’s account of the qualities of counsellors, 
stating that ‘it is likewise certayne, that in affaires where we haue no interest, we 




Béthune uses the metaphor of gamblers to demonstrate this point, writing 
that ‘he that lookes ouer Gamesters, and is not possest neyther with the hope of 
gayne, nor the feare of losse, will giue a better iudgment of the carriage of the game 
then he that playes’ and so likewise ‘he that in Councell hath not any feare to lose 
his Estate, and who brings neyther affection nor passion, will alwayes take the most 
honourable party’.
994
 He makes clear that this ‘affection’ and ‘passion’ is 
synonymous with interest, for ‘he which hath any interest preuented by his owne 
opinion and feare, will willingley incline to that side by the which he thinks to saue 
himselfe’.
995
 Notably, Béthune’s metaphor of the ‘gamester’ suggests that it is 
actually those outside the game – those watching the stage-play of politics – who 
have the least interest and judge best, although he does not explicitly make this 
point. He does, however, question how likely it is that such disinterested 
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 Béthune 1634, pp. 55, 59.  
994
 Béthune 1634, p. 59. 
995
 Béthune 1634, p. 59. 
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counsellors are to be found, for he writes that ‘the Councellors of Princes are 
accompanied with iealousie one against another; and tending all to one end, they 
finde out many times publique Councels, and make them serue to their owne 
priuate interests’.
996
 Thus it is the prince who must outwit his own counsellors, 
even by spying on them, as the Grand Seignior, who views his counsellors through 
a secret window in the council chamber ‘by the which (without being seene) he 
may heare all that is spoken and past in his Councell’.
997
 
Turning to the second type of interest – that of the state – Béthune makes 
reference to it via his translation of Botero’s first maxim of prudence: ‘A Prince 
may easily iudge by himself what may be the deliberation of all others of his 
condition. Interest is the part and reason which preuailes, and makes the 
resolutions, bend to that side where it shewes it selfe: And therefore he must neither 
trust to Friendship, alliance, league, nor any other Bond, if there be no interest’.
998
 
This idea had already appeared in Anglophone discourse in 1606, with the 
translation of René de Lucinge’s The beginning, continuance, and decay of estates. 
A diplomat like Béthune and acquaintance of Botero, Lucinge draws heavily on the 
Ragione, applying reason of state to contemporary politics in an analysis of 
European relations with the Turkish Empire.
999
  
Interest plays an important role in this work, for Lucinge, first having 
established that the Ottomans gained their great empire via Machiavellian means, in 
his final book seeks to discover whether their state will soon fall, and in particular 
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 Béthune 1634, pp. 67-8.  
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 Béthune 1634, pp. 8. Béthune also repeats the distinction between counsel and 
command made by Felippe and others, writing ‘in regard of the Councels power, it 
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being inseparable with the Souereignty’ (1634, p. 64).  
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asks ‘Why the leagues amongst Christian Princes are commonly of small 
effect[?]’
1000
 He begins by establishing that ‘all the actions of Princes are 
vndertaken for two principal causes, honor and profit’; however, as it is usually 
profit which is given the primary regard – ‘the consideration of honor often 
masqueth vnder the pretence or good of their affairs’ – he agrees with Botero that 
the better approach is to ‘only meddle with profit’ which he ‘tearme[s] interest’.
1001
 
Although interest is a ‘common maske for all faces’, there is not a single interest 
but a multiplicity of them amongst the princes in Christendom when it comes to the 
Turkish empire – some are driven by necessity to engage in a war against them, 
others have no interest whatsoever – and so they cannot be united against them.
1002
 
To argue for the conquest of the Turks from interest would require that all princes 
see ‘great profit or interest in such an enterprise’.
1003
 As this is not the case, there is 
an ‘impossibilitie of establishing a league... vnlesse wee can minister some remedy 
to the diuersities of this interest and profit’.
1004
 His only suggestion is that ‘the 
league be contracted at leisure, in a time of peace’ so that none of the princes have a 
particular interest in the enterprise, and are thus able to turn to ‘the glory of God 
with a free hart, and an vndaunted magnanimitie’.
1005
 As long as interest remains a 
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in his original edition of Ragione, although it is removed from the 1598 edition. In 
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consideration for any of the princes, however, such a godly endeavour is 
impossible.  
By 1640, this discourse is fully developed and expressed through the 
translation of Henri, Duc de Rohan’s A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and 
States of Christendome. He opens his work with the resounding statement that ‘The 
PRINCES command the People, & the Interest commands the Princes. The 
knowledge of this Interest is as much more raised above that of Princes actions, as 
they themselves are above the People’.
1006
 Interest is also elevated above counsel, 
for ‘The Prince may deceive himselfe, his Councell may be corrupted, but the 
Interest alone can never faile’.
1007
 If this true interest is not discovered, it is either 
because ‘the Prince hath not well understood it, or else for that it was disguised by 
the corruption of his Ministers’.
1008
  
In his second part, he notes how ‘the ill successes that have happened’ in 
Christendome ‘proceeded not from any other cause, then the neglecting of the said 
interest’.
1009
 In ‘matter of State’ one must be guided not by ‘inordinate desires’, 
‘violent passions’ nor ‘superstitious opinions’ but rather by ‘proper interest guided 
by reason alone’.
1010
 Interest replaces honestum as that which is guided by reason 
and is thus the proper end of the political counsellor. 
Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, a French epistolary writer, directly connects 
this state interest with the proper ends of counsel in his Prince, composed in 
eulogistic praise of Louis XIII in 1631, and translated into English in 1648.
1011
 
Writing against those who ‘mingle God among their passions, who ingage him in 
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their Interests, and who employ him upon all occasions’, Balzac echoes Rohan’s 
assessment that true interest is driven by reason as a counter to the passions.
1012
 It is 
what leads us to honest action, for ‘we must be honest men of necessity and out of 
Interest, when we cannot be by Inclination nor will; since evill is as unprofitable as 
dishonest’.
1013
 He praises Louis’s clemency as it demonstrates that ‘he moves only 
by the line of Reason... [and] that the Interest of his State retain in him this day, the 
place of the passions of his soul’.
1014
 
Importantly, following interest can also lead to the withdrawal of mercy, 
such as in the case of the traitor who ‘mingled his own Interests with those of the 
State’ so that ‘none but the King could separate them’.
1015
 This man’s death was 
‘excusable severity’ as it was used ‘to divert misfortunes which threaten the 
state’.
1016
 He uses this example of mingled interests to praise ‘that punctuall and 
scrupulous Justice’ which preventatively prosecutes crimes before they take 
place.
1017
 This ‘extream right’ would be ‘extream injustice’ if prudence did not 
‘ease Justice in many things’ such as this.
1018
 For ‘Justice is exercised only upon the 
Actions of men, but Prudence hath a right over their thoughts, and secretest 
Intention... she respects the publicke Interest’.
1019
 Prudence leads one to uncover 
the state’s true interest, which can serve to justify the overthrow of justice.  
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Balzac applies the pre-emptive defence of state interest to the question of 
the ‘Monster’ of Europe: the Spanish ‘design of the Universall Monarchie’.
1020
 This 
‘monster’ is a perversion of the relationship between counsel and command, for 
Balzac ‘accuse[s] that Counsel which fights against the good nature of the Prince, 
which will command its own Master; and this is the Monster of which I speak’.
1021
 
It is ‘at the[ir] perswasion’ that the ‘Emperour himself so wise and vertuous’ has 
plotted against his fellow Christian princes, so that the actions of Spain are ‘but a 
part of the Actions and Thoughts of this Monster’.
1022
 The Spanish Council of State 
embraces ‘Machiavellian’ counsels: ‘that Truth of it self is not better than 
falsehood, and that we ought to measure the value of the one and of the other, by 
the profit which comes from them’ and that ‘vertue may be sometimes dangerous, 
but its appearance alwayes necessary’.
1023
 These counsellors have ‘renounce[d] all 
hope of Paradice for the smallest Interest’ and have ‘give[n] certain vices the 
names of vertues, which are neer unto them’.
1024
  
Like Lucinge, he seeks to discover if the interests of the European states are 
in accord in combating this corrupt conciliar monster. He notes, for example, that 
the King of England, ‘Now that he is rid of that Importunate, who traversed all his 
good designes’ – the Duke of Buckingham
1025
 – will certainly join, for he ‘wil not 
abandon a cause in the which besides the reasons of State which are common to 
him with us, his Honor and his Conscience will ingage him’.
1026
 He will follow ‘his 
                                                 
1020
 Balzac 1648, pp. 175, 174.  
1021
 Balzac 1648, p. 175. 
1022
 Balzac 1648, pp. 179-80, 183.  
1023
 Balzac 1648, p. 188.  
1024
 Balzac 1648, pp. 198, 235.  
1025
 Executed in 1628, the same year that the manuscript edition of Le Prince was 
sent to Cardinal Richelieu and two years before its first publication.  
1026
 Balzac 1648, p. 311. 
 242 
first Inclinations, and his true Interests’, which are to join with the Italians.
1027
 He is 
‘an Italian by the Mothers side, and consequently interessed in the present affaires, 
not only by honour and consideration of State, but also out of a naturall Inclination 
and Piety’.
1028
 Having been freed from the contrary counsel of Buckingham, 
Charles I is able to follow his and England’s true interests in warring against the 
Spanish monster. 
Not every writer, however, was so willing to trust in the guidance of 
interest, associating it instead with the dangerous attributes of the false reason of 
state condemned by the Jesuit writers. These themes are present in the work of 
Italian satirist Trajano Boccalini, translated as The New-Found Politicke by 
William Vaughn in 1626, but better-known as the News-sheet from Parnassus. In 
this piece, Boccalini takes particular aim at those who espouse Machiavellian 
reason of state as well as those like Lucinge, Rohan and Balzac who are willing to 
see the state’s interest as the guiding star of the political counsellor. The book 
opens with a discussion of the ‘publick Shop in Parnassus’ which has been set up 
by the ‘Corporations of Politicians’, selling various tools of their trade, for 
instance, playing on the idea of redescription, ‘most excellent Pencils for those 
Princes, who in their vrgent occasions, are often enforced to paint white for black 
vnto their people’.
1029
 Also sold in this shop are ‘certain Compasses... of the pure 
interesse of the most fine reputation’.
1030
 These compasses ‘measure a mans owne 
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  ‘Interresse’ receives a resounding critique in the Newsheet. In Boccalini’s 
allegory of the flight of Fidelity from Parnassus, Fidelity states that it is ‘that 
infamous Interesse’, which ‘tyrannizeth ouer the minds of all the best Nations’, that 
has ‘banished me from out the heart of men, which in former times were wholly 
mine’.
1032
 The metaphor of the compass returns again in Boccalini’s analysis of 
Spain, in which he writes that ‘they who measuring all the Actions and proceeding 
of those which reigne among Princes, by the onely compasse of priuate interesse, 
doe seldome admit any manner of piety towards God, much lesse of charity towards 
men’ and that Spain knows well ‘how vnder her rich robe of cloth of gold to paliate 
her priuate interesse, be it neuer so diabolicall’.
1033
 The country is in trouble, 




Following this analysis of the ministers of Spain, Boccalini treats those 
‘seruants, that with their prodigious ambition, and artificial tricks (altogether 
diabolical) vndertake to rule and gouerne their Lord and Master’ and who ‘are 
without charity towards their Princes welfare, or priuate interesse’ in favour of their 
own.
1035
 Courtiers, Boccalini notes, are forced to navigate the changing seas of the 
prince’s ‘priuate interesse, and self-passion’ while also attempting to steer the 
‘course of their priuate passions towards their owne interesse or self-respects’.
1036
 It 
is satirically suggested in one passage that the best way to combat the self-interest 
of such counsellor-figures is to adopt the German method ‘of excessiue quaffing of 
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 Counsellors in Germany, ‘did most exquisitely well aduise & counsell 
their country... by means of the good store of wine that they had drunk, hauing 
therein drowned all priuate interesses’.
1038
 Boccalini ends this discussion with a 
quotation from Tacitus’s Germania: ‘Deliberant, dum fingere nesciunt; constiuunt, 
dum errare nonpossant [sic]’ – ‘They deliberate when they have no power to 
dissemble; they resolve when error is impossible’.
1039
 
This reference to Tacitus may be read with irony, given what Boccalini has 
to say about this author elsewhere in his work. As has been established, and as 
Botero notes, Tacitus was a foundational author in the reason of state discourse.
1040
 
Boccalini identifies him as ‘the chief standard-bearer of all famous Historians, the 
Father of all humane wisdome, the Oracle of perfect reason of State, and absolute 
Master of Politicians’, a encomium more biting than praising, for ‘to obserue and 
obey the rules of Tacitus’, princes ‘act, and daily perpetrate deeds, that by the 
vgliest Deuils of hell, are deemed most abhominable’.
1041
 Boccalini’s Apollo 
declares that ‘all moderne Policie is but the trash of... Tacitus’ and that he is a 
‘sublime Pedagogue to instruct others in that most villanous doctrine to smother 
and suppresse the conceits and meanings of a true-meaning heart, and yet to speake 
with a false-lying tongue’.
1042
 It is he who has provided the instructions for how to 
use the ‘tools’ for sale in the politicians’ shop: ‘how with the pensill of false 
pretences, to pourtray blacke for white... and with the pernitious compasse of 
priuate interesse to measure loue, hate, trust, faith, honestie, and each humane or 
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 In other words, with the consideration of interests taken into 
account, Boccalini suggests that there may be reason to mistrust even the counsel of 
the dead.  
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Chapter 8: Observation, Travel and Secrets of State 
The introduction of the discourse of reason of state is intimately connected with a 
change in views regarding the knowledge and skills required of the political 
counsellor. We have already seen, in Chapter 5, that many writers replace the 
orthodox humanist emphasis on rhetorical technique with a preference for the 
political knowledge gleaned from histories, based on suspicions of the rhetorically-
adept counsellor. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this reliance on 
history too finds critics, and is rejected by many in favour of political knowledge 
drawn from contemporary external affairs, provided by the first-hand observations 
of travellers.
1044
 This is based not only on a suspicion of the biases of historians, 
who are held to have their own interests, but also on the importance placed on 
comparative state discourse and the knowledge of state secrets to the determination 
of reason of state. Just as we saw the people positioned as the recipients of histories 
in Chapter 5, here too we see that by the middle of the period the revelation of state 
secrets becomes a matter for the populace as a whole, and that the people – through 
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I. The Rejection of Histories 
History, of course, does not cease to be an important source for political counsel for 
many writers; Tacitus in particular was foundational during this period.
1045
 The 
historian Richard Baker dedicates his 1642 translation of Virgilio Malvezzi’s 
Discovrses Upon Cornelius Tacitus to Lord Viscount Saye, a member of the privy 
council, as such ideas were ‘most fit to be presented to Counsellours of State’ and 
Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac’s The Prince adds the language of interest to the oft-
cited lesson that the best counsel to a prince comes from the dead: history presents 
‘sincere counsels, which are not suspected of flattery, nor proceed from passion, in 
which there enters no particular Interest’.
1046
  
 Other writers, however, instead suggest that historians were just as likely to 
flatter as a living counsellor. Barnabe Rich, for example, writing against the 
Machiavellian turn in his Faultes faults of 1606, notes that although the 
‘Historiographers... office is as well to record faults, as worthie Acts’, many 
‘Historiographers flatter’.
1047
 If one examines their works, it becomes clear that 
they have ‘so powdered their writings, with such varietie of discourse, as he is but a 
single-soald reader that cannot perceiue they haue flattered’.
1048
 Historians, Rich 
contends, are just as likely to paint and powder their writings as rhetoricians.  
The rejection of history’s presentation of the naked truth was, for many 
writers, a strategy to discredit Machiavelli’s political authority. This connection is 
made explicit by William Struthers, a minister in the Church of Scotland. In his 
Looking glasse for princes and people, published in 1632, Struthers sets out three 
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kinds of kings: ‘Gods King: Machiavells Tyrant: And the Pop[e]s Vassall’.
1049
 
God’s King accredits God and the people with the establishment of his power, is 
religiously disposed, governs according to the counsel of the wise and accounts his 
people as free men. By contrast, Machiavelli’s Tyrant is willing to use whatever 
means necessary to attain to the crown, only appears to be religious, trusts in his 
own wit above the counsel of others and enslaves his people.
1050
 Struthers suggests 
that ‘Machiavells godlesse direction’ in crafting this tyrant was not his own, but 
gleaned from his study of history.
1051
 Machiavelli was ‘not so much the inventer as 
a polisher’, for ‘the pieces of that policie lay scattered in Histories’ and he but ‘put 
them together’.
1052
 For Struthers, Machiavelli himself is the sort of flattering 
historian that Rich criticises for his treatment of ‘his darling’, Cesare Borgia, 
learning such practices from his study of other historians, primarily Tacitus.
1053
 
Despite writing in praise of Tacitus, the Italian humanist and diplomat 
Virgilio Malvezzi details in his Discourses the corruptions common to historians, 
connecting this theme with the language of interests. Malvezzi writes that historians 
have most difficulty with the ‘persons interessed’ in their histories, ‘which are 
either Princes, or Common-wealths’.
1054
 Historians, like counsellors, face the 
greatest challenge ‘under a wicked Prince’ for ‘either conceiling his vices, he 
shewes himselfe a manifest flatterer, and no wise Historian... or else writing the 
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truth, he shal in so doing, make his owne grave’.
1055
 History is just as susceptible to 
the manipulations of clever writers and the pressures of self-interest as any other 
source of counsel and as a result not as reliable as many would have it be. 
Malvezzi seeks to determine what kind of historian is ‘most worthy to be 
credited’, those who write of times past or those who write of present events – both 
of whom he describes as ‘historians’ – taking into consideration as well the 
difference between those who write as witnesses and those who use the accounts of 
others.
1056
 He concludes that it is ‘historians’ of present events who are most 
credible, as in ‘writing of their owne time, they are not tied to stand to the bookes 
of others, who never agree with one another’.
1057
 Unlike many of the travel-writers 
we shall encounter, Malvezzi suggests that it is this present historian who relies on 
accounts, rather than having witnessed the event himself, who will be the most 
reliable; for although ‘it appeares there is more credit to be given to an Historian 
that writes of his owne time, and of those things at which he hath himselfe been 
present’, he who writes of events he did not witness will be ‘voyd of those 
affections, which make Historians speake lesse truth’.
1058
 Thus for Malvezzi it is 
the historian of contemporary affairs, who was not present at the events that he 
relates, who is the most reliable source; historians who speak of present events 
which they witnessed themselves are second-most credible, and it is the historian of 
past events who is the least trusted to relate the truth.  
Malvezzi drives this point home in his own history of present events – The 
Pourtract of the Politicke Christian-favourite, translated in 1647. In this piece he 
provides an account of the life of Count Gaspar de Guzmán, Duke of Olivares. As 
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Guzmán was still alive at the time of its composition, ‘the book is not yet finished’, 
containing ‘not All that the Duke hath done, nor all that hee will doe’.
1059
 It is, thus, 
very much a present history, and Malvezzi explicitly positions himself as the 
historian most to be credited, noting that what he writes is ‘onelie a little that I 
came to heare of’, not that which he was present at himself.
1060
 Thus his ‘actions 
are without policies’ for he is ‘without interest’ in the affairs he relates.
1061
  
The main body of the work echoes these themes, further discrediting the 
verity of histories of past events. In his ‘State Maxims, and Polliticall observations 
on the actions of Count Olivares’, Malvezzi notes especially that ‘the relation of 
things past, is like the painting of a picture, and some oddes there is, in relating 
things past, and present’.
1062
 Like many painters, historians opt for flattery in their 
portrayal of their subject: ‘the Actions of Predecessours that they may be praised, 
require no more then to bee flourishingly related’ and so, like a portrait, ‘if they be 
but master-like painted, no consideration is had, whether the Actions be true’ for, 
being in the past (and as ‘the space of an hundred yeares, is the bredth of the 
channell of the river of forgetfulesse’), no one can determine for certain whether or 
not they occurred as reported.
1063
 Instead, he concludes that ‘it is profitable to 
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 Malvezzi 1647, n.p. ‘Odds’ here having the meaning of ‘The amount by which 
one number or quantity differs from another, or by which one thing exceeds or 
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Crucially, Malvezzi uses this distrust of historical accounts to mount an 
attack on Machiavelli. He goes a step further than Struthers had, not simply 
accusing Machiavelli of being a flattering historian, but criticising him for using 
history at all in his political writings. ‘Machiavell’, he writes, was ‘deceived in 
believing, that the helpe of history did consist in the making use of example; and 
from this errour, as from the Root, come all his failings in policy’.
1065
 He counters 
the argument that ‘If men are desirous to know the learning of the Ancients, they 
should likewise desire to imitate their actions’, suggesting that ‘Nicholas 
Machiavel... would have men have recourse to Ancient rather than Modern 
Writers’.
1066
 He reports that Machiavelli ‘said, that if we make use of the learnings 
of the Antient, for Physick, if of their Lawes for judgment... why should be we not 
serve out turnes likewise with them by imitation of their Actions’ and declares 
himself of ‘a contrary opinion’ for ‘though men be not changed in their Species, yet 
they are changed in their actions’ and so their manners.
1067
 One must turn to the 
present, not to the past, to guide our choices and actions: ‘As in Astrologie, the 
observation that is nearest, is least false, so in pollicy, is that example, which is 
most moderne’.
1068
 He who, like Machiavelli (or Malvezzi’s interpretation of 
Machiavelli), ‘believes that after he hath read a laudable example of our 
Predecessours, that he is able by and by, to put it in practice, is deceived; he should 
have need first to change all the world’.
1069
  
The use of historical example, Malvezzi contends, does not properly take 
into account the workings of chance and fortune: ‘Many examples are required to 
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make a rule; many of them are dangerous, as being not from prudence, but from 
fortune’.
1070
 The attempt to form rules for action from historical study is 
undermined by the variable of fortune in history. He does not wish to suggest that 
history be done away with altogether – ‘I blame not by this the reading of history, 
for I commend it’ – but rather the way that it is used.
1071
 He suggests that just as 
‘Statues are no use to Sculptours, but for good delineation’ and not for imitation, 
‘So Histories are little helpfull to Polititians, but only for the setling of a good 
judgement. For they are not to operate according to the examples, but according to 
the judgement that they have raised upon the reading of the examples’.
1072
 In other 
words, those in politics should use histories to sharpen their prudence – their ability 
to discern truth from falsehood – rather than to adopt rules or lessons. For this 
former task, the biases of historians and the influences of fortune are perfectly 
suited.  
This potential use for histories, not as a source of counsel but as an 
important exercise in prudence, is best seen through the paradox, a genre popular in 
the early seventeenth century to which Malvezzi himself was a contributor.
1073
 An 
especially apt example comes from the essayist, William Cornwallis, whom we 
encountered in Chapter 6. In his ‘Prayse of King Richard the Third’, published in 
1616 as part of his Essayes of Certaine Paradoxes, Cornwallis uses the same events 
detailed in Thomas More’s history to praise and defend Richard III according to 
Machiavellian reason of state principles, highlighting the ways in which history can 
be manipulated according to the interests of the historian.  
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Describing Richard as a ‘wronged prince’, Cornwallis suggests that 
Richard’s actions, wicked as they may have been, were founded in a justifiable 
desire for self-preservation and the maintenance of the state. Richard was ‘iealous 
of his own preservation, of the safety of the Commonweale, and of the ancient 
Nobilitie’ and so ‘with great reason and iustice he executed them, whom, if he had 
suffered to liue, were likely enough to haue beene the destruction of him, it, and 
them’.
1074
 These motives are especially evident in Richard’s most condemned act, 
the murder of the princes in the tower. Richard, by ‘depriuing them of their liues, 
freed the people from dissention’ and so Cornwallis asks ‘how could hee 
demonstrate his loue more amptly, then to aduenture his soule for [the people’s] 
quiet?’
1075
 Rather than being driven by blind ambition, Richard realised that ‘there 
was no safety, but in Souereigntie’ and so he had to claim the crown, or risk his 
own life and the well-being of England.
1076
 
Historians, Cornwallis suggests, have redescribed the virtues in Richard’s 
possession as vices: ‘His Humility they terme secret pride: his Liberality, 
Prodigality; his Valour, cruetlie and bloudthirstinesse’.
1077
 Turning to the execution 
of the Duke of Buckingham, Cornwallis declares that ‘had this been the action of 
some other Prince, it had been good, iust, necessary; but being his, it is censured the 
contrary; so that sinne is not sinne, nor vertue accounted vertue, by their owne 
natures or effect, but are made vertues or vices, by the loue or hate that is borne to 
the committer’.
1078
 It is not the actions of Richard, but rather the ‘vanitie of these 
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Croniclers’ which is to be blamed.
1079
 Historians have warped the truth of the 
events, as ‘their malice [is] greater then either their truth, or their iudgement’, and 
Cornwallis concludes (with more than a hint of sarcasm) that nevertheless ‘they are 
Historians, and must be beleeued’.
1080
 Histories cannot be used as credible sources 
for counsel, as they are just as susceptible to the paradiastolic practices of 
rhetoricians as any other source.  
 
II. Observation and Travel 
If the examples of the past cannot be trusted, from where ought counsel to be 
drawn? Certainly Malvezzi points us in the right direction – observation of present 
events is best, whether this comes from eyewitnesses or collected accounts. The 
clearest answer, however, is provided by Botero himself, although not in the 
Ragione di Stato. The Ragione had no contemporary English print translation; 
however, Botero’s widely read Relationi universali was translated by the essayist 
Robert Johnson in 1601, going through six editions in the years from 1601 to 1616, 
followed by a further edition in 1630.
1081
 Johnson took great liberty with Botero’s 
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 Shackleton 1948, p. 405: 
(1) 1601 The Travellers Breviat, or an Historical Description of the most 
famous Kingdoms in the World. Pp. 180. Dedication signed ‘Robert Iohnson’.  
(2) 1601 The Worlde, or an Historical Description of the most famous 
Kingdoms and Commonweales therein. Pp. 222. Dedication signed ‘I.R.’ 
(3) 1603 Historical Description of the most famous Kingdoms and 
Commonweales in the Worlde. Pp. 268. Dedication signed ‘I.R.’  
(4) 1608 Relations of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales.... Pp. 
330. Dedication signed ‘R.I.’  
(5) 1611 Relations of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales.... 
[same title as 1608] Pp. 437. Dedication signed ‘Rob. Ihonson’.  
(6) 1616 Relations of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales.... Pp. 
437. Dedication signed ‘Rob. Iohson’.  
One can see how Johnson consistently built upon his original text – beginning with 
a tract of 180 pages, to one of 437 pages in its final formulation. Notably, Johnson 
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text and each edition was different, as he constantly amended and added to the 
work, keeping it up-to-date with the changing times.
1082
  
 Johnson’s first edition, The Travellers Breviat, OR An historicall 
description of the most famous kingdoms in the World, directly translates Botero’s 
survey of the most powerful nations of the world from the Relationi. It is ‘a generall 
description of the World’, and little else. In the same year, however, Johnson also 
published an extended edition of the text, The Worlde, adding the details of 
countries not included in the first. This version also contained a new introductory 
section taken from Botero’s Relationi: ‘Of the World, and the greatest Princes 
therein’, which explains to the reader that it is not enough to know ‘those 
occurances which daily passe in the world’ – as was contained in the first edition – 
but in order to deserve ‘the commendation of wit and iudgement’ one must be able 
to determine ‘the true reasons, whereby one kingdome or state becommeth greater 
than other’.
1083
 Both Botero and Johnson understood that the Relationi contained 
the source material necessary for determining reason of state, which is why Johnson 
felt it had to be kept up-to-date. 
 The 1611 and 1616 editions most clearly outline how the knowledge 
contained in the Relationi was to inform reason of state, replacing both moral 
philosophy and the reliance on histories. In 1611 Johnson added a section, ‘Of 
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edition of the text – Relations of the most famous kingdomes and common-wealths 
thorowout the world discoursing of their situations, religions, languages, manners, 
customes, strengths, greatnesse, and policies – are not identified, but it was 
certainly not Johnson. See Fitzmaurice 2007, pp. 791-5 for the few details known 
about Johnson’s life, especially his involvement with the Virginia and Bermuda 
Companies.  
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Observation’, which opens the first book of the text. Here, he makes clear the 
subject matter of the work, and its relationship to the overall purpose:  
Being to relate of the Customes, Manners, and Potencies of Nations 
and great Princes; my Scope shall neyther be, to trouble your 
Readings with such obsolete Authors, as are to be accounted verie 
ancient (for of these Themes they were ignorant, by reason of 
indiscouerie:) Neyther will I wholly refer you to Histories, because 
their Caueats being infinite; some are growne out of vse, some are 
temporarie, some opposite, and others mutable; eyther of themselues, 





With this, Johnson rejects outright the two sources of counsel we encountered in 
Parts I and II: classical philosophy and history. Instead, he wishes ‘to lay downe 
some few obseruations’ in order to make clear ‘the reasons, which giue occasions to 
one Prince to excell another’.
1085
   
 Such observation is of two kinds, Johnson suggests. The first is ‘stable and 
are never changed’, describing the character and behaviour of men according to 
their climate and place on the globe.
1086
 For this he borrows not from Botero, but 
from Jean Bodin. In his Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (which had 
no contemporary English translation), Bodin establishes that there is good reason to 
‘impugn history, or to withhold agreement’ for ‘those who ought to have had the 
highest standards’ have not always ‘had regard for truth and trustworthiness’ and so 
we find ‘disagreement among historians’ and even that they ‘contradict 
themselves’.
1087
 To determine which histories are to be trusted, and how best to 
interpret them, Bodin seeks to ‘make some generalizations as to the nature of all 
peoples or at least of the better known, so that we can test the truth of histories by 
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 These generalisations cannot be learned from classical or 
historical sources, for on this ‘the ancients could write nothing’ and so they were 
forced to judge ‘by inferences of probability’, rather than fact.
1089
 
 Johnson repeats these ideas in his Essaies, or rather Imperfect offers, first 
published in 1601, with further editions in 1607 and 1613. In his seventh essay, ‘Of 
Hystories’, he first commends the profit of reading history, and especially those of 
a Tacitean nature, for they contain ‘most necessarie thinges, that can be warned 
vs’.
1090
 However, like Bodin and later Malvezzi, he also cautions regarding the 
application of history, for such knowledge ‘only enformes a likelyhoode’ and so to 
‘gouerne our counselles by it’ requires ‘a concurrance of the same reasons, not 
onelie in generall, but also in particularities’.
1091
 Thus the use of history is 
dependent on observation, for ‘In making iudgement of Historie, and consideratelie 
applying it to our present interestes, wee must speciallie regard the dispositions of 
the agentes, and diligentlie remarke how they are affected in minde’.
1092
 
 The ‘seco[n]d branch of Obseruation’ given in Johnson’s translation of the 
Relationi is not constant like the first, but is just as important in determining action, 
especially political action.
1093
 This is the knowledge of ‘the greatest Princes and 
Potentates, which at this day sway the world’, the section taken from Botero which 
Johnson had included since the second edition in 1601.
1094
 The key to achieving 
this knowledge is given by Johnson in the seventh, and final, added chapter to Of 
Obseruation: ‘Of Trauell’. Here, Johnson once again discredits the use of ancient 
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knowledge, replacing it with first-hand observation of other states. As tradition is 
‘A Sandy foundation either in matter of Science, or Conscience’, there is ‘nothing 
fitter’ than travel for ‘the bettering of our vnderstanding’, both by ‘hauing a 
conference with the wiser sort in all sorts of learning, as by the Eie-sight of those 
things, which otherwise a man cannot attain vnto but by Tradition’.
1095
 Rather than 
Botero or Bodin, Johnson is here quoting from Robert Dallington’s Method for 
Trauell of 1605, in which he notes that, for any traveller, ‘the end of his Trauell is 
his ripening in knowledge; and the end of his knowledge is the seruice of his 
countrie’ which is ‘done by Preseruation of himself and Obseruation of what he 
heares and sees in his trauelling’.
1096
 Once again these ideas are also evident in 
Johnson’s essays, which include a section ‘Of Trauell’, in which he sets out that 
‘this obseruation’ gleaned from travel is ‘most powerfull to inspire vs with ciuill 
wisedome, and inable our iudgement for any actiue employment’.
1097
  
 The connection between the knowledge gained by travel and ‘ciuill 
wisedome’ is brought out most clearly by the editors of the 1630 version of the text. 
Not making any distinction between Botero’s work and that amended from Bodin 
and Dallington or written by Johnson himself, the editors write that ‘Our Author 
deserves rather to bee numbred among the Politicians, than amongst the Historians 
or Geographers’.
1098
 They expand upon Johnson’s argument in ‘Of Obseruation’, 
noting that the ‘Observations, Rules, and Caveats’ of ‘obsolete Authors’ are 
‘nothing so certaine as ours of these lightsomer times’ and were ‘neither so pleasant 
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nor so useful as these more assured & more moderne Relations’.
1099
 The constant 
flux of political affairs has made past knowledge redundant, for ‘Time and the 
Warres have altered much since Aristotle and Ptolomies dayes; whose Rules and 
Observations have since growne partly out of use; and beene partly bettered’.
1100
 
Although ‘tis true’ that knowledge alone cannot advance a state, ‘yet... by 
observing of some naturall and casuall advantages’ – the two types of observation 
laid out by Johnson – one can learn to ‘make a small towne to become a great Citie, 




Johnson’s suggestions regarding the importance of travel for political counsel were 
certainly not isolated, but rather reflected a larger shift in the discourse at the turn 
of the century.
1102
 Although the making and recording of pilgrimages had been 
popular since the middle ages, travel in a ‘secular spirit’ becomes widespread 
towards the middle of the sixteenth century, with the first ‘travel reports’ available 
from the Elizabethan period onward.
1103
 Although classified in the genus of 
historia, travel writing marked a divergence from histories based on its relation of 
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 Travellers acted as the ‘eyes’ of the prince, informing him 
better than any other kind of counsellor – living or dead.
1105
 
 The idea that counsel could be gleaned from the writings of travellers is 
articulated as early as 1578 by William Bourne’s Treasure for traueilers. Although 
primarily a text describing the instruments of navigation, the mathematician Bourne 
also outlines for his readers the purpose of travel. As ‘euery gentleman’ ought to 
‘defend the common weale, or els to profyt it some otherway... as well in their 
counsel, and also in their acts and deeds’, so travellers are ‘very necessary members 
in the common weale’ for they are able ‘to geue iudgement by his owne Countrie of 
other’ – to compare the elements of the state in much the way that Botero’s 
Relationi does.
1106
 Such knowledge is ‘very necessarie to bee knowne vnto to 




Thomas Palmer’s Essay of the meanes how to make our trauailes, into 
forraine countries, the more profitable and honourable of 1606, an imitation of 
Theodor Zwinger’s Methodus apodemica of 1577, repeats this sentiment in the 
address to the reader. He tells his audience that ‘of all voluntarie Commendable 
actions that of trauailing into forraine States... is the most behoueable & to be 
regarded in this Common-weale’.
1108
 Palmer, a courtier and member of the king’s 
privy chamber, dedicates his work to the young Prince Henry, who despite having a 
great interest in the affairs of other countries, was limited by his station and unable 
to travel, thus relying on others to bring him the information essential to his training 
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 Palmer seeks to demonstrate to him ‘the means how to make the 
trauailes of other men... somewhat more profitable and honorable’ to him.
1110
  
In the second part of the essay, which details ‘what is meete’ for these 
purposes ‘in the interim of trauaile’, Palmer relates that the ‘sixt and last generall 
duetie which is the very point which euery Trauailer ought to lay his witts about’ is 
‘To get knowledge for the bettering of himselfe and his Countrie’.
1111
 Such 
knowledge is ‘the meanes whereon all policie is grownded’ and the ‘vtensils, and 
materialls of States men’.
1112
 The acquisition of this wisdom marks the difference 
between ‘the home States man... & the compleate Trauailer’ for the former ‘is fed 
by aduertisements only, and is ledde by other mens eyes’.
1113
 Drawing on the 
critique of philosophy we have already seen, Palmer suggests that such a difference 
is like that between the soldier, who has real experience, and the theorist, ‘whose 
booke rules, in accidentall things, faile many times as in particular motions’.
1114
 




The idea that the traveller serves as the ‘eyes’ of the prince is fully 
articulated by the early decades of the seventeenth century. For instance, in 
speaking of the famous traveller and diplomat Robert Shirley in the 1625 edition of 
his popular Pilgrims, Samuel Purchas, a clergyman and member of the Virginia 
company, notes that Shirley sees with ‘Eyes more then of a Traueller’, for he was 
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‘Himselfe... the Eyes of a mightie Monarch, which in his person visited so many 
Countries, Cities, and Courts’.
1116
 Although Purchas had dedicated his original 
1613 edition to the Archbishop of Canterbury, emphasising the religious lessons 
that could be taken from his work, this 1625 edition was dedicated to Prince 
Charles, and Purchas, like Botero, is more interested in highlighting ‘Things 
humane’ such as the ‘various Nations, Persons, Shapes, Colours, Habits, Rites, 
Religions, Complexions, Conditions, Politike and Oeconomike Customes... and 
other remarkeable Varieties of Men and humane Affaires’.
1117
 In so doing, he is 
keen to emphasise that he has framed his work ‘by a New way of Eye-euidence’ 
and thus he has set out his compilation ‘more amply and cetainly [sic] then any 
Collector euer hath done’.
1118
 He elevates eye-witness reports above both history 
and philosophy, noting that the travellers’ accounts which his volume contains are 
set out ‘not by one preferring Methodically to deliver the Historie of Nature 
according to rules of Art, nor Philosophically to discusse and dispute; but as in way 
of Discourse, by each Traveller relating what is the kind he hath seen’.
1119
 
It is worth noting that travellers were not universally acknowledged to be 
good sources of advice, either because of their potential for falsity or because of the 
corrupted morals they may have picked up along the way. William Parry, who had 
accompanied Robert Shirley’s brother Anthony on his travels, notes in his 1601 
edition of The trauels of Anthony Sherley, that the idea that ‘Trauellers may lie by 
authority’ had already become ‘prouerbiall speech’ by the turn of the century, and 
so he makes clear that he gives the ‘true relation of what mine eies saw... contenting 
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my selfe with the conscience of the truth’.
1120
 Although some ‘entiteling themselues 
Trauellers’ do indeed ‘take authoritie to vtter lies in England’, there is no question 
that ‘many honest and true Trauellers, speaking the truth... are concluded liers for 
their labour’.
1121
 Parry uses the allegory of the cave to explain away accusations of 
falsity, for ‘how could a man, from his birth confined in a dungeon or lightlesse 
Caue, be brought to conceiue, or beleeue the glorie and great magnificence of the 
visible, celestiall, and terrestriall globes’?
1122
 Robert Devereux repeats the same 
metaphor in the preface to his Profitable instructions describing what speciall 
obseruations are to be taken by trauellers of 1633. Arguing against those who have 
‘lately maintained... That the best travailing is in maps and good Authors’, he 
suggests that such a view is a ‘pleasing opinion for solitary prisoners, who may thus 
travell ouer the world, though confined to a dungeon’.
1123
 This ‘sedentary 
Traueller’ only passes for a wise man if he ‘converseth either with dead men by 
reading; or by writing, with men absent’, but as soon as he must ‘enter on the stage 
of publike imployment’ it becomes clear that he is ‘vnfit for Action’.
1124
 Just as the 
philosopher had been the ideal figure to provide political counsel for the orthodox 
humanists in the light of his knowledge of moral philosophy, so now does the 
traveller take his place on the political stage because of his better understanding of 
world affairs. 
Devereux’s ‘sedentary Traueller’ is ‘innocent’, for he has escaped the 
‘corruptions’ that are risked by travel, ‘but withall is Ignorant’ of the knowledge 
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 The traveller and writer Fynes Moryson had made this 
trade-off between innocence and experience clear in his Itinerary of 1617, 
emphasising that it had more to do with the original condition of the traveller than 
the influence of travel itself, for ‘if an Asse at Rome doe soiourne, An Asse he shall 
from thence returne’.
1126
 Nevertheless, for Moryson, such an ass is still better 
advanced than those ‘graue Vniuersity men’ who are ‘sharpe sighted in the 
Schooles’ and yet are ‘often reputed idiots in the practice of worldly affaires’.
1127
 
Those who ‘discourage the affects of these great rewards’ to be gained from travel 
‘are not vnlike the Sophisters, who perswade that blindnesse, deafenesse, and the 
priuations of other senses, are not to be numbred among euils, because we see many 
vnpleasing things, often heare that which offendeth the eares, and for one good 
smell draw in twenty ill sauors’.
1128
 It is such opinions, Moryson suggests, that has 
led to travellers being denied their rightful place as informants to ‘Counsellours of 
States, and Peeres of Realmes’, who instead ‘desire to haue dull and slothful 
companions, then those that are wise and ambitious’.
1129
 Thus he intends to ‘write 
especially in this place to the Humanist’, meaning ‘him that affects the knowledge 
of State affaires, Histories, Cosmography and the like’.
1130
 
These themes are brought together in the popular Coryat’s Crudities, first 
published in 1611.
1131
 Dedicated to Prince Henry, the prince sponsored the book, 
and his copy is still extant in the British Library. Thomas Coryate, a traveller and 
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unofficial jester in the prince’s court, writes in his address that he was encouraged 
‘to present these my silly Obseruations’ by the hope that they would spur ‘many 
noble and generose yong Gallants’ of Henry’s court ‘to trauell into forraine 
countries’, enriching themselves ‘partly with the obseruations, and partly with the 
languages’ of the regions that they visit, ‘seeing thereby they will be made fit to doe 
your Highnesse and their Country the better seruice’.
1132
 Coryate uses the important 
vocabulary of observation throughout this dedication, playing on its relation to the 
language of travel in his sign-off: ‘By him that trauelleth no lesse in all humble and 
dutifull obseruance to your HIGHNESSE then he did to Venice and the parts 




Before relating his travels to Henry, Coryate includes an oration from the 
German philosopher Hermann Kirchner, ‘That young men ought to Trauell’, in 
which Kirchner argues that ‘there can be no nearer way to the attayning of true 
wisedome and all experience of a ciuill life, no speedier way to aspire to the 
gouernement of a Commonweale... then trauell’.
1134
 Knowledge cannot be gleaned 
from the ‘mute sounds of books’, but rather ‘we must go unto those learned men, 
know & search for many things, and gather many things by our eye and sight’.
1135
 
Kirchner suggests that all sciences, especially history, are predicated on such 
observation, declaring:  
For good God, what Historiographer can you exemplify vnto me, of 
what credite, knowledge, or experience soeuer he was, that hath not 
for the most part beene personally present at those matters, which hee 
hath thought good to commit... that hath not with his owne eyes seene 
those places whereof he maketh a description to others, that hath not 
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The knowledge gleaned from travel ‘doth impart farre greater benefits to Common-
weales’ than simply to the traveller himself.
1137
 There is no one more suited to be 
‘aduanced to the sterne of a Common weale’ then such a traveller.
1138
 Kirchner 
goes as far as to combine this figure with that of Plato’s philosopher-king, asserting 
that ‘surely this is the man whom Plato doth call a Philosopher, who before hee 
came to the administration of the Common-weale, disputed not at home in his 
halfe-mooned chaire... but, which by trauersing the Common-weales of many 
Nations, hath searched out all the wayes and meanes that pertaine to a ciuill life, 
and the gouerning of a humane society’.
1139
 Combining this with the language of 
reason of state, Kirchner suggests that it is such a one who will know ‘what doth 
weaken, disipate and ouerthrow a Kingdome, and what again doth strengthen, 
establish & preserue it’.
1140
 ‘O happy that Common-weale’, he declares, ‘which 
hath from aboue gotten some such ruler’.
1141
 However, in those kingdoms where 
God has not been so kind to institute this travelling-philosopher as king, then this 
figure ought to be the counsellor, as ‘what other Counsellor can a Prince chuse 
himselfe [?]... For this Counsellor is like that opticke Glasse, wherein not onely the 
space of three or tenne miles, but also of a whole Prouince, yea and of the whole 
world it selfe may be represented’.
1142
  
 But what observations ought this traveller-counsellor to impart? Palmer’s 
1606 work makes clear that ‘the publike and reuealed gouernment’ – such as the 
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details of states contained in Botero’s Relationi – is the knowledge which 
‘properly’ belongs to the traveller.
1143
 That being said, it remains a ‘point of 
knowledge’ for the traveller to pry into the ‘Secretes of the State’ where he 
travels.
1144
 Palmer suggests that this knowledge of state secrets is ‘the singular 
point that ennobleth a Trauailer aboue the home-politician’ and forms ‘the 
foundatio[n]s of momentall policies’.
1145
 As Béthune writes, ‘euery Prince [has] the 
like interest, to know what is done with his Neighbour’, and so he must understand 




III. Most Secret Instructions 
The idea that the keeping and uncovering of secrets was one of the most important 
elements of statecraft was strongly associated with Tacitism, and had been outlined 
in Botero’s Ragione.
1147
 As Etherington’s abridged translation makes clear, ‘There 
is nothing more necessary in matter of state then Secrecy’, which is why the prince 
must have the ability to dissemble, for ‘the better to keep secret any thing is to 
learne the art of dissimulation. to seeme not to reguard, esteame or know that w
ch
 
you regard esteame and know & to do one thinge by another’.
1148
 Quoting the 
popular maxim of Louis XI, Etherington repeats that ‘the great arte of raigning [is] 
y
e
 arte of dissimulation’.
1149
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Counsellors in particular, Béthune suggests, ought ‘aboue all things’ to be 
‘required to be secret’ and so they, like princes, must know how to dissimulate.
1150
 
Santa Maria, in his Policie Vnveiled, notes too that it is to ‘Ministers, and 
Secretaries of State... [that] secrecie more properly belongs’, a fact which is clear 
even in their titles, ‘for out of that obligation which they haue to be secret, they are 
called Secretatries, and are the Archiues and Cabinets of the secrets of the King, 
and the kingdom’.
1151
 With them and their secrecy rests the security of the 
kingdom, so kings must be wary of ‘the[ir] disclosing of secrets, either out of their 
respect to such and such persons, or for their particular Interests, or out of the 
weakenesse of a slippery tongue’.
1152
 He ends with an exhortation to such persons: 
‘Let Priuie-Counsellours (I say) and Secretaries of State, bridle their tongues; If not, 
let Kings, if they can, restraine them’.
1153
 The importance of secrets of state furthers 
the Machiavellian inversion of the traditional model of counsel, with princes 
bridling and controlling their counsellors, rather than the reverse.  
 Boccalini’s satire, News-sheet from Parnassus, details how this emphasis on 
state secrets has changed not only the role of the prince and his counsellors, but of 
the people as well, for the lessons of Tacitus, intended ‘onely for the benefit of 
Princes’, have been ‘imbraced and cherished with such insatiate greedinesse, by 
priuate and meane subiects’ who ‘shew not themselues more cunning in any 
profession than of State policy’.
1154
 The publication and proliferation of Tacitus’s 
work has fundamentally altered the political environment: ‘Tacitus with the 
seditious argument of his Annals, and of his Histories, hath framed a kinde of 
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spectacles, that work most pernitious effects for Princes’, for ‘being put vpon the 
noses of silly and simple people, they so refine and sharpen their sight, as they 
make them see and prie into the most hidden and secret thoughts of others’, 
including princes.
1155
 Importantly, although the people ought not to be allowed 
these ‘spectacles’, they are to be retained by ‘Secretaries, and vnto Priuy 
Counsellors of States to Princes’ so that they might ‘facilitate vnto them the good 
and vpright gouernment of the people’.
1156
 Counsellors have the crucial role of 
manipulating both truth and falsehood in the negotiation of good government and 
reason of state.  
 The counsellor’s role in advising, and keeping, state secrets is demonstrated 
and usurped in a set of popular texts of the 1620s known as the secretissima 
instructio works. These texts purport to be missives written to the Elector Palatine, 
Frederick V, from his counsellor, advising him on his present position, possible 
actions and the probable outcomes. They open up the discourse between 
counsellors and princes in a partly-factual, partly-imagined propagandistic genre, 
drawing on the reason of state tradition to fuel the suspicions of princes and people 
in an environment of deception and dissimulation.
1157
 In so doing, both counsellor 
and prince are presented in a negative light, and the communication between them 
made all the more dubious for its secretive nature.
1158
 
There are three known texts within this genre, all anonymous: the first 
published in 1620, the second in 1622 and the third probably written in the summer 
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 Although never published in English, two of the secretissima texts – 
the first, the Secretissima instructio, and the third, the Altera secretissima instructio 
– were translated into English and circulated in manuscript form. The Altera is a 
longer, more detailed and more sophisticated text, but both follow the same basic 
outline. They begin with an appeal to the prince from the writer that he accept his 
counsel. In the Secretissima, the counsellor places himself in a position of authority 
over his prince, describing himself as the prince’s ‘most faithfull tutor’ as well as 
his ‘maistor’ who will minister to him ‘secret, but serious Councells’.
1160
 The writer 
of the Altera takes an even stronger position, demanding ‘That you will beleeue me 
I deserue, not aske’ for ‘you owe it me’.
1161
 
 The advice given is couched in the air of suspicion and dissimulation 
surrounding reason of state. As the author of the Altera writes, ‘Neuer aske’ what 
the cause of the variation and infidelity of princes might be, for it is always ‘the 
great cause, cause of causes, Reason of State’.
1162
 Frederick is not to trust any of his 
friends, who will vary allegiance based on changing circumstances, with only their 
interests to guide them. In order to counter this, both writers counsel Frederick that 
he too must adopt such stratagems and plots, or be destroyed. If ‘By force, the way 
is barred’ the author of the Altera writes, the Elector Palatine has only recourse to 
‘Prayers and Fraud... When y
e
 Lions skin is worne out, put on the Foxes case’.
1163
 
Frederick has two tools at his disposal: ‘wise Counterfeiting and dissembling; and 
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 The first he has used effectively thus far, but his credit has 
run out, and so it is ‘best to proceed w
th
 the other pollicy... I meane Celeritie’.
1165
 
Frederick must move quickly in order to act in ‘due tyme’, before circumstances 
change.  
It is worth noting that this language of occasion – drawn we shall remember 
from kairos – remains an essential part of the tradition of reason of state. Botero 
makes the knowledge of kairotic timing one of his maxims of prudence in his 
Ragione, instructing his prince to ‘Learn to recognise the critical moment 
[occasione] in war and affairs and to seize opportunities [opportunità] as they 
appear’.
1166
 He defines the kairotic moment as ‘a certain point of time [periodo di 
tempo] when a fortunate combination of circumstances [concorso di circonstanze] 
favours some piece of business, which both before and after that moment would be 
most difficult: this is opportunity, and it is of supreme importance’.
1167
 His two key 
virtues, valour and prudence, are placed under this skill of knowing occasion, for 
‘Might and cunning are of little avail if they are not aided and guided by 
opportunity’.
1168
 Botero’s last maxim, before the chapter ‘Of Secrecy’, notes that 
this knowledge of occasion must also govern counsel, as it ‘must depend largely 
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 Botero 1956, p. 46.  
1167
 Botero 1956, p. 46.  
1168
 Botero 1956, p. 46. See the translation by Etherington: ‘Study to know the 
occasion of the imprese in hand, & embrace the fitt opportunity nothing being of 
more moment. opportunity being no other thinge, saue onely a period of tyme, 
wherein there is the concourse of circumstances w
ch
 maketh the busines easie’ (Sl. 
MS fo. 12
r
) and Johnson’s translation of the Relationi: ‘opportunitie is a meeting 
and concurring of diuerse circumstances, which at one instant do make a matter 
very easie, which at another time, those circumstances being ouerslipped, it will be 
impossible, or very hard, to bring into effect’ (Botero 1601, p. 9). 
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Returning to the discussion of opportunity in the Secretissima, the 
counsellor tells Frederick that the other princes of Europe will not hesitate to seize 
occasion – ‘Doe yo
u
 thinke the Turke would refuse so faire an oportunity’ to move 
against him ‘if it were offered?’ – and so Frederick must be willing to do the 
same.
1170
 Echoing Machiavelli and other writers on occasion, the counsellor advises 
Frederick that there is ‘at this present affaire occasion w
ch
 offereth it self vnto’ him, 
and if he does not take it, it will be too late.
1171
 The same emphasis on seizing 
occasion is expressed, in much stronger terms, by the author of the Altera: ‘Nothing 
distresses me more’, he tells Frederick, ‘I am torn apart in my mind, I am shattered 
by pain at the thought that we may lose this opportunity [occasio]; if those things 
pass us fruitlessly, I shall hang myself’.
1172
 The language of kairos is once again 
presented as fundamental to the sinister urgings of a dubious counsellor-figure.   
 
Although there were only three secretissima instructio texts, similar propagandistic 
writings were prevalent in the period, so much so that Boccalini parodies the genre, 
while also partially engaging with it, in his Newsheet, describing the ‘letters 
intercepted, and taken from a Currier, dispatched by some Princes to the Lake of 
Auerno’ by which ‘the common people come to know, that the rancors and hatreds 
now raigning among diuers Nations, are occasioned and stirred vp by the artificers 
of their Princes’.
1173
 The most prolific English writer within this genre was Thomas 
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 Boccalini 1626, p. 61; see Malcolm 2007, pp. 32, 34.   
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Scott, whose anonymously published pamphlets created such a stir in England that 




 Scott was fully aware of the tradition with which he was engaging, as he 
spent the early 1620s producing a translation of selections of Boccalini’s Newsheet, 
published in 1622. He comments on both the difficulties encountered in publishing 
such tracts, and the necessity that they be circulated, in his added preface and 
postscripts. In the preface he plays the role of reluctant translator, noting that ‘the 
truest and securest precepts of Policie are those, which either are drawen from the 
prudent resolutions, or vnaduised errors of great Princes in the deliberations of their 
most important affaires’.
1175
 To publish such deliberations abroad would be to elicit 
the ‘infinite displeasure’ of the prince in question, as Scott well knew.
1176
 These 
‘Advertisements from Pernassus’ then, as they show ‘the actions, interests, true 
ends, and defects of many Princes, not very iust, coming to be censured, touched, 
discovered, and noted’ run the same risk, and so the preface-writer claims to have 
determined to ‘keepe them from the Presse’ and to ‘hide my Writings’ so that they 




 Scott counters this view in his closing letter from the ‘poste of Pernassus to 
the Reader’, providing a fictional account of how these secret deliberations were 
published.
1178
 He writes that ‘these Papers comming by chance into my hands’ he 
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had thought it ‘best to communicate them’ and ‘judged them fit for all eyes’.
1179
 
Acknowledging that he considered it may be better ‘to be silent, and keepe these 
Papers from flying abroad, for feare of having my owne wings clipt’, in the end he 
determined that he ought not to ‘be guilty of so much cowardize, as to reserve 
myself’ and ‘to conceale what God hath sent into my hands... for the generall 
information and benefit of all Christendome’.
1180
 Scott uses the News-sheet to turn 
himself into a secular martyr for his revelation of secret political counsels.
1181
 
 His most famous work is Vox Populi, or Newes from Spayne, also his first 
published pamphlet, written in Scotland and printed in London in 1620. This work 
too blends fiction and fact by presenting an imagined meeting of Spanish 
councillors, convincing enough that many readers took it as a genuine piece of 
political intelligence, prompting Scott’s flight to the Netherlands. The main figure 
of Vox Populi is the Spanish ambassador to Britain, Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, 
Count of Gondomar. Scott uses him to highlight the devious practices of the 
Spanish, specifically of its ambassadors and counsellors.
1182
  
Vox Populi offers counsel to James I by highlighting the advantages that 
Gondomar thinks Spain has against Britain. For example, Gondomar tells his fellow 
counsellors that James ‘extreamly hunts after peace’ and that the English ‘haue no 
patience to temporize and dissemble’ like the Spanish and so are less suspicious of 
the plots of the Spaniards, as well as being less likely to move against them.
1183
 
Scott repeats this distinction between the natures of the English and the Spanish in 
his sequel, The second part of Vox populi, or Gondomar appearing in the likenes of 
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; see Peltonen 1995, p. 257.  
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Matchiauell, published four years later. In this text, he draws on Bodin and Botero 
to establish that the Spanish, as they are in the south and thus ‘neere to the Sunne’, 
are ‘more crafty, politique, and religious’, whereas the English in the north, 
‘howsoeuer goodlier in person’, are ‘plaine simple’ and therefore more easily 
deceived. Scott works to make the English, and James I specifically, aware of the 
plots of which their innocence makes them ignorant.
1184
 Like the writers of the 
secretissima texts, Scott presses James towards a course of action which combines 




 Spain, in addition to being adept at dissimulation, is presented in both these 
works as a state willing at all times to ‘followe opportunity close at the heels’, for 
Gondomar’s ‘very many faithfull and fast friends in England’ are willing to move 
against the English, as soon as ‘time and occasion be offered’.
1186
 Scott brings out 
these themes of time and opportunity most clearly in his Experimental discoverie of 
Spanish practises, written in 1623, in which he argues in favour of a timely war 
against the Spanish. The text begins with an address from the publisher to the 
reader, which notes that, although the text is not yet complete, ‘because (as we say 
in the prouerb) Delayes are dangerous, specially in matters of moment’ he has 
‘presumed to publish it as it is’.
1187
 Although peace is to be preferred to war in most 
cases, ‘yet for that the time agreeing with the necessity’, Britain must go to war 
with Spain.
1188
 Spain has ‘faire opportunityes offered vnto the greatnesse of his 
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 Scott 1624b, p. 12.  
1185
 ‘Temporizing’ is often used in such works, as is the noun ‘temporizer’, and 
carries the meaning of suiting one’s actions to the time or occasion, often either to 
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 Scott 1623, p. 1. 
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desire’ and no ‘opportunitie... would he let slip for the accomplishment thereof’.
1189
 
There is ‘no people’ who can ‘readier finde the occasion, or sooner take, or resolue 
it, when it is offred’ than the Spanish.
1190
 James must emulate the Spanish and 
‘make a warre with your enemie, whilst you haue the aduantage in your hands’.
1191
 
He is ‘now of more power then any of his Predecessours’ and Spain has gone into 
decline.
1192
 Danger must be prevented ‘in a conuenient season’ for ‘opportunitie 
doth not attend upon Captaines and Councellours pleasures, but sheweth it self on a 
suddaine; and if not imbraced, passeth away without returning’.
1193
 
In a work published in the same year as the second Vox Populi, The Belgick 
souldier warre was a blessing, Scott continues to emphasise these themes, 
encouraging the English, like the Spanish, to consider the issues of time and 
opportunity, namely ‘Whether we haue sufficient occasion or no, to fall out with 
Spaine’.
1194
 Such a question is precisely the type which must be referred to ‘the 
State, or Councell of Warre’ whose role it is to ‘decide these things’.
1195
 The 
council, however, has been filled with Spanish ‘time seruers’ and ‘temporising 
parasites’, such as the papists and ‘Hispanolised English’, who stand in the way of 
Britain seizing the occasion to move against Spain.
1196
 It will not be the council 
who opposes Spanish plots in England.  
 Returning to the Vox Populi texts, here too Scott is keen to offer counsel on 
the pernicious effects of Spanish temporising practices, specifically in relation to 
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1191
 Scott 1623, p. 3.  
1192
 Scott 1623, p. 47.  
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the respective positions of James, his counsellors and parliament.
1197
 Gondomar in 
the first Vox Populi claims that ‘one of the principle services’ he has done to aid the 
Spanish cause against England is to have worked ‘such a dislike betwixt the King 
and the lower house’ that ‘the King will never indure Parliament againe’.
1198
 James 
will ‘rather suffer absolute want then receive conditionall relief from his 
subjects’.
1199
 In 1620, when Vox Populi was published, parliament had not sat since 
the eight-week ‘addled parliament’ of 1614. As Gondomar makes clear, this has put 
James in a vulnerable position, for ‘levying of subsidies and taskes have been the 
onely use princes haue made of such assemblies’.
1200
 As it is ‘unlikely there should 
ever be a Parliament’ it is ‘impossible that the Kings debts should be payed, his 
wants sufficiently repaired’ except by the marriage to Spain, which is but a ‘cover 
for much intelligence’.
1201
 This has also stopped Britain building their defences and 
furnishing their navy, weakening them against a possible attack by Spain. 
The suspension of parliament has been achieved, Gondomar suggests, by an 
English counsellor – ‘that honourable Earle and admirable Engine’ who was ‘a sure 
servant to us and the catholike cause while he lived’.
1202
 It is not just he, however, 
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 Scott 1620, sig. B, 3
r
. The obvious candidate for this ‘honorable earl’ might be 
the Earl of Buckingham (not the Duke of Buckingham until 1623), who was often 
accused of being an enemy of parliament. However, he was still alive in 1620, and 
Scott, especially in the second Vox Populi, goes to great lengths to defend him 
against the accusation of standing in opposition to parliament (although such 
protestations need not be sincere). Instead, Gondomar is most likely referring to 
Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, who had died in 1614. He secretly converted 
to Catholicism in that year with the help of Gondomar himself and openly declared 
himself an active supporter of the Spanish match. He wrote to the Spanish 
ambassador with the details of his advice to James I in regard to parliament, 
declaring that that his advice to the king against the calling of parliament was ‘in 
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who stands in the way of the remedy of parliament, for ‘there are so many about’ 
the king, ‘who blow this cole fearing their owne stakes, if a Parliament should 
inquire into their actions’.
1203
 Although there are those ‘who preserve the priviledge 
of subjects against soveraign invasion’ and who ‘call for the course of the common 
lawe’, the ‘lawe proper to their nation’, the ‘tyme servers cry the lawes down and 
cry up the prerogative’.
1204
 In doing so they ‘prey upon the subject by suites and 
exactions’ and ‘procure themselves much suspition... & hate’.
1205
 Scott paints a 
clear picture of enmity between the favourite counsellors of the king – who follow 
their own interests – and the parliament, holding up the latter as the mainstay of the 
state.  
The second Vox Populi deals even more specifically with these 
parliamentary and conciliar themes. Published in 1624, it takes place during the 
‘happy parliament’ of 1624-1625. This parliament is greatly praised by Scott, and is 
placed as the primary cause of the ‘tempestuous times’ faced by the Spanish.
1206
 In 
particular, the ‘now-present parliament’ of England has uncovered ‘in all treatises 
for the space of these two hundred yeares’ how ‘Spaine hath dealt with the English, 
fide punica’ to ‘serue her necessities for the present’.
1207
 In other words, it is the 
parliament who has fulfilled the role of discovering the secret plans and 
machinations of the Spanish, which Scott had detailed in the first Vox Populi. As a 
result, this parliament is chief of ‘the mischeifes’ facing the Spanish, for the king 
has ‘wholy referred himselfe’ to it, ‘not onely for the examination and redresse of 
                                                                                                                                        
keeping with the good of Christianity and the advantage and service of Spain’; 
quoted in Redworth ODNB online.  
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all abuses and misdemeanors at home, but for the discussing and searching into all 
plots and practices of other abroad, that may seeme any way to preiudice the quiet 
and well gouerned estate of his Kingdomes, without interposition or mediation’.
1208
 
In this way, ‘the King and people goe all on and together, with that alacrity and 
constancy, in prouiding for the good estate of the Kingdome, as the like hath no 
beene seene these nany [sic] yeeares’.
1209
 This parliament, Gondomar suspects, will 
persecute their Catholic agents, weakening their cause and intelligence in England. 
The work ends with an address ‘TO THE ILLVSTRIOVS MAGNIFIQUE AND 
GRAVE Assembly of the High Court of Parliament in England’.
1210
 Calling them 
‘the Most Honorable, Great, and Graue Senate’, Scott encourages them to view ‘as 
in a little glasse’ the ‘effect of a seauen yeares Treaty with Spaine’.
1211
 In Scott’s 
work, it is the parliament, against James’s counsellors, who ‘may plainly see’ the 
plots and practices of the devious Spanish and make steps to oppose them. 
Parliament fulfils the role which had been given to the counsellor in the reason of 
state tradition.  
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Chapter 9: Counsel and Command in the English Civil War 
Having examined developments in the discourses of counsel from the early Tudor 
period to the mid-seventeenth century, this final chapter will consider how these 
theories were employed by both sides in the debates surrounding the English Civil 
War. This conflict was largely concerned with questions about the proper location 
of sovereignty; however, underlying these claims were arguments about the nature, 
and proper source, of counsel. By looking at the debates of the civil war from the 
perspective of the discourses of counsel, two conclusions can be drawn. First, it 
becomes clear how both sides understood the importance of counsel for competing 
claims about sovereignty. Second, we see how this connection between advice and 
sovereignty – or counsel and command – leads to the devaluing of the early-modern 
discourses of counsel in the face of a modern politics of sovereignty. 
 These themes are best explored through the works of two of the most 
influential political writers of the revolutionary period: Henry Parker and Thomas 
Hobbes.
1212
 Both directly address the issues of counsel and command, Parker from 
the parliamentarian side, Hobbes as an opponent of parliament.
1213
 Both were also 
counsellors in their own right, Parker as an adviser to the people, Hobbes to the 
future Charles II.
1214
 Placing their views on counsel, politics and sovereignty in 
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 It may be going too far to say that Hobbes consistently put forward a royalist 
argument, but he was certainly not in favour of parliamentary sovereignty; see 
Fukuda 1997; Lukac de Stier 1997, pp. 51-67; Skinner 2002b, pp. 287-9; Malcolm 
2012a, pp. 13-72.  
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 For Parker’s role as a ‘public privado’ who ‘fashioned his concept of 
parliament (or more generally, government) in his own image, the image of a 
counsellor’ see Mendle 1995. Although Hobbes too wrote for a large public 
audience, especially in Leviathan (see Skinner 1996, p. 426), he also wrote for an 
audience of one: the future Charles II. Hobbes had been Charles’s tutor in the late 
1640s, although at the time was at pains to make clear that his position was to teach 
‘mathematics, not politics’ as the prince was ‘too young’ to learn Hobbes’s views 
on politics; quoted in Malcolm 2012a, p. 52. However, as Hobbes’s political 
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dialogue reflects their conscious orientation as opposing political forces in the 
1640s and early 1650s; Parker’s theory of parliamentary sovereignty was built on 




I. Parliament and Counsel 
As early as the first tract that can be plausibly attributed to him, the Divine and 
Politike Observations of 1638, Parker embraces the orthodox humanist model of 
counsel in order to demonstrate its necessity in governing a prince.
1216
 Figuring 
himself as the ‘translator’ of the piece, Parker explains to the reader that ‘great 
Princes can hardly see any thing, but in such shape as it is represented to them by 
such of their Courtiers or Councellors as they are pleased to trust’, which is why he 
has ‘adventured to translate in English the foresaid Observations’.
1217
 Observation 
                                                                                                                                        
science was rooted in a view of mathematics, as we shall see, his tuition of the 
prince cannot be wholly divorced from this view. Moreover, his objections that the 
prince was too young for political instruction were raised in 1646, when Charles 
was the sixteen-year-old Prince of Wales, but by the time Leviathan was presented 
to Charles in 1651, he was twenty-one and the proclaimed king of Scotland, as well 
as claimant to the throne of England. Thus, the suggestion (made by Malcolm 
2012a p. 55) that Hobbes ‘envisaged himself as some sort of political adviser to the 
Prince’ can be supported contextually, as well as textually, and the very formation 
of Leviathan placed in a context of counsel to Charles: ‘a rather speculative account 
may be offered of the origins of [Leviathan]... At some point during the first year of 
Hobbes’s tuition of Prince Charles, after various conversations in which the Prince 
had asked him to express his opinions about psychological and political matters, 
Hobbes conceived the idea of writing an English-language text for the Prince’s 
benefit’ (Malcolm 2012a, p. 58). For Charles’s copy of Leviathan see Hobbes 1996, 
pp. li-lvi; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 197-209. Hobbes had also written as adviser to 
Charles’s father in the early 1640s; see Malcolm 2012b, pp. 145-60. 
1215
 Mendle 1995, p. 167; see Fukuda 1997, pp. 52-3; Skinner 2002c, p. 205; 
Malcolm 2012a, p. 23. 
1216
 Mendle 1995, pp. 8-10.  
1217
 [Parker] 1638, n.p. The king’s dependence on counsel is a theme that runs 
throughout his oeuvre, repeated in his Jus Populi of 1644: ‘the Major part of Kings 
are so farre from being the best Judges, the profoundest Statesmen, the most 
excellent soldiers, that when they so value themselves they prove commonly most 
wilfull, and fatall to themselves and others; and that they ever govern best, when 
they most relye upon the abilities of other good Counsellors and Ministers’ (pp. 9-
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was, as we saw in in the previous chapter, one of the foundational concepts for the 
reason of state writers, especially in relation to the role of the counsellor, and 
Parker, later known as the ‘Observator’, draws explicitly on this tradition in his 
works.
1218
 Divine and Politike Observations also first establishes his important tri-
partite definition of parliament; parliament is the ‘honourable Court’, the 
‘representative body of the Kingdome’ as well as ‘his Majesties most faithfull and 
least corruptible counsell’, although it does not substantiate this last claim.
1219
 
It is in his later texts that Parker sets out three fundamental reasons why 
parliament is the superior source of counsel for the king. These ideas first emerge in 
Parker’s response to the 1638 ship-money test case, The case of the shipmony 
briefly discoursed, published two years after the event. Unlike other writers on the 
topic, Parker does not oppose the invocation of necessity and reason of state to 
justify the tax, but rather the king’s invocation of it.
1220
 The reason is counsel. 
Parker writes that one must accept that ‘Kings may be bad’, and it is in fact ‘more 
probable and naturall, that evill may be expected from good Princes, than good 
from bad’, and so it is that they must receive the best possible counsel.
1221
 Although 
this has been a recurrent theme, first articulated as the Aristotelian rejection of 
Plato’s philosopher-king, Parker’s suggestion that it is parliament which is the best 
source of this counsel is far more radical. He provides ‘three things wherein 
                                                                                                                                        
10). See also Parliament 1642, p. 15: ‘The Wisdome of this State hath intrusted the 
Houses of Parliament with a power to supply what shall be wanting on the part of 
the Prince’.  
1218
 See also [Parker] 1641a, p. 43: ‘Temporall Counsellors... in State affairs’ are 
‘good spectacalls’. For Parker’s commitment to the idea of ‘observation’ see 
Mendle 1995, pp. 9-10, 34. For ‘the Observator’ see Mendle 1995, pp. 2, 90. 
1219
 [Parker] 1638, p. 13. See also [Parker] 1641a, p. 52: ‘Parliaments, which are the 
grand Courts and Counsells of Kingdomes’; [Parker] 1641b: ‘the best, and highest 
of all Counsells, viz. Parliaments’; [Parker] 1643b, p. 17: parliament is ‘the 
Common Counsell of all the Land’. See Mendle 1995, pp. 9, 76.  
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 See Mendle 1995, pp. 37-8, 43-8.  
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parliaments excell all other Councells whatsoever’, which he refines and repeats in 
his later texts of 1642 – Some few observations and Observations upon some of His 
Majesties late answers and expresses.
1222
 Both texts respond to the issues 
surrounding the Militia Ordinance of 1642 and the growing sense of ‘emergency’ in 
English political culture, and both use the superiority of parliament as an advisory 
body to argue that parliament should not only step into the ‘conciliar breach’ left by 




Parker’s reasons for parliament’s superior conciliar authority, as given in 
Some few observations, are: ‘first... [that] they must in probabilitie be more 
knowing then any other privadoes; Secondly, in regard of their publike interest, 
they are more responsible then any other, and lesse to be complayned of in case of 
errour. Thirdly, they have no private interest to deprave them, nothing can square 
with the Common Councell but the common good’.
1224
 It is worth detailing the case 
Parker makes for each of these, as they bring together the argument from prudence, 
which had been running through the discourses of counsel for millennia, with the 
emerging seventeenth-century language of interest.  
 
II. Prudence and Counsel 
The first element Parker addresses in making his case is prudence, which as we 
have seen remained the quintessential virtue of the counsellor even into the 
seventeenth century. For Parker, this prudential counsel is best found in parliament. 
As he writes in Shipmony, ‘For wisedome, no advice can bee given so prudent, so 
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 [Parker] 1640, p. 35. Note once again the use of ‘observation’ in the titles of 
these texts. 
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profound, so universally comprehending, from any other author’ than 
parliament.
1225
 The prudence of parliament is so profound, he establishes in his 
Discovrse concerning Puritans a year later, that it issues ‘infallible avisoes’ which 
‘are now in all well-governed Countries, the very Oracles of all Policy, and Law’, 
and thus a prince cannot be deceived that is ruled by them.
1226
 
Parliament’s role as representative of the kingdom and the people lies at the 
foundation of its prudential abilities. It is ‘incredible’ he writes in Shipmony, that 
‘an inconsiderable number of Privadoes should see or knowe more then whole 
Kingdomes’.
1227
 Parliament is able to bring together the collective prudence of the 
kingdom as a whole, as he suggests in Some few observations: ‘[T]hat which is the 
judgement of the major part in Parliament is the judgement of the whole 
Kingdome’ and thus it ‘is more vigorous, and sacred, and unquestionable, and 
further beyond all appeal, then that which is the judgement of the King alone, 
without all Councell’ or even ‘of the King, with any other inferiour Clandestine 
Councell’.
1228
 He supports this view in Observations with reference to a popular 
classical (and, specifically, Aristotelian) metaphor: ‘I think every mans heart tels 
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parliament at any given time, however, but a collective memory and prudence, as 
Parker alludes to in writing against the Leveller John Lilburne. Lilburne’s 
‘exceeding defective, and insufficient’ knowledge and judgement ought to bow to 
the ‘Authority of so many Parliaments’ and ‘the prudence of so many ages’, as 
should all royalists ([Parker] 1650, p. 10). 
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him, that in all publique Consultations, the many eyes of so many choyce 




In marked contrast, Hobbes not only contests the suggestion that parliament will 
provide more prudent advice, but rejects the notion of prudence as the 
quintessential virtue of political counsel altogether.
1230
 His definition of prudence 
remains consistent with that of previous writers: ‘Sometime a man desires to know 
the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the event 
therefore one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions... Which 
kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence’.
1231
 It pertains to the 
connection between ends and means, and is thus ‘When the thoughts of a man, that 
has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they 
conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce unto’.
1232
 As one might 
expect, such knowledge is determined ‘by how much one man has more experience 
of things past, than another’.
1233
 
 It is here that Hobbes levels his critique. If prudence is simply learning from 
experience, it is an equal and naturally innate attribute, the differences in men 
arising only from their variable experience, not any difference in ability: ‘For 
                                                 
1229
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 11. Parker’s opponent John Spelman responds to this 
analogy by suggesting that ‘in the body natural a very few members (that is none 
but the eyes) have the sense of seeing, but all the members have the sense of 
feeling, so in Communities all have the sence of enjoying good, or suffering evill: 
but very few the faculty of discerning the cause and means of either’ (1643b, p. 19).  
1230
 Skinner 1996, p. 259-62. This is in addition to Hobbes’s contestation of 
Parker’s notion of representation, which has been treated at length by a number of 
historians, and so I will not be addressing it here; see Tuck 1993, p. 328; Skinner 
2002c, pp. 181-208; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 15-16. 
1231
 Hobbes 2012, p. 42.  
1232
 Hobbes 2012, p. 108.  
1233
 Hobbes 2012, p. 42.  
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Prudence, is but Experience, which equall time, equally bestowes on all men’.
1234
 
Furthermore, it is not a quality to be extolled, for it is not inherently rational or 
distinctively human, nor does it lead to the ‘infallible’ results Parker had attributed 
to the prudence and knowledge of parliament, for ‘though it be called Prudence, 
when the event answereth our Expectation; yet in it its nature, it is but 
Presumption’.
1235
 As he had declared in Elements of Law, written in 1640, 
‘PRUDENCE is nothing else but conjecture from experience’ and ‘Experience 
concludeth nothing universally’.
1236
 In the end, the ‘best Prophet’ is in fact only 
‘the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the 
matters he guesses at’.
1237
 
 True philosophy, Hobbes explains, is ‘the Knowledge acquired by 
Reasoning’, not by prudence.
1238
 The key to this is science, defined as ‘the 
knowledge of Consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which, 
out of what we presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or 
the like, another time’; it is how we observe ‘like causes’ in order to ‘produce the 
like effects’, and thus usurps the place of prudence in achieving the ends of our 
designs. Science involves the generation of rules which predict outcomes, and 
Hobbes’s project is to generate a moral and civil science analogous to those of 
figures (geometry) and motion (physics).
1239
 Although, as he points out, prudence is 
often synonymous with wisdom (as it is in Parker’s work), science is true wisdom, 
                                                 
1234
 Hobbes 2012, p. 188.  
1235
 Hobbes 2012, p. 44.  
1236
 Hobbes 1969, p. 16.  
1237
 Hobbes 2012, p. 44.  
1238
 Hobbes 2012, p. 1052.  
1239
 See Malcolm 2002, pp. 146-52.  
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and ‘as much Experience is Prudence, so, is much Science, Sapience’. It is the 
latter, he explains, which is ‘infallible’, whereas the former, simply ‘useful’.
1240
 
 It is clear for Hobbes, then, that science, not prudence, will provide the best 
sort of counsel – personal or political. When deliberating on an action, Hobbes 
writes, ‘the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight and the good and evill 
consequences, and sequels of the actions whereof we Deliberate’.
1241
 He who can 
best connect the ‘chain of consequences’ is most able to determine what actions are 
conducive to his appetites: ‘so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the 
greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able 
when he will, to give the best counsell unto others’.
1242
 Although presented here as 
two options, it is clear that when it comes to counsel reason once again trumps 
experience; it is ‘Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes’ which ‘disposeth, or 
rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others’.
1243
 The 
office of a counsellor is ‘when an action comes into deliberation... to make manifest 




 This is especially the case, Hobbes maintains, in politics. There is a ‘skill of 
making, and maintaining Commonwealths’, which ‘consisteth in certain Rules, as 
doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not... on Practise onely’.
1245
 Certainly, 
                                                 
1240
 Hobbes 2012, p. 76. It should be clear, that although Hobbes calls the 
conclusions drawn from science ‘infallible’, this is meant in the sense of likely 
being true, for he notes elsewhere that ‘No Discourse whatsoever, can End in 
knowledge of Fact’ (2012, p. 98) and that science is ‘conditionall Knowledge’ 
(2012, p. 100).  
1241
 Hobbes 2012, p. 94.  
1242
 Hobbes 2012, p. 94.  
1243
 Hobbes 2012, p. 156.  
1244
 Hobbes 2012, p. 406.  
1245
 Hobbes 2012, p. 322; see also Hobbes 2012, p. 546. Note that in the Latin 
edition of 1668, Hobbes uses the term ‘Scientia’ not ‘ars’ for the ‘skill’ required 
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experience plays a helpful role in counsel, but it ought to be paired with scientific 
study of the rules: ‘No man is presumed to be a good Counsellour, but in such 
Businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much meditated 
on, and considered’.
1246
 Counsel requires both experience and science, which he 
separates into two fields of requisite knowledge. Knowledge of ‘the disposition of 
Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and 
Honour’ is ‘not to be attained without study’ and thus falls under science; 
knowledge of ‘Strength, Commodities, Places... the inclinations, and designes of all 
Nations that may any way annoy them’ – which we may recognise as the content of 
Botero’s reason of state – is ‘not attained to, without much experience’.
1247
 This 
experience, he later explains, is gathered from ‘Intelligences, and Letters’ and the 
like, such as those which the secretissima literature sought to emulate.
1248
 This 
experiential knowledge in political counsel is limited, however, by scientific rule-
based knowledge: ‘all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that 
has learnt, or found out the Rule’.
1249
 It is only when ‘there is no Rule’ that he who 
‘hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best 
Judgement, and is the best Counsellour’.
1250
 Prudence is adequate until one is 
introduced to Hobbesian civil science.  
 The question becomes, what sciences ought the political counsellor to be 
versed in? As we saw, Hobbes suggested that three elements make up the 
                                                                                                                                        
(2012, p. 323). As has been well established by Skinner 1996, Hobbes also rejects 
the humanist contention that moral philosophy might provide the basis for political 
decision making; see Hobbes 1969, p.66; Hobbes 2012, pp. 1052-97.  
1246
 Hobbes 2012, p. 406.  
1247
 Hobbes 2012, p. 406.  
1248
 Hobbes 2012, p. 408. Hobbes himself translated the Altera into English, as 
Malcolm 2007 shows.  
1249
 Hobbes 2012, p. 406.  
1250
 Hobbes 2012, p. 408.  
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knowledge to be gained through science: ‘the disposition of Man-kind’, ‘the nature 
of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour’ and ‘the Rights of Government’.
1251
 If we 
look to the Ramist chart of the sciences included in Chapter 9 of Leviathan, we see 
that the ‘disposition of Man-Kind’, or the ‘Consequences from the Qualities of 
Men’, becomes divided into two further questions, the ‘Consequences from the 
Passions of Men’, which is ‘ETHIQUES’, and ‘Consequences from Speech’.
1252
 
This, in turn, becomes further subdivided into disciplines including poetry, rhetoric, 
logic and ‘The Science of JUST and UNIUST’, which also covers Hobbes’s 




 It seems clear, however, that although the counsellor ought to have 
knowledge of disciplines such as ethics and rhetoric, this is not so that he can use 
them in the communication of his counsel, as it was for the early humanists, but 
simply in predicting outcomes; they form part of the ‘disposition of Man-Kind’, not 
the skill-set of the counsellor. This is perhaps best demonstrated in his own counsel, 
intended for Charles I in late 1643 or 1644.
1254
 Here, he seeks to use knowledge of 
the situation of other states – namely the Scots and the Swedes – to predict future 
events and consequences. He combines this with an understanding of the passions 
of men – specifically the Earl of Warwick – to attempt to predict his reaction to a 
carefully crafted proposal, drawing on the earl’s reputation and the promise of 
honours and rewards to convince him to abandon the parliamentarian cause. 
Although he suggests that Warwick be subject to persuasive speech and rhetorical 
arguments, he does not use them himself in his proposal, which is devoid of 
                                                 
1251
 Hobbes 2012, p. 406. 
1252
 Hobbes 2012, p. 131; see Skinner 2002c; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 141-5. 
1253
 Hobbes 2012, p. 131.  
1254
 Presented in Malcolm 2012b, pp. 146-7 
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Regarding ‘the Rights of Government’, the final aspect of the scientific 
knowledge which the political counsellor ought to be versed in, Hobbes is quite 
clear. ‘CIVILL PHILOSOPHY’ is defined as the ‘Consequences from the 
Accidents of Politique Bodies’ and is wholly distinct from natural philosophy, 
which is ‘Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Naturall’ and includes the 
above-mentioned categories of ethics and rhetoric.
1256
 When it comes to civil 
science, there are only two parts, first ‘Consequences from the Institution of 
COMMON-WEALTHS, to the Rights, and the Duties of the Body Politique, or 
Soveraign’ and ‘Consequences from the same, to the Duty, and Right of the 
Subjects’.
1257
 Civil science is a topic dealing solely with the duties and rights of 
sovereignty and of obedience. It is, in short, a science of sovereignty, which is 
wholly contained in Leviathan.
1258
 
There is no reason, Hobbes insists, to assume that any class or group has a 
better grasp of this science of politics than any other.
1259
 ‘Good Counsell’ Hobbes 
writes, ‘comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason 
to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State’.
1260
 Nor is there 
                                                 
1255
 Malcolm 2012b, p. 157; see Skinner 1996, pp. 127-32. Compare to the 
Elizabethan letters of advice analysed in Mack 2004, pp. 176-214.  
1256
 Hobbes 2012, p. 130. In the Latin of 1668, there is no mention of the science of 
justice, and civil philosophy is included among the sciences attained by 
contemplation of the disposition of man: ‘Ex contemplatione denique Hominis & 
Facultatum ejus oriuntur Scientiae Ethica, Logica, Rhetorica, & tandem Politica 
sive Philosophia Civilis’ (2012, p. 129). 
1257
 Hobbes 2012, p. 130.  
1258
 Note that Hobbes excludes history completely from the consideration of 
philosophers, as it is ‘The Register of Knowledge of Fact’ and no part of the 
knowledge of consequences (2012, p. 124).  
1259
 See Malcolm 2012a, p. 157.  
1260
 Hobbes 2012, p. 546. 
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any reason to expect it more of parliament. As he writes following the civil war, in 
Behemoth, the lords were ‘no more skilful in the Publick affairs than the Knights 
and Burgesses’ and both houses were ‘prudent and able men as any in the Land, in 
the business of their Private Estates, which requires nothing but diligence, and a 
Natural Wit to govern them; but for the Government of a Common-wealth neither 
Wit, nor Prudence, nor Diligence is enough, without infallible Rules, and the true 
Science of Equity and Justice’.
1261
 It is not sufficient, he tells us in Leviathan, 
‘onely to be lookers on’ in politics.
1262
 Being the ‘Observator’ is not enough.  
 
III. Interests and Counsel 
Parker’s second reason for the superior counsel of parliament is its consistency with 
the interest of state: ‘in regard of their publike interest, they are more responsible 
then any other’, which must be considered in conjunction with Parker’s third factor, 
the avoidance of the taint of private interest: ‘thirdly, they have no private interest 
to deprave them, nothing can square with the common Councell but the common 
good’.
1263
 Drawing on the writings that we examined in Chapter 7, Parker makes 
clear that it is only the parliament that will be able to assess and represent the public 
interest successfully in the political arena. As he writes in The case of shipmony: 
‘the common body can effect nothing but the common good, because nothing else 
can bee commodious for them’.
1264
 By 1642, he had integrated the language of 
‘interest’ to this appraisal, as he does in Some few observations and Observations: 
the counsel of parliament is superior because of ‘the great interest the Parliament 
                                                 
1261
 Hobbes 1679, pp. 69-70.  
1262
 Hobbes 2012, p. 546.  
1263
 [Parker] 1642c, p. 5.  
1264
 [Parker] 1640, p. 36; see also [Parker] 1641a, p. 53.  
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has in common justice and tranquillity’.
1265
 Although the king too may have such 
an interest, Parker makes clear that he ‘is not so much interessed in it as 
themselves’.
1266
 Parliament, he writes, ‘does not deny the King a true-reall Interest’ 
but affirms that ‘the State hath an Interest Paramount’ above it, which is 
represented in the parliament.
1267
 He that ‘confesses, That the King hath a true and 
perfect interest in the Kingdom’ must also accept ‘That the Kingdom hath a more 
worthy and transcendent interest in it self’.
1268
 In fact, it is one of the two primary 
functions of parliaments ‘not to be attained to by other meanes’ that ‘the interest of 




 In addition, parliament accurately understands and follows the public 
interest because they, in contrast with the counsellors who surround the king, have 
no private interests to distract them from it.
1270
 Already in Divine and politike 
observations of 1638, Parker writes that ‘Courtiers or Councellors’ of princes ‘often 
have private ends or interest for disguysing truths unto them’ and he repeats the 
theme in his Discovrse three years later: ‘Individualls may have many particular 
ends, severed from the Princes or the States... and have judgement beside apt to be 
                                                 
1265
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 11.  
1266
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 13.  
1267
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 33. This is because, for Parker, parliament virtually (in the 
sense of being a portrait or a picture) represents the state, even is the state. This is 
opposed to Hobbes, who sees the sovereign as the representative of the state (not 
requiring the sense of virtual representation, but rather authorship); see Skinner 
2005, pp. 155-84.   
1268
 [Parker] 1642c, p. 9. 
1269
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 5.  
1270
 In The case of Shipmony, Parker’s third reason for the superiority of 
parliament’s counsel is not the element of private interest, but rather its 
effectiveness: ‘because the hearts of the people doe not goe along with any other, as 
with that’ (1640, p. 38), a factor which he compounds in the 1642 Some few 
observations with his second point concerning public interest.  
 293 
darkened by their owne severall interests and passions’.
1271
 By his Observations in 
1642, he can declare it ‘a maxime... grounded in Nature, and never till this 
Parliament withstood’ that ‘a community can have no private ends to mislead 
it’.
1272
 The very ‘composition of Parliaments... takes away all jealousies’ so that 
there is no vying for position or fuelling of ambition.
1273
 
Parker’s royalist opponents did not agree, and well before Hobbes penned 
Leviathan, strong objections were being raised to Parker’s view of interest. A 
critique of Parker’s argument for parliament’s superior understanding of the state’s 
interest can be found in an anonymous response to Parker’s Observations, entitled 
Certain Materiall Considerations, published in 1642. The author notes that ‘The 
King and Subjects are mutuall’ and so the king’s interest is equal to his subjects’, 
and stronger than any individual’s interest in the state: ‘his interest in them is of an 
higher Alloy, and more noble’.
1274
 
Nor did Parker’s opponents accept the idea that private interest plays no part 
in parliamentary assemblies. John Spelman, writing against Parker in 1643, 
concedes ‘That Communities are lesse subject to private ends and affections then 
particular men are’ but suggests that ‘it is also true, that they are not absolutely free 
from them, and when they fall into them, they are more fatally violent and 
dangerous’.
1275
 James Maxwell’s lengthy response to Parker of 1644 – Sancro-
sancta regum majestas – goes even further than Spelman’s in challenging the 
contention that parliament is free from private interest, and comes close to 
                                                 
1271
 [Parker] 1638, n.p.; [Parker] 1641, p. 53.  
1272
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 22.  
1273
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 23.  
1274
 Certain Materiall Considerations 1642, p. 11. 
1275
 [Spelman] 1643b, p. 18; see Mendle 1995, pp. 105-7.  
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Hobbes’s own analysis of the outbreak of the Civil War.
1276
 He notes how ‘subtle 
factious Spirits have great Advantages to work on the People and their weak 
Understandings’ and so ‘from those Inconveniences of Government’ which 
aggravate the people, they ‘take occasion to press upon the weake sort (which is 
most numerous) the present Inconveniences, shew them their Interest’ and incite 
them to rebellion.
1277
 These ‘Achitophels, Absaloms, and Sheba’s’ – popular 
allusions to corrupt counsellors – blur the line between public and private interest in 
order ‘to bring this happy Change about’.
1278
 This can be accomplished because 
‘Communities [are] subject to dangerous inclinations from private Incitements’ and 
‘Representatives [are] subject to mis-leading Factions, and ambitions of private 
ends’.
1279
 Thus it is that ‘Communities, or their Representative bodies, are... 
molested or transported with corrupt judgments and affections for private ends’.
1280
 
It is the counsellors to the people who are to blame as they ‘have a mighty Zeal and 
Care of their own Honour and Wealth’ and intend all their persuasions ‘for 




Hobbes’s view of the political landscape is much like the one provided by writers 
such as Maxwell. For Hobbes, it is not the counsel of the individual which bears the 
taint of private interest, but rather that of the multitude. Before moving on to the 
complete statement of these ideas in Leviathan, it is worth taking a moment to 
notice their generation in some of Hobbes’s earlier works. For instance, in some of 
                                                 
1276
 Mendle 1995, pp. 123-6. 
1277
 Maxwell 1689 [1644], pp. 241-2.  
1278
 Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 242.  
1279
 Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 246. I have changed this passage from a series of 
rhetorical questions to positive statements for sake of clarity.  
1280
 Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 246.  
1281
 Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 289. 
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the earliest essays attributed to him, contained in the 1620 Horae Subseciuae 
compiled by his student William Cavendish, Hobbes addresses the complex 
relationship between public and private interests in public figures.
1282
 In ‘A 
Discovrse vpon the Beginning of Tacitvs’, Hobbes notes that ‘Companions in such 
[public] affairs can seldom be content, that all counsels, nay almost that any, should 
tend to the other’s profit, so constant is every man to his own ends’.
1283
 In his 
‘Discovrse of Rome’, his contribution to the genre of travel writing, he notes that 
‘To prepare a man fit for both [action and counsel], nothing so much prevailes, as a 
hard and weary life, such an agitation will not permit idlenesse, nor the minde to 
settle too much vpon priuate ends, which being so, could neuer be aptly applyed for 
Publique’.
1284
 This difficult lifestyle is essential, he suggests, because a man ‘can 
neuer haue sufficiency, nor will to preuaile for the publique, once being confined to 
his own particular interest, and looking no further’.
1285
 
 For these reasons, even in these early works, Hobbes prescribes a 
monarchical, rather than an assembly-based political system. This is perhaps 
clearest in his ‘Of the Life and History of Thucydides’, which accompanied his 
1629 translation of The Peloponnesian War. He suggests that ‘[Thucydides] least of 
all liked the Democracy’, providing the same reasons that would later appear in 
Leviathan, most notably ‘the emulation and contention of the Demagogues... the 
                                                 
1282
 See Skinner 1996, pp. 254-5; Skinner 2002c, pp. 46, 55, 62; Hobbes 2005, pp. 
3-22. 
1283
 [Hobbes] 1620, pp. 253-4; Skinner 2002c, p. 62 notes that this essay falls into 
the humanist category of the genus deliberativum, offering advice ‘about how 
political leaders should conduct themselves if they wish to obtain honour and 
advantage’. 
1284
 [Hobbes] 1620, p. 335.  
1285
 [Hobbes] 1620, p. 336; emphasis added. Hobbes, like many of the travel writers 
of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries emphasises the direct nature of 
the knowledge he communicates, noting that he does not ‘goe beyond mine owne 
knowledge’ and only ‘set[s] downe my obseruations’ (1620, p. 329-30). 
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inconstancy of Resolutions, caused by the diuersity of ends, and power of Rhetoric 
in the Orators’.
1286
 This theme is also presented in the frontispiece to the work, 
which contrasts a council-scene of ‘ὀi aristoi’ with a scene of demagoguery in ‘ὀi 
polloi’ (Figure 19).  
 The same systems are juxtaposed, using the language of interests, in 
Leviathan’s ‘Comparison of Monarchy, with Soveraign Assemblies’. Hobbes notes 
that ‘whosoeuer beareth the Person of the people, or is one of the Assembly that 
bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person’ and although he ‘be carefull in his 
politique Person to procure the common interest’ he cannot help but also ‘to 
procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends’.
1287
 When, 
inevitably, ‘the publique interest chance to crosse the private’ Hobbes suggests that 
such a person ‘preferrs the private’, as ‘the Passions of men, are commonly more 
potent than their Reason’.
1288
 Regarding sovereign power, ‘in Monarchy, the 
private interest is the same with the publique’ and so the monarch’s preference for 
private interest will not have the same disastrous consequences.
1289
 
 But what about counsel? Hobbes, in dealing with the ‘Differences of fit and 
unfit Counsellours’, begins by reiterating the importance of experience and science 
in counsel: ‘to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the 
place of Memory and Mentall Discourse’.
1290
 However, ‘with this resemblance... 
                                                 
1286




. In Leviathan, Hobbes gives six reasons for the 
superiority of monarchy: (1) the ‘common interest’, (2) the quality and secrecy of 
the counsel, (3) (in)constancy of resolution, (4) (dis)agreement, (5) favourites and 
flatterers and (6) usurpation (by regents) (2012, pp. 289-94). All but the issue of 
secrecy appears in this passage of his introduction to The Peloponnesian War.  
1287
 Hobbes 2012, p. 289.  
1288
 Hobbes 2012, p. 289.  
1289
 Hobbes 2012, p. 289.  
1290
 Hobbes 2012, p. 404.  
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there is one dissimiltude joyned, of great importance’.
1291
 Whereas for a man, ‘the 
naturall objects of sense... work upon him without passion, or interest of their own’, 
the same cannot be said of counsellors, who ‘may have, and often have, their 
particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and 
many times unfaithfull’.
1292
 It is based on this that Hobbes sets down ‘for the first 
condition of a good Counsellour, That his Ends, and Interest, be not inconsistent 
with the Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth’.
1293
  
 In order to ensure that private interest is not interfering with the public, 
Hobbes gives a prescription completely at odds with that of Parker: ‘a man is better 
Counselled by hearing [counsellors] apart, then in an Assembly’.
1294
 He provides a 
number of reasons for this argument, the most important being that in an assembly 
the voice of one will soon drown out or determine all other voices, and this single 
voice will almost always be that of one whose interests are not aligned with the 
public: ‘in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests 
are contrary to that of the Publique, and these their Interest make Passionate, and 
Passion Eloquent, and Eloquence draws others into the same advice’.
1295
 Because 
interests are associated with the passions, and the passions drive eloquence, the 
most eloquent and persuasive will be the speaker with the most private interest.
1296
 
It is better, Hobbes suggests, to have no counsel at all, than to take the advice of a 
                                                 
1291
 Hobbes 2012, p. 404.  
1292
 Hobbes 2012, p. 404.  
1293
 Hobbes 2012, p. 404; see also Hobbes 2012, p. 546. The Latin edition of 1668 
is more concerned with a specifically political application than the English, for in 
place of ‘and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many 
times unfaithfull’ the Latin reads ‘nec semper cum scopo Civitatis congruentem’ 
and where it reads ‘Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth’ the Latin gives: 
‘Finibus & Bono publico’ (2012, pp. 404, 405).  
1294
 Hobbes 2012, p. 408; Latin: ‘Monarchae cui Consiliarii sunt, audire illos satiùs 
est seorsim unumquemque’ (2012, p. 409).  
1295
 Hobbes 2012, p. 408. 
1296




 Countering the Aristotelian metaphor employed by 
Parker, Hobbes admits that ‘although it be true, that many eys see more than one; 
yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours’, for ‘many eyes see the same 




IV. Crisis, Counsel and Command 
One of the most important elements in the discussion of counsel in the civil war 
period is the sense of crisis which pervades it. We have seen how the language of 
occasion – drawn from the idea of a kairotic period of time outside the usual 
prescriptions of chronological time – developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries into a potentially dangerous tool for overriding traditional views of 
authority and morality, inseparable from the role of the counsellor. Another layer is 
added to this connection by the recognition on the part of Parker and Hobbes, 
among others, that there are those within the public sphere who are not counselling 
in the way that they ought, with pernicious effects. This results in a situation of 
crisis for both writers, whereby it is clear that sovereign authority must be gathered 
into a single source divorced from such privately interested counsel. In so doing, 
these writers turn a crisis of counsel into an argument about the location and 
mechanisms of sovereignty, devaluing the place of counsel in the political realm. 
For Parker, the crisis exists in the tension and antagonism between a 
parliament which holds the public interest and the ‘Court-flatters and time-serving 
                                                 
1297
 Here Hobbes uncharacteristically employs a simile – comparing the relationship 
of counselled and counsellor to firsts and seconds in a tennis match. Not only does 
Hobbes retain this analogy in the Latin edition, but he includes ‘concilium 
comparatum ludo pilae’ in his index; Hobbes 2012, pp. 410, 412, 1253. 
1298
 Hobbes 2012, p. 412. Hobbes thus brings the emerging science of optics, and 
specifically perspective and lines of sight, to bear on his consideration of counsel 
and politics; see Clark 2007.  
 299 
Projectors’ who would like nothing more than to do away with the counsel of 
parliament altogether.
1299
 This is a natural antagonism, Parker suggests in Some few 
observations; parliament is ‘odious to Court parasites’ and their machinations, and 
so it is ‘no wonder that the Kings Favorites and Followers hate Parliaments’.
1300
 
These figures work against parliament, and thereby against the true interests of the 
state, by ‘perswading [the king] first to withdraw himself from his parliament, and 
then to call away the Members of both Houses’.
1301
 
 More concerning than this is these counsellors’ use of the logic of reason of 
state and necessity. As we have seen, Parker accepts ‘That the King ought to have 
aid of his subjects in time of danger, and common aid in case of common danger’ 
as being ‘laid down for a ground, and agreed upon by all sides’.
1302
 Such 
emergency powers are not limited by the ordinary concerns of either utile or 
honestum; they are given ‘out of necessity, not honour or benefit’ and are essential 
to the proper functioning and survival of the commonwealth.
1303
 The issue for 
Parker is the ability to recognise and declare such crises, for kings, due to ‘ill 
counsell’, may ‘pretend danger causlesly’ in order to do away with the legal 
                                                 
1299
 [Parker] 1641a, pp. 58-9.  
1300
 [Parker] 1642c, pp. 10, 14. We can see here Parker’s debt to Thomas Scott. 
1301
 [Parker] 1643c, p. 5. The antagonism between parliamentary counsel and that 
of the privy councillors is recognised even by Parker’s opponents, who see the 
latter as protecting the king against the power of parliament. For instance John 
Spelman, writing in 1643, suggests that the law ‘allowed unto the King the power 
to sweare unto himself a Bodie of Counsell of State... faithfully to advise him in his 
Government, that he may neither do nor receive wrong, especially not in 
Parliament’ (1643a, p. 12). Spelman notes that the ‘providence of the Law’ has 
provided the king with the ability to ‘at His owne discretion sweare unto Himselfe a 
body of Councell to advise Him’, otherwise the king ‘should be left all alone to 
advise and dispute His Right against all the wisedome and sollicitation of the 
numerous body of the Subject’ (1643b, p. 10).  
1302
 [Parker] 1640, p. 2. For the connection between the ship-money debates and the 
languages of necessity and reason of state see Mendle 1995, p. 43; Baldwin 2004, 
p. 638. 
1303
 [Parker] 1640, p. 12. 
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constraints on their power, constraints in place to protect the people from the 
‘jealousies’ of precisely these ‘flatterers’ about the king.
1304
 Parker suggests that 
this is the case with regard to ship-money and demands that, in addition to the 
reversal of the judgement, ‘some dishonourable penalty may bee imposed upon 
those Iudges which ill advised the King herein’.
1305
 
 Parker had alluded to this removal of ill counsel in the epigraph of Divine 
and politike observations: ‘Take away the wicked from before the King, and his 
Throne shall be established in Righteousnesse’, and it formed one of the 
fundamental demands of the parliamentarians in the early 1640s, as well as 
underlying the justification of the Militia Ordinance in 1642.
1306
 The argument that 
parliament ought to take up arms to remove the king’s counsellors, however, broke 
through the fundamental barrier between counsel and command, and many 
recognised it. As Parker records in Observations in 1642, the king’s response to 
parliament was to reiterate this fundamental distinction: ‘the Lords and Commons... 
Commission and trust... is to be Counsellors, not commanders’.
1307
 
 Parker agrees that the maintenance of the boundary between sovereignty 
and counsel is indeed the ‘ordinary course’ in English politics, and he reinforces 
this traditional distinction in reference to spiritual counsel in his 1641 True grounds 
of ecclesiasticall regiment. Using the example of Peter and Nero, Parker writes that 
                                                 
1304
 [Parker] 1640, pp. 23, 25. 
1305
 [Parker] 1640, p. 47. 
1306
 [Parker] 1638, p. 62; [Parker] 1642a, p. 30. The first two of Parliament’s 
Nineteen Propositions of 1642 reflect this concern: ‘I. That the Lords, and others of 
our Majesties Privie Councell... may be put from your Privie Councell... excepting 
such as shall be approved of by both Houses of Parliament... II. That the great 
Affairs of the Kingdome may not be Concluded or Transacted by the Advice of 
private men... but that such Matters as concern the Publick, and are proper for the 
high Court of Parliament which is your Majesties great and supreme Councell, may 
be Debated, Resolved, and Transacted onely in Parliament, and not elsewhere’ 
(Charles I 1642, p. 2).  
1307
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 6.  
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‘If Nero forbid Peter to preach, contradicting God herein, whose power is still 
transcendent, this prohibition binds not Peter, but if Nero use the Sword hereupon 
against Peter, this sword is irresistible’.
1308
 This is because the sword – command – 
must always come above persuasion and counsel: ‘The use of power is not to 
intreat, or perswade only, for these may be done without power, but to command, 
and commands are vaine without compulsion, and they which may not compell, 
may not command, and they which cannot command, may not meddle at all except 
to intreat or perswade’.
1309
 Whomsoever uses compulsion to enforce their words 
has gone beyond counsel into the realm of command, for ‘if Peter may doe more 
then perswade Nero, the Scepter is Peters not Neroes’.
1310
 Parker writes that 
‘whethersoever the power of commanding rests, it cannot rest in both, the Scepter 
cannot be shared, independence cannot be divided’.
1311
 Parker makes clear that 
‘that power which is proper, must include not only a right of commanding, but also 
an effectuall vertue of forcing obedience to its commands, and of subjecting and 
reducing such, as shall not render themselves obedient’.
1312
 Parker knew very well 
the line between counsel and command when he crossed it. 
 Doing away with this ‘ordinary course’ of politics can be justified, however, 
according to the language of necessity and emergency. As he writes in 
Observations, there is a ‘Crisis of seducement’ in the king’s ‘preferring private 
advise before publike’.
1313
 In such an instance, the ‘ordinary course cannot be taken 
                                                 
1308
 [Parker] 1641b, p. 23.  
1309
 [Parker] 1641b, pp. 23-4.  
1310
 [Parker] 1641b, p. 25.  
1311
 [Parker] 1641b, p. 24.  
1312
 [Parker] 1641b, p. 24.  
1313
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 30. The 1641 Answer to the Lord Digbies Speech in the 
House of Commons, most likely written by Parker (see Mendle 1995, pp. 73-4) had 
already established that counsel, even when not executed, could constitute treason 
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for the preventing of publike mischiefes’ and so ‘any extraordinary course that is 
for that purpose the most effectuall, may justly be taken’.
1314
 In other words, ‘if the 
King will not joyne with the people, the people may without disloyalty save 
themselves’.
1315
 This involves, first and foremost, as in The case of shipmony, 
moving against the pernicious counsellors of the king: ‘if Kings be so inclineable to 
follow private advise rather then publique... then they may destroy their best 
subjects at pleasure, and all Charters and Lawes of publike safetie and freedome are 
voyd’ and so ‘there must be some Court to judge of that seducement, and some 
authoritie to inforce that iudgement, and that Court and Authoritie must bee the 
Parliament’.
1316
 One may detect a weakness in the argument here – if there is a 
crisis of counsel, parliament should be given the authority to determine if there is a 
crisis of counsel – but it does the work that Parker needs it to, supporting the claim 
that parliament’s ‘Councell [is] of honour and power about all other, and when it is 
unjustly rejected, by a King seduced, and abused by private flatterers, to the danger 




 This involves control of the militia, as Parker makes clear in his Political 
catechism of 1643, a response to the king’s retaliation against the Nineteen 
Propositions. Here he reiterates the dangers of self-interested counsellors – the 
‘most Pernicious Instruments... of Faction and Division’ – against the interests of 
state and the superiority of parliament – the ‘Great Councel of State’.
1318
 These 
                                                                                                                                        
(pp. 12-13), an argument with its roots in Elizabethan works which we have already 
explored, such as Leicesters Commonwealth.  
1314
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 16. 
1315
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 16.  
1316
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 30.  
1317
 [Parker] 1642a, p. 29.  
1318
 [Parker] 1643c, p. 5.  
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counsellors have, as forewarned in Shipmony, used ‘the Name of publick necessity’ 
to move against their ‘Enemies’ in parliament and, Parker insists, it is parliament 
which ought ‘to be Trusted’ in such cases to declare such trickery.
1319
 The step 
Parker takes in Political catechism is to note that such theoretical juridical power 
also translates into concrete military power: ‘The Power of both Houses is by Law 
to raise Arms if need be, for the apprehending of Delinquents’.
1320
 In such a case, 
‘the two Houses have Power by the Law to raise not only the Posse Comitatus of 
those Counties where such Delinquents are, to apprehend them, but also the Posse 
Regni, the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be’.
1321
 In the name of ‘their own 
and the Kingdoms safety’ the two houses of parliament ‘have Legal Power to 
command the People to this purpose’ which is the ‘Punishment of Delinquents, and 
for the Prevention and Restraint of the power of Tyranny’.
1322
 
 In The contra-replicant, also written in 1643, Parker articulates these 
arguments for parliament’s extra-legal action in the language of reason of state and 
counsel. He reiterates that ‘Lawes ayme at Iustice, [and] Reason of state aimes at 
safety’ and thus the latter ‘goes beyond all particular formes and pacts, and looks 
rather to the being, then well-being of a State... by emergent Counsels, and 
                                                 
1319
 [Parker] 1643c, p. 8.  
1320
 [Parker] 1643c, p. 10.  
1321
 [Parker] 1643c, p. 10.  
1322
 [Parker] 1643c, pp. 11-12; emphasis added to ‘command’, other emphasis 
original. The same argument is advanced in A Nest of Persidious Vipers, published 
anonymously in 1644: ‘The law allowes rather to kill, then by killed’ and so just as 
‘David is guiltlesse’ for taking up arms against Saul and his ‘Evill Counsellors’ so 
too the parliament has the right to defend itself against the same (p. 8). Parker had 
laid the foundations for such an argument in Some few observations in which he 
writes that because the king ‘is now seduced by wicked Councell, and therefore 
rejects [parliament’s] requests, to the danger of the State’, the members of 
parliament ‘conceive there is a power in them to secure the State without [the 
king’s] concurrence... At other times, when the Kings are not seduced, [parliament] 




 As ‘The Parliament is... better regulated and qualified for 
consultation’ than any other body, it is also better able to take the necessary powers 
dictated by reason of state and to be given ‘a kind of a dictatorian power’.
1324
 
Therefore, ‘To deny the Parliaments recourse to reason of State in these miserable 
times of warre and danger [is] to deny them self-defence’.
1325
 Parliament must 
‘make us of an arbitrary power according to reason of state’ rather than ‘confin[ing] 
themselves to meere expedients of Law’.
1326
 Such arbitrary power is ‘only 
dangerous in one men or in a few men’ but not in parliament, and so ‘To have then 
an arbitrary power placed in the Peers and Comm[ons] is naturall and expedient at 
all times, but the very use of this arbitrary power, according to reason of state, and 




 It is worth noting that Parker’s astute opponents recognised clearly that his 
line of reasoning turned an argument for counsel into one of sovereign command, 
and they state the case more overtly than Parker ever dared to do. For instance, 
John Spelman in his Review of the Observations of 1643 notes that Parker 
transgresses the line between counsel and command by supporting the parliament’s 
right to enforce their advice. He has no qualm with Parker’s argument that 
parliament is an important source of counsel, he ‘grant[s] it behoovefull for the 
King to hearken to His Parliament’; however, he makes it clear that ‘we must not 
understand it so behoovefull, that there should be inevitable necessity laid upon 
Him that He should follow whatsoever they advise’, for to do so would be to 
                                                 
1323
 [Parker] 1643a, pp. 18-19.  
1324
 [Parker] 1643a, p. 19.  
1325
 [Parker] 1643a, p. 19.  
1326
 [Parker] 1643a, p. 29.  
1327
 [Parker] 1643a, p. 29.  
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‘overthrow the fundamentall Law & frame of Parliaments’.
1328
 It would suggest that 
‘The Soveraignty (against all our Oathes and expressions to the contrary) is not in 
the King but in the people’ and ‘His will, his understanding, and his power... is all 
subjected to the body of the very Subject’.
1329
 In other words, if counsel becomes 
command, as Parker suggests, ‘there is really nothing but a meer popular assembly, 




Hobbes responds to the argument for conciliar sovereignty articulated by Parker 
and highlighted by Spelman by reinforcing the division between the ideas of 
command and counsel. He lays out three criteria – with another added in Leviathan 
– by which one can distinguish between the two: the beneficiary of the counselled 
action, what reason or justification is given, and whether or not the counsel is 
understood to be obligatory. The first, the question of benefit, touches very closely 
on Hobbes’s theory of interest which we have already explored. Already in De Cive 
he marks one of the differences between counsel and law as being that ‘Counsell is 
directed to his end that receives it, Law, to his that gives it’.
1331
 In Chapter 15 of 
Leviathan, primarily concerned with the distinction between counsel and command, 
Hobbes makes clear that whereas in giving command all is done for the speaker’s 
‘own Benefit’, in counsel, the speaker ‘deduceth his reasons’ according to the 
‘benefit that arriveth by it to whom he saith it’ and thus it ‘pretendeth only 
(whatsoever he intendeth) the good to him, to whom he giveth it’.
1332
 He most 
abhors what he calls ‘exhortation’ – ‘Counsell vehemently pressed’ – for it is 
                                                 
1328
 [Spelman] 1643, p. 16.  
1329
 [Spelman] 1643, p. 17.  
1330
 [Spelman] 1643, p. 17.  
1331
 Hobbes 1651, p. 211. 
1332
 Hobbes 2012, p. 398.  
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‘directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, 
which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour’.
1333
 
 The second criterion – the justification of the counsel – follows from this, 
and is drawn from Hobbes’s rejection of prudence in favour of scientific reasoning. 
Whereas a command need only be justified by ‘the will of the Commander’, counsel 
requires further justification.
1334
 In The Elements of Law, Hobbes suggests that 
counsel ought always to be given in ‘provisive’ language, ‘as for example, If this be 
done or not done, this will follow’; counsel must always ‘give the reason of the 
action it adviseth to’.
1335
 It demands reasoning on the consequences of actions, 
which in the case of politics, as we have already seen, requires knowledge of the 
‘rules’ of civil science. When it comes to counsel, ‘the expression is Do, because it 
is best’, whereas in law it is ‘Do, because I have a right to compel you; or Do, 
because I say Do’.
1336
 
 This issue of compulsion – the third criterion – is central for Hobbes, 
addressing precisely the transgression that Parker and the parliamentarians make in 
seeking to enforce their counsels regarding the ‘privados’ of Charles I. This 
concern first emerges in The Elements of Law, in which Hobbes makes clear that 
‘the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled’.
1337
 If it were – ‘if to 
counsellours there should be given a right to have their counsel followed’ – then 
they would be ‘no more counsellours, but masters of them whom they counsel; and 
                                                 
1333
 Hobbes 2012, p. 402.  
1334
 Hobbes 1651, p. 210; see Hobbes 2012, p. 398.  
1335
 Hobbes 1969, pp. 185, 186. 
1336
 Hobbes 1969, p. 186. Here we see Hobbes’s debt to Felippe 1589, pp. 70-1: 
‘that they which giue a man counsell, and make him acquainted with the reasons 
which mooue them to giue such counsell... doo not bind, or by any necessitie force 
him to whom the counsell is giuen, to follow their counsell: but they that will 
commaund, will haue y
t
 doone which they commaund’. 
1337
 Hobbes 1969, p. 186.  
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their counsels no more counsels, but laws’.
1338
 It is a mistake that ‘men usually call 
counselling, by the name of governing’ and only do so because they envy those 
who are called to counsel, a reason that he would later give as a cause of the civil 
war.
1339
 De Cive repeats these lessons. Those who ‘lesse seriously consider the 
force of words’ tend to ‘confound Law with Counsell’ by thinking that ‘it is the 




 It is in Chapter 25 of Leviathan – ‘Of COUNSELL’ – that Hobbes fully 
develops these ideas. Although the opening marginal note reads ‘Counsell what’, 
Hobbes, uncharacteristically, does not begin this chapter with a definition, but 
rather opens by railing, as he had in De Cive, against those who have conflated the 
definitions of counsel and command: ‘How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of 
things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, 
than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands’.
1341
 This arises from ‘the 
Imperative manner of speaking in them both’, a reference to his treatment of the 
types of speech in Chapter 6, in which he had made clear that ‘all Passions may be 
expressed’ either ‘Indicatively; as I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I 
                                                 
1338
 Hobbes 1969, p. 186. This is almost a direct quotation from Béthune 1634, p. 
64: ‘in Estates, whereas Councellors commaund that which they Councell, they 
may not onely be termed Councellors but Souereignes’. Notably, Juan de Santa 
Maria had condemned those counsellors as being ‘like vnto that great Leuiathan, or 
huge Whale in the Sea’ who ‘cloath themselues with the Kings royall command, as 
with a garment, and beare themselues too insolently-high vpon the Title of their 
Offices; and vnder colour and zeale to the seruice of their Kings, will make 
themselues their Tutors, Masters of their libertie, Lords, ouer their vassalls, and sole 
Commanders of the whole Kingdome’ (1650 [1632], p. 138).  
1339
 Hobbes 1969, p. 186; see Hobbes 1679, p. 164.  
1340
 Hobbes 1651, p. 210. 
1341
 Hobbes 2012, p. 398. The confusion between these types of speech, Hobbes 
suggests, is not one of mere ignorance, but based on the interests of those making 
the judgement, for those who ‘mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for 
the Precepts of them that Command’ do it ‘according as it best agreeth with the 




 ‘Subjunctively’, which is proper to ‘Deliberation’ and ‘differs not 
from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words; but 
Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars’ or, finally, ‘Imperative[ly]; as Do 
this, forebeare that’.
1343
 This last, Hobbes marks, is the language of ‘Command’ 
otherwise it is ‘Prayer, or els Counsell’.
1344
 Whereas in The Elements of Law 
Hobbes had kept imperative speech separate from the ‘provisive’ speech of counsel, 
in Leviathan he acknowledges the common practice of stating both imperatively, 
‘for the words Doe this, are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also 
of him that giveth Counsell’.
1345
 
 In Chapter 25 he once again repeats the distinctions between counsel and 
command based on the intended beneficiary and justification of the advice, before 
coming to the issue of obligation: ‘that a man may be obliged to so what he is 
Commanded... But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled’.
1346
 However, in 
Leviathan, this becomes merely an extension of the idea that ‘Command is directed 
to a mans own benefit, and Counsell to the benefit of another man’.
1347
 In place of 
this, Hobbes adds another distinguishing element: ‘that no man can pretend to be of 
another mans Counsell’.
1348
 For Hobbes in 1651 even pressing the right to give 
counsel is to cross the boundary between counsel and command. Part of this rests 
on the sovereign’s control of the secrets of state, required for experiential 
knowledge; its acquisition requires ‘hav[ing] seen the archives of the 
commonwealth’ and so ‘they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good 
                                                 
1342
 Notably, ‘I command’ is left out of the Latin edition of 1668; Hobbes may have 
wanted to distinguish it from imperative speech.   
1343
 Hobbes 2012, p. 94.  
1344
 Hobbes 2012, p. 94.  
1345
 Hobbes 2012, p. 398.  
1346
 Hobbes 2012, p. 400.  
1347
 Hobbes 2012, p. 398. 
1348
 Hobbes 2012, p. 400. 
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Counsell in such cases to obtrude’.
1349
 Hobbes’s contention, however, goes even 
further than this practical consideration. In The Elements of Law, the proscription 
against uninvited counsel is one of the fundamental Laws of Nature: ‘That no man 
obtrude or press his advice or counsell to any man that declareth himself unwilling 
to hear the same’ because ‘there may often be just cause to suspect the counsellor’ 
and so it is a ‘breach of peace’ and ‘against the law of nature to obtrude it’.
1350
 He 
abandons this as a law of nature in Leviathan, but revives it in marking the 
distinction between counsel and command.
1351
 
 In Leviathan Hobbes also introduces a third category – exhortation – in 
addition to counsel and command.
1352
 He that exhorts, like he that commands, ‘doth 
not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth’ and so does not ‘tye himselfe 
therein to the rigour of true reasoning’.
1353
 Instead, he appeals to the ‘common 
Passions, and opinions of men’ for his reasons, making use of ‘Similtudes, 
Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory’ in order ‘to perswade the 
Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advice’.
1354
 This is a pointed and 
                                                 
1349
 Hobbes 2012, p. 408. The MS copy held in the British Library (MS Egerton 
1910), widely held to be the presentation copy given to Charles II, reads ‘they who 
are not called to Counsell in such cases can have no good Counsell to obtrude’ and 
here, as well as at a number of points in this section on the requirements of counsel, 
text has been added, and then crossed out, probably in Hobbes’s own hand. The 
original text is rendered illegible by such corrections. See Hobbes 1996, pp. li-lvi; 
Malcolm 2012a, pp. 197-208. 
1350
 Hobbes 1969, pp. 91-2.  
1351
 Hobbes’s pressing of the difference between counsel and command may have 
to do with the connection between counsel and deliberation, and the latter’s literal 
meaning of ‘putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting’; counsellors 
ought not to deprive anyone, especially the sovereign, of his liberty (2012, p. 92).  
1352
 Hobbes 2012, p. 400. We see Hobbes’s debt to Felippe’s category of 
‘perswasion’ here; see Felippe 1589, pp. 70-1. 
1353
 Hobbes 2012, p. 400.  
1354
 Hobbes 2012, p. 400. By ‘metaphor’, Hobbes is referring to the figure of 
paradiastole, defined in his own brief of Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric produced in 
1637: ‘He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his Metaphor from 
somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a Crime, as Error. On the 
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deliberate attack not only on humanist neo-classical rhetoric, but also on public 
privadoes such as Parker, as ‘the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, 
where a man is to speak to a Multitude because when the Speech is addressed to 
one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously’.
1355
 Such men, 
‘are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest’ for, as he 
explains in the Latin edition, ‘men are generally more vehement in their own 
interests than in those of others’.
1356
 If it is parliament which can be accused of 
crossing the line between counsel and command in pressing both the obligation and 
right of their counsel, it is Parker and his fellow public counsellors who are to 
blame for exhorting them to do so. 
 Counsel, from parliament and from its counsellors, emerges even more 
strongly as the causal factor in the outbreak of the civil war in Hobbes’s later 
accounts. In A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common 
Laws, written in the late 1660s, the Philosopher and the Student agree that a king 
who ‘will not Consult with the Lords of Parliament and hear the Complaints and 
Informations of the Commons... sinneth against God’.
1357
 However, under no 
circumstances can he be ‘Compell’d to do any thing by his Subjects by Arms, and 
Force’.
1358
 In fact, the Philosopher makes clear that a king has a right to, and often 
ought to, ‘neglect such advice’, for instance ‘if the Lords and Commons should 
Advise him to restore those Laws Spiritual, which in Queen Maries time were in 
                                                                                                                                        
other side, when hee would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from 
somewhat worse, as, calling Error, Crime’ (p. 156); Aristotle 1926, pp. 355-7; see 
Skinner 2002b, p. 273.  
1355
 Hobbes 2012, p. 402; see Skinner 1996.  
1356
 ‘homines in suis plerumque rebus vehementiores sint, quam in alienis’ (Hobbes 
2012, p. 403). The English is more lengthy and convoluted on this point. 
1357
 Hobbes 2005, p. 26.  
1358




 The same is repeated in Behemoth, also a dialogue, in which Hobbes 
notes that men who distinguished themselves according to their military valour 
were often marked out to be members of the king’s council, and so ‘Kings of 
England did upon every great occasion call them together by the name of Discreet 
and Wise men of the Kingdom, and hear their Councils’.
1360
 Although such men – 
the Lords – ‘gave him Council when he requir’d it’ they ‘had no Right to make War 
upon him, if he did not follow it’.
1361
 As to the commons, the speakers in the 
dialogue doubt that they ‘were part of the King’s Council at all’ nor were they (as 
Parker would have them) ‘Judges over other men’.
1362
 Hobbes suggests that he 
cannot find evidence that ‘the end of their summoning was to give advice’ at all, 
but rather ‘in case they had any Petitions for Redress of Grievances’ to be given to 
the king.
1363
 This statement closely echoes the closing passage of Hobbes’s 
treatment of the choice of counsellors in Leviathan, in which he writes that ‘The 
best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations... is to be taken from 
the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each Province’, as long 
as that stands not ‘in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveriagnty’, for without 
these ‘the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist’.
1364
 The best counsel, then, is 
simply the expression of petitions or grievances, only voiced when it does not 
interfere in any way with the operation of sovereign power. 
 
So what do Hobbes and Parker leave us with in terms of a mid-seventeenth century 
discourse of counsel? For Parker, although he seems to embrace the orthodox 
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humanist model of counsel, the conciliar role of parliament gives way to a 
sovereign one whenever the king can be said to be ‘seduced’ by private counsel, in 
other words, when the king does not follow parliament’s advice. This obligatory 
parliamentary counsel, as his opponents point out, crosses the line between counsel 
and command, placing the latter in the hands of parliament, and reducing counsel to 
nothing more than a cover for sovereign power. Counsel, in Parker’s model, 
becomes command. 
 Hobbes’s attempts to rebuild the distinction between these two concepts are, 
at least in part, a response to Parker and the events of the 1640s. In reconstructing 
the barrier between counsel and command, however, Hobbes buries the former 
beneath the latter. Rejecting the humanist model of counsel built on the persuasive 
power of rhetoric, the Machiavellian model built on history as well as the reason of 
state model built on direct experience, he denies any political body a right to give 
advice, completely subjecting counsel to the will of the sovereign. The figure of the 
counsellor had emerged with the Aristotelian separation of the philosopher and the 




I have argued that the Anglophone discourse of counsel disappears at the end of the 
English Civil War. What, then, is to be gained by studying it? I should like to end 
by suggesting two answers. The first is purely historical, and arises from a recent 
move in Tudor political history towards highlighting figures on the peripheries of 
personal monarchical power – particularly counsellors.
1365
 Many of the resulting 
works have been biographical in nature, although efforts have been made to embed 
such scholarship within a wider understanding of political networks and culture, an 
endeavour to which my own study is intended as a contribution. 
For example, Alexandra Gadja’s recent work on the Earl of Essex declares 
that it is ‘not a biographical work’ but an attempt to ‘deepen our understanding of 
the earl’s career by thematic analysis of the expression of political and religious 
ideas’.
1366
 Gadja notes how recent scholarship on Elizabethan England has focused 
upon the ‘governing elites’ who expressed ‘their own visions... of how 
commonwealth and church should be governed’.
1367
 Her own work aims to use ‘the 
example of Essex’s career... as a prism through which many aspects of the culture 
of late Elizabethan politics are refracted with colour and clarity’.
1368
 My research 
supports this microcosmic approach by taking a broader view of the frameworks 
within which figures close to the throne operated in early modern England. By 
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pp. 81-95 within that volume – Guy 2000; Adams, ed. 2002; Loades 2008; Loades 
2009; and within the last year: Alford 2012; Bridgen 2012; Gadja 2012; Hadfield 
2012; Maginn 2012; Rampling 2012, pp. 432-6; Loades 2013 [forthcoming]. We 
might think, too, of the recent interest in ‘new diplomatic history’, see Fletcher and 
DeSilva 2010, pp. 505-12. Interestingly, this trend has not yet extended into Stuart 
political history; perhaps a study such as this will promote interest in these figures 
into the early seventeenth century.  
1366
 Gadja 2012, p. 9.  
1367
 Gadja 2012, p. 14.  
1368
 Gadja 2012, p. 12.  
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bringing both perspectives together, a fuller picture of the political culture of the 
period can be constructed.  
 My second reason for considering it important to focus on political advisers 
is the recent increase of interest in such figures in contemporary political life. 
Scholars of public administration now suggest that such advisers – the ‘people who 
live in the dark’ – have been overshadowed by a concern for the institutions and 
structures of parliament and state, and that they are only lately receiving adequate 
attention.
1369
 Particularly ‘special advisers’, ‘political advisers’ or ‘minders’, who 
take a more personal and informal role, have returned to prominence in public 
service analysis.
1370
 Confronted with a lack of research on the history of such 
figures, scholars have attempted to rebuild an understanding of their roles and 
duties in historical perspective, usually with reference to sixteenth century 
discourse.
1371
 This parallel is apt; contemporary advisers have a duty to ‘speak truth 
to power’,
1372
 to ‘counterbalance and offset the defects and limitations of their 
bosses’,
1373
 to participate in a ‘court culture’
1374
 and to ‘bind’
1375
 rulers – language 
and roles with clear connections to the discourse I have examined above.  
Attempts to make historical connections, however, have been shallow and 
under-researched.
1376
 For instance, Laugharne’s 1993 study traces the use of 
                                                 
1369
 Peters and Barker 1993, p. 1; Blick 2004.  
1370
 See Walter 1986, p. 2; Weller 1987, pp. 149-57; Blick 2004; Gains and Stoker 
2011, pp. 485-98.  
1371
 See Goldhamer 1978; Walter 1986, pp. 30-4; Blick 2004, p. 30; Lynn Jr. 2006, 
p. 44; Burnham and Pyper 2008, p. 6.  
1372
 Bromell 2010, p. 58. 
1373
 Dror 1987, p. 188.  
1374
 Walter 1986, pp. 3-12.  
1375
 Dror 1987, p. 203.  
1376
 See Dror 1987, p. 186, who declares that ‘key features of relations between 
rulers and advisers have not changed very much’ since their evolution 5000 years 
ago, and so he adopts ‘a general theoretical approach to the subject, rejecting 
historicism’. 
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specialist advisory committees to the early middle ages, through to developments in 
sixteenth-century political administration.
1377
 Although this is an interesting 
suggestion, little analysis of this historical precedent is actually given, and it fails to 
incorporate the methodological move outlined in my introduction – the turn away 
from Eltonian institutional histories and towards an understanding of political 
cultures, languages and theories. References which do incorporate the beliefs of 




 – are given 
without any contextual consideration or engagement with the text as a whole. My 
hope is that my own study may contribute to a more historically-informed 
understanding of the role that informal advice can play in public and political 
life.
1380
   
 A move away from an exclusive or predominant concern for the 
institutional mechanisms of sovereignty – both historically and in contemporary 
political analysis – yields insights that have not yet received sufficient attention. 
Perhaps the most important lesson is that such a shift in perspective need not 
present a threat to institutional structures and the workings of sovereign power, but 
rather works to support them.
1381
 Historically, the discourse of counsel stands as a 
counterpart to sovereignty, mitigating personal flaws and institutional 
inflexibilities. The ‘monarchy of counsel’ was built upon an understanding of the 
                                                 
1377
 Laugharne 1993, pp. 21-2.  
1378
 Chabal 1993, p. 51.  
1379
 Walter 1986, pp. 3, 8.  
1380
 My forthcoming work for inclusion in the volume The European Public 
Servant: A Shared Administrative Identity? will attempt to draw such connections; 
Paul 2014a.   
1381
 See Bartelson 2001 for the critique of state sovereignty that has arisen out of 
the shift towards a concern for informal networks of governance. A similar critique 
of parliamentary democracy has also been raised of late; see Alonso, Keans and 
Merkel, eds. 2011. I have attempted to answer some of these critiques in historical 
perspective in Paul 2012, pp. 36-54. See the collection of essays in Kalmo and 
Skinner 2010.  
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relative importance of both components. My hope is that this study has furthered 
the appreciation of the relationship between counsel and command, with indications 
toward both historical and contemporary significance.   
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University College Oxford MS 85 in Ferster, Judith (1996). Fictions of Advice: The 
Literature and Politics of Counsel in Late Medieval England, Philadelphia, 
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Alciato, Andrea (1531). ‘In senatum boni principis’ in Emblematum Liber, 
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Alciato, Andrea (1534) ‘In senatum boni principis’ in Emblematum libellus, Paris, 
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Alciato, Andrea (1550). ‘In senatum boni principis’ in Emblemata, Lyon, p. 157.   
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Figure 8  
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Natura breuium (1494), London, frontispiece.  
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Figure 9  
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Salomon and Marcolphus (1492), Antwerp, frontispiece.  
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Figure 10  
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Here begynneth a lytell treatyse for to lerne Englysshe and Frensshe (1497), 
London, frontispiece. 
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Figure 12  
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Hall, Edward (1548). The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre 
[and] Yorke, London, frontispiece.  
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Hall, Edward (1548). The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre 




Figure 14  
[Removed for copyright purposes] 
 
Boissard, Jean Jacques (1588). ‘L’Occasion’ in Emblemes latins, Metz, p. 60. 
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Figure 16  
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Foxe, John (1583). Actes and Monuments, London, p. 799.   
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Figure 19  
[Removed for copyright purposes] 
 
Thucydides (1629). Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre, trans. Thomas 
Hobbes, London, frontispiece. 
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Appendix B – Transcription of Sloane MS 1065 
Introduction:  
What follows is a transcript of the first and second books of Richard Etherington’s 
Abstract of Giovanni Botero’s Ragione di Stato (Sl. MS 1065). Etherington also 
gives an abridgement of the remaining eight books of Botero’s text, as well his own 
Adiunct of Conservation of the State; however, I have limited my transcription to 
the books quoted from above.  
The text is dedicated to Sir Henry Hobart, who served as Chancellor to 
Prince Charles as well as Chief Justice of Common Pleas from 1613 until his death 
in 1625. The dedication to Hobart dates the writing of the text between his 
appointment (or more likely his reappointment in April 1617) and the death of 
James I, 27 March 1625.  
Sir Richard Etherington was the eldest son of Thomas Etherington (d. 1589) 
and his wife Margery (or Margaret) Middlewood, daughter of William 
Middlewood.
1382
 He was a prominent member of Lincoln’s Inn in the 1580s; he 
acted as Master of the Revels on the 2 November 1587 and was called to the bar 
accession day (13 May) 1591.
1383
 It is at Lincoln’s Inn that he may have first met 
Hobart, who was called to the bar in 1584. Both men were knighted in 1603, but 
thereafter their fortunes diverged dramatically. Etherington was appointed receiver 
of Pickering in 1606, but later that year was accused by Sir John Edmondes of 
emblezzling profits of the manorial courts and ‘seek[ing] by all sinister ways to 
possess himself of [Edmondes’s] interests’.
1384
 In 1609 Etherington lost all but his 
own manor of Ebberston.
1385
 He was outlawed for debt in 1621, and Ebberton was 
seized by the Crown.
1386
 It seems likely that the MS below was composed 
sometime after 1621, in an appeal from Etherington to gain favour with his 




                                                 
1382
 Page, ed. 1923 (accessed 3 April 2013). 
1383
 Records of the Honorable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, The 1896, pp. 6, 20.  
1384
 Healy 2010 (accessed 3 April 2013).  
1385
 Page, ed. 1923 (accessed 3 April 2013).  
1386
 Page, ed. 1923 (accessed 3 April 2013). 
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Conventions:  
Abbreviations and Contractions: I have expanded contractions and abbreviations 
using square brackets, excepting ‘y
r
’ for ‘your’, ‘y
e
’ for ‘the’, ‘y
t
’ for ‘that’, ‘w
th
’ 
for ‘with’ and ‘w
ch
’ for ‘which’. I have retained the use of superscript throughout.  
Additions/Deletions: I have indicated additions with carets (eg. ^example^) and 
deletions by striking through the passage (eg. example). I have not indicated 
additions or deletions by a later hand, as these are few and minor.  
Foliation: I have used the folio numbers given, excluding the blank unmarked 
pages added before the first noted folio. A later hand has added a second set of folio 
numbers, beginning from the ‘First Book of State’ (fo. 4
r
); I have ignored these.    
Italics: I have used italics only where the script changes, usually to indicate a 
proper name or a foreign-language quotation. As this is a subtle change in most 
cases, I have used my discretion and not added italics to quotations where the script 
does not appear to change.  
Paragraphs: I have added space between significant paragraph breaks for clarity of 





An Abstract of Boterus della 
Ragione di Stato 
 
With an Adiunct of Conser- 














 Henry Hobart 
kn[igh]
t
 and Baronet, Cheife Iustice of his  
Ma[jes]
ties
 Courte of Common Pleas, and 
Chauncello
r
 to the most excellent 
Prince Charles. 
 
The Communitie of Blood in the noble fabrique of man Gods 
Plenary and perfect Pattarne and Resemblaunce of a goodly 
Cittie Common-wealth or society all Composed of Reciprocall 
respect each part to other should begett an affection in all of all 
necessary trauell for publique Conserue. which was the first 
motiue that in some few stolne howers from necessaries I 
endeavoured to attire a straunger Bosterus after our Country 
guise teaching him our Country language contracting all the 
Chapters of his ten seuerall Bookes in his treatise Della 
Ragione Di Stato into one, extracting as the marrow of his 
Bookes his seuerall politiqe positions and placing in the 
margent his painfull collected examples therof so many as well 
could be placed.  
 
therein on purpose leauing out Invectiues against some States 
Charitably extenuating them as not straunge that a Straunger to 
them should erre in opinion to mainteyne that wherin he was 
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bred, and fed his wellbeing and mainteynance proceeding from 
the mainteynance therof. yet therefore did not I thinke fitt to 
neglect so much good as was therin learnedly and painfully 
couched for some such intermingle of ill Dij odere Curiosum 
and there is an excellent Refraine in Spanish Adonde se halla la 
miel, no Falsa Hiel. 
Full litle hony, Hony-Bee should make:  
If for each bitter tast, It flower forsake. 
This Booke, If best vse be made therof (in my poore [fo. 2
v
] 
opinion) bringeth hony to the quiet Hive of the Common-
wealth wherin the Causes of the diseases of the Common-
wealth are Curiously enquired of: exterior and interior and 
thervnto applyed their suerall Respectiue Cures, therby 
politiquely provyding Harbour and quiet repose for Religion & 
Religious excercises And for that there is not Nisi a natura 
pessime Informatus which will not thinke of some worthy thing 
in the Common-wealth Deserunt Rempublica qui nihil operum 
in eam Conferunt. Thus warranted to this Translation I onely 
adde an Adiunt hastely by me collected which though as a silly 
abhortiue not worthy the paper written (the reason giuen by a 
graue Philosopher why he did not write) yet well may it serue 
for a foyle or Counterfeit to adde grace and lustre to a work 
more worthy.  
 
Now my much worthily honoured Lo[rd] trewly noble in 
nobility of minde exceeding noblenes in blood as much as 
trewth presumption, manifestation likelyhood, noblenes in 
blood being a spurre to noblenes of mynde, But Expressi est 
maior virtus quam taciti And this noblenes of minde springs 
out of trew noble Blood, Education, Learning, experience and 
other honest Causes. Honestie being the fairest Flower in 
Hono:
rs
 garland. which cannot be without prudence to know 
what is honest Iustice to doe it, temperance in the manner of 
doing it, and fortitude to darre to doe it, Cuiq[uibus] dignitati 
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State.  
Lawe of State and 
Conscience one.  
Iudgement of State.  
nulla Dignitas comparari potest, without which generosi 
becomes degeneres These and yo
r
 ordinary respective 
Humanitie to all and yo
r
 speciall vndeserued fauour allready 
receiued by mee did move and embolden me to offer this 
meane [fo. 3
r
] Translation and Adiunct to yo
r
 graue and learned 
Censure and Correction presenting a litle guift, out of a great 
desire as a Demonstration of affection which neither can showe 

















THE FIRST Booke 
Of State, The causes of  
Ruyne and Conseruation 
thereof. 
 
Some haue grounded their reason in litle conscience. Some 
haue mantled their tyranny with a cloke of barbarous lawe of 
Ma[jes]
tie
, and yet both accounted famous Statists or Idœaes of 
State, as though there were one law of State another of 
conscience: when as such as take away consciences Iurisdiction 
more in publique then in priuate thinges haue neither Soule nor 
God. 
 
State is a firme or established gouernment ouer people.  
Iudgement of State is a notive of meane actions to found, 
conserue and enlarge gouerments or dominyons.  
 














Naturall by election or succession.  
Acquired is by Conquest by force money’s or otherwise. 
Dominyon by Conquest are the worse qualited the more 
resisted before Conquest. And the Subiects the worse qualited 
the further they are from the truth.  
 




Litle dominyons are not able to defend them-selues  
The Meane or midle, not to litle nor to great hath most meanes 
to conserue it selfe. 
The great or eminent breedeth Ielousy in others, thereby 
combyneinge against it: and is more subiect to the interior 
causes of ruyne, vices, w
ch
 most abound where most people are. 
Likewise his greatnes breedeth dangerous security, and like 
^ripe^ fruites bringeth out of it selfe, wormes to deuoure it 
selfe.  
So that dominyons w
ch
 exceed the limites of mediocrity exceed 
the limites of security, hauing a great Body and small or weake 
Nerues for his necessary motion or gouerment. And therefore it 
once being disordered is not to be reduced as dominyons in 
mediocrity may be.  
 
Dominyons also are vnited or disunited.  
Vnited such as haue their body & members contynue and lye 
together w
ch
 are safest, saue onely from interior causes of 
ruyne, vice there more abounding. 
Disunited, where one of them may conueniently relieue 
th’other, are no lesse safe but rather harder to be Conquered & 
freer from contagion from one to th’other by reason of distance 




The causes of the ruyne of the State as in all other naturall 
thinges are interior and exterior.  
As Spain by reason so many 
Kingdomes & portes of their 
freindship & co[m]maund that by 








Iewes and Turkes 
Ragugia, Luca. 
Venice, Bohemia, Millaine, 
Flaunders. 
The great Turke, the King of 
Spaine. 
The interior causes of ruyne are 
best showne in the Romaynes who 
therby euen in their heigh suffered 
shipwracke. 
So came Spaine Conquered by the 












 state is 
the Prynces. 
Reputation.  
More glorious to 










The Interior, is excesse and corruption of the first quality as 
cruelty & luxurye, being y
e
 ruyne of the reputation of the 
Prince, and so by consequence of the State. And it is a question 
disputable whether luxury or cruelty in a Prynce be the greater 
ruyne of the state. So likewise enuy, discorde, the fury of the 
people, popularity of y
e
 Lordes, ambition or want of witt in the 
Prynce, be inward causes of ruyne of the State.  
The Exterior causes are deceit or trechery or power of the 
enemy, w
ch
 are lesse dangerous then th’other for that seldome 
or neuer a Kingdome is ruynated by exterior enemy if not first 
corrupted by interior.  
 
It is more glorious and truly noble to conserue then to enlarge 
the state. for that all things naturally are dayly changing, like 
the Moone, to w
ch
 they are subiect, force & strength are giuen 
to many, wisedome (by w
ch
 conseruation of the state) to fewe. 
The conseruor of the state fighteth against exterior and interior 
enemy, th’enlarger or Conqueror onely against the’exterior. 
And yet ordinarily the Conqueror hath more esteame, then the 
conseruor. The reason is, for that his trauell is more manifest, 
and runneth w
th
 a greater currant of rumors.  
 
As all things naturall are conserued by such meanes, as they are 
first produced by. So the cause of foundation & conseruation of 





In Election of Prynces reputation hath greater force then Loue, 
and reputation is grounded vpon vertue, but loue contenteth it 
selfe w
th





 highest, whereunto whoe atteyneth is more esteamed then 
loued; w
ch
 esteame if vpon Religion or piety grounded, it is 
called Reuerence, if vpon art politique, or military, Reputation, 
By these both the King & Decem 
viri were cast out of Rome & the 
Moores brought into Spaine. 
Demetrius King of Macedon and 
Pirhus King of Epirus in Greece 
embraceing more then they could 
contayne. 
The Romaynes by power 
Conquered the Macedons, the 
Barbarians the Romaines. 
The Lacedemonians pu[n]nisht 
such as lost in battell their sheild 
not their Sworde. 
Fabius Maximus being called the 
shield of the common wealth was 
of more esteame then Marcus 
Marcellus who was called the 
sworde of ye Common wealth. 
The Romaynes neuer committed 
busines to silly or giddy headed 
fauorits but to ripe yeares of 











Betwene Prynce and 
Subiect.   
in both a diuine excellency, desireable in Prynces, for that the 
foundations of euery State, is the obedience of y
e
 Subiect to the 
Superior, w
ch
 is grounded vpon the eminency of the vertue of 
the Prynce some of them begetteth loue, some esteame.  
 
Loue is begott by Humanity, Curtesy, Clemency & other 
inferior vertues, w
ch
 may be reduced to Iustice, and Liberality.  
         
Reputation by fortitude, Art military, policye, constancy, vigor 
of mynde, readines of witt, w
ch
 are reduced to prudence and 
valour.  
 




 now waxing cold, 
Iustice must add necessary heat ther’unto; Iustice being y
e
 




Iustice is either betwene Prynce and Subiect, or Subiect & 
Subiect. 
 
In iustice to the Subiect from his Soueraigne, the Subiect is 
bound to his Soueraigne (being his defender) to his [fo. 6
r
] 
vtmost power. And the King must be wary in dispending the 
reuenewes of the Crowne; being the sweat and blood of his 
Subiects, for if the Prynce herein be vaine and not iust (vanity 
haying no measure) he falleth into disorder & needes, and to 
redeeme him selfe casteth himselfe headlong into all iniquity; 
and the people being ouer burthened, leaue their Country, or 
reuolt from odedience.  
Likewise the Prynce must be iust in distributing profitts, 
offices, honours & fauours, distributing them to worthy & 
deseruing Subiects, nothing being more preiudiciall to a King 
then to conferre such, more for fauour then meritt, for that 
besides the wrong herein done to Vertue it selfe; the Subiects of 
better partes and meritts, much disdaining, turnes disobedient, 
The excellency of Camillus in 
remaunding the School maister 
and Scholers. Fabricus the 
Phisition Traytor, Scipio the 
goodliest creature to her husband 
vntoucht & Scipio therfore held of 
the Spanyard as a God come 





Luis. 12. put of his hatt to the 
gallowes, saying he was king by 
the execution of iustice. The King 
of Egipt swore his maiestrates not 
to obey his co[m]maund vnless 
iust. So the King of Fraunce his 
letters vnles they were thought 
reasonable were not to be obeyed. 
Caligula haying spent all, fell to 
rapyne and all cruelty. 
Salomon haying spent much 
vainly, fell to impositions, and the 
people not able to beare them, 
rebelled against his Sonne 
Roboam. 
Such vnworthy & excessuye fauor 
was bestowed on Spenser by E.2. 
The like in Ric.2. tyme. The like 
by Francis duke of Britaine to his 
fauorite Peter Laudoic therby 
brought so to be distressed yt he 
was forced to deliuer him to be 
straungled. 
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murmurers, & such as should obey (scorning such vnworthy 
superiority) reuolts from due obedience. to their Soueraigne. at 
the least y
e
 Courte groweth full of factions, the Citty full of 
rancor, and y
e
 whole Kingdome full of dissention. The King in 
a Laborinth not k^n^owing how to gett out.  
 
In Iustice betwene Subiect & Subiect, the Prynces care must 
first be to meet w
th
 fraudes of all kindes w
ch
 are the pest of the 
kingdome, and amongst all, the Prynce hath more need to looke 
into the mischeife of Vsury then all the rest, for that the riches 
of a Prince dependes of the faculty’s [fo. 6
v
] 
and abilityes of all his perticuer Subiects, consisting in Waires, 
Traffique reall vpon the profitts of the Land, or Maryne by 
transportation, either from home or homewarde,  and vpon the 
perticuler industry of euery Subiect; none of w
ch
 the vsurer 
vseth, but stealth away the treasure of the land into some few 
perticuler mens hands, and decayeth all trades at home & 
Traffique abroad, and banisheth publique reuenewe; Customes 
and duties to the Prynce, euery one of any substance turning 
Vsurer, louing gaine without paine, and so gett into their hand 
all the money’s where w
th
 all Trades at home and Traffique 
abroad should be mainteyned, which should enrich the 
Cominalty infinitly and sufficiently, and in mediocrity euery 
perticuler person. As the common wealth of Venice doth shew 
vs, being famous and rich moderately in euery particuler, & 
infinit rich in the generall, by reason of their reall trade and 
traffique; when as Genoa (also in Italy) by reason of their 
common traffique, cheifly by echange of money’s they are 
infinitly rich in some few perticulers, & extreame poore and 
miserable in ^their^ publique reuenewe.  
 
For redresse wher’in, and infinite other common greiuances, 
seing that y
e
 Prince cannot doe all in his owne person. It is fitt 
Betwene Subiect & 
Subiect.   
The like in Naples by Iohn.2. to 
his fauorite Alopo and Caracciolo. 
Luis.12. was for his care ouer his 
subiects called father. 
Asia therby twise giuen ouer into 
the hand of Methridate with great 
bloodshed of the Romaines being 
first by vsuryes consumed as 
though by the monster Harpia. 
Great comendations it was to 
Solon in Athens Cucullo in Asia, 
Cæsar in Spaine to banish or at 
least moderate vsury. 
Athens & Rome were brought to 
great misery by vsury. 
The King of Fraunce oft hath 
banished the Italian bankards or 
lumbards. 
 345 
Keeping of good 




good Officers.  
Keeping 
them good.  
Election of good 
Officers.  
he should haue a great care in election of good officers & in 





Therefore he must choose men of integrity of life, of science, 
and of necessarie practise for their places. Arguments of vertue 
are illustrious deedes proceeding of extraordinary goodnes, 
obliginge the doer not to doe things vnworthy his already 
worthily acquired fame. 
And common good fame bringeth Credit or Reputation to the 
place and seldome is deceiued in common esteame. Likewise 
already had experience in graue affayres breeds iudgment in 
things to come.  
A good co[m]mendor is modesty, w
ch
 is knowne by moderation 
of mynd, w
ch
 is knowne by vniformity of life. from whence 
cannot but be expected reguler carriage. So liberality for that 
one truly liberall will hardly ^be^ enduced to doe uniustly.  
Younge yeares are full of vehement passion not fitt for 
gouerment. 
Necessity swayeth the poore, couetousness y
e
 rich. therfore the 
inwarde goodnes and inclination is to be respected, w
ch
 
directeth both hand & harte of rich and poore.  




 interest of 
Allyes and freindes: and Strangers many tymes to vphold 
themselues, leane to much to great personages, therefore the 
best is neither a stranger altogether, nor of the same place, 
where he is to be Iudge, but of some other place where the 




He that selleth offices maketh the[i]ues. for the buyer entereth 
therunto, not as into a feild of thrones and weedes, but as into a 
fruitfull possession that will yeald abounding profitt.  
Good officers may turne bad, and of doues become crowes: 
And nothing doth more discouer the inward man, then 
In Rome that was capitall. 
Nero his rule, nihil in penatibus 
sius ve nale nihil ambition 
peruium. 
Alexander Seuerus the Emperor, 
long before he made any 
magistrate, published his name to 
heare what report would be made 
of him. 
The Lacedemonians named all the 
competitors in a publique meeting, 
& choose that man that had the 
greatest applause of the people. 
Th’ancient lawe-giuers held the 
poore officers to be subiect to 
extortion. 
The Romaines neuer ^made^ 
choyse of younge yearers for 
Officers. 
In diuers Cittyes in Italy where 
factions were forayne Iudges. 
Marcus Aurelius and Phillip the 
faire King of Fraunce would haue 
none Iudges where they were 
borne. 
In Carthage Honors & offices 







magistracy. The best way to ensure their integrity is well to 
reward them; that they haue no need to intend other things then 
their place, and to leaue to their iudgement as fewe things as 
may be. for that the iugdement of man is subiect to passion, and 
where it is free to iudge as it listeth, commonly it vseth not 
fitting diligence, neither to vnderstand the cause nor the lawes. 
Also somtymes sharp demonstrations must be made vpon some 
corrupt Iudge, one example restraining many.  
Many Iudges or assistants are chargeable therefore some haue 
vsed secret spies, some vse vistors, some to visitt themselyes in 
fit tyme & places: for that to see & heare w
th
 other mens eyes 
or eares is dangerous, and it is a question whether it were better 
to be deafe, then to heare all.  
 
In execution of iustice vniformity & expedition must be 
cheifely respected.  
 
For that it sufficeth not that they hold the ballance of iustice 
straight if they giue grace where punishment is merited, w
ch
 
properly belonges to the Prynce, the Iudge [fo. 8
r
] 
being onely to mitigate the rigor of y
e
 lawe: and to giue pardon 
to a fault that hath noe excuse of ignorance, nor iust greife, is 
not grace but iniquity.  
Also the Prynce must haue speciall care y
t
 delayes be cut of, the 
poore suitor many tym’s spending more in charges then the 
principall: and therefore it is a Pryncely worke to appoint 
woorthy honoured & fit men to take course for cutting of all 
delayes.  
The multitude of Doctors daylie writing, doe much hurt, for 
truth is not to be enquired of by multitude of authors but of 
reason it selfe.  
The King of Spayne writt to the Senate of Millayne that it 
should be a thing of acceptable seruice if any could propose a 
short forme for expedition of iustice.  
In execution 
of Iustice.  
The King of Chyna prouides for 
his officers all fitting things for 
their profit & honour.  
In Egipt the Statues of the Iudges 
were wthout hand, and the 
President with eyes fixed vpon the 
earth.   
Cosmio the Duke of Tuscania vsed 
spies.  
Aritperto king of Lombardy vsed 
to goe disguised to hear what was 
spoken of himself & his 
magistrates  
Ludouicus .12. informed himself 
of all things of such as by chance 
or vpon some busines came to 
him, writeing all in bookes.  
Cambise king of Assiria tooke the 
skinne of from a faulty Iudge 
liueing & there withall couered the 
Tribunall.   
Iulius Cæsar gaue the charge to 
excellent men for selecting ye 
cheif ciuill lawes. 
So did Alaricus king of the Gothes. 
So Iustinian[us] th’Emperor. 
Vespasian gaue authority to 
worthy men to doe su[m]mary 
iustice in Sweathland at the 2. 
hearing diffinitiue sente[n]ce. 
In Italy an old order yt euery one 
should be his owne proctor and 
aduocate, and if vnfitt his nearest 








of vertues.  
Com[m]iseration of 
miseries. 
Promotion of vertues. 
Aduises in liberalitye. 
 
Princely liberality is best showen in commiserating misery’s & 
promouing of vertues.  
 
Commiserating miseries either in p[er]ticuler or generall but 
especially in generall for that publique desasters are the proper 
matter & best occasion, that can be presented to a Prynce to 
gaine the mynd’s & harts of y
e
 Subiects. which though it be 
remediles, let there be showen a feeling of their greife, and if a 
perticuler Subiect would or could releiue it, it is fitt y
e
 Prynce 
should first doe it, being not safe that the Comminality should 




Also it is great wi[n]ning of Subiects loue, not to spare his 




Likewise Pryncely liberality is it, to promote vertues, to giue 
fauours to witts, entertayne Artes, make Sciences flourish, 
bring lustre to Religion, the supreame Splendor and ornament 
of State.  
 
It is not true liberality to giue to y
e
 vnworthy, for besides the ill 
bestowing thereof, it is a wronge to y
e
 worthy & to vertue it 
self, and forceth Subiects to forsake vertue, & betake them to 
such vnworthy fauoured courses, as they see rewarded w
th
 the 
bounty onely due to vertue. Likewise i[m]moderate guift’s are 
not Pryncely liberality, nor cannot hold out vnles the Prynce 
will streatch out his hand where it should not be: neither is it 
prouident liberality, to giue all at once w
ch
 he meaneth to giue, 
but by litles, thereby the receyuor still resisting bound, w
th
 a 
hope of receyuing more, for that euen as the shower w
ch
 softly 
& slowly falleth doth continue longest, & better bath’s y
e
 
The Hebreues hold almes ye 
conseruatrix of their families & 
the mainteyner of their greatnes. 
The king of the Iewes in 
th’extreame dearth wore haire 
clothes vpon his shoulders. 
The Duke of Sauoye also his 
recreation to feed and cloth ye 
poore. 
Luis .9. ordinarily releiued .120. 
poore. 
Robert king of Fraunce here wth all 
established his Kingdome 
releiuing .1000. poore, to follow 
the courte to pray for him. 
Cassius lost his life wth others for 
larges of corne in ye tyme of 
dearth to the poore. 
Marcus Aurelius made an outcry 
for sale of all his gold plate & 
iewells, & with ye money therfore 
receiued mainteyned ye warres. 
Iustinian, th’Emperor Constantyne 
both vnlearned yet wth fauour of 
learning were famous. 
So Otto .3. but a young man. 
So Alphonsus of Aragon. Mathias 
Caruinus king of Hungary all great 
patrons of learning. 
Herewthall Carolus Magnus got his 
name. 
Basilius Macedom Emperor for 
that his auncestor had ill bestowed 
the reuenewe caused proclamation 
for restitution. 
Nero in 14 yeares gaue aboue 











ground and deeper entereth in thereunto. So liberality vsed in 
measure doth better begett and conserue beneuolence of his w
ch
 
doth receyue it; & w
th
out doubt it is better to giue moderately to 
many, or to all if it were possible, then profusely to fewe; for 
that greater & more Pryncely is the vertue, the more generall it 
is, and more like the Sunne, which giueth comportement and 





THE SECOND BOOKE, OF 
THE ADIVNCT’S OF 
Reputation. 
 
Thus passing ouer Iustice and liberality as specyall meanes to 
wynne loue, necessary to Prynces: let vs proceed to the 
adiunctes of reputation to a Prynce no lesse necessary, w
ch
 are 
Prudence & Valour, two Pilasters where vpon euery good 
gouerment hath his foundation. Th’one for th’eye of y
e
 Prynce, 
th’other for his hand, otherwise both blynd & impotent. Th’one 
subministreth Councell th’other force; th’one commaundeth, 
th’other executeth, th’one discouereth the difficulty of the 
imprese th’other breaketh through it, th’one designeth th’other 
incarnateth th’affayres. Th’one refineth y
e
 iudgement th’other 
corrob^or^ateth y
e
 hart, but it is fittest to handle them seuerally.  
 
Refiners of Prudence are Science & experience fit also to be 
handled seuerally.  
 
To none it is more conuenient to knowe more then to a Prynce, 
Philosophy morall to giue knowledge of passion common to 





 rules of good gouerment, knowledge Military, 
Poeticall, Geometricall, Mechanicall to serue himselfe 
iudiciously ouer. such as professe them Rhetoricke is likewise 
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not to be forgotten: for that Eloquence is the moderatrix of the 






 none can haue w
th
out knowledge of naturall Philosophy. To 
come by all w
ch
, the best way is for the Prynce to haue still 
about him men of euery profession singuler, as 
Mathematicians, Philosophers, Orators, Captaynes and 
Souldiers; by whom dayly in few wordes and houres he may 
learne that, which he could not in Schooles in many moneth’s. 
In perticuler nothing is more necessary for a Prynce to know, 
then the inclination and humors of his Subiects. w
ch
 best are 
knowne by the scyte of the Country age, fortune and education, 
all saue y
e
 first sufficiently handled in Aristotle in his 
Rhetoriques.  
As in euery other thinge the good consisteth in the midle, so is 
it in the scyte of the vniuerse, Therefore Aristotle saith that 
people twixt the north and south are the best qualitied of witt 
and carriage, and aptest to gouerne. 
The Northern people not in the extreame part of the North, are 
Stout, great bodyes full of blood and vigor open, constant, 
merry w
th
out crafte, subiect to Bacchus. The Southern are 
subtil, sharp witted, inconstant, melancholique not stout 
drawing neerer y
e
 nature of the foxe then the lyon, subiect to 
Venus.  
The meridionall people are giuen to Speculation, gouerning by 
[fo. 10
r
] Religion and Superstition. Astrology and Magicke had 
there first their beginning.  
The people in th’extreame Northren and Southern partes are of 
litle body, and of ill fashion or carriage; in th’one of them 
fleagme abounding, in th’other melancholy. 
Th’eastern people are tractable of goodly great personage. 
People towards th’east & South subtile & of close carriage. 
Towards the North & West more open & simple. The people 
inhabiting where great stormy windes are turbulent, & where 
For the Mechanickes Iulius Cæsar 
was excellent. So in Eloquence 
Pericles thundered in his discourses. 
Augustus had facility.  
 
Tyberius waight and obscurity in 
his speaches. 
Caligula eloquent, yet somtyme 
wandring in his speaches. 
Claudius excellent in speach 
premeditate. 
Alphonsus king of Naples vsed to 
say a Prynce vles learned is an asse 
crowned. 
Charles the great and Charles the 
wise & Traiane Emperors all 
generally wise. 
The Assiryans, Meedes, Persians, 
Turkes, Greekes, Romaynes, 
Fraunce, Spaine. 
The Transiluians, Poles, Danes, 
Scotch and English people. 
The Saracens, the king of Morocco 
and Fessa. The great Negro, Prester 
Iohn which as it were would haue 
him adorned of his people neuer 
showeing them any part of his body 





quiet ayre, sweetly conditioned. In mounteynous places they 
pertake more of the Sauage feirce & cruell.  
In Valley’s more effeminate, in barren Countryes industrious, 
in fruitfull Countryes delicate & idle.  
The Marityne people by reason of great conuerse & practise w
th
 
strangers are wilye & aduantagious, and therefore Plynie 
calleth y
e
 Sea, Improbitatis magistrum. And lastly the peopled 
mediterraine are sincere, loyall & easy to be contented.  
 
There is nothing more ^so^ necessary to giue perfection to 
Prudence, & by it well to mannage the Commonwealth, as 
experience the mother y
e
 mother of prudence. for that many 
things seemeth in Chamber discourse, to be grounded vpon 
reason, w
ch
 put forward cometh to no effect: many things seem 
easie to effect, w
ch




This experience is of two sortes, by our selfe or by others, 
liuing or dead; and the largest feild to learne experience in, is 
by the dead, in reading written histories, the largest Theatre 
imaginable where is to be learned all things at other men’s cost 
and damages.  
And Poetry, as it were a liueing and liuely experience of things, 
is not to be neglected, w
ch
 so liuely point’s out fictions, that is 
breed’s imitation; and handling of heroicall actions excellently 
by a good poet, will incite any Prynce to affections & actions 
heroique, but fly the impudique and scurril poets w
ch
 teach 
roguery not vertue.  
 
Hold as a thinge resolued for a Prynce not to deale in 
deliberation or trust w
th
 any that hath not y
e
 foundation of 
reputation.  
At the first meet y
e
 begining of ills w
th
 fitt prouision: for 
disorder in tyme encreaseth and getteth strength.  
Lucullus a pryme Captaine onely by 
reading histories. 
Selin in reading the historie of 
Alexander magnus and Iulius 
Cæsar became like them in 
affection of mynde. 
Mahomet .2. the first called great 
Turke alway’s had a booke of 
histories in his hand. 
And Ferdinando the Marques of 
Pescara in reading in his young 
yeares the Romaine histories was 
so enflamed with glory that he 
became a famous Captaine. 
Alexander the great found great 
delight in Homer. 
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But if ill exceed thy force vse tyme for a meanes, for he that 
hath tyme hath life.  
Doe not thinke in any pointe of deliberation to salue all sores, 
for in all best orders some disorder is conioyned. 
Yet doe not neglect the least disorder that can be helped: for 
that all ills beginne by litles. 




Doe not embrace to many impreses of importance at once. Chi 
multo abraccia. poco stringe: he w
ch
 embraceth much, claspeth 
litle.  
In Conquests make good footing: Tacit[us] commends to .P. 
Ostarius, Destinationis certum, ne noya moliretur, nisi prioribus 
firmatis.  
In the first yeare of the prynces raigne doe no nouelty.  
Shoulder not one more potent, and suffer not too many broyles 
to come vpon the at one tyme. Ne Hercules contra duos. 
dissemble iniuryes beyond thy power to remedy, or offences 
w
ch
 thou canst not correct. for in insuperable tempests, best is to 
strike Sayle and to giue way vnto tyme.  
There is nothing more vnworthy a wise Prynce, then to committ 
himselfe to fortune or chance.  
Make no suddaine violent change w
ch
 neuer produceth durable 
effect. the Cæsars perpetuall Dictators first became Tribunes, 
then Prynces and lastly Emperors and absolute patrons of y
e 
Commonwealth.  
Being ready to any imprese deferr not.  Nocuit semper deferre 
paratis.  
Alwayes preferr old before new and quiet before trouble. 
Vse no absolute power, where ordinary power will serue, 
Th’one is Kinglike, th’other Tyrantlike. 
In bookes Prynces may see many worthy secrets w
ch
 none dare 




By noueltyes the ruyne  of Fraunce 
& Flaunders th’one by Iasper di 
collingi to Francis .2. th’other 
presented to the Duke of Parmaes 
Lady. 
Ladisloa the sonne of Charles ye 
king of Naples in his first yeare 
being called to Hungary dangered 
all, not hauing first setled him in 
his owne kingdome. 
Phillip king of Macedon excelling 
herein. 
The Romaines & Turkes followed 
this rule. 
Immotum aduertus eos sermones 
fixumq[ue] Tiberio fuit non 
omittere caput rerum neq[ue], in 
casum dare. 
So Cart[us] Marsellus aspiring to 
the crowne of Fraunce being but 
Steward of the house did not first 
vsurpe ye name of king but Prince 
of the nobility of Fraunce. And so 





 the Commonwealth being powerfull, but w
th
 
great aduantage & secured of the victory.  
Breake not w
th
 the Church, for it will alwayes seem impious & 
not likely to come to good effect. 
In election of Officers, let officers alwayes be like to the place 
for that the superior scorneth the seruice and y
e
 inferior is not 
able to vndergoe it.  
Continue not in warres w
th
 thy neighbours, for that will make 
them Souldiers & dangerous neighbours. for so was Agesilaus 
paid home w
th
 the Thebanes.  
Much lesse continue warres w
th
 thy Subiects, especyallie 
naturall Subiects, w
ch
 still by warres waxe worse. at the first 
none being so shameles or malepart to rebell. but once if they 
embrew their sword in blood, and put of the vaile of iust 
proceedings, they make generall reuolte. 
Doe not so trust to peace, vtterly to dismisse armes; for that 
disarmed peace is the weakest peace, more dangerous then 
warres.  
Speedy and nimble dispatch of busines, is of far more 
importance, then force; th’one striketh at vnawares, th’other is 
foreseen. Th’one first disordereth th’enemy and then breaketh 
through them, being far easier to disorder, then to breake 
through.  
The greater busines is conduced to good end w
th
 long 
perseuerance rather then w
th





] and tyme first to weaken & then to cast 
downe then violently at y
e
 first to force all.  
Study to know the occasion of the imprese in hand, & embrace 
the fitt opportunity nothing being of of more moment. 
opportunity being no other thinge, saue onely a period of tyme, 
wherein there is the concourse of circumstances w
ch
 maketh the 
busines easie. Temporibus sapienter vtens. 
Tiberius alwayes obserued this. 
The Turkes policyes alwayes in 
warres, And so hath old Souldiers 
neuer continuing warres in any one 
place, or maketh any old souldiers 
but his owne. 
So Alexander ye great king of ye 
Iewes after six yeares warres with 
his Subiects & 50,000 persons 
slayne nothing would content them 
but his blood. 
Sigismond in Bohemia the king of 
Spayne in Flaunders a good 
example herein. 
Constantine th’Emperor securing 
himself of peace for his tyme, 
dismist his lymitary soldiers and 
opened the gate into ye whole 
Empire to the Barbarians. 
Cæsar began his warre with 300 
horse & 5000 foot & wth 
inestimable dexterity tooke away 
opportunity from his enemy to 
make head & in 70 dayes was 
possest of whole Italy. 
Philip king of Macedon so serued 
himselfe with the discord of Greece. 
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Secrecy. 
Committ no busines of importance to him w
ch
 disliketh of it, for 
that the will cannot be effectuall, where there is no inclination 
in vnderstandinge.  
Consult maturely, but prescribe not y
e
 manner of th’execution, 
w
ch
 dependeth vpon the opportunity & occasions present, and 
to lymit such execution is to intricate th’executioner and to 
creple and lame the busines. Therfore are needfull wise 
Councell, stout actes: Consultare sente, consulta exequi 
festinanier. which cannot be done where the Commission is 
curiously straitened. 
Thinke not to auoyd dangers w
th
 flying, for ^they^ then follow 
the; encounter then and then they flye the.  
Take heed of shewing any perticularity more to the Nobles, 
then to the Comminality. for that therby of a Prynce of all, thou 
shalt become a head but of a part.  
Trust him not w
ch
 either is or thinketh himself wronged by the, 





Because Officers neere or about the King will still help 
themselues: the King should make account of the absent, w
ch
 
ordinarily are at greater charge & trauell then th’other.  




 great difficulty 
is ouercome & w
th
 great losse of loue: but good maryner like 
take y
e
 wynd in the flanke when you cannot haue it in the 
poope, and make showe to will & giue that freely: w
ch
 cannot 
be held or hindered, Scelara impetu, bona consilia mora 
valescunt.  
 
There is nothing more necessary in matter of state then 
Secrecy, making easy the execution of things desseigned; as 
also the managing of it from the begining: like to couert & 
secret vndermynes w
ch
 haue admirable effect otherwise bring 
danger.  
So Amurath king of ye Turkes 
enlarged his Empire in Europe by 
discord of ye Prynces of Greece. 
A Iust example was yt of the Count 
Iulian and Charles of Burbon. 
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The way to keep secret, is not to imparte but that is me^e^nt, in 
things w
ch
 the Prynce in his owne iudgement is able to resolue. 
but if it be to be perticipated then to few and to such as by 
nature are secretly desposed and of great warynes.  
And the better to keep secret any thing is to learne the art of 
dissimulation. to seeme not to reguard, esteame or know that 
w
ch
 you do regard esteame and know & to do one thinge by 
another. 
Alway’s take heed to show any passion, or in any passion to 
shew any signes of the mynd or affection: and in passion of 
anger especially be watchfull not to let fall any word of 
threatening w
ch
 is th’armes of y
e




To much nimblenes & vivacity of witt in Councell is not to be 
followed. they in their curious limitation are ^lyk^ y
e
 Germane 
clocke, where in, the more curious arte, the sooner they are 
disordered. for matter of state are of so great moment, that they 
cannot endure to be grounded vpon Atomes or minute sutleties. 
Likwise neither the grand or magnificall councells are to be 
embraced, whose fruites comonly are shame & da[m]mage, 
whose councell is onely of great apparance but of no substance.  
Much lesse regard huge vaste councell, embraceing 
vnmeasurable proiects, w
ch
 neither the Prynces money, life or 
force can supplye.  
Also desseignes of great darring or too much boldnes are 
dangerous, whose end comonly is misery and desperation.  
In stead of those, follow Councell well grounded mature & 
least subiect to accident. Yet in Conquest or seruice to enlarge 
y
e
 Kingdome, hazard sometyme must be made to shew 
stoutnes, for he that hazards nothing gets nothinge: otherwise it 
is in conseruation of kindomes, where slow & surest 
Counsellors are fittest whem as in endeuors of Conquest 
nimblenes & viuacitye in Counsell are to be embraced. 
Councell cannot be too cautelous in deliberation, except in 
The same answere was made by 
Peter of Aragon to Martin the .4. in 
the like occasion. 
Merellus answered one desirous to 
know a secret: that if he thought his 
shirt knew of it he would cast it in 
to fire & burne it. 
Luis .11. king of France held the 
great arte of raigning to be ye arte of 
dissimulation. 
Alphonso Duke of Calabrio onely 
by threatening, stirred vp rebellion. 
Francis Dorso being threatned by 
Ieronimo Riario kild him in his 
chamber. 
The venetians lesse subtle then ye 
Florentynes, & the Lacedemonians 
then th’Athenians, eyer had better 
successe in matter of Councell. 
Antiocus ye great in magnificall 
burialls of the Macedons in the 
arres betwene K. Philip & Q. 
Flaminius is a fitt example. 
Such was ordinarily the thought’s 


















things presently vrginge, nor to bold in execution. Doe not 
easily giue credit or likeing to new inuentions, not warrented by 
experience, nor make reckoning of engines w
ch






Nouelty’s in Gouerments are hatefull and if attempted it must 
be by insensible litles, imitatinge nature in her gentle passe 
from her extremity of cold to extremity of heat, and so contrary 
and all by litles insensible by the pleasant interpose of the 
spring and fall.  
Alcibides saith it is the securest life to be content w
th
 lawes & 
customes although meanly good. 
 
Valour consisteth of prudence & vigor of mynde, which two 
being vnited produce admirable operation. 
Valour is of far more value and force to conserue the state then 
potency, as the descendents from Conqueror inheriting there 
powers and forces but not their vertues in many perticulers 
from tyme to tyme shew and make manifest.  
 
This valour as it consisteth of stoutnes or vigor of mynde, 
proceed’s partly from the mynd, partly from the body & partly 
from th’exterior forces. 
Of which although that which proceed’s from the mynde be 
more excellent, co[m]maunding th’infirme body. yet ordinarily 
a body ill complexioned & infirme, interreth and maketh grosse 
y
e
 best part of y
e
 mynd. Therefore in a Prynce is required a 
personage well composed of complexion sound & lusty. 
 
To which end nature must be helpt with arte conseruing and 
encreasinge health. 
 
Saule after he was chosen & 
anoynted king liued as a priuate 
man onely to escape enuie and 
emulation. 
August[us] Cæsar to palliate the 
nouelty of principality would not 
be called Emperor or king but by 
the name of Tribune. Proprium 
Tiberio scelera nuper reperta, 






may be. Encreased. 
Mainteyned. 
Conseruinge of health is sobriety & moderation in dyet, the 
contrary filleth [fo. 14
r
] the body w
th
 ill humors & crudity 
begetting gouty and other wearisome maladyes. 
Likewise continency, whose contrary weakneth man and beast 
in spirite and nerues, hasteneth old age, darkneth the sight and 
openeth a thousand gates to goute, dropsie, and death.  
Health is encreased best by exercise: best whereof such as 
awaketh and nimbleth euery part of the body.  
And to encrease health and to make it stout the body must be 
acquainted w
th
 heates and coldes, hunger, thirst, and watching, 
water and wyne, & w
th
 all the varietyes of life: for so is health 
best assured ready and able for all accidents & encounters.  
And how soeuer if y
e
 body cannot be made stronge but still 
continue infirme: The vigor of mynd must help to susteyne the 
counterpoise of the body in all his infirmityes.  
 
And thus hauing learned the way to reputation vertue prudence 
& valour, it is fit to see how reputation may be maynteyned & 
encreased. 
First rather warily couer weaknes & impotency then defence it, 
for that such defence many tymes doth more descouer it.  
It also addeth to reputation to make shew of best forces without 
ostentation.  
So more deedes then wordes: for that Prynces workes should 
not be wordes.  
So grauity & solidarity in speaches, w
th
out vant or brauery, & 




Fly amplification and hyperbolicall speaches w
ch
 take away the 
credit of the speaker and argue litle experience in the busines. 
It proceedeth of constancy & iudgement to mainteyne thy 
worde. 
Galene commendes ye ball, and 
hunting. 
A worthy example of Charles the 
.5. soe ill affected with goute, that 
he could not hold his foot in any 
Stirrop but in a swadlin lynnen 
band & yet kept feild all awinter 
in snowe and myre. 
Alfonso king of Aragon excellent 
herein. 
Scipio Africanus admirable 
herein. So vespasian of whom is 
said in ipso nihil tumidu[s] 
arrogans, aut in nouis nouum. 
Duke of Parma famous herein. 
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Be constant in aduersity w
ch
 sheweth stoutnes of harte & 
valour, and moderate in prosperity w
ch
 sheweth a mynd 
superior to fortune.  
Take not in hand any thinge aboue thy force, and enter not into 
any thinge where thou canst not securely come honorablye out. 
Send not out to base or meane impreses w
ch
 are no way like to 
bringe out reputation.  
Let thy vnderstanding be great, especially in thy beginings for 
thereof the rest is iudged. Nel principio consista la meta.  
Hauing put thy selfe into a busines, easily leaue it not of, therin 
showeing litle iudgement in enteringe into it, and lesse spirit in 
leaueing it. 
Be not a dependant of a Councell or fellowe worker w
th
 others, 
for that is to constitute a Superior, & to discouer incapacity and 
weaknes.  
Professe nothinge but that w
ch
 is seemly for a Prynce. 
Vse secrecy w
ch
 maketh the God like, and keepeth thy Subiects 
alwayes suspecting & expectinge great desseignes.  
vniformity in life & actions, and inuariable maner of 




Suffer not thinges belonging to thy selfe to be managed but by 
excellent persons.  
Entreat not of matters of moment by meane Subiects, base or 
weake, whose basenes doth vilifye the busines. 
Be not familiar w
th
 any, especially with pratlers  
Make store of thy selfe, not showinge thy selfe vpon euery 
occasion: but in great occasions & then in state seemly for a 
Prynce. Continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines 
ipsa facietate facit.  
Delight not in garments light, but graue, not pompeous but 
moderate.  
Fly extremity either in headlong, or to slowe falling into 
busines, but maturely & moderately, rather slowe w
ch
 hath a 
The Romaines in ye warre againt 
Antiochus so conditioned before 
victory as though they had 
conquered & after as though they 
had not. 
Such was Scipio his imprese of 
Carthage in the begining of his 
gouerment in Spaine. 
The Spanyard so wary they will as 
it were neyer willingly lose a 
pawne. 
Galba th’Emperor wanted it. 
None was allowed to picture 
Alexander ye great but Apelles. 
Augustus Cæsar scorned to heare 
his name handled but of greatest 







resemblance of prudence, then precipitate which hath a plaine 
semblance of temeritye, contrary to reputation.  
Seuerity before pleasant blithnes is preferrd in a Prynce. 
All thing concerninge a Prynce must be excellently & pryncely 
done with due circumstance.  
Let him shew in euery thinge magnificence, spending largely in 
honoured things y
t
 is either belonginge to God, the good of y
e
 
Co[m]monwealth and ^or^ extraordinary occurrents. 
Likewise magnanimity, great w
th
 the great, humanity with his 
like, makeing more account of verity then opinyon & 
whatsoeuer proceedeth from him let it be great, compleat, 




Let him not take impreses many, but fewe excellent and 
glorious.  
In all his actions let there be represented something high and 
heroique. 
Let him be assured to keep on foot obedience and dependencye 
of his Subiect in things of importance.  
Let him not communicate any thinge that concerneth his 
greatnes, maiesty or superiority.  
Sit summæ seueritatis et munificentie  
Old age often tymes diminisheth reputation. 
Let him be out of doubt that reputation depends not of 
seeminge, but of being.  
 
Prynces haue been called great, by reason of the greatnes of the 
state vnited to the Crowne: or by greatnes of th’imprese done 
by them in peace or warres, which is esteamed great either for 
th’importance thereof or for that it is the first tyme of 
vndertaking.  
So haue they been called wise for any study, arte, or learninge. 
 
Paulus Emelius no lesse renowned 
by feasting ye Grecian ambassader 
then in taking of ye king of Persia. 
Scipio Africanus and Alfonsus 
king of Naples excellent herein. 
The king of India & Iapon being 
old retyred themselues 












 vertues afore remembered, parents or pilasters of loue or 
reputation, cannot long stand w
th
out these two supporters; 
Religion & Temperance: for y
t
 the Co[m]monwealth is a vyne 
w
ch
 cannot flourish or bring out his fruit w
th
out fauourable & 
Cælestiall influence & humane industry cherishing it & 
dressing it from his superfluityes.  
Religion procureth maintenance of states by supernaturall helpe 
of the grace of God.  
Temperance with holding out the ill extremes and cherishing of 





Therefore Prynces first of all ought to humble themselyes 
before God, and to acknowledge as from him all gouerment & 
obedience done to them beinge here appointed by hym as his 
vice-regents for a tyme, and the higher they are placed the more 
they ought to humble themselues before God and not to put 
hand to any thinge but such as they are assured of to be 
warranted by Gods lawe.  
And to that end whatsoeuer matter of importance they should 
cause it first to be hammered in the forge of good conscience 
by learned Deuines. 
Such a Prynce so humbled and good in y
e
 sight of God is many 
tymes the cause of the prosperity of the people: Such a Prynce 
will reforme his people with good lawes & put best order in 
thinges of religion and diuyne worshippe: for that religion is 
the mother of all vertues of obedience of y
e
 Subiects, of 
fortitude in all dangers, and redines in any thing that concerneth 
the Commonwealth, and doth not onely bring the people to 
subiect their bodyes, & facultyes whatsoeuer, and bynde their 
handes but eyen their hearts and thoughts, so that willingly they 
suffer any thinge before disturbance of the peace of the land. 
And nothing more disobligeth the Subiect from obedience to y
e
 
Prynce then when any thinge is prest contrary to the lawe of 
Aristotle councelled the Tyrant 
by all meanes to seeme 
religious, his Subiects thereby 
thinking they shall not vniustly 
be dealt withall, & with very 
chary to offend him wch they 
thinke is beloued of God. 
Fardinande of Aragon & Issabella 
of Spaine alwayes left to their 
Captaines as p[ar]te of their 
co[m]mission to attempt nothing 
before the religious and the 
Bishopps were first acquainted 
therewithall. 
The Turkes doe nothing but first 
consultation had with their mutflies. 
The Romaines attempted nothing 
without the first approbation of 
their Southsayers & not before 
some pacification first made of their 
Gods anger or reconciliation of 
fauour or giueing of thankes for 












nature or the lawe of God: So that people religious w
th
out all 
question liue far more obedient to y
e
 Prynce then those y
t
 are 





And therefore the Prynce must haue especiall care to auoyde 
the extreames of religion: Dissimulation & Superstition which 
cannot hold out, and discouered vtterly discredits the doer.  
Therefore against dissimulation let him be trulye religious, and 
wise against superstition; for God is trueth, and in trueth & 
cleannes of spirit wilbe worshipped. 
To which end let the Prynce prouide store of worthy teachers, 
not such as flourish in words like entertainors of Gusse, but 
such as auoide such blushles carriage in so diuine a seruice, 
breathing and as it were infuleing in the mynde of the hearers 
spirit and trueth, preaching Christ crucified and no themselues. 
Let him also prouide for the ministers, that they be not 
contemptible poore, or beggerly, w
ch
 greatly debaseth religion 
to the common people.  
Let him vse magnificence in the fabrique of the Church, and 
thinke it more estimable for a Christian Prynce to repaire 
th’ancient Churches then to build new, w
ch
 many tymes is done 
out of vanity.  
And for that there is no true wisedome w
th
out temperance it is 
fit to learne some lessons of temperance.  
Religion is the mother, and temperance the Nurse of vertue: for 
that w
th
out Temperance prudence is blynd, fortitude weake, 
Iustice corrupted, and euery [fo. 17
r
] good looseth his vigor.  
Gluttony, sleep and idle downbeds abandons out of y
e
 world 
whatsoeuer is honest and generous. 
Indigestion stupifieth the witt, taketh away strength and 
shorteneth life.  
Delicacy hatcheth effeminacy, goeth beyond equality, 
parallelleth superiority in magnificence both at table, dyet & 
Miscislaus king of Polonia 
greatly encreased Christian 
faith there with, founding & 
endowing Churches & adoreing 
diuine worship. Dauid was 
magnificent in the fabrique of 
ye Temple & much bettered ye 
seruice of the Tabernacle. 
Delicacy entered into Rome with 
the triumph of Scipio & Manlius & 
from hand to hand so spred abrod 
this delicate poison yt Rome vtterly 









apparell: yea men are so far ouergone in euery vanity that they 
cannot content themselues w
th
 their owne reuenewes & estate, 
but will streatch out their hands euen to holy and sacred 
thinges.  
Thus falleth the priuate & so ruynateth the publique, and 
wanting the foundation, downe goeth the state: for of that 
nature is mans greatnes that in the very height it breeds & 
bringes foorth wormes of delight Rust & canker of sensualityes 
which by litle and litle consumeth it and bringeth all to ruyne.  
But cheifly and first to be remedied and reformed is the pride 
and pompe of women who are so apt to corrupt men, and men 
so apt to be corrupted by them that few men haye any rule at 
all, or are maisters of their wiues, but ^with^ their lubricity & 
lasciuiousnes are by them in their substance quite consumed.  
For remedy whereof there are two wayes, either to forbid stuffe 
cloth or ornaments of great price to be worne, or els to charge 
them w
th
 so high imposition, that none [fo. 17
v
] great 
personages can afforde to giue the price thereof. otherwise 
these and especially pearles, stones, fumes, and other things 
that are far fett from strange & forraigne places, will steale out 
of the Kingdome the greatest quantity of gold and silver of the 
land, and onely for a gentle fauor or a litle pratle of foolish 
women, mens coffers must be exhausted and there estate quite 
ouerturned.  
Cato said long will that City 
continue where a fish is sold deerer 
then an oxe. 
So Portugale ruynate by delicacy 
from India. 
August[us] Cæsar gaue Edict for 
moderating excesse in building. 
Seneca Couiuoru[s] et vestium 
luxuria ægræ ciuitatis indiciæ. 
Domitian[us] his sonne forbad 
purple & pearle & such like. 
Forbidden in Portugal and Genes. 
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Appendix C – Transcription of Sloane MS 3938  
Introduction:  
What follows is a full transcription of the English translation of the first 
Secretissima instructio, originally published in Latin in 1620 and followed by 
two others in 1622 and 1626.
1387
 One of Europe’s most widely read 
propagandistic works, its author has never been determined, nor does the 
translator identify himself. The extant MS itself has neither dedication nor 
preface, and the title page was added at a later date. It is also difficult to date the 
manuscript, although it is likely that it followed fairly closely on the heels of the 
publication of the Latin original.     
 
Conventions:  
Abbreviations and Contractions: I have expanded contractions and abbreviations 
using square brackets, excepting ‘y
e
’ for ‘the’, ‘w
th
’ for ‘with’ and ‘w
ch
’ for 
‘which’. I have retained the use of superscript throughout.  
Additions/Deletions: I have indicated additions with carets (eg. ^example^) and 
deletions by striking through the passage (eg. example). Additions by a later 
hand are indicated by carets and italicised text (eg. ^example^). 
Foliation: I have used the folio numbers given, excluding the blank unmarked 
pages added before the first noted folio.  
Illegible Text: The single example of illegible text has been indicated by square 
brackets and ellipses.  
Italics: I have used italics where the script changes, usually to indicate a proper 
name, or a foreign-language translation.  
                                                 
1387




^Advice to Frederick 5
th
 Elector 
Palatine, who was chosen King 





: Daughter to James 1
st
 King 
of Great Brittain, by whom he had 






Charles succeeded his Father in y
e
 Electorate.  
Rob
ert





 marryd to y
e
 Princess Ann of Mantua &  









1: Most gratious Prince, and most beloued puple receave from yo
ur
 most faithfull 
tutor, a well experinced Souldio
r
 and most profound statesman, these noe vulgar 
lessons: by keepinge of them yo
u
 shall preserue yo
ur
 selfe: by these the 
kingdomes of Brittannie are united, Holland defended, and the kinges of Fraunce 
kept in their office, by these yo
u











 follower, whose 
health dependes upon yo
ur
 safetie, minnistringe unto yo
u
 secret, but serious 
Councells: From a Child yo
u
 have learned the difference twixt Councell and 
Flattorie. But yo
u
 must be Carefull to keepe those secretts of state close from 
other men, for if yo
ur








2: The dice are Cast, yo
u
 have passed Rubicon, yo
u







 may now fall downe headlonge from the toppe, come downe yo
u
 
cannot. It is not fitt that he w
ch
 oppresses his equalls, should find amongest his 
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equalls: either all, even those that are yo
ur
 helpers to this greatnes, must be 
suppressed, or all must be lost: All Alexanders progenie were slaine by 
Alexanders Captaines: Consider these things well and yo
u





3: As ever in any kingdome, then in yo
urs
, it is a much greater vertue to keepe 
that yo
u
 have gotten, then to gett: I say greater, for without any labour of yo
urs
, 
onely by the Craft and wilinesse of yo
ur
 freindes, all thinges are brought unto yo
ur
 
hands. In a word, were it lawefull in these hidden mistories to confesse soe 
much, yo
u
 are become a kinge by mistakinge or error. But now that yo
u
 haue 




 must defend it w
th
 all the strength yo
u
 can make either of 
yo
ur
 selfe or by freinds. Recken from the tyme of Julius Cesar unto Fardinand, 
and yo
u
 shall finde that amongst one hundreth that [fo. 3
r
] haue usurped 
kingedomes, there are not foure that haue not lost them againe, and perished w
th
 
theire whole family. Amongest great kindes, few liue out their tyme: Amongest 
50: Emperours, finde three, that haue not yeelded up their bloud to Enuie and 
hatred. Amongest the Bohemian kindes, two onely haue ruled without Rebellion 
Bee yo
u
 afraid of these, whose place yo
u
 now hould yo
u
 haue drawen yo
ur
 sword 
against the Emperour: feare not onely the Emperours, but euery mans sword. 
Whosoeuer Contemmes his owne life is maister of yo
urs
: yea whosoeuer shall kill 
yo
u
, will glory in the act, as though he had done it upon a theefe or a Robber: 
Take warninge therefore from me, learne magnificence from Courtiers, and the 
hazard yo
u
 ru[n]ne from the dead, and I wish yo
u
 may know all these thinges by 
readinge, not by experience.  
 









 true frindes and faigned frindes, or close Enemies, both w
ch
 







 open Enemies are, the howse of Austria, the Pope, the Italians, and such 
as honestly and without dissimulation adheare unto them: For defence against 
these Enemies, yo
u
 will be putt to a great and dayly expence, yo
u
 will haue need 
of expert and faithfull Captaynes, and a perpetuall warre, because all these are in 
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their power, they may be often oue^r^come but slowlie Conquered: yo
u
 know 
Hanuball victorius in three great, and some smaller battayles and yett at length 
ouercome in warre, lost all those glories w
th




 cannot of yo
ur
 selfe equall yo
ur
 open Enemies in riches and strength, and 
therfore yo
u
 must pray in aid of Confederates, wherin there are many daungers: 
First that they be not greiued w
th
 expences: Secondly that they dispaire not of 
Recompence: Thirdly that they be not discouraged by any misfortune: Fourthly 
that they disagree not amongest themselues: Fiftly that they be not engaged in 
another warre: Sixtly that yo
ur
 greatnes draw not on their Enuies: Last of [fo. 4
r
] 
last of [sic] all, least upon any occasion fallinge of difference amongest 





of Germany hath taught yo
u
 those thinges by example in the tyme of Charles 5: 
when the Princes betrayed the Cittizens. It is therfore worthie your 
Considerac[i]on how to make yo
ur




7: Neither would I onely haue yo
u
 to Consider the present power of yo
ur
 Enemies, 
but even that also, w
th
 extreame daunger and desperac[i]on may bringe to passe 
and procure: A stout ^hart^ though vanquished can neuer want weapons. What if 
Fardinand, Leopold, Charles, and others be put to extreames: what if they passe 
ouer their Rights to the Venetians: what if they deliuer Lusatia, Silesia, Morauia, 
to the nobles of Poland or to that kingedome: what if they offer their Right, I say 
not to Spayne, or Fraunce but to any other. What if by force of a league they take 
aid heretofore wilingly offered from [fo. 4
v
] the Turke, from whome yo
u
 and 
Gabor haue desired help, doe yo
u
 thinke the Turke would refuse so faire an 
oportunity: what if the Spainiard make peace w
th
 the Turke: what if they sell 





 shall be strooke when yo
u
 looke not for a blow; men in miserie 
are verie industrious, great men shall neuer want Co[m]misserac[i]on nor the 
afflicted helpe: But why doe I loose my selfe? yo
u 
shall receaue a blow from 
those yo
u
 least suspect.  
 
8: Consider likewise yo
u
 haue but few freindes: yo
ur
 father in law, yo
ur
 weife, the 





frindes, the rest follow yo
ur
 Fortunes, and are frindes to their owne hope and 
preferment, whom unlesse yo
u
 satisfie and that fully, yo
u





9: But to take a more p[ar]ticuler vein of yo
ur
 Freinds. The Bohemians are in noe 
sort yo
ur
 frindes, that [fo. 5
r
] is more true then credible, and that yo
u
 shall finde 
when yo
u
 examine their Act[i]ons: First they chose yo
u





 but out of necessitie, and when both Saxonie and Bauaria had 
refused them, and there was a great dispute amongst them, whether they should 
proferre Saxonie against his will or Gabriell: Then they determined to be free, 
after the maner of Holland and the Venetians, anon they preposed an Heluelian 
Republique, but standinge doubtfull betwene Dukes and kinges, when they 
perceaued the Princes would yeild them noe aid in an example soe pernitious, 
when they considered likewise, that w
th
out a kinge they could haue noe voice in 
the elecc[i]on of the Emperour, upon better aduise they to draw in aides to them 
selues by a ceremoniall coronation: 
Thirdly, now they show a more manifest signe of their hatred against yo
u
, when 
they put upon yo
u
 such condic[i]ons of gouerninge, as moderat lords would 
scarce impose upon their slaues: yo
u
 are constrained to sweare to all their present 
and future Actes and decrees: if yo
u
 refuse, they are yo
ur





] hangmen or breakneks: yo
u
 cann wage noe 
warre appoint noe Souldio
urs







 can haue noe howses of munition, the will: To conclud, yo
u
 are 
enforced to subscribe the Actes of their Senate though it be to yo
ur
 owne 
disgrace, yea against yo
ur




 yeald unto, yo
u
 shall be 




 fayre word and flatterie, counterfaintinge and 
ostentation doth more affect in businesses of this nature then truth and 
freindshippe: cosenage had need of many vayles, least it be found out: Learne 
their natures, amidst theire cuppes and their surfests  they consult, and are very 
swift and speedie in effectinge their consultations Bohemia was euer a 
Stepmother to kinges of its owne nation, then hope not to finde it a mother to yo
u
 
a straunger: while it feares other Princes and hopes in yo
u
, it will be at some 
quiett, when it begins to feare, or leaues of hope in yo
u
, it will returne to its 




10: Seinge therfore the Bohemians are by nature cruell, fierce, and stubborne, in 
their councells abrupt, suddaine in their execuc[i]on, yo
u
 shall doe [fo. 6
r
] well as 
yett not to thinke yo
ur
 selfe their kinge nor them yo
ur
 subiectes: Thinke yo
ur
 selfe 




 owne rootes but supported w
th
 diuerse 
Forkes and Proppes, wherof many may very easily be cutt downe and broken of: 
consider that noe power canne be of continuance, that is not borne up and 
grounded on its owne strength: yo
ur
 government cannot be durable but by consent 
of freinds, but that consent is very uncertaine and lasts but a moment: This shall 
yo
u
 finde true, when they need not feare the howse of Austria, when yo
u
 shall 
demaund tribute of them and decree punishments against them: yea the 
Lutherans and Hussites will publiquely neglect yo
u
, and respect Saxonie as the 
defender of their libtertie; nay there are some that haue deemed it fitt yo
u
 should 
be crowned and killed, as Cicero said of Augustus that he was to be praysed and 
taken away: doe not yo
u








 may clearly see these thinges looke upon yo
ur
 cosen Maurice and 
the Hollanders: none within the memorie of man did euer beare [fo. 6
v
] armes for 
his countrey w
th
 greater daunger, or better successe then Maurice, noe man more 
gratious or better beloued of the cittizens: for what haue they not both said and 
done when they entertayned him triumphinge? what haue they not giuen and 
promised him, nay proffered him publiquely their naked virgins: 
Notwithstandinge all this, had he not brought to passe his mischeuious plott, he 
had bene now but a dead carkasse and Barneuelt should haue raigned. The cause 
is the deadly strife betwene libertie and kindome: The same case is now in 
Bohemia; yo
u
 desire to be a kinge absolutely, and not in appearance and that they 
should all become yo
ur 
subiects, they desire to be most free, and that the kinge 
should haue power to doe nothinge but what likes them. Whilest therefore they 
require immoderate lib[er]ty and to domineere ouer their kinges, yo
u
 ^expect^ 
obedience from them not by entreatie but co[m]maund; it cannot be but fact[i]on 
and quarrell should arise amongest yo
u
, as now we see in the Lowcountreys 
where all thynges are tried, neither is there any power found equall to the hatred 
of the multitude: Therefore it were better to bringe all the Lowcountreys into 
servitude, then to hould [fo. 7
r







 course now is happily begune, by chaunginge the magistrates ancordinge to 
the condicion of the Tymes. 
 
12: I come to yo
ur




 will hardlie finde to be soe, if yo
u
 shall 
iudge the Bohemians to be none. Gabor of Transiluania is noe frinde of yo
urs
, but 





whiles hee thrusts yo
u
 vpon daungers, he may enioy and defend Hungaria: He 
likewise affected the kingdome of Bohemia, but when his hopes fayled him, he 




 in that pray, but as speedily as he 
came, what he lett goe against his will, he will endevo
ur
 to recover w
th
 all his 
power: he makes his braggs that yo
u
 were made a kinge by his ^meanes^ and 
expects recompence: he knowes well that he cannot defend Hungarie against the 
Turkes, Tartars, venetians, Pollands and the Hungarians themselues, but by the 
helpe of other kingdomes and Provinces: And therfore he supposes not without 
reason Bohemia and the dominions ther unto belonginge to be necessarie for his 
crowne. And sithens the nobilitie or states of Bohemia [fo. 7
r
] doe challenge to 
themselues the right of electinge a kinge, it will be now great difficultie for 
Gabor by flattorie and faire words, to bringe them to his opinion, and then will 




 have done to Fardinand, and he to the howse of Austria: yea 
if the Emperour will give him Hungarie in fee, vnlesse he hath lest his ould 
woont, he will be ready w
th
 all his forces to restore Bohemia to the howse of 
Austria.  
 
Much lesse can yo
u
 esteeme the Turke yo
ur
 faithfull friende; hee will sitt still and 
w
th
 a great deale of pleasure looke vpon yo
ur
 quarells: Both the conquero
ur
 and 
the conquered shall be his prey: soe the Rammes contend the woolfe lookinge on 
and gapinge to devoure them: soe the cockes fight wilest the Eagle reioyces. It is 
an axiome of the Turkes, to hould frindshippe w
th
 no christian but for profitt 
sake: Turne ouer all the annalles and histories, and yo
u
 shall finde he never aydes 
any in the warres whom he did not bringe into miserable servitude and slaverie, 
he measures his faith onely by his faine and profitt. He hath longe sought to 
wynne Hungarie with the expence of many mens lives [fo. 8
r
] and much wealth. 
but what he could never by force obtayne, processe of tyme may purchase him 
freely w
th
out bloud or charge: he possesses Hungarie by his faithfull vassall, 
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receaved tribute from him; he hath power to bringe an Army into Morauia, 
Bohemia and Silesia, and if he doe itt not soddenly yet yo
u
 will ever be afraid of 
it, and must ever expect it, for Gabriell^or^ by his helpe gott Transiluania, and 
by his power enioyes Hungarie. The Basshaes have an Army ready at his call to 
take citties for caution and pledge, as they did Lippa in Transiluania: And can 
yo
u
 hope that the Turke will not hould on his vsuall custome? why hath he soe 
daungerousely, treacherousely and cruelly, disquieted the gouernment of 
Germany, if yo
u
 thinke he will now suffer yo
u
 to reigne in quietnes. 
But suppose he keepe his promise, yet ought not yo
u
 to trust him; because 





 have already sent to Constantinople, in part are now p[re]paringe, and 
the great guifts wherwith yo
u
 hope to demerite the Turkes, and tokens of yo
ur
 
subiection, but noe assurance of yo
ur
 securitie. This also is a most miserable 
thinge, that [fo. 8
v
] whensoever it shall please him to breake his faith, yo
ur
 
kingdome must fall into his handes: or if hee call yo
u
 to his highnes court, yo
u
 
must presently goe. If he co[m]maund yo
u




 his against any 
christian Prince, yo
u
 will be forced to doe itt: as also yo
ur
 Gabor did, some two 
yeares past, sendinge his Army against the Polonian, vnder the conduct of 
Schender Bassa. Neither should it seeme strange vnto yo
u
 if the Turke breake his 




 selfe, for the winninge of a 
kingdome have soe many wayes broken yo
ur
 oth and promise, and left sufficient 
Testimonie therof against yo
ur
 selfe. And I am perswaded when yo
u
 and 
Gabriell^or^ shall thinke yo
ur
 selues most happy: yo
u
 shall find the Turke yo
ur
 
mortall Enemie. For hitherto the Turke hath laboured this onely, to settle his 
owne estate by dissention of the Christians. But now if he shall find that yo
u
, 
Gabriel, the venetians, and certaine Princes of Germanie are united together? he 
will feare yo
u
, and when yo
u
 have beaten the Austrians: he will breake yo
ur
 
amitie, and lett vpon each of yo
u
 apart: and will destroy yo
u
 by the helpe of 







 Those thinges w
ch
 I have lightly touched before concerninge the Turkes 
and yo
ur
 Transiluanian Gabor, it is not amisse for yo
u





 may easily vnderstand by the coppies of his letters faithfully transcribed out 
of the Originall: Out of them I say, yo
u
 may learne the Art of dealinge w
th
 the 
Turkes. Neither be yo
u
 ashamed, or lett it greive yo
u
, beinge but a scholer in the 
schools to learne of him w
ch
 is a beaten souldio
ur
 and hath spent a good part of 
his tyme of riper yeares among the Turkes, and yo
u
 shall also playnly perceiue, to 
what marke Gabor doth direct all his cares and cogitations. But that yo
u
 may 
more easily vnderstand those thinges w
ch
 are contayned in the former letters, yo
u
 
ought to know, that this yo
ur
 Gabriell, against his owne Prince and Lord brought 
a mightie Army of the Turkes into the very hart of Transiluania, w
ch
 beinge 
miserably spoyled and wasted, and Gabriell Bathore being slayne he settled the 
Principalitie vpon himselfe: but the Turkes leadinge into miserable bondage 
many thousands of the christians departed out of Transiluania. And to discharge 
the reward w
ch
 he had promised to the Turkes, for the service they [fo. 9
v
] had 
done him, gatheringe together all the power of Transiluania, he mad warre 
against his owne bloud and kindred, mindinge to give ouer into the hands of the 
Turkes those forces w
ch
 he had promised, and were a stronge defence for the state 
of Christendome. Which villany the garison soldio
urs
 vtterly detestinge, would 
not yeald vnto. But their walles beinge beaten and cast downe w
th
 the Cannon, 
First of all Lippa w
ch
 was defended w
th
 a stronge wall and two Castles, after that 
Solynos, Eperies, Tovaraggia, Margita, Monostor, Arad, Syri, Faesat, were 
taken and given up to the Turkes, and by his meanes onely a greater part of 
Hungarie was gott by the Turkes, then they had bene able to winne in the tyme of 
16. yeares warre: After this worthy art, (that is the entrallinge of the cheefe part 
of a noble province to the slaverie of the Turkes) he writes his former letters to 
the vezir Nakas Hasen Bassa, from his Tentes. The latter, whence, and vpon 
what occasion they were written, yo
u
 shall after vnderstand out of the letters 
themselues.  
The copie of the letters of Bethlem Gabor to the vezir Nakas Hesen Bassa. 
[fo. 10r] 
                                                 
1388
 Given in catchword, but not in body text.  
 
 371 
Most worthie and most magnificent Vezir Bassa, my most noble and honorable 
lord, God ever preserue and make fortunate yo
ur
 magnificence, and prolonginge 
yo
ur
 tyme from one day to many thousand, encrease yo
ur
 prosperitie in the service 
of the mightie and victorious Cesar, For many yeares past there have bene 
certaine variances and debates, betwene our most mighty and victorious 
Emperour and the kindome of Transiluania vpon the takinge and not restoring 
backe the towne of Lippa. I cannot denie there are many iust and evident causes, 
why neither the kingdome, nor the Princes therof could to this day be brought to 
restore the same. For since the tyme the progenito
urs
 of the ancient Hungarians 
lovinge Scythia, First gott this kingdome, destroyinge the ancient inhabitantes 
therof w
th
 the sword, it was never heard or read by any man, that the Hungarians, 
did freely give backe vnto any man (I say not Fortes, citties, or whole countreys) 
but soe much as one handfull of ground, without battayle, and much slaughter 
and effusion of bloud. [fo. 10
v
] And since the tyme of Ottoman made warre 
against the Hungarians, in whatsoeu[er] sort, howe great soever the siege and 
assault were, they never yealded themselues, but rather fought it out to the last 
man in defence of thier countrey. witnes wherof Alba greca, Temesuar, Gyula 
Szigetum, Now by our Actions and assured fidelitie, toward the most mightie 
Emperour beinge throughly declared, the state of thinges is much altered For to 
the end we might fully manifest our certaine fidelitie to the mightie Emperour, 
by restoringe the castle of Lippa, (notwithstandinge the practises of many w
ch
 
were of the Germane faction, to go ther w
th
 the rebellion of the Garison 
souldio[urs], and the manifold difficulties ariseninge to our army wee tooke the 
cittie by assault and after wanne the Castle by strong hand, although w[th] the 
expence of much bloud and losse of the liues of many worthy souldio
urs
, that by 
this meanes we might declare our great affection to the most mighty Emperour. 
In this meane tyme, though vnder pretence of peace, many rich guiftes were 
presented [fo. 11
r
] to the most mighty Emperour from the Germans: yet on the 
contrarie they sent George Homonnay into Transiluania, and Sorban Wayuorls 
into Walachia w
th
 a stronge Army. They sent also against vs a great army to 
succo
ur
 the castle of Lippa, at request of the Garison therof, to prevent that we 
might not deliver it vp to the most mightie Emperour. But we by great marches 
prevented their co[m]minge, and had newly taken the towne when these succo
urs
 







 by the favo
ur
 of god we happily overcame them both. And soe havinge 
taken the castle, and thrust out the Garison that was therin, according to the 
appointment of the most mightie Emperour, we resigned itt vp into the hands of 
worthy and magnificent Mehmet Bassa Beglerbeg of Temesuaria. For this 
declaration of o
ur
 assured fidelitie, worthie to be kept in perpetuall memorie, the 
like wherof no man till this day either of the whole nation of Hungary, 
peradventure neither of any other countrey hath ever shewed before. In requitall 
wherof, what [fo. 11
v
] gentle protection, what plenty of wealth, wee might 
deservedly expect, from our most milde and most honorable Emperour, what 
favo
ur
 and friendshippe from his vezirs, what thankefullnes from the whole 
Musulman nation, that wee commit to the iudgment, First of the most mighty 
god, and after to the censure of the whole world. Such and soe great service have 
we performed, w
th
 the daunger and adventure of our owne life, and w
th
 the bloud 
of soe many brave and worthy souldio
urs
, endevoringe by this meanes to demerit 
the grace and favo
ur
 of the most mightie Emperour. Our orator w
ch
 is the^ir^ 




 the course of this whole 
busines, and w
th
 our dimaundes w
ch
 we have presented to the most mighty 
Emperour: most ernestly desiringe yo
ur







iust requests, the w
ch
 wee together w
th





thankfullnes to demerite. God longe preserue yo
ur
 magnificence in safetie. Given 
from our Tentes at the Castle of Lippa the 14. day of June 1616. 
Yo
ur
 magnificente affectionat  





The second letter of Bethlem Gabor  
to Schender Bassa. 
Most worthy and magnificent Bassa, God poure downe vpon yo
ur
 magnificence 
plentie of all good thinges. How sincerely and brotherly w
th
 what thankfull and 
louing affection I haue euer endeuored to doe yo
ur
 magnificence seruice the most 
mighty god is my witnes yet know I not for what desert of mind, yo
ur
 
magnificence at the most famous Court and other whom hath layd many snares 
tendinge to my destruction, from the w
ch
 god hitherto hath protected me, that I 
haue not fallen into them. I neuer offended against yo
ur
 magnificence, but rather 
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as farre as was in my power I euer laboured to demerite yo
u
, and was almost yo
ur
 
tributarie seruant. For euery yeare I must pay vnto yo
ur
 magnificence many great 
guifts, as Cloth of siluer, ready money, Salt: whereof I can bringe forth many 
witnesse when tyme shall serue, wherby the noble Court shall knowe how 
miserably yo
ur
 magnificence doth spoule the Countrey of Transiluania; yo
ur
 
magnifience hath euer giuen me very kind wordes to my face, and also before the 
Embassado
rs




 vnto me w
ch





power to procure my destruction. 
Witherto I have dissembled all those thinges. Yesterday I receaued the letters 
wherby yo
ur
 magnificence, since my departure out of Transiluania, sturred vp the 
Saxons, the w
ch
 havinge read I could not but marvaule that as yett yo
ur
 
magnificence ceaseth not from yo
ur
 practises against Transiluania. I would have 
yo
u
 knowe that we have not deposed or sett aside all care of Transiluania. 
Wherefore I would entreat yo
ur
 magnificence to desist from such practises and 
that henceforth ye write not into Transiluania; Assuringe yo
ur
 selfe that by such 
meanes as hitherto ye have practised yo
u
 cannot effect what ye entend. I meddle 
not w
th
 such busines as belonges to yo
ur
 magnificence sith it appertaynes not to 
^me^ by office: neither would I that yo
ur
 magnificence should take vpon you to 
order such thinges as belonge vnto me, sith in this behalfe nothinge is Committed 
to yo
ur
 Charge.  
I would wishe yo
ur
 magnificence to be p[er]swaded, that I thinke my selfe a 
servitor to the [fo. 13
r
] Emperour my kind lord, equall to yo
ur
 magnificence. I 
have served, and to this day doe serve his highnes w
th
 all faithfullnes, w
ch
 latly I 
have manifested. For I have brought the whole state of Hungary, into the same 
subiection to his highnes, as I have done Transiluania. Each of them at this tyme, 
together w
th
 my selfe, and his faithfull sevauntes. I remaine now at Polonium in 
the kingdome of Hungarie, the Crowne is in my handes thankes be to you: W
th
in 
10. dayes they minde to Choose themselves a kinge. The whole Army of 
Ferdinand assembles together were aboue threescore thousand, we fought w
th
 
them before the bridge of Vienna: The mightie god vnder the Conduct of the 
myghtie Emperour gave vs the victorie. Wee overthewe our Enemies and droue 
them beyond the Dauane. We haue shutt vp Vienna. Now we minde to passe 
over our Army to fight w
th
 them againe. And (by the favo
ur
 of god) Vienna it 
selfe, in short tyme shall be in o
ur
 power. I have brought the kingdome of 
 
 374 
Bohemia, the kingdome of Morauia, the kingdome of Silesia to be frinds and 
well affected to the most mighty Emperour: their Armies are ioyned w
th
 me. 




 their guiftes to his mighty Court: 
while [fo. 13
v
] in this sort I serue our most mighty lord, yo
ur
 magnificence 
laboreth vnderhand to withdrawe my subiectes from me, to put them in rebellion, 
for w
ch
 I renounce all service vnto yo
u




 magnificence. From 
Polonium the 4. Of november 1619.  
 
15: These are many causes why yo
u
 should not thinke the venetians to be yo
ur
 
freindes. First their state is Aristocraticall, they have a Prince onely in showe, the 
people they vtterly neglect, their Patricians they onely reckon fitt to governe. 
Therfore their state is naturally ill affected to a Monarchie. Neither doe I thinke it 
fitt for yo
ur
 nobilitie to have any familiaritie w
th
 the venetians, for from them they 
learne the loue of libertie and the hate of Principalitie. Secondly the venetians are 
evill neighbo
urs
, they keepe peace w
th
 none of the Italians. They are frinds to 
none of theire neighbo
urs
, but ielous of them all, w
ch
 they lately shewed in the 
warre of Gradisca, wherin they were forced to looke for ayd out of Holland and 
other places. Assure yo
ur
 selfe they will be noe freindes to yo
u
. Thirdly, both of 
yo
u
 studie to encrease yo
ur







, there can be noe peace of continuance [fo. 14
r
] 
betweene Corrivales. The cause why they now flatter yo
u
 and send Gabriell is, 
for that by yo
ur
 meanes and charges they hope to weaken the house of Austria, 
whose greatnes they envie, desiringe to have noe neighbo
ur
 whom they may 
feare. Soe that if yo
ur
 or Gabriells power growe so greate soe that they may feare 
itt they will by all meanes oppose yo
u
.  
Heretofore they labored to cutt of the trade of the Portingals into the East Indies. 
For they envie all that are myghtier then themselves. They flatter and beare w
th
 
the Turke though they are opprest and spoyled by him. To conclud suppose that 
all things fall out to Gabriell accordinge to his will, and give it that by helpe of 
the Turkish forces he wynne from the Emperour Styria and the rest and ioyne 
them to the kingdome of Hungarie, then of necessitie will the peace betwene him 
and the venetians be broken. Bee assured if thinges come to that state, Gabor will 
demaund of the venetians, such places as heretofore they wrongfully (takinge the 
occasion of other mens misorie) took from the kinges of Hungarie being oversett 
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by the Turkes. But suppose, that [fo. 14
v
] hee will not reviue auncient quarrells, 
yet assuredly he will not neglect the present. It is all one to the venetians whether 
Hungarie, Transiluania, Styria, Carinthia and Austria be united together, or 
whether they be made subiect and tributarie to the Turke. And then will the noble 
Cittie of Venice subsist or perishe at the will and plesure of the Turkes Court, 
when against two mightie Enemies by land and by sea they shall find none to 
help them: all w
ch
 is so much to be feared, as it may not be hoped, that the Turke 
or Gabriell (occasion of encresinge their owne estate beinge offered) will never 
want a Colorable pretence to breake their leage as though he would not offer to 
the venetian that w
ch
 he hath often done to the Emperour. Neither can the 
venetians be ignorant of these thinges, but that out of envie w
ch
 they beare to the 
howse of Austria, they reckon not of the danger w
ch
 futurely may fall out. For 
nothing is more powerfull then Envie w
ch




 may repose some hope and Confidence in [fo. 15
u
] the Prince and Citties 






 when it is ended, 
each man will follow his owne busines. All of them looke to thier owne securitie 
and advauncem[ent], w
ch
 must be made good out of the Clergie mens livinges, 
for there is nothinge els for yo
u
 to bestowe vpon them. w
ch
 hope fallinge short, 
when those liveinges are bestowed, those w
ch
 are not satisfied, will fall to hate 
yo
u
. For in this division, accordinge to lawe, yo
u




 brother and ^to^ so many Palatines w
ch
 are in want. The Citties 
also, out of desert, will looke for their reward, they loue not to lay out their 
money w
th
out consideration, Futhermore the free Citties w
ch
 are neare adioyninge 
will stand in awe of yo
u
, I meane Wormes, Spire, Francofurt. And if yo
u
 shall 
growe somewhat greater, Norimberg also and Vlme will begin to feare yo
u
, 
persuadinge themselues that yo
u
 will rule over them, or at the least may if yo
u
 
please. For the weaker never Consider what the stronger ought to doe, but what 
he is able to doe. Thirdly dissentions and variances, vpon light occasions, fall out 
betwene Princes. Many Citties greatly hate their Senate. And there is noe 
question, the feare of the Emperour [fo. 15
v
] beinge taken away, but that the 
Cittzens w
ch
 have bene hardly vsed by their Senate, will either thrust them out, or 
kill them. Lately Francofurt, Wormes Norimberg were vpon the like 
Co[m]motion soe will yo
ur






 must depend very Causiously vpon the freindshippe of the Hollanders, 
except it fall out that Maurice bringe them to his subiection. There fell out, some 
two yeares past a varience betwene yo
ur
 father ^in^ lawe of Britaine and them. 
They hate yo
ur
 Cosen Maurice, because they suspect, and not w
th
out cause, that 
he goes about to sett vp his owne Principallitie: and yo
u
 also began to be 
suspected of the same matter. But because they mortally hate the Spaniard, 
therfore will they helpe yo
u
: Conditionally notwithstandinge, vpon this hope, that 
in requitall of this ayd w
ch




 will assist them to the 
Conquest of all Europe, whereto they aspire w
th
 all their might and skill. And, if I 
be not deceaved, it is to bee feared, that from thence may arise some danger of ill 
to yo
ur





18: Consider then that yo
u
 are but a newe kinge, and soe assuredly vnder yoe the 
enmitie of many Princes and haue but a fewe frindes, and therefore yo
u
 must doe 








 know what is to be done: And though yo
u
 be wise of yo
ur
selfe, and 
haue some subtile and craftie Councello
rs
: yet of this aduice of o
urs
 may doe yo
u
 




 haue made yo
ur
selfe stronge, by two meanes, wise 
Counterfeitinge and dissembling: and speedie execution. The former is now lost 
and gone: therfore yo
u
 must rest vpon the latter. By Counterfeitinge and 
dissemblinge yo
u
 can now deceaue noe man of Europe. Therfore I would aduise 
yo
u
 to leaue of that will doe yo
u
 noe good. Yo
ur
 letters are yet extant, soe 
Curtious, soe freindly, soe farre from all ambition: that might persuade himselfe 
they proceeded from vertue it selfe, and from plaine simplicitie.  
In the meane tyme there is a league made w
th
 the Hollanders, the Venetians, the 
Turke, w
th
 Gabriell and w
th
 all that had [fo. 16
v
] any power to hurt or helpe. The 
Bohemians soddainly rebell, the Sisesians, Morauians, Austrians revolt, and 
there ariseth out of the seven hills a newe Enemie as it were out of an Engin. I 
have herd it vpon good intelligence that neither the Emperour nor the Papist 
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Princes did ever believe that yo
u





 did persist in yo
ur
 dissimulation and the busines went fairely on. I 
thinke the Papists themselues did believe yo
u
 excluded the Emperour out of 
Bohemia, for love. But in good earnest doe not imagine that there is any Papist 
soe stuped as to thinke there is any credit to be geiven to yo
u
 if they say they 
beleeve yo
u
 they forsweare themselves to doe yo
u
 aduersetie. I speake thus much 
to lett yo
u
 know, that dissimulation the groser it is, the more it doth exasperate 
hatred. It is a hatefull thinge to goe about to foole yo
ur
 fellow princes in this 
fashion. For they all know and have the Bohemians owne letters to showe, that 
Gabriell hath bene solicited for ayde and the Turke also himselfe, by whose 
meanes the [fo. 17
r
] Polonian hath bene diverted from infestinge Silesia. 
Wherefore then doe yo
u
 call him an Enemie, and make such a showe of 
detestinge him, when he is yo
ur
 good Lord, by whose power, authoritie and 
furtherance yo
u
 have gayned a kingdome. Without his p[er]mission, neither could 
Gabriell assist yo
u
, nor the Polonian be diverted nor yo
u





selfe into his protection, have given assurance to be his 
frinde by sundry Embassages w
th
 many and large offers, and that all the world 
knowes this to be true, I thinke it is a thinge not fitt to be deemed. Our 
Hollanders laughed at Bethlem when he talked of fortifyinge his borders against 
the Turke, knowinge that he of his owne accord in the midst of his kingdome had 
deliuered vp vnto the Turke Lippa and divers other stronge places, w
ch
 he had 
taken by force, that in his hart he is a Turke, that he hath vndertaken by his letters 
and negotiations w
th
 the Turkes, to subdue Vienna vnto the Turkish yoke. 




 credit and a^u^thoritie to professe yo
ur
 selfe 
a confederate of the Turke and threten to bringe him in. [fo. 17
v
] It is true the 
Citties of Germany will hardly digest this, but what imports it: Confesse boldly 
and mayntaine that to be well done w
ch
 cannot be denied to be done.  
 




 make in the latter part of yo
ur
 
declaration. For it is noe sufficient reason to satisfie any man to say, It is lawefull 
to seze of an other mans kingdome, because thou is a certaine sort of men 
sufforde to live there, that are seducers of greate Princes. For if such quarells as 




22: Wherfore it is yo
ur
 best to proceed w
th
 the other pollicy and yo
u
 are like 
inough to preuayle, I meane Celeritie. As it was well done of yo
u
, at the very 
instant of yo
ur
 Coronation to pursue the Enemie at the heeles in Bohemia, 
Moravia, Hungaria, Austria: if yo
u
 can follow the victorie in this maner, the 
Emperour will not haue a foote of ground left him in Germany w
th
in a few 
monethes. Make one victorie [fo. 18
r
] a stoppe vnto an other. And looke 
especially to this, that yo
u
 giue them noe tyme of breathinge. Detayne the 
Tenthes, for in yealdinge them yo
u





 shall appear confident. Possesse yo
ur
 selfe of all before 
the next springe. Yo
u




 shall gett 
riches and renoune, and yo
u
 shall want noe followers. The springe is to be feared, 
but yo
ur




 men and money, in due tyme. 







standinge that the state or successe of yo
ur
 affaires at any tyme should giue 
yo
u
 occasion of rest and Cessition. For know that there is nothinge can be more 
dangerous for yo
u
 then securitie. Wherfore proceed bouldly, solicite all men, 
studie howe to gaine the French, and all the rest. Be alwayes vpon some newe 
exploit, that may argue yo
u
 to be still in hart, make soddayne irruptions, whene 
yo
u
 were neuer lookt for.  
 
23: Further this one point yo
u
 must remember, [fo. 18
v
] Either all or nothinge, we 
haue alway sayd this, that if you desire to get any one peece of the Austrian 
dominion if it be but one towne of ^any^ Bishoprike, yo
u





 selfe Emperour, then as a priuate Prince Elector defend a 






 one part, yo
u
 shall be depriued 
of that by those that hould the possession of the rest. If yo
u
 take the Tigres whelp 




 Catch both yo
u
 shall enioye yo
ur
 prey quietly. A 
kingdome cannot be deuided, wholy possessed it may be, Germany cannot 
endure two sonnes.  
 
24: These thinges I aduise yo
u
 in generalitie. It resteth that I put yo
u
 in minde 
how yo
u
 are to deale w
th
 the particulars, and first w
th
 the Emperour. The 
Emperour you must entertayne w
th
 Curteous and smoth language, entreate him to 
resigne his kindomes, to acknowledge yo
u 
for his sonne, not to trouble his poore 
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afflicted subiects nor to give credit to the Jesuites. And so that purpose yo
u
 have 




 Father of Britannies Embassador, havinge 
first dealt w
th
 him to make some hopefull presentation of peace and Concord in 
fair and ample wordes. In the meane tyme yo
ur
 must vse all yo
ur
 Cunning to 
bringe the Emperour into yo
ur
 power. For soe yo
u
 shall quickly compas to be 
Chosen kinge of the Romans. But there is one thinge yo
u
 must consider, w
ch
 I 
spoke of in the seventh article, yo
u
 must not drive the Austrians into 
desperac[i]on, vnlesse yo
u
 can both Catch them and kill them at once. For 
extreame desperation is oftentimes the cause of victory. furie will alwayes finde 
weapons and they will finde an Enemie for yo
u
 sundry wayes. So vast a body 
cannot fall w
th
out great noyce and the ruyne of many others. It is to be feared 
least if they once perceaue they cannot defend their owne, they will Choose 
rather to yeald. Those thinges they hould to any other rather then to their Enemie. 
Neither can yo
u




selfe to e^n^large yo
ur
 domination, 
haue entred into a league w
th
 the Turke and opened him away into Germany, 
what [fo. 19
v
] may not they doe for their saftie, or their honour or at least for 
revenge sake.  
 
25: With the Romanists, that is w
th
 the Pope, the Bishoppes and the rest of the 
Clergie you must deale moderatly, yet if yo
u
 have taken any thinge from them it 
is yo
ur
 best to hould it lest it may seeme to have bene done inconsiderately and 
lightly.  
All this kinde of people in Germany are given to their ease, if yo
u
 feed them, vse 
them gently and observe them, they will never stirre. As there are some kinde of 
animalls that whiles their mangers be full lye downe by it and sleepe, but if they 
once begin to be pincht w
th
 hunger they wax enraged. Soe it is w
th
 those, if they 
levie souldio
urs
, let it not trouble yo
u
, though they should have an Army twise soe 
great and soe good as yo
urs
, they will never hurt yo
u
, they will kee[p]e it vp 
w
th
out doinge any thinge till they have consumed themselues and their freindes 
and at last will cast themseluves into yo
ur
 protection: But if you [fo. 20
r
] force 
them vnto desperation, they will finde wayes of revenge, w
ch
 they will prosecute 
vnto death. Brute beasts will also fight for thier meate. It is to be feared lest they 
should yeald themselues into the hands of some powerfull Princes, least they 
should laye their estates to pawne, least they should call in the French, least they 
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should doe other thinges wherof it hath bene sufficiently spoken before. For such 
is their power as they can if they will rayse greter forces then yo
urs
 and pay them 
better: and it is likely they will when they shall finde themselues pressed by 
necessitie, w
ch
 is the sharpest spurre that is either too good or bad actions. 
Wherefore let this be yo
ur
 care to gaine vnto yo
ur
 party their Councello
urs
, their 
Cannons, and men of quality that are about them. For they have all of them some 
officers and sometymes even their Captains of the reformed religion, by whose 
meanes yo
u
 may be acquainted w
th
 all their designes. When yo
u
 have besett them 
w
th
 these false ministers that they can call in noe foraine succors, by falling 
soddenly vpon them, yo
u
 may easily put [fo. 20
v
] them downe and make yo
ur
selfe 
master of such a masse of riches as will strike a terro
ur
 into all men. This is 





 have done vpon them. yo
u
 must beware of extremity. If the 
venetians have bene of such excessiue charges to oppresse the howse of Austria, 
what will not the Romane Cardinalls doe, to save themselues? Of the expedition 
of Italy yo
u
 must not suffer a word to be spoken, for that busines must be 
soddainely acted and ex improviso.  
 
26: With the great Emperour of the Turkes the matter hath bene alredy well 




 Father, of the venetians, and of the 
Hollanders, that he should not take it in ill part to be stiled an Enemie in yo
ur
 
Patents. For there is noe other forme to be vsed to procure him frindes in 
Germany. In the meane tyme yo
u
 must not take yo
ur
selfe to be free from all 
daunger of him. He will not presse yo
u
 very [...] to have stronge [fo. 21
r
] places 
in Moravia assigned him, before yo
u
 be invested in the Roman Empire. And till 
that tyme yo
u
 may deferre the suppression of the Lutherans, whom afterwards 
when yo
ur
 affayres are firmely setled, yo
u
 may easily and comodiously exturpe. 
In the meane tyme, I can scarsly see anyway how you may be secured from the 
Turke. If yo
u





 the forces of Germany, and w
th
all perswade Gabriell to relinqishe 
the Othomanik vassalage, yo
u
 might noe doubt be able to resist the Turke. But 
Gabriells deseignes doe now rather tend to subdue as many as he can to the 
Turkish subiection and to enlarge and establish the bondes of his Monarchy, 





 remayne in this feare, yo
u
 must worke by all meanes to winne the 
Basshaes and those purple Courtiers to be yo
urs
 and espeacially to oblige them by 
mony. For by way of presentes yo
u
 shall obtayne any thinge of them, though yo
u
 
were an Enemie. [fo. 21
r
] For it fallesth out often in gret kingdomes that some 
Councello
urs
 can doe more then the Prince himselfe. In the meane tyme yo
u
 must 
entertayne the Turkes w[th] fayre Complements and large promises but 







 must manage in such sort as yo
u
 may have them in 
subiection and that they may Choose yo
ur
 sonnes and the sonnes of yo
ur
 sonnes 
for their kinges. For it were a great folly in yo
u
 to Cast yo
ur
 selfe into the 
Combustion of a warre to purchase therby to yo
ur
 posteritie in steed of a 
kingdome nothinge but Envie for their inheritance. It is not like they will make 
these elections of themselues and though yo
u
 may have some hope they will, yet 
it is the part of a wise man by his owne foresight to provide for himselfe, and not 
to depend on the turbulent factions of an assembly. yo
u
 shall bringe them into 
yo
ur
 subiection by dissemblinge, [fo. 22
r
] by advauncinge some, by removinge 
others. By dissemblinge as by fayninge an absolute securitie and confidence in 
such sort as ^noe^ man may have cause to suspect yo
ur
 purpose. Lett Tiberius be 
yo
ur
 schoole-master in this point, who vsed to bestoe extraordinary favo
urs
 on 
those that he ment to overthrowe and after when they were by this meanes out of 
all feare and daunger he easily oppressed them. For it is co[m]monly observed, 
that there are very few that can cary the hono
urs
 that their fortune layeth vpon 
them w
th
 moderation but that they will be still labouringe to rise higher then is 
befittinge them.  
By advauncinge yo
ur
 frindes, and also yo
ur
 Enemies, but these last yo
u
 may raise 
the higher, that their fall may be the greter. It is an easie way of overcominge a 
mans Enemie to trayne him to some place of highth from whence it is likely he 
should tumble downe. Britanny and the lowcountreys have advaunced many 





 frinds that yo
u
 thinke [fo. 22
v
] assured to yo
u
, advaunce those 
that yo
u




28: Concerninge the point of removinge. The men fitt to be be removed are those 
of bould spirit, those of contrarie religion, those that affect little more then will 
stand well w
th
 the nature of a kingdome; The bould and violent spirits must be 
lookt vnto, because they are co[m]monly popular and thought to be 
magnanimious, but the securitie of kinges consisteth in the submission and 
basines of their subiects. The examples hereof are Co[m]mon.  
The Lutherans and Hussites yo
u
 must suppresse as they have done the Puritans 
and Lutherans in England. The Papists and Anabaptists are able to doe nothinge, 
for they are alredy sufficiently worne out. The Lutherans stand vpon equall 
termes w
th
 the Reformitans, they vaunt their Saxon, and are supported by 
forrayners, wherfore yo
u
 must reduce them into conformity as the Arminians 









 desire to be ridde of, is vnder colour of 
doinge them hono
ur
 to put them vpon magnificent and expensiue employments. 
yo
u
 must send Thurn Embassador into Brittany, who soe longe as his liues in 
Bohemia will alwayes be more powerfull then yo
ur
selfe. And send away 
Mansfield to some other place  
Another maner there is by way of accusers, to bringe actions against them, and 
draw them into question by Calumniations. wher there is dissention ther will 




selfe must stirre vp dissentions and quarells 
amongest them. The lovers of libertie and imperious and unruly spirits yo
u
 must 
strive to pull downe by all maner of plotts and inventions possible, yo
u
 have a 




 all the power they 
had, could not take away the life of Barnevelt, and yet there was a necessitie it 
should be done, but the busines was soe Cunninglie handled that he had his 
throate cutt by the states themselues.  
 
[fo. 23v]  
30: All the danger yo
u
 stand in, depends on the nobilitie of yo
ur
 kingedome. For 





must hould. there are three states in Bohemia, of the lords, of the Contry, and of 
the Burgers. Amongest those there is amost fierce and sharpe Emulation. The 
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Burgers are in a maner contemned. yo
ur
 way is first to sett vpon the Lordes, that 
is the Countes and Barons, then the Gentrie, and lastly to deprive the Burgers of 
their priviledges and rightes. The Lordes are for the most part to be cut of; And 
thinke not that strange for it is a precept of regalites, to cut of to ^the^ heads of 
those plantes w
ch
 overtop their fellowes. Vnles yo
u
 cutt them, yo
u
 will be cut yo
ur
 
selfe. First handle the matter soe, by the mediation of fitt instruments, that those 
w
ch






, may be so animated w
th
 great hopes that they 
may thervpon grow proud and begine to contemne and wrong their equalls and 
therby become adious [sic] vnto them. Then procure some differncs [sic] or 




 may take 
occasion to cut them of. In the meane tyme favo
ur
 and Counte^u^nce the Citties 
vntill yo
u
 have put downe the Gentry, to w
ch
 busines they will willingly lend their 
helpinge hands. For so long as the nobilitie doth florish, yo
u
 shall raigne but by 
way of Curtesie. They beinge once oppressed yo
u
 must fall vpon the Citties by 
takinge the iudicature and hearinge of causes into yo
ur
 owne hands, by hearing 
the complaints of the Cittizens against the magistrates, by takinge care of them 
and by releevinge them; soe shall yo
u
 come to the sifteinge and changinge of the 
Senators as it hath bene lately practised in Holland. when yo
u







 must make the Countrey bores and poorer sort, 
whose power is popular and as it were tribunitiall of equall ranke w
th
 the 
Cittizens. And so yo
u
 shall governe absolutely and w
th
 ease accordinge to yo
ur
 
hearts desire. In a word by the death of banishm
ent
 of three hundreth of the 
nobilitie yo
u
 shall assure and establishe yo
ur
 kindome.  
 













 may master even yo
ur
 owne followers. 
Countenance the soldi
ours
. And let them be of yo
ur
 owne Germans, and be 
yo
ur
selfe their Comannder. For if yo
u
 trust a Generall to make warre for yo
u
 his 




32: Lett not the states have the disposinge of the tresure, if yo
u
 can soe worke it, 
if yo
u
 cannot tra^n^sferre it into yo
ur
 owne hands; be alwayes Cravinge, or at 
least bring it soe to passe that it may be devided, w
ch
 is a thinge yo
u










 German Princes yo
u
 must adore, To the Counts yo
u
 must be Courteous 
and effable, play and drinke w
th
 them, soe yo
u







 of the Citties yo
u
 must discourse of their Commodities. And 
because whole Senates are not to be bribed, the Syndickes and [fo. 25
r
] 




 must spare noe 
cost to assure and make them yo
urs
.  
There is one thinge I would wish yo
u
 to doe, wayte some opportunity to seze into 
yo
ur
 handes the rich Citties of Norimberg, Vlme and the rest, for w
th
 their weath 
yo
u
 shall be able to strenghten yo
ur
selfe exceedingly. I[m]mitate Julius Cesar and 
others who sacked diuerse Citties onely for the Pillage yo
u
 shall not much offend 




 will but Cast a morsell of the pray into 
their mouthes. In Holland at this present there are secret plotts in hand to bringe 
Amsterdam into Maurices power, for the welth of that Cittie is soe great as will 
suffice to mayntayne the warre for ten yeares. If yo
u
 can lay some bayte to invade 
Frankford, it will be a mervelous strengtheninge to yo
ur
 affayres, there are a 






 finde these Citties will not be catcht [fo. 25
v
] with Coyyinge and deceit, 
yo
u
 must stirre vp the Plebions and make yo
ur
selfe a Tribune of the people, and 
give out that yo
u
 come to reforme and revenge the pride, insolency wronges and 
Contumelies of the Patricians. How pleasinge this will be to Norimberg, Vlme, 
Frankford, and Wormes yo
u
 know; when yo
u
 are possessed of these Citties and 
haue made yo
ur
selfe stronge and actiue w
th
 their sinews, yo
u
 must reduce the 
Counts and others of the nobilitie into order and providently strike of the lofty 
toppes of those poppies. Till this be done yo
u
 shall be noe kinge.  
 




 the Turke be not discouered, 
lest yo
u
 be Condemned for a Catiline of yo
ur
 Countrey and a trayto
r
 to the 
German lib[er]ty. For there is noe man so ignorant but knowes it to be an 
infallible practise of the Turkish tirrany, to extirpe the Prince and nobilitie 
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Finally in a kindome where yo
u
 haue nothinge but force, yo
u
 must exercise force 
[fo. 26
r
] but mixt w
th
 Cunnyng and fraude, till yo
u
 haue gott the possession of all. 
Feare the Turke, beware of Gabriell, make ware w
th
 the Austrians, haue noe feare 





, though they be stronger then yo
u
. There are noe animalls 
that dare venter vpon the Lion, a thousan sheepe will not assayle one wolfe, nor a 
thousand Cowes one Lion. yo
u
 are a Lion, yo
u
 need not feare them, but turne yo
ur
 
forces vpon other Enemies; Gard well Moravia, p[ro]uide for yo
ur
 heires in the 
Spanish Netherlands. Wee hope for the revolt of some of those states and Citties, 
if that happen yo
ur
 affayes will stand safe. But these thinges must be done w
th
 
expedition, for all the confederates doe earnestlie wishe to see both yo
u
 Kinge of 
Germany and Maurice lord of the Lowcountrey at one tyme. If the French will 
lye still and giue vs soe much respect, the Conquest is ours. Wee haue alredy 
solicited the Princes and Citties [fo. 26
r





, to prepare themselues. We meane to cast Bullion or his sonne into the midst 
of Fraunce if we can, if not him, then some other, that will ioyne himselfe w
th
 us. 
And here I end, recommendinge vnto yo
u
 these admonitions drawen from the 
depth of the politicall art wishinge yo
u
 to lay them vp in yo
ur
 hart and to make 
happy vse and application of them in yo
ur
 actions. Others w
ch
 by dayly occasions 
shall be offered, as the tyme and state of yo
ur
 Ca^u^se shall require, I will as I 
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